China and Turkey had high hopes when Prime Minister Wen Jiabao on a 2010 visit to Ankara negotiated a strategic partnership, that envisioned Turkey helping China quell a simmering insurgency in its north-western autonomous region of Xinjiang.

The deal, a year after then Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan accused China of genocide in Xinjiang, involved a halt to Turkish support for Uighur secessionist groups. It promised mutual economic benefit and Turkish leverage at both ends of the Silk Road Economic Belt that Beijing hopes to revive across the Eurasian land mass. Together with the Maritime Silk Road in what Beijing calls the “One Belt One Road” project, this comprises a network of roads, railways, ports and pipeline that China expects will link it to the Middle East and Europe via Central, Southeast and South Asia.

High hopes

In recognition of the fact that Uighurs historically have always looked West towards their Turkic cousins rather than East at the Han Chinese, China encouraged Turkey to invest in Xinjiang on preferential terms in the hope that greater Turkish influence would dampen nationalist sentiment in the region that has been on the rise since the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Chinese expectations of Turkey’s potentially moderating influence were also reflected in China’s decision to send religious students to Turkey rather than to Islamic centres of learning in the Arab world.

Close relations were further highlighted by Ankara considering the acquisition of a Chinese surface-to-air missile system and Turkey becoming the first country in which a Chinese bank would operate an overseas business with the acquisition of Tekstilbank by Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, the world’s largest bank.

China had hoped that by enlisting Turkey it would be able to counter US support for Uighur activists that it viewed as an effort to create problems for Beijing in its own backyard. Chinese concerns have since been heightened by the fact that an estimated 300 Chinese Muslims have joined the Islamic State (IS) in Syria whose leader, Abu Bakr Al Baghdadi, described China as one of the worst violators of Muslim rights.

War of words

Those hopes now threaten to be mired in a war of words between Beijing and Ankara sparked by Uighur nationalist protests against Chinese discrimination, including a ban on fasting during Ramadan and the forced opening of restaurants during daytime fasting hours.

The ban was introduced at the tail end of a failed year-long government campaign against what it termed “terrorism” and “illegal religious activity” that involved strict controls of sermons in mosques, closure of a number of Islamic schools and restrictions on traditional dress.

Nationalist Turks see the ban that applies to government employees, students and teachers – a significant segment of the Uighur population — as the latest of a series of restrictive measures aimed at weakening Uighur identity and religiosity. Chinese authorities have defined illegal religious activity among others as refusing to shake a woman’s hand; rejection of inter-ethnic marriage; boycotting government social programmes, and closing restaurants during Ramadan. Women’s headscarves and beards are viewed with suspicion.

The measures have also sparked protests in Malaysia and Cairo. The 57-nation Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) expressed concern and called on Beijing to respect Uighurs’ religious rights. The Qatar-backed International Union of Muslim Scholars headed by prominent Islamic scholar Sheikh Yousef al-Qaradawi put out a similar, more strongly worded statement.

Turkish passions were fuelled by sensationalist reports in pro-government media of a massacre of Uighurs while fasting and others being forced to consume alcohol. These came amid domestic Turkish politicking as Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sought to forge a coalition government in the wake of last month’s parliamentary election that failed to produce an absolute majority for the ruling Justice and Democracy Party (AKP).

A pro-government newspaper, catering to nationalist sentiment, published a bloodied map of Xinjiang as part of its coverage of a visit to Beijing by a delegation from the left-wing Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), the first pro-Kurdish party to be represented in the Turkish parliament. The newspaper said the HDP had gone ahead with the visit “despite the East Turkestan torture,” a reference to Xinjiang by its Uighur and Turkic name.

Chinese policy as core driver of unrest

In response, Chinese officials have revived accusations that Turkey is encouraging Uighur radicalism. Tong Bishan of the Chinese public security ministry’s Criminal Investigation Department recently told foreign correspondents that Turkish diplomats in South-east Asia had facilitated passage of hundreds of Uighurs to Turkey from where they were being sold to IS as “cannon fodder”.

Tong was referring to the issuing of Turkish passports to 173 Uighur refugees in Thailand to prevent their return to China. The issue of Turkish passports has however become sensitive after the perpetrators of an attack last year at a train station in Kunming in Yunnan province in which 33 people were killed, were found to have been travelling on Turkish documents.

China’s focus on external forces fuelling unrest in Xinjiang was however called into a question by a clash with police last month in the ancient city of Kashgar in which 28 people died. The clash’s background suggested that Chinese policy rather than Islamist ideology may be a core driver fuelling nationalist violence.

The attackers were reportedly members of one family whose land had been confiscated and given to a Han Chinese. Impoverished, the family turned to religion, only to be tackled by authorities who forced female members to bare their hair and males to shave their beards.

The government, rather than heed warnings of the impact of Chinese policies, has sought to silence its critics. Uighur scholar Ilham Tohti warned in a lengthy article published after he was arrested last year that because Chinese policies “do not address deep-seated problems, we cannot afford to be sanguine about Xinjiang’s future, nor can we be certain that violence will not erupt again”.

Tohti’s warning appears to be something that China accepts as a principle to counter jihadism anywhere but in Xinjiang. In a recent debate on US-Chinese cooperation in the Middle East, Yang Jiemian, a senior fellow at Shanghai Institutes for International Studies, argued that “tackling root causes” was the key to combatting extremism but that “China has other ways” that include a “strong medicine with side effects”.

It is the strong medicine that threatens to complicate China’s relations with key players in the Muslim world, as seen in the protests by the OIC and global Islamic leaders as well as in countries such as Malaysia and Egypt.

This article was published at RSIS

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By Shastri Ramachandran*

The Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is a regional forum where India may not be able to have its way against Pakistan. To the contrary, Pakistan – which also became a full member of the SCO along with India on July 10 in Ufa (Russia) – may be better placed in the six-member regional grouping dominated by China and Russia.

Although both India and Pakistan have been “accepted” as full members of the SCO, the technicalities involved would take a year to be completed. For the past 10 years, India’s status in the SCO was that of observer.

The elevation to full membership entailed a price: of India (and Pakistan) being asked to give a “firm commitment” to keep bilateral disputes out of the grouping.

At a closed-door meeting of the six members before the SCO’s plenary session, Uzbekistan reportedly raised the issue that taking India and Pakistan on board meant the risk of the forum becoming “hostage” to the conflicted relationship of the two neighbours.

The case of SAARC being a permanent hostage to India-Pakistan rivalry, bickering and recriminations was brought up as a cautionary tale to impress that India-Pakistan differences prevented any regional forum from making any meaningful progress. It was then decided to ask India and Pakistan for a commitment that they would keep bilateral issues out of the SCO; and, the required commitment was duly given.

The story, as the six old and two new members know, won’t end here. For all the bonhomie on display at the SCO’s plenary where India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif addressed each other in congratulatory tones, the issues are always just below the surface. For example, India has an issue with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor that runs through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

Sharif explicitly underscored the corridor’s importance saying, “Development is linked with the prosperity of our neighbourhood. Among others, the corridor envisions construction of roads, railways and important energy projects”. Modi, for his part, stuck to generalities about peace, friendship and stability in the region.

It may be too early to read anything between the lines of Sharif seeing the SCO as a forum for Pakistan to promote peace and stability in South Asia and Afghanistan. Yet Chinese President Xi Jinping’s assurance to Sharif that India’s entry would not dilute Beijing’s special relations with Pakistan could not have been music to South Block. Xinhua quoted Xi as telling Sharif, “We will make joint effort to enrich the connotation of the China-Pakistan community of common destiny”.

Even as India is basking in the afterglow of Ufa, the much-toasted outcome of the Modi-Sharif meeting appears to be unraveling rather sooner than expected. Pakistan’s National Security Advisor Sartaj Aziz called a press conference to make the point that “no discussion will take place with India if Kashmir will not be discussed.” We will stay firm on all our primary issues, he asserted. Pointing out that the Modi-Sharif meeting was informal, Aziz said that none of the agreements were binding.

Aziz’s statements belie the expectation that “all issues connected to terrorism”, as wanted by India, would be discussed between the two countries. In fact, Pakistan appears to be reneging on its commitment to hasten the trial of the accused in the 26/11 Mumbai terror attack by saying that it needs more evidence from India.

In short, the signs in the immediate aftermath of Ufa are not good, even assuming that the Pakistani political leadership is putting out these statements for domestic consumption. Expectations that the SCO may ease India-Pakistan tensions and that China and Russia may mediate the way forward to better relations are, at this stage, premature.

Energy-rich grouping

India-Pakistan differences apart, the SCO is an energy-rich grouping where India, as a consumer, would necessarily be at the receiving end of pipelines, which would go from Central Asia through Pakistan. Which explains why Modi was emphatic about India’s policy to boost connectivity in the region. The fact that India – unlike others in the SCO – has not taken to China’s Silk ‘Road and Belt’ is another disadvantage it would have to negotiate.

The other SCO members – Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan – are firmly locked into the Belt and Road project with China at the Asia end and Russia in Europe. The Eurasian economies are racing to be integrated in the upcoming China-Russia corridor with its connectivity and infrastructure for energy, transport and IT hubs and highways. Besides, SCO observers – such as Afghanistan, Iran and Mongolia – awaiting full membership, are also closer to China, Russia and Pakistan.

The Russia-China strategic equation has political and economic depth and embraces a vast area dependent on these two powers for their development. This is a reality that India would have to come to terms with as it seeks to leverage its position in the SCO.

There are also expectations from India, which may not have been spelled out at this stage but are too obvious to be ignored. One such is that New Delhi would pay heed to China knocking at the doors of SAARC. In the event of India-Pakistan relations moving on the lines projected in Ufa with Modi eventually going to Islamabad for the SAARC summit in 2016, China’s knocks to enter SAARC would become louder. Others, in the SCO as well as in SAARC, especially Pakistan, would do everything to amplify China’s claims for its “rightful” place in SAARC.

Doubtless, this is a quid pro quo that Modi and the Ministry of External Affairs would prepare for well in advance. What would be a bigger challenge for India is taking its “due place” in the SCO whether as a “leading power”, “balancing power” or “swing power”. How India plays the Russia-China axis in driving the SCO’s 10-year development plan for intensified cooperation on security and foreign relations would be another test defining its role and efficacy in SCO.

With four nuclear weapon states in the SCO, the grouping could acquire the strategic heft to challenge the U.S.-led NATO at some stage in the future. India’s ‘natural’ inclination towards the US combined with New Delhi being overly amenable to Washington’s pressure was a hallmark of the former government’s foreign policy that remains unchanged under Modi. Such a situation clearly does not sit well with Russia and China. In fact, the Modi Sarkar’s ‘irrational exuberance’ when it comes to the US is incompatible with “Hindu nationalism” and its visions of India as an independent global power.

Regardless, right now, India enjoys enviable strategic autonomy and is wooed by all the big powers. If China and Russia want India active in SCO, BRICS and other forums, it is to prevent India from becoming a prop for the U.S. “pivot” strategy in Asia. How India sustains and uses its strategic autonomy to emerge as a force to reckon with in SCO and pursue its interests independent of U.S. pressures may be the biggest foreign policy test for Prime Minister Narendra Modi.

*This article first appeared in The Citizen and is being reproduced by arrangement with the writer, an independent political commentator.

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Algeria’s foreign exchange reserves dropped by half in the first quarter of 2015 due to the collapse in global crude oil prices, the central bank said.

In the first three months of 2015 the sales of hydrocarbons abroad reached a value of $8.7 billion, while in the sae period the previous year $15.6 billion.

The sharp drop underscores the challenge of low oil prices to the North African OPEC member, which relies on energy revenues for 60 percent of its state budget, and oil and gas exports for 95 percent of sales abroad.

The post Algeria’s Foreign Exchange Reserves Drop By Half On Lower Oil Prices appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The number of unemployed persons in Sri Lanka is estimated to be around 422,446 during the First Quarter 2015, with the unemployment rate for the First Quarter of this year at 4.7 percent, according to figures released by the Sri Lanka government.

Sri Lanka’s overall unemployment rate reported for females was 7.9 percent, while it was 2.9 percent for males. Youth unemployment rate (15 – 24 years) reported for the First Quarter was the highest, at 21.7 percent.

According to Sri Lanka Labour Force Survey results for the First Quarter of 2015 released by the Department of Census and Statistics further revealed that the unemployment among females is higher than that of males, in all age groups. Youth and female unemployment contribute more to the overall unemployment of the country.

The highest un-employment rate is reported from the G.C.E.(A/L) and above group which is about 10.1 percent. Corresponding percentages are 5.3 percent and 14.3 percent for males and females respectively. Female unemployment rates are higher than those of males in all levels of education. This further shows that the problem of unemployment is more acute in the case of educated females than educated males, which has been seen the same picture in previous survey results, the government said.

The post Sri Lanka Overall Unemployment Rate 4.7%, But Much Higher For Women appeared first on Eurasia Review.

China, Russia and the United States must cooperate on strengthening barriers against the spread of nuclear weapons.

By Richard Weitz

The most important impact of the July 14 Iran nuclear deal may be how it affects the overall pace and extent of nuclear-weapons proliferation. Supporters of the deal expect it to confirm the value of sanctions and diplomacy in limiting the spread of dangerous nuclear materials and technologies. Opponents fear that the accord’s defects will encourage other countries to pursue nuclear weapons and further weaken the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, or NPT, the main global treaty against the further militarization of nuclear technologies.

Under the terms of the deal, Iran will reduce by two-thirds its capacity to enrich uranium, export almost its entire stockpile of low-enriched uranium, convert its Fordow enrichment plant into a research center, reconfigure its plutonium reactor at Arak and accept extensive international monitoring of its nuclear facilities. In return, foreign countries will end their nuclear-related economic sanctions on Iran, release its frozen financial assets, confirm Iran’s right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes, and eventually repeal the UN arms embargo and limits on its ballistic missile program.

The agreement to freeze Iran’s nuclear-weapons program for a limited period might offer opportunities to strengthen the NPT, dispel assumptions of near-term nuclear disarmament and generate a fresh attempt to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions.

The NPT already suffered a serious blow earlier this year when, at its most recent review conference, which ran from April 27 to May 22, the 190 member governments failed to reach a consensus on the final document. Although the conference did not deal directly with the Iranian nuclear issue, one of the main reasons for the deadlock was the inability to agree on a planned conference to make the Middle East a zone free of weapons of mass destruction.

Another adverse factor preventing consensus at this year’s review conference was the decreased cooperation among Russia, China and the United States on nuclear weapons issues. Russia and China declined to support the US effort to ensure that the Middle East WMD conference had conditions that Israel, a reluctant participant, found acceptable.

Relations between the governments of Russia and China with that of the United States have clearly deteriorated over the past two years. These differences are primarily related to US resistance to Russian and Chinese regional security ambitions in Eurasia and the Asia-Pacific region, respectively, rather than nuclear issues. Shielding their trilateral nuclear cooperation from collateral damage resulting from their other differences has proven difficult.

The NPT mandates nuclear disarmament, nonproliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. To support disarmament as they eventually eliminate their own nuclear arsenals, Russia, China and the United States have agreed to rely less on nuclear weapons in the foreign and defense policies. For example, they have pledged in their military doctrines not to use nuclear strikes against other states not having nuclear weapons except in extreme circumstances.

However, while China continues to claim it will never employ nuclear weapons first and the Obama administration has been building missile defenses and strengthening US conventional forces to reduce the need for nuclear-weapons use, Russian military and political officials have over the past year repeatedly asserted their capacity and willingness to use nuclear weapons, even against states that do not have them, such as NATO members hosting US missile interceptors. Russia has also jeopardized existing arms-control agreements by violating them. More recently, Russia ignored its 1994 pledge to respect Ukrainian sovereignty in return for Kiev’s renunciation of the nuclear weapons Ukraine inherited from the Soviet Union.

In addition, the Russian and Chinese governments have been developing and deploying new nuclear-weapons delivery systems. Indeed, while Moscow and Washington have been slowing the cut back in their number of nuclear warheads in line with their bilateral arms-control requirements, China is the only legally recognized nuclear-weapons state whose nuclear arsenal is growing in terms of numbers, diversity and capabilities. Beijing pursues a policy of nuclear opaqueness that includes refusing to offer even general statements about how many nuclear warheads and delivery system the country possesses. Beijing has also refrained from joining in nuclear-arms control, citing the country’s unenforceable no-first-use doctrine.

Fortunately, despite their differences, Russia, China and the United States have stood firm in demanding that Iran forego nuclear weapons. This solidarity played no small part in compelling Tehran, which has repeatedly if unsuccessfully sought to exploit differences among the great powers, to reach this week’s nuclear-weapons deal.

However unwelcome, any practical harm from the deadlocked NPT conference could be outweighed by progress in preventing Iran and also North Korea from developing nuclear arsenals. The leading forum for these nonproliferation talks is not the bulky NPT. The great powers have established two separate and more flexible mechanisms for multilateral negotiations: the P5+1 talks for Iran and the Six-Party Talks for North Korea. The first includes Germany and the second includes Japan, both countries that have renounced nuclear weapons.

Tehran and Pyongyang represent the immediate state drivers for nuclear proliferation today. If the world can foil their nuclear-weapons aspirations, no other country beyond the existing nuclear-weapons states will likely soon have the intent and capability to acquire nuclear weapons.

Supporters of the Iran deal hope that it will lead North Korea to end its nuclear-weapons program. However, the success of the recent Iran deal is uncertain and depends on continued cooperation among Russia, China and the United States on nuclear-proliferation issues.

Despite their many differences, these three countries could pursue additional practical measures and strategies to improve their nonproliferation cooperation among themselves and with other NPT members:

First, they must implement the Iranian nuclear agreement in a mutually reinforcing manner to prevent Tehran from exploiting their differences. In particular, Russia, China and the United States must cooperate in how they enforce the accord to prevent Iranian cheating. Equally important, they must coordinate how they relax sanctions on Iran to avoid rewarding Tehran too much or too soon and thereby reduce its incentive to comply with the deal.

Regarding the NPT, Russia, China and the United States need to sustain comprehensive discussions among their officials and nongovernmental experts regarding the causes for the deadlocked 2015 review conference and how to overcome them. Although on average only half the NPT review conferences achieve a consensus on their final communique, the disagreements at this year’s conference reflected a disturbing gap in the perspectives and preferences among those states possessing nuclear weapons and those countries without them. Many of the former suggest that the barriers against nuclear proliferation are too weak, while many of the latter consider the rewards for abstention – general security assurance and civil nuclear cooperation – too small.

To address this gap, Russia, China and the United States must cooperate more effectively in countering the unrealistic demands from other NPT states. For example, many non-nuclear-weapons states profess to support a nuclear-weapons convention that would completely prohibit the production, possession and use of nuclear weapons. But achieving universal nuclear disarmament anytime soon would require fundamental world order changes and improbable conditions – an end to regional conflicts, exquisite verification techniques and many other unprecedented developments.

More pragmatically, Russia, China and the United States need to consider how they could draw lessons from the Iran deal to more effectively address a North Korean government that obstinately refrains from renouncing its nuclear weapons, but has, at least during the last two years, restrained from testing another nuclear device.

Although Pyongyang’s relations with Washington remain frozen and its ties with Beijing are terrible, the North Korean leadership has shown interest in developing ties with Russia. Exploiting this perhaps fleeting opportunity, US policymakers need to consider how they might follow their Iran playbook and cooperate with Moscow as well as Beijing in pushing for North Korean nuclear disarmament.

*Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at Hudson Institute. His current research includes regional security developments relating to Europe, Eurasia and East Asia as well as US foreign, defense and homeland-security policies.

This article appeared at YaleGlobal

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By Ramesh Jaura*

An international conference has highlighted advances made in detecting nuclear explosions,tracking storms or clouds of volcanic ash, locating epicentres of earthquakes, monitoring the drift of huge icebergs, observing the movements of marine mammals, and detecting plane crashes.

The five-day ‘Science and Technology 2015 Conference’ (SnT2015), which ended June 26, was the fifth in a series of multi-disciplinary conferences organised by the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO), which has been based in the Austrian capital since 1997.

The conference was attended by more than 1100 scientists and other experts, policy makers and representatives of national agencies, independent academic research institutions and civil society organisations from around the world.

SnT2015 drew attention to an important finding of CTBTO sensors: the meteor that exploded over Chelyabinsk, Russia, in 2013 was the largest to hit Earth in at least a century.

Participants also heard that the Air Algérie flight between Burkina Faso and Algeria which crashed in Mali in July 2014 was detected by the CTBTO’s monitoring station in Cote d’Ivoire, 960 kilometres from the impact of the aircraft.

The importance of SnT2015 lies in the fact that CTBTO is tasked with campaigning for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which outlaws nuclear explosions by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth’s surface, in the atmosphere, underwater and underground. It also aims to develop reliable tools to make sure that no nuclear explosion goes undetected.

These include seismic, hydro-acoustic, infrasound (frequencies too low to be heard by the human ear), and radionuclide sensors. Scientists and other experts demonstrated and explained in presentations and posters how the four state-of-the-art technologies work in practice.

170 seismic stations monitor shockwaves in the Earth, the vast majority of which are caused by earthquakes. But man-made explosions such as mine explosions or the announced North Korean nuclear tests in 2006, 2009 and 2013 have also been detected.

CTBTO’s 11 hydro-acoustic stations “listen” for sound waves in the oceans. Sound waves from explosions can travel extremely far underwater. Sixty infrasound stations on the Earth’s surface can detect ultra-low frequency sound waves that are emitted by large explosions.

CTBTO’s 80 radionuclide stations measure the atmosphere for radioactive particles; 40 of them also pick up noble gas, the “smoking gun” from an underground nuclear test. Only these measurements can give a clear indication as to whether an explosion detected by the other methods was actually nuclear or not. Sixteen laboratories support radionuclide stations.

When complete, CTBTO’s International Monitoring System (IMS) will consist of 337 facilities spanning the globe to monitor the planet for signs of nuclear explosions. Nearly 90 percent of the facilities are already up and running.

An important theme of the conference was performance optimisation which, according to W. Randy Bell, Director of CTBTO’s International Data Centre (IDC), “will have growing relevance as we sustain and recapitalise the IMS and IDC in the year ahead.”

In the past 20 years, the international community has invested more than one billion dollars in the global monitoring system whose data can be used by CTBTO member states – and not only for test ban verification purposes. All stations are connected through satellite links to the IDC in Vienna.

“Our stations do not necessarily have to be in the same country as the event, but in fact can detect events from far outside from where they are located. For example, the last DPRK (North Korean) nuclear test was picked up as far as Peru,” CTBTO’s Public Information Officer Thomas Mützelburg told IPS.

“Our 183 member states have access to both the raw data and the analysis results. Through their national data centres, they study both and arrive at their own conclusion as to the possible nature of events detected,” he said. Scientists from Papua New Guinea and Argentina said they found the data “extremely useful”.

Stressing the importance of data sharing, CTBTO Executive Secretary, Lassina Zerbo, said in an interview with Nature: “If you make your data available, you connect with the outside scientific community and you keep abreast of developments in science and technology. Not only does it make the CTBTO more visible, it also pushes us to think outside the box. If you see that data can serve another purpose, that helps you to step back a little bit, look at the broader picture and see how you can improve your detection.”

In opening remarks to the conference, Zerbo said: “You will have heard me say again and again that I am passionate about this organisation. Today I am not only passionate but very happy to see all of you who share this passion: a passion for science in the service of peace. It gives me hope for the future of our children that the best and brightest scientists of our time congregate to perfect the detection of the bomb instead of working to perfect the bomb itself.”

United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon set the tone in a message to the conference when he said: “With a strong verification regime and its cutting edge technology, there is no excuse for further delaying the CTBT’s entry into force.”

South African Minister of Science and Technology, Naledi Pandor, pointed out that her country “is a committed and consistent supporter” of CTBTO. She added: “South Africa has been at the forefront of nuclear non-proliferation in Africa for over twenty years. We gave up our nuclear arsenal and signed the Pelindaba Treaty in 1996, which establishes Africa as a nuclear weapons-free zone, a zone that only came into force in July 2009.

Beside the presentations by scientists, discussion panels addressed topics of current special interest in the CTBT monitoring community. One alluded to the role of science in on-site inspections (OSIs), which are provided for under the Treaty after it enters into force.

This discussion benefited from the experience of the 2014 Integrated Field Exercise (IFE14) in Jordan. “IFE14 was the largest and most comprehensive such exercise so far conducted in the build-up of CTBTO’s OSI capabilities,” said IDC director Bell.

Participants also had an opportunity to listen to a discussion on the opportunities that new and emerging technologies can play in overcoming the challenges of nuclear security. Members of the Technology for Global Security (Tech4GS) group joined former U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry in a panel discussion on ‘Citizen Networks: the Promise of Technological Innovation’.

“We are verging on another nuclear arms race,” said Perry. “I do not think that it is irreversible. This is the time to stop and reflect, debate the issue and see if there’s some third choice, some alternative, between doing nothing and having a new arms race.”

A feature of the conference was the CTBT Academic Forum focused on ‘Strengthening the CTBT through Academic Engagement’, at which Bob Frye, prestigious Emmy award-winning producer and director of documentaries and network news programme, pleaded for the need to inspire “the next generation of critical thinkers” to help usher in a world free of nuclear tests and atomic weapons of mass destruction.

The forum also provided an overview of impressive CTBT online educational resources and experiences with teaching the CTBT from the perspective of teachers and professors in Austria, Canada, China, Costa Rica, Pakistan and Russia.

With a view to bridging science and policy, the forum discussed ‘technical education for policymakers and policy education for scientists’ with the participation of eminent experts, including Rebecca Johnson, executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy; Nikolai Sokov of the James Martin Center for Non-proliferation Studies; Ference Dalnoki-Veress of the Middlebury Institute for International Studies; Edward Ifft of the Center for Security Studies, Georgetown; and Matt Yedlin of the Faculty of Science at the University of British Columbia.

There was general agreement on the need to integrate technical issues of CTBT into training for diplomats and other policymakers, and increasing awareness of CTBT and broader nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament policy issues within the scientific community.

Yet another panel – comprising Jean du Preez, chief of CTBTO’s external relations, protocol and international cooperation, Piece Corden of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, Thomas Blake of the Dublin Institute of Advanced Studies, and Jenifer Mackby of the Federation of American Scientists – looked ahead with a view to forging new and better links with and beyond academia, effectively engaging with the civil society, the youth and the media.

“Progress comes in increments,” said one panellist, “but not by itself.”

[With inputs from Valentina Gasbarri]

* This analysis was first carried by IPS-Inter Press Service News Agency.

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By R. Upadhyay

On 20 May the newly formed Telengana State in one of its first policy decisions made Urdu as its first official language along with Telugu. In the Nizam area, imposition of Urdu had played a divisive communal politics and unless the political class acts with responsibility the danger of communal polarisation in Telangana is real.

Urdu is not the mother tongue of all the Muslims in the country. Only about 12 to 13 percent of population in the newly born southern state of Telangana, speak Urdu.

The current political leadership of the newly born State had apparently ignored the history of Urdu during the Nizam era and in this process unwittingly compromised with the loyalists of the former Muslim ruler to replay the “Urdu Politics” that is likely to create a wedge between Telugu speaking majority and that of the smaller group of Urdu speakers.
Situation Before Independence:

Before Independence Telangana was one of the three linguistic regions namely Telugu, Marathi and Kannada, of the princely State of Hyderabad under the rule of the Nizam. The region was even called Telugu Angana (where Telugu was spoken) to differentiate it from the Marathi and Kannada speaking areas of the princely state, ( http://koausa.org/language/Warikoo.html).

The then ruler chose Urdu as the official language both in politics and education. This was seen by the majority Teleugu speaking people as a diabolical plot to suffocate the voice of the majority of the locals, their language and the culture. The political manifestation of Urdu created a communal divide and continued to be a major challenge to the social harmony in the region.

Notwithstanding the fact that Urdu failed to take roots in the rural areas of Telangana in view of its snobbish aversion to native Telugu language, its primacy over Telugu remained a constant source of irritant to the native population that perceived it as an instrument of hegemony. Even though a section of the urbanised group in the region accepted this alien language for their economic self interests, this linguistic dominance over Telugu sowed the seeds of communal polarisation from the beginning.

Urdu after the liberation of Hyderabad State

With the end of the Princely State of Hyderabad that ended the dominance of the unruly and blatantly communal behaviour of Razakarsand after its amalgamation with India, the role of Urdu declined with only 7.8 percent of the population speaking that language. Urdu was also removed from its official status as the dominant language.

Telugu, the language of the majority of the people assumed importance and was declared as the official language only after the historical agitation in 1950s and the formation of Andhra Pradesh subsequently.

The Nizam loyalists who were lying low initially gathered enough strength to coerce the government of the state to declare Urdu as the second official language in the districts that had a sizeable Urdu speaking population.

By and large, except Jamat-e-Islami Hind the majority of Muslims were found to be indifferent to the agitation for Telangana as separate state. President of the Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, known as the main political voice of Muslims in Hyderabad had also argued before Srikrishna Committee against the creation of Telangana. As far back as in 2006 the MIM had even demanded a separate state for Urdu speaking people on the plea that “When there can be two Telugu speaking states in the country, why can’t (there) be an Urdu state or at least a union territory”.

After the bifurcation of Andhra Pradesh and the creation of Telangana when the numerical strength of Muslims increased from about 8% in united Andhra Pradesh to over 12% in the new state, the MIM demanded the status of Urdu at par with Telugu. Strategically, the Muslims also chose to put forward their other demands like reservation for the Muslims. Some news paper reports also reveal the mind of Islamist politicians who had demanded a Muslim as Deputy Chief Minister of the state.

The strategy of the Islamists in the State is certainly to revive their position to the old Nizam days. This is the lurking danger the new State may witness in the next few years. While focussing on the development of the new State, it should not again resort to pampering a section of the community for their vote bank. At any rate this should not be the beginning of a communal politics that had dogged this region in Nizam’s days.

It is an irony that the Telugu which precipitated the re-structuring of Indian states has been forced to lose its linguistic primacy in the state just to appease a minority group who had succeeded an getting equal status to Urdu which is spoken by only about 12% of population. In trying to restore the pride of Nizam days, the Islamists are once again said to have reached a position to pose a challenge to native Telugu. Except Jammu & Kashmir, no state in the country has given the status of first official language to Urdu.

The Kashmir Case

We must turn to the case of Kashmir to see how imposition of an external language has killed all the local languages.

The language demography of Jammu & Kashmir suggests that Kasmiri is its principal language that has the largest number of speakers and ranks first among the mother tongues of the State with Dogri in second and Gujari in the third position. But it was the political, linguistic and cultural assertion of Urdu that the State Constitution recognised it as first official language and pushed the native mother tongues to the status of regional languages. The Constitution did not even give equal official status to the native languages which have many more speakers than Urdu and thereby debarred them from getting equal facilities for their development. It appears that there was an organised conspiracy of political-bureaucratic elite of the state to obstruct the growth of Kashmiri and other local mother tongues.

Although the Kashmiri language forms the core of much publicised concept of ‘Kashmiriyat’ it was never given due importance when Urdu was recognised as first official language. The the 1941 Census listed Kashmiri, Dogari, Punjabi, Rajasthani, Western Pahari, Balti, Ladakhi, Shina/Dardi and Burushaski as the main language spoken in the State but usage of Urdu had official patronage.( http://koausa.org/language/Warikoo.html). So much so, even the Sharda script in which Kashmiri was written was totally ignored to the extent that the natives stated writing their personal letters in Kashmiri only in Arabic script. In fact the official imposition of Urdu over the cultural tradition of the natives was the calculated policy of the political leadership to subvert their indigenous linguistic and ethno-cultural identities.(Ibid.)

A study conducted by the Muzaffarabad based scholar Mohsin Shakil reveals that in the State of Jammu & Kashmir,“Kashmiri is spoken by nearly 35 percent people followed by Pahari-Pothwari with 24 percent and Dogri with 18 percent speakers. The survey suggests that there is a decline in the number of active speakers of regional languages, possibly due to the influence of English and other languages(particularly Urdu) in the region”.( http://www.jammu-kashmir.com/archives/archives2014/kashmir20140629d). Like cultural subjugation of Telugu in Hyderabad Princely State, the cultural and linguistic subversion was deliberately carried out by the Islamists in J & K to “”subsume the Kashmiri identity of Kashmir by a Pan-Islamic identity” after “tampering with the racial and historical memory of an ethnic sub-nationality through a Pan-Islamic ideal”. Kashmir was thus projected as “an un-annexed Islamic enclave” for its secession from the secular and democratic India. (Ibid.)

In the first Census after partition in 1951, Muslims in various Indian States registered native languages as their mother tongues but with a view to identify Urdu as a part of their cultural identity, they started opting for this language in 1961 afterwards as mother tongue.

Pampering Politics?

The decision of the state government is generally viewed as a part of pampering politics due to the pressure of the organised efforts of Nizam loyalists who have used Urdu as a political instrument earlier and are still carrying a design to re-establish the supremacy of this language over the native Telugu.

Ajay Gudavarthy of Centre for Political Study, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi in a survey on the socio-economic and political ground reality of Muslims in Telangana carried out in March 2014 just two months before the creation of this state on June 2, 2014 observed: “The new aspirations of the Muslims for socio-economic benefits and political representation is being viewed by the dominant community as “aggressive” re-assertion by the Muslims, who were otherwise dormant and subdued in the integrated state of Andhra Pradesh”. (Economic and Political Weekly April 26, 2014 – http://www.epw.in/election-specials/muslims-telangana-ground-report.html)

The problem of the Muslims in Telangana as reflected in the survey is their feeling that they belonged to the ruling class and thereby they are not ready to accept the reality of their number in a democratic political set up.

Urdu perceived as the “ruling language”

The Urdu agitation in the early twentieth century which sowed the seed of partition of Indian sub-continent has a historically proven divisive record. It was the declaration of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan that caused a major agitation in East Pakistan in early 1950s that led to the partition of the newly created Islamic state of Pakistan and birth of Bangladesh.
Both before and after Independence Urdu has been a part of Muslim politics in India. Although, with sixty percent vocabulary of Persian and Arabic synthesized with Khadi Boli (Hindi), Sindhi, Punjabi, Braj Bhasa and Rajasthani, it was born as a lingua franca for the interaction of the soldiers of Muslim rulers with the natives but it was deliberately not allowed to develop in the linguistic and literary tradition of this land as happened to the language of the previous invaders like the Huns, Kushans and others with a view to identify it with the separate identity of Muslims. It was exclusively written in Arabic script which created major hindrance in its development as a language of the masses. Thus, despite the fact that Urdu was born in North India, in view of its separatist character, non-Muslims with the exception of those in the court of the Muslim rulers took it as a foreign language. Similarly, Urdu failed to make its dent in South India except in the administration of the princely state of Hyderabad.

Although, Urdu does not have an Islamic heritage, Muslim leaders of Telangana identified it with the socio-religious identity of the community for restoring its status and political strength that it had during the rule of Nizam.

In view of the divisive role of Urdu in playing the part of communal polarisation, its linguistic equality with Telugu is not only an insult to the language of the largest majority in the state but also a threat to widen the politico-linguistic rivalry and ethnic conflict that had cursed this region during the reign of Nizam.

The political leadership of the state needs to have a positive and responsible attitude towards the native language which was ignored during the Nizam era.

Urdu should not be made as a tool to revisit the Nizam area in Telengana.

*The author can be reached in E-mail ramashray60@rediffmail.com

The post India: Is Telangana Trapped In Game Of Urdu Politics? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Ali Omidi*

The marathon nuclear talks between Iran and the United States have finally born fruit and the two sides reached a nuclear agreement on July 14, 2015. This development is considered a major turning point in history of Iran’s relations with the United States subsequent to the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Therefore, Iranian leaders have described it as a point of departure which will lead to a thaw in bilateral relations between the two countries. Before the agreement, the US Secretary of State John Kerry had paid a visit to the office of Iran’s representative in the United Nations in New York, which is symbolically considered as part of the Iranian territory, to show that a new political will exists in the United States for the reduction of tensions with Iran.

The two sides also sent positive signals to each other about changing the buildings of their interests sections. While remaining cautious about making optimistic remarks on the nuclear deal, Leader of the Islamic Republic Ayatollah Seyyed Ali Khamenei said, “Of course, negotiations on the nuclear issue are just an experience. If the opposite side gives up its erratic behavior, this experience can be generalized to other issues.” Also in his remarks following the Geneva statement (March 2015), President Hassan Rouhani emphasized that the nuclear talks are just a first step toward constructive interaction with the world. He added, “We want to improve our relations with countries with whom we have cold relations now, and even with countries that we possibly have tensions with, we are seeking to end tension and animosity because we believe that this cooperation is to everybody’s benefit.”

Therefore, it seems that following the conclusion of the nuclear deal, we must expect important developments in Iran’s relations with the United States. In an interview with the Guardian newspaper, Hashemi Rafsanjani, head of Iran’s Expediency Council, described this development as shattering the taboo of direct talks with the United States. He even went as far as noting that reopening of the US embassy in Tehran was possible, adding that such a change would create a positive attitude toward the United States among Iranians. The present article aims to prove that between simplistic optimism and negative pessimism toward future outlook of Iran-US relations, it would be better to choose a middle way.

In reality, Iran and the United States have overcome the most important reason for tensions in their relations by clinching the nuclear agreement on July 14, 2015. The two countries have different viewpoints on other issues such as the human rights, the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, the fate of the Lebanese Hezbollah movement, and regional conflicts in Syria and Yemen, and their differences are severe. However, they have common interests in the restoration of security to Iraq and Afghanistan, and also in fighting extremism, establishing security in the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden – by fighting against pirates – and also in scientific and academic fields, taking into account that the United States accounts for 50 percent of science generation in the world. In the world of politics, rivalry and differences are normal. The experience of the nuclear agreement may have caused the two countries to reach the conclusion that sitting at the negotiating table and engaging in serious negotiations is better than exchange of messages or posing threats through intermediaries.

On the other hand, past doubts are still overshadowing the minds of both countries’ decision-makers. Steven L. Spiegel and Louis Cantori, two prominent researchers of international relations, believe that the background of relations between two counties in terms of the intensity of hostility will certainly affect the current and future situation of their ties. Therefore, nobody can expect an immediate opening in relations between Iran and the United States in view of the tumultuous history of their political relations. At any rate, relations with the United States have not been worse than Germany relations with Britain, and France in the height of the World War II. Also, it is noteworthy that the hostility and animosity that once existed between the United States and Cuba or Vietnam, is now totally gone. Certainly the background of relations can simply slow down the pace of improvement, not totally obstruct it. If relations between countries are considered as consisting of six phases, namely: 1. Strategic, 2. Good, 3. Normal, 4. Thermidor, 5. Armed peace, and 6. War; it seems that following the nuclear deal, relations between Iran and the United States will get promoted from the state of armed peace to thermidor, or the situation that Trita Parsi has described as truce.

At least, the shadow of war and threat has left Iran and the region in the light of Tehran-Washington relations and the two sides will not continue Satanization of each other anymore. Although this agreement may mark the beginning of bilateral cooperation in various fields, it should not be expected to take the two countries’ relations to a normal state, or lead to cooperation and agreement in other fields in the short run. Just like what happened after the French Revolution, the relations between Iran and the United States will be promoted to a state of thermidor, which means the end of hostility between Tehran and Washington. In this state, warmongers will have no further say, though in a state of thermidor, relations between the two countries would not be necessarily normal.

In this state, there are still many obstacles (especially domestic) to normalization of relations between Iran and the United States in order to prevent bilateral relations from getting promoted from a state of thermidor to a normal situation in the near future. In addition, trade plays an important role in reducing hostilities among countries. Now that the US government is not supposed to remove primary sanctions against Iran, the businesspeople and ordinary people in the two countries will be deprived of trade exchanges and this will cause many limitations for official diplomacy between Tehran and Washington. A poll conducted by the University of Maryland showed that more than 60 percent of American people support a nuclear agreement and normalization of relations between Iran and the United States. Therefore, Tehran and Washington will be inclined to talk about and possibly cooperate with regard to their common interests. Of course, this does not mean that the two sides are very eager for this cooperation, but political exigencies might force them to engage in this cooperation.

* Ali Omidi
Associate Professor of International Relations at University of Isfahan, Iran

The post Iran-US Relations Following Nuclear Deal: Thermidor Or Normal – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The judgment delivered by the International Court of Justice on March 31, 2014 is a landmark judgment in the domain of international environment law. The decision ordering Japan to stop its whaling operations in the Southern Ocean came at a crucial time when Japan was conducting large scale whaling activities under the guise of ‘scientific research’ when in reality it was slaughtering numerous whales and selling the by products such as whale meat in the commercial market. If this trend had been allowed to continue, other whaling nations may have also followed Japan and found loopholes in the moratorium prohibiting commercial whaling and resumed whale hunting under some other pretext. The judgment raises several questions which touch on a wide variety issues.

The Origins and Development of Whaling

The origin of whale hunting dates back millennia to the prehistoric ages. The original method of whale hunting involved driving the animals towards the shore and trapping them once they entered shallow waters. . Subsequently the drogue method of whale hunting was devised where a buoyant object was tied to a harpoon or similar tool which was pierced into the skin of a whale. It was believed that the constant resistance and drag from the buoyant object would soon exhaust the whale which could then be approached and killed easily; this method was mainly used to kill smaller species of whales such as Sperm Whales and Humpback Whales.1 Several communities have been known to employ similar tactics to hunt whales such as the Native Americans, the Basques of the Bay of Biscay and many others.

Commercial Whaling began in the 1600’s with the huge upsurge in the demand for whale oil, blubber, whale bone, whale meat and other by-products of whaling. By 1900, the Basques of the Bay of Biscay had mercilessly depleted the stocks of several species such as the Humpback whales, Sperm Whales, North Atlantic Right Whales, Pacific and South Hemisphere Right Whales and Atlantic and Pacific Sperm Whales.2

In 1932, the Whaling Nations adopted the Blue Whale Quota (BWC) which targeted only Blue Whales with an economic motive, as Blue Whales were the largest species on earth.3 However, the benefits of this move were not received by the ecosystem, as the depletion of other species continued along with the Blue Whale. Cetacean populations continued to plummet while the ruthless hunt for even more species reached its peak in the 20th century. Though whales got a respite from being hunted during World War II, this was only short lived as post war whaling on a massive scaled resumed, in Japan, the number of whales killed increased exponentially as whale meat was used to feed the impoverished as it was considered economic and relatively cheap. Contributing to the problem was the emergence of sophisticated weaponry such as explosive harpoons etc. and the advent of faster diesel fuelled ships due to the post war industrial boom.

It was in this backdrop that the International Whaling Commission was formed in 1946 according to the terms of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) with an aim to “provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”.

Between the years of 1946 to 1990, the number of whales hunted increased astronomically in spite of several regulations imposed by the ICRW such as allowing certain species to be hunted only in a particular season. This regulation backfired as whaling countries upgraded their technology and weaponry to hunt the maximum number of whales in the short span of time due to the increased competition. This led to increase in annual number of whales hunted and this period was is often referred to as the “Whaling Olympics”.4

Due to concerns of depletion of whale stocks due to a history of over-harvesting, a moratorium on commercial whaling was introduced in 1986 which placed a ban on all forms of commercial whaling from the 1986 period onwards and is still in operation today. Though, some countries such as Norway and Iceland continue commercial whaling presently in their Exclusive Economic Zones, either under an objection to the moratorium or under reservation to it, they must provide all relevant information of their catches and scientific data to the IWC. The moratorium decision is binding on all other member countries of the IWC including Japan and they must abide by it.

The effectiveness of the IWC has to be looked at quantitatively, though it has had several shortcomings in the past, it is responsible for the existence of several species of whales today. In its absence, the whaling nations may have hunted down the last whale years ago. However, the inherent problems faced by the IWC especially which pertain to implementation and enforcement of its regulations needs to be solved. Also, the provisions need to be amended whenever required and many undefined terms need to be strictly defined to clear ambiguity.

An Analysis of The Scientific Research Projects carried out by Japan

Japan conducted the first phase of its whale research programme, the Japanese Whale Research Programme under Special Permit in the North Pacific (JARPN) between 1994 and 1999 under the special quota of the IWC with the twin objectives of assessing the stock of common Minke whales, in particular determining the mixing rate between different stocks and to determine the feeding ecology of the common Minke whales in the North Pacific.5

Based on the favourable results of JARPN, the second phase of the programme, JARPN II was initiated in 2000 and the first survey carried out in 2002 with the objectives of carrying out feeding ecosystem and ecology studies, monitoring environmental pollutants which affect cetacean populations in the marine ecosystem and determining stock structure of large species of whales such as Minke whales, Sei whales and Sperm whales.6

The programme was described as a “long term research programme of undetermined duration” and involved the annual catching of 150 Minke whales, 50 Bryde’s whales, 50 Sei whales and 10 Sperm whales.7 One of the main criticisms against JARPN II is the use of lethal sampling methods to collect data when non- lethal options are available. The killing of whales using harpoons is unnecessary according to some scientific communities who argue that for the purposes of carrying out studies to determine stock structure, ecosystem analysis and other objectives of the research programme, non-lethal methods could have easily been used. Instead of impaling a harpoon, one could have collected tissues from the skin of the whale using biopsy darts which would have provided the same results.

Also, the use of such alternatives would have been cheaper in terms of cost and also would not have harmed the whale populations. Another shocking allegation made by Japan on the basis of its research was that whales are primarily responsible for the depletion of other fish stocks across the world and therefore should be hunted so that fish stocks can improve. Japan uses this argument to justify its demand for a right to commercially hunt whales. However, evidence shows that the main cause for the decline of fish stocks is the over fishing done by humans, also many species of whales do not prey on those species of fish which are caught by fishermen.

The data which has been gathered by Japan through its many researches has not been allowed to be subject to independent analysis and the poor level of publication records raise doubts over the meaningfulness of the research. In fact, many countries allege that Japan uses the data collected only to justify that commercial whaling is sustainable so that the moratorium may be relaxed and Japan may be allowed to continue full scale whaling activities.

The Antarctic Whaling Case

On March 31, 2014, the International Court of Justice (the principal judicial body of the U.N.) at The Hague pronounced its judgment in the Whaling case between Australia and Japan ordering Japan to stop its whaling operations in the Southern Ocean. The second phase of the Japanese Whale Research Programme under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) was initiated in 2005 in the Southern Ocean by Japan as a scientific research programme to study whales. The key research objectives of the programme were to:

1. Monitor the Antarctic ecosystem and cetaceans in their natural ecosystem.
2. Construct a competition model among whale species and establish future management objectives.
3. Elucidate temporal and spatial changes in stock structure.
4. Improve management of Antarctic Minke whale stocks.

However, the methods employed by Japan towards fulfilling these objectives did not seem in consonance with the research objectives themselves. In 1982, the IWC established a total moratorium on all forms of whaling with two exceptions, i.e. aboriginal subsistence whaling and special permit scientific whaling under Article VIII of the ICRW. The ICW had also established a sanctuary in the Southern Ocean (Antarctic Ocean) within which all forms of whaling were strictly banned; it had also prohibited the use of factory ships. JARPA II contravened both these provisions. Under its programme it killed 450 Minke whales annually and 50 each of Fin and Humpback whales per season using lethal sampling techniques. The whale meat is processed using factory ships and the meat is then made available in shops and restaurants in Japan.

Japan was found guilty of violating three provisions under the ICWR namely:

1. The 1986 moratorium on all commercial whaling operations.
2. The prohibition on using factory ships to process whales.
3. The moratorium on whaling within the territorial waters of the Southern Ocean.8

Japan argued that it was not participating in commercial whaling activities and the number of whales it slaughtered every year was for the purpose of ‘scientific research’ and as such was not banned by the moratorium imposed by the ICW. The killing of whales for research is allowed under the 1946 ICRW which states that: “any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this Convention.”9

The studies conducted by JARPA II resulted in the death of more than 1000 Minke whales. Japan held that these killings were necessary for their scientific survey to ascertain the number of whales and prospects for sustainable whaling. However, the question which arises is whether the killing of whales is required to understand the demographics of the whale population? Whether DNA samples cannot be extracted from whales without killing them? Whether it was necessary to kill so many specimens to gather data? According to the ICJ, even though the motive may have been to further ‘scientific research’, the modus operandi was not for scientific purposes. It was further uncovered, that whale meat which was a residue of Japan’s scientific studies was being commercially sold in Japanese markets. There are also concerns that Japan’s intention is to use the data gathered from the research to prove the existence of an abundant stock of whales so that the moratorium on commercial whaling may be lifted to suit Japan’s demands.10

Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling and Sustainable Utilization of Whales

One of the important aspects of the IWC moratorium is that it recognizes Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling in many parts of the world. Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling refers to the whale hunting carried on by aboriginal communities in less developed parts of the world, this hunting is solely done with the objective of self-consumption and unlike commercial whaling it kills a very limited number of whales. The main objectives of Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling are:

• To ensure that risks of extinction are not seriously increased by whaling;
• To enable native people to hunt whales at levels appropriate to their cultural and nutritional requirements.
• Move populations towards and then maintain them at healthy levels.

Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling (ASW) is a quota created by the ICRW which exempts certain aboriginal communities across the world from the 1986 moratorium on commercial whaling established by the ICW. Under the provisions of this quota, a community is allowed to hunt whales as per a specific catch limit set by the commission provided that they fulfil the essential criteria to fit within the ambit of the provision. ASW is distinguished from commercial whaling practices in so far as the objective and the catch limits are concerned. The criteria for Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling require two prime objectives to be fulfilled, namely: nutritional needs and cultural needs. It has been established from archaeological evidence that several indigenous communities such as the Makah in the United States and the Chukotka people in Russia have an ancient tradition of whale hunting. This was a part of their culture as well as diet. The Makah people have recently been granted the ASW status after much appeal, but they have been restricted to a very narrow catch limit so that the cetacean population does not suffer significantly. However, critics hold that the ICW has not formally granted the Makah people the quota and the current position is ambiguous and erroneously interpreted by the U.S Government. The main arguments against ASW with particular reference to the Makah people are:

1. “Cultural Need” criteria cannot be met by the Makah:

The term “cultural need” needs to be understood in the strictest sense of the term as flexibility will only lead to confusion. The Makah have used the term “culture” in a very broad manner. Considering the fact that the tribe voluntarily stopped hunting whales due to more economically viable alternatives several decades ago and the last recorded whale hunt took place in 1907, the term “need” loses its meaning as the tribe has clearly survived without whaling for the better part of a century and has diversified its means of earning a livelihood. In other words, they have got along just fine without hunting whales. In fact, the Makah have undergone a “cultural renaissance” and have upheld their culture and traditional values without whaling by adapting to the change in economic activities. In essence, their “cultural need” to hunt whales is distinguishable from the need of other communities who have been granted the ASW quota in the past such as the Eskimo’s for whom whaling is absolutely indispensable.

It has also been argued that the Makah people have recently incorporated several superficial traditional tools to hunt whales such as the obsolete harpoons, though the whales are ultimately killed by modern methods. They also selectively follow their cultural practices, observing only those which are convenient and incorporating modern techniques whenever needed. Hence, these insincere approaches will not help in reviving cultural ties and should not be encouraged.11

2. “Nutritional Need” criteria cannot be met by the Makah:

The Makah case lacks the element of opportunistic hunting which is a key characteristic of subsistence hunts. It means that the hunt is not specified and the tribe kills whatever it can catch to satisfy its daily dietary needs. The Makah tribe has thrived for decades with the exclusion of whale meat from their diets, it is not even used as a luxury good. Hence, the argument of nutritional necessity fails as the Makah in contemporary times have several alternative sources of nutrition such as an abundance of fish stocks, access to grocery stores, etc.12

Implications

By bringing the Makah community within the width of the quota, the IWC has erred and has given the space for possibly dangerous precedents to crop up. Japan is a country which has been aggressively vocal against the commercial whaling moratorium and has been pressing the commission to lift the ban on several occasions. However, Japan and several other countries may now try and find ambiguous provisions in the legal framework which have not been clearly defined.

Both Japan and Norway have taken advantage of the vaguely defined terms such as “subsistence” and “aborigines” by submitting applications for small type whaling operations such as Japanese Small Type Commercial Whaling (JSTW) which blur the distinctions between subsistence and commercial whaling. Japan also claims a Cultural Right to whaling by arguing that its 400 year old history entitles it to commercially hunt whales. The abuse of the “scientific research” clause by Japan highlights the danger of the permission of quotas and of precedents created by the loose and often unspecified definitional clauses in legal frameworks such as the ICW. Another important point to be noted is the sudden alliances formed between commercial whalers and the aboriginal or indigenous people who are applying for ASW rights. This nexus poses the danger of subsistence whaling turning into commercial whaling especially since a single Gray whale is valued at an excess of 1 million dollars.

Japan has protested several times saying that it should be allowed to hunt whales which are not specifically on the endangered list and also whales whose populations are sustainable according to the Japanese. In response to the concerns voiced by Conservation groups like the American Cetacean Society regarding the continuance of commercial whaling by Japan under the façade of “scientific research” in the Antarctic slaughtering around 300 Minke whales whose by-products were subsequently sold in commercial markets, thereby violating the IWC moratorium, Japan had once said that they could eat whales if Americans could eat beef. The issue is extremely delicate as it is fraught with economic and political implications between the two countries.

Conclusion

Though the ICJ’s judgment does not really ban Japan or the other two whaling nations, i.e. Norway and Iceland from undertaking whaling operations since Japan is still free to do whaling in the Northern Pacific as long as it abides by the ICRW, the impact of the decision is that it will send a strong message to the world at large that Whaling is an extremely important issue and it will discourage other nations from continuing whaling under a camouflage. The vital role these marine mammals play in the ecosystem cannot be downplayed. They are an integral part of the food chain, if whales were to become extinct, the aquatic organisms that they preyed upon would be allowed to overpopulate causing an imbalance in the ecosystem. Whales also help in growth of phytoplankton, and reduction in the amount of carbon dioxide present in the air. If whales were to become extinct, the entire food chain would be broken and ultimately man himself would suffer. Therefore, the need of the hour is to devise management strategies for cetaceans which would not harm existing stocks and at the same time be able to formulate techniques for sustainable stock management.

About the author:
*Srinivas Raman is an undergraduate law student at National Law University, Jodhpur (India). He can be contacted at srinivas.nluj@gmail.com

Notes:
1. J. N. Tonnessen; A. O. Johnsen, The History of Modern Whaling, Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, Vol 130, No. 5314, pp. 676-677, (September 1982)
2. Infra note 4
3. See, for timeline of Whaling and Blue Whale Quota system also known as Blue Whale Unit, (Last visited 30 May 2014) http://www.cgeorgemuller.com/timeline.htm
4. Gare Smith, The International Whaling Commission: An Analysis of the Past and Reflections for the Future, Natural Resources Law 16 Nat. Resources Law, Vol 16, pp 543, (1983-1984)
5. See, for details of JARPN and JARPN II (Last visited 30 May 2014) http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/61JARPNResearchResults.pdf
6. Ibid
7. Phillip J. Clapham, et. al., Whaling as a Science, Oxford University Press on behalf of American Institute of Biological Sciences, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 210-212 (March 2003).
8. Whaling in the Antarctic Ocean, ICJ 2014
9. International Whaling Commission,1946,Article VIII
10. See for analysis of the 31st March ICJ judgment between Australia and Japan with New Zealand intervening (Last visited 30 May 2014) http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/eyes-on-environment/the_japanese_whaling_controversy_8211
11. Leesteffy Jenkins and Cara Romanzo, Makah Whaling: Aboriginal Subsistence or a Stepping Stone to Undermining the Commercial Whaling Moratorium?, Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law & Policy, Vol 9, No. 1, pp 71-114 (1998).
12. Ibid

The post Whaling In The South Sea: A Review Of ICJ Decision appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Adelaide Mena and Matt Hadro

Abortion giant Planned Parenthood is facing harsh criticism after the release of footage allegedly showing its top doctor describing how the organization offers body parts from aborted babies for money.

“A lot of people want intact hearts these days, they’re looking for specific nodes,” Dr. Deborah Nucatola, Planned Parenthood Federation of America’s senior medical director, appears to say in a recently released undercover video.

“Yesterday was the first time she said people wanted lungs. And then, like I said, always as many intact livers as possible.”

The video was released July 14 by the Center for Medical Progress, a non-profit group focused on medical ethics. It is the first in the center’s “Human Capital” series, a nearly three-year-long investigative study of Planned Parenthood’s practice.

In the video, two members of the investigation team are seen presenting themselves as part of a “Fetal Tissue Procurement Company” and asking about how they could work with Planned Parenthood clinics to procure fetal tissue for research.

The video purports to show Nucatola explaining to the undercover investigators how Planned Parenthood provides organs from aborted babies for a “reasonable” fee.

A nine-minute long edited video of the conversation was released alongside the nearly-three-hour long complete footage.

Eric Ferrero, vice president of communications for Planned Parenthood Federation of America, defended the practice in a statement, saying that Planned Parenthood clinics help patients “who want to donate tissue for scientific research, and we do this just like every other high-quality health care provider does – with full, appropriate consent from patients and under the highest ethical and legal standards.”

He said that neither Planned Parenthood nor the patients receive a financial benefit from these donations, but that “actual costs, such as the cost to transport tissue to leading research centers, are reimbursed, which is standard across the medical field.”

Ferrero accused the video of being a “heavily edited, secretly recorded videotape” produced by a “well-funded group established for the purpose of damaging Planned Parenthood’s mission.”

While selling human body parts in general is illegal, federal law does not prohibit tissue donations, with “reasonable payments” for the “transportation, implantation, processing, preservation, quality control, or storage of human fetal tissue.” State laws governing organ donation – including from aborted babies – vary from state to state.

The undercover video appears to show Nucatola discussing what constitutes a “reasonable” payment for the donation of an aborted baby’s organs: “They just want to do it in a way that is not perceived as, ‘This clinic is selling tissue, this clinic is making money off of this. I know in the Planned Parenthood world they’re very, very sensitive to that.”

“(T)hey want to come to a number that doesn’t look like they’re making money. They want to come to a number that looks like it is a reasonable number for the effort that is allotted on their part.”

The Planned Parenthood medical director then appears to suggest a price of $30-100 per “specimen,” noting that liver is in high demand, before describing a grisly procedure for removing the organs from aborted babies “under ultrasound guidance.”

“So then you’re just kind of cognizant of where you put your graspers, you try to intentionally go above and below the thorax so that, you know, we’ve been very good at getting heart, lung, liver, because we know that, so I’m not going to crush that part. I’m going to basically crush below, I’m going to crush above, and I’m going to see if I can get it all intact.”

“And with the calvarium [head], in general, some people will actually try to change the presentation so that it’s not vertex, because when it’s vertex presentation, you never have enough dilation at the beginning of the case, unless you have a real, huge amount of dilation to deliver an intact calvarium,” she appears to say.

According to the Center for Medical Progress, Nucatola “has overseen medical practice at all Planned Parenthood locations since 2009,” “trains new Planned Parenthood abortion doctors,” and “performs abortions herself at Planned Parenthood Los Angeles up to 24 weeks.”

Pro-life groups were outraged by the report. Kristan Hawkins, president of Students for Life of America, called it “truly horrific.”

“This generation is already turned off by Planned Parenthood once they learn that they have abortion quotas, the extraordinary amount of money they receive from taxpayers and that they commit a quarter of all abortions done yearly,” she said in a statement.

“This video provides a shocking reality check about the grisly, inhumane business model of Planned Parenthood,” added Dr. Charmaine Yoest, president and CEO of Americans United for Life. She added that “the time is now to de-fund Planned Parenthood. The American taxpayer should not be in business with such callous profiteers.”

“Planned Parenthood’s barbaric practices reveal their contempt for rule of law and human life,” said Lila Rose, president of the pro-life advocacy group Live Action. “This latest expose of Planned Parenthood’s trafficking of baby parts for profit should be the final nail in the coffin for the abortion giant.”

The post Planned Parenthood Under Fire For Allegedly Trafficking Baby Organs appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Gary C. Gambill*

After two years of negotiations with Iran over the fate of its nuclear program, the Obama administration has unveiled an agreement abandoning the pursuit of a decisive reduction in the Islamic Republic’s breakout capacity – the ability to quickly and successfully produce a bomb – and lifting the economic sanctions that have hobbled its economy.  The agreement not only sanctifies Teheran’s retention of sufficient enrichment infrastructure to produce a bomb in a year or less, but also drops or dilutes a range of other longstanding demands, from closing a once-secret, heavily fortified underground enrichment facility to providing inspectors with a full accounting of its bomb-making research and development.

As the Obama administration and its supporters seek to rally domestic and international support for this historic compromise, listen for what can best be described as a Hyde-and-Jekyll defense.

When discussing what will happen if the P5+1 world powers maintain their long-standing refusal to accept Iran’s retention of proliferation-prone nuclear infrastructure, the administration has often depicted the Islamic Republic as a menacing force hell-bent on continuing its march toward the brink, whatever the consequences. Secretary of State John Kerry has suggested that Iran might “rush towards a nuclear weapon” if the talks collapse.  Obama has characterized the alternative as “letting them rush towards a bomb.” Outside of the administration, supporters of the pending nuclear agreement have typically offered more measured warnings that the Iranians could “take the lid off their program” and “rapidly ramp up their uranium enrichment.”  Most believe that war will be likely, if not unavoidable, if there is no agreement.

However, when speaking about what will happen if the P5+1 recognizes and validates Tehran’s nuclear threshold status, the administration and its supporters have depicted the Islamic Republic as an eminently rational actor likely to abide by the letter and spirit of a prospective agreement. Obama sees the P5+1 as offering the Iranians the prospect of being “a very successful regional power” in return for accepting monitored limits on their nuclear program.  “Without in any way being under an illusion about Iranian intentions … [or] the nature of that regime, they are self-interested,” according to Obama. “It is possible for them to make a strategic calculation that, at minimum, pushes much further to the right whatever potential breakout capacity they may have.”

Put simply, if we continue refusing to lift sanctions until Iran fully unclenches its nuclear fist (dramatically downsizes its enrichment infrastructure, acknowledges past weaponization work, gives inspectors wide latitude, etc.), we will get Mr. Hyde.  But we will get the friendly Dr. Jekyll if we give in and accept the agreement Obama has put before us.  And this is only if we give in – proponents of the agreement are quite certain that the good doctor won’t pop up if the international community stands firm (i.e. that the Iranians won’t, upon further reflection, make more concessions on the nuclear issue, or otherwise try harder to win international confidence).

Oddly enough, the Hyde portraiture isn’t one of Iran reverting to its nuclear posture before direct talks with the Obama administration began in early 2013.  Back then, the mullahs weren’t “rapidly” ramping up enrichment capacity (let alone “rushing” for a bomb), but increasing it slowly enough not to cross certain thresholds deemed likely to trigger Israeli and/or American military action (e.g., accumulating enough near-20% enriched uranium to produce through further enrichment sufficient weapons grade uranium for a bomb).  The Iran they suggest will emerge from our failure to compromise is far more unhinged and oblivious to its people’s welfare than the one they sat down with two years ago.  And dumber, too – an attempt by Iran to “rush” for a bomb or significantly narrow its nuclear breakout time by ramping up enrichment capacity would be supremely stupid when international resolve is at a peak.

While some proponents of the agreement are simply cherry-picking diametrically opposed characterizations of Iran to fit mismatched legs of a bad argument, many appear to genuinely believe that a nuclear threshold détente will somehow transform Iran into the kind of partner one might trust to linger near the finish line of producing a bomb, and that lack of one will put it on a path to war.

There are three overlapping strands of reasoning in this argument.  All have an elegant logic with a weak empirical track record outside of Iran and little applicability to the particulars of the case at hand.

“More to lose”

The first holds that lifting sanctions will accelerate Iran’s integration into the world economy, creating disincentives to misbehave.  “If in fact they’re engaged in international business, and there are foreign investors, and their economy becomes more integrated with the world economy, then in many ways it makes it harder for them to engage in behaviors that are contrary to international norms,” explained Obama in April.

Although there is much to be said for free markets and trade, economic integration hasn’t reliably inhibited the aggression of states. The European continent was more economically integrated on the eve of World War I than at any time prior and for many decades after.

In any case, lifting sanctions isn’t likely to result in Iran’s headlong integration into the world economy.  This isn’t a situation where a bankrupt dictatorship opens up to the world out of desperation and falls prey to socio-economic forces beyond its control.  The Iranian regime is getting a direct financial windfall out of this (access to frozen Iranian assets worth as much as $150 billion, ability to sell oil, etc.), which it can simply pocket while forgoing the kind of increased trade and foreign investment that might constrain its freedom of action later.

“More like us”

The second line of reasoning holds that drawing Iran into closer economic and socio-cultural contact with the rest of the world will cause religious extremism, xenophobia, and other unsavory attitudes among the public at large to give way to materialist and individualist concerns that will constrain government decision-making.  Obama “believes the more people interact with open societies, the more they will want to be part of an open society,” says Ivo Daalder, Obama’s former NATO ambassador and head of the Chicago Council on Global Affairs.

But this presumes that the Iranian public has influence over its government’s aggressive regional and international policies. As was made clear in the deadly aftermath of the rigged 2009 elections and at many other times, the Iranian government can and does ignore public opinion.

In any case, there’s little evidence that Iranian public opinion supports the regime’s nuclear brinksmanship. While most Iranians do express support for a civilian energy program, few attach a high priority to it.  Despite a steady diet of government propaganda heralding the nuclear program as the sacred right of the Iranian people, only 6% of respondents in a September 2013 Zogby poll said that continuing Iran’s enrichment program was one of their top two policy priorities.  Iranian leaders threaten world peace because of ideological and strategic reasons, not public opinion.

“Empower moderates”

Finally, Obama has argued that an agreement “could strengthen the hands of more moderate leaders in Iran.”  President Hassan Rouhani and other “moderates” will gain clout in Iran’s government if there is a deal on his watch, while “hardliners” will gain influence if there isn’t one.

But this is a misreading of what causes the strength of moderates in government to fluctuate.  This variable is in large part a function of how aggressively radical mullahs vet who can run in elections.  So-called “moderates” are allowed to ascend the ranks of power when the system is under threat and Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei needs them to safely channel public dissent and/or soften international hostility to Iran, but they lose clout when they are no longer needed to deflect such challenges.

Might not the exorbitant financial payoff to the Iranian state of having sanctions lifted boost the legitimacy of the system and thereby weaken moderates?  Alan J. Kuperman, head of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, is concerned that such a windfall “would entrench the ruling mullahs, who could claim credit for Iran’s economic resurgence.”

Moreover, Kuperman adds, the Iranian regime will acquire “extra resources” to “amplify the havoc it is fostering in neighboring countries like Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.”  And once a nuclear deal is signed, fear of provoking Tehran to violate it will surely discourage the international community from punishing it for its terrorism sponsorship and bloody proxy interventions in the region.

Rouhani may get a personal boost from getting sanctions lifted on his watch, but it’s a mistake to translate that into broad advancement of “moderates.”  The Iranian president may be a soft-liner on some domestic issues, but he is no less committed to realizing Iran’s nuclear ambitions than so-called hardliners.

Indeed, he is arguably more so.  Many hardliners are more interested in using the nuclear program to throw a wrench into Iran’s relations with the West and keep it on a “rogue” footing than in the delicate task of preventing the international community from stopping its eventual construction of a bomb.  Not surprisingly, the above-mentioned Zogby poll showed that Iranians who believe Iran should have nuclear weapons are more likely to self-identify as Rouhani supporters than those who don’t.

Conclusion

The reality is that we don’t know what will happen inside Iran in the years to come.  But it’s a good bet the nature and temperament of the regime won’t change dramatically for better or worse as a result of whether or not the international community sanctifies Iran’s nuclear threshold status.

Although Obama administration officials are quick to insist that their proposed nuclear agreement with Iran is a good idea regardless of the nature and intentions of the Iranian regime, no one really believes this. If Iran is completely unchanged by its opening to the world, then the best case scenario is that we’ll be exactly where we are today when modest restrictions on its enrichment capacity expire in 10 years, only Iran will have recovered economically from the impact of sanctions, shattered the global coalition arrayed against it, and obtained the internationally sanctioned right to ramp up enrichment.

The worst-case scenario is, well, a lot worse.

About the author:
*Gary C. Gambill is a frequent contributor to The National Post, FPRI E-Notes, The Jerusalem Post, Foreign Policy, and The National Interest. He is a research fellow at the Middle East Forum and was formerly editor of Middle East Intelligence Bulletin and Mideast Monitor.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

The post Beware Hyde-And-Jekyll Defense Of Iran Nuclear Agreement – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Kurdish armed group that controls territory in northern Syria, despite some progress, is still not meeting its commitment to demobilize child soldiers and to stop using boys and girls under 18 in combat, Human Rights Watch said today.

On June 5, 2014, the People’s Protection Unit (YPG) signed a “Deed of Commitment” with the nongovernmental organization Geneva Call pledging to demobilize all fighters under 18 within one month. One month later, it demobilized 149 children. Despite this promise and the initial progress, Human Rights Watch documented cases over the past year of children under 18 joining and fighting with the YPG and the YPJ, its female branch. Some children under 18 with those forces, based on public sources, apparently died in combat in June 2015.

The YPG and YPJ are not the only offenders among the many armed groups in Syria using child soldiers, but they can do more to stop the practice, Human Rights Watch said.

Based on information provided by local and international organizations, Human Rights Watch compiled a list of 59 children, 10 of them under 15, who were allegedly recruited by or volunteered for YPG or YPJ forces since July 2014. Human Rights Watch confirmed seven of these cases by speaking directly with the children’s relatives. In some cases, the groups enlisted children without their parents’ consent.

“My daughter went to school and was taken from there by a group of YPJ,” a father of a 14-year-old girl near Qamishli said. “We knew nothing about her until a YPJ commander called and informed us that she had joined YPJ.”

Human Rights Watch sent a letter to the YPG on June 10, 2015, asking for a response to the allegations. In its reply on June 24, the group acknowledged that it faced “significant challenges” to stop its use of child soldiers due to the ongoing armed conflict. It acknowledged that there had been “some individual cases” over the past year.

The letter noted that, on June 13, the YPG had demobilized 27 boys and, on April 20, the YPJ had demobilized 16 girls. In addition, seven YPG officers had been punished for accepting child soldiers – three expelled from the force and four demoted, although the group gave no names or dates.

On July 5, the YPG and YPJ issued a circular to commanders and heads of recruiting centers saying they were not to recruit or accept anyone under 18. Those who fail to comply will face “maximum disciplinary measures,” the circular said.

The internal regulations of the YPG, as well as the Kurdish-run police force, called Asayish, forbid the use of children under 18.

Human Rights Watch acknowledged the difficult conditions in Syria, with the extremist group Islamic State (also known as ISIS) repeatedly committing war crimes in Kurdish-held areas, including the deliberate killing of more than 200 men, women, and children in the town of Kobani (`Ayn al-`Arab in Arabic) on June 25.

In September 2014, ISIS opened a major attack on Kobani and seized parts of the city. Kurdish forces and Syrian opposition fighters, aided by US-led airstrikes, expelled the group in January 2015.

At the same time, the YPG and its affiliated political party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which governs the northern Kurdish-run areas, can better uphold their obligations under international human rights law and, when related to armed conflict, international humanitarian law, Human Rights Watch said. This includes the prohibition on recruiting or using children under 18 as fighters, scouts, or couriers, or at checkpoints.

An additional concern is the Kurdish group’s creation of a “non-combatant category” for children aged 16 and 17, based on a reservation the group entered with Geneva Call’s Deed of Commitment. The reservation says the group will continue to recruit and accept 16- and 17-year-olds but not have them perform military functions.

The YPG said in its letter to Human Rights Watch that it is accepting recruits into this category and is keeping them at “centers” far from the front lines, but it did not know the exact number of children in this group or specify what tasks they perform.

Human Rights Watch urged the YPG and YPJ to stop recruiting 16- and 17-year-olds, even if they are not serving a military function. The Optional Protocol to the Children’s Rights Convention on Children and Armed Conflict says that non-state armed groups should not recruit children under 18 for any purpose.

Under customary international humanitarian law and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC), it is a war crime for members of armed forces or non-state armed groups to conscript or enlist children under 15, or to use them to participate actively in hostilities. Ten of the 59 children who allegedly joined the YPG or YPJ over the past year were 15 or younger.

The June 5 report of the United Nations secretary-general to the Security Council on children in armed conflict said that the recruitment and use of children in combat in Syria had become “commonplace.” The United Nations verified cases of 271 boys and 7 girls who had been recruited and used by groups affiliated with, among others, the Free Syrian Army (142), YPG and YPJ (24), ISIS (69), and al-Nusra Front (25), and the actual numbers are believed to be higher. Some armed groups fighting with the Syrian government, such as Hezbollah and the Popular Committee, also reportedly recruited children in small numbers, the report said.

“Armed groups in Syria are placing children in direct harm by giving them weapons and sending them to fight,” Abrahams said. “The YPG has a chance to stop this practice and show that it’s serious about keeping its commitments on human rights.”

The post Syria: Kurdish Forces Violating Child Soldier Ban, Says HRW appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Hillary Clinton won’t propose reinstating a bank break-up law known as the Glass-Steagall Act – at least according to Alan Blinder, an economist who has been advising Clinton’s campaign. “You’re not going to see Glass-Steagall,” Blinder said after her economic speech Monday in which she failed to mention it. Blinder said he had spoken to Clinton directly about Glass-Steagall.

This is a big mistake.

It’s a mistake politically because people who believe Hillary Clinton is still too close to Wall Street will not be reassured by her position on Glass-Steagall. Many will recall that her husband led the way to repealing Glass Steagall in 1999 at the request of the big Wall Street banks.

It’s a big mistake economically because the repeal of Glass-Steagall led directly to the 2008 Wall Street crash, and without it we’re in danger of another one.

Some background: During the Roaring Twenties, so much money could be made by speculating on shares of stock that several big Wall Street banks began selling stock along side their traditional banking services – taking in deposits and making loans.

Some banks went further, lending to pools of speculators that used the money to pump up share prices. The banks sold the shares to their customers, only to have the share prices collapse when the speculators dumped them.

For the banks, it was an egregious but hugely profitable conflict of interest.

After the entire stock market crashed in 1929, ushering in the Great Depression, Washington needed to restore the public’s faith in the banking system. One step was for Congress to enact legislation insuring commercial deposits against bank losses.

Another was to prevent the kinds of conflicts of interest that resulted in such losses, and which had fueled the boom and subsequent bust. Under the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, banks couldn’t both gamble in the market and also take in deposits and make loans. They’d have to choose between the two.

“The idea is pretty simple behind this one,” Senator Elizabeth Warren said a few days ago, explaining her bill to resurrect Glass-Steagall. “If banks want to engage in high-risk trading — they can go for it, but they can’t get access to ensured deposits and put the taxpayers on the hook for that reason.”

For more than six decades after 1933, Glass-Steagall worked exactly as it was intended to. During that long interval few banks failed and no financial panic endangered the banking system.

But the big Wall Street banks weren’t content. They wanted bigger profits. They thought they could make far more money by gambling with commercial deposits. So they set out to whittle down Glass-Steagall.

Finally, in 1999, President Bill Clinton struck a deal with Republican Senator Phil Gramm to do exactly what Wall Street wanted, and repeal Glass-Steagall altogether.

What happened next? An almost exact replay of the Roaring Twenties. Once again, banks originated fraudulent loans and sold them to their customers in the form of securities. Once again, there was a huge conflict of interest that finally resulted in a banking crisis.

This time the banks were bailed out, but millions of Americans lost their savings, their jobs, even their homes.

A personal note. I worked for Bill Clinton as Secretary of Labor and I believe most of his economic policies were sound. But during those years I was in fairly continuous battle with some other of his advisers who seemed determined to do Wall Street’s bidding.

On Glass-Steagall, they clearly won.

To this day some Wall Street apologists argue Glass-Steagall wouldn’t have prevented the 2008 crisis because the real culprits were nonbanks like Lehman Brothers and Bear Stearns.

Baloney. These nonbanks got their funding from the big banks in the form of lines of credit, mortgages, and repurchase agreements. If the big banks hadn’t provided them the money, the nonbanks wouldn’t have got into trouble.

And why were the banks able to give them easy credit on bad collateral? Because Glass-Steagall was gone.

Other apologists for the Street blame the crisis on unscrupulous mortgage brokers.

Surely mortgage brokers do share some of the responsibility. But here again, the big banks were accessories and enablers.

The mortgage brokers couldn’t have funded the mortgage loans if the banks hadn’t bought them. And the big banks couldn’t have bought them if Glass-Steagall were still in place.

I’ve also heard bank executives claim there’s no reason to resurrect Glass-Steagall because none of the big banks actually failed.

This is like arguing lifeguards are no longer necessary at beaches where no one has drowned. It ignores the fact that the big banks were bailed out. If the government hadn’t thrown them lifelines, many would have gone under.

Remember? Their balance sheets were full of junky paper, non-performing loans, and worthless derivatives. They were bailed out because they were too big to fail. And the reason for resurrecting Glass-Steagall is we don’t want to go through that ever again.

As George Santayana famously quipped, those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it. In the roaring 2000’s, just as in the Roaring Twenties, America’s big banks used insured deposits to underwrite their gambling in private securities, and then dump the securities on their customers.

It ended badly.

This is precisely what the Glass-Steagall Act was designed to prevent – and did prevent for more than six decades.

Hillary Clinton, of all people, should remember.

The post Hillary Clinton’s Glass-Steagall – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

A cross-party agreement between Macedonian political parties to end the country’s political crisis jointly mediated by the European Comission and European Parliament has been described by mediator Richard Howitt MEP as ‘pulling the country back from the brink.’

The British Euro MP who represented the Socialist and Democrat Group in the four person-mediation team and who had previously helped negotiate the earlier ‘March agreement’ to overcome a previous breakdown in the country’s parliament said he hoped the new agreement could begin the process of building permanent progress for democratic development in the country and to guarantee its Euro-Atlantic perspective.

Following over twelve hours of talks in the country’s capital Skopje, Richard Howitt MEP joined European Commissioner Johannes Hahn and the leaders of the country’s four main political parties to announce the deal in the early hours of Wednesday.

The agreement includes a timetable for governing party VMRO-DPMNE leader Nikola Gruevski to stand down in favour of a new Prime Minister in a new Government which will including some ministerial appointments from the opposition SDSM party and joint arrangements for early elections in April 2016.

A linked agreement will see special prosecutors appointed to pursue cases arising from the scandal surrounding illegal interception of telephone calls which prompted the current political crisis.

According to Richard Howitt MEP, “The prolonged crisis has had grave consequences for the stability of the country, its international standing and its prospects for progress towards European Union membership and it is not an exaggeration to say the timing agreement could pull the country back from the brink.”

Howitt said, “I am proud the European Parliament has joined the European Commission to facilitate the talks but it is now crucial that this new agreement now leads to permanent progress towards democratic development in the country.”

“The announcement of a Special Prosecutor working with full autonomy on the alleged criminality and corruption arising from the interception of communications, must be pursued fully and impartially to meet Europe’s and the international community’s expectation that there must be legal accountability for any wrongdoing,” Howitt added.

The post appeared first on Eurasia Review.

The Kenyan Ministry of Interior confirmed Thursday the deaths of four senior al-Shabaab commanders, including the mastermind behind the Garissa University attack that killed 148 people.

“It is a great day for Kenya. I can confirm that at 2am (Thursday) a U.S. drone attack killed four top al-Shabaab commanders,” interior ministry spokesman Mwenda Njoka told Anadolu Agency on Thursday.

“Garissa University attack mastermind Mohamed Kuno… was killed in the morning attack,” Njoka said.

“This is a great blow to the Somali militants as yesterday the Kenya Defense Forces were also able to kill seven commanders who ambushed one of their vehicles,” the spokesman added.

Njoka said the U.S. drone strike took place in Somalia’s Juungal area.

On April 2, al-Shabaab militants stormed Garissa University in northeastern Kenya, killing 148 people, 142 of whom were students.

Kenya then issued a $195,000 million bounty for the attack’s mastermind, Mohamed Kuno.

U.S. president Barack Obama is expected to visit Kenya later this month on July 24 for the Global Entrepreneurship Summit.

Original article

The post US Drone Strike Kills Mastermind Behind Kenya University Massacre appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By C. Raja Mohan*

The historic nuclear accord between Iran and the international community unveiled in Vienna on Tuesday helps remove a number of recent constraints on Indian foreign policy. As they facilitate a larger Indian role the Greater Middle East, the consequences of the nuclear agreement also present New Delhi with a number of new geopolitical challenges.

Over the last decade, the deepening tensions between Washington and Tehran had threatened India’s prospects for reconciliation with the global nuclear order, prevented it from an effective pursuit of energy security, limited its options in stabilising Afghanistan, and weakened its ability to cope with violent religious extremism.

The accord, which blocks Iran’s pathways to assembling a nuclear weapon on short order in return for lifting most of the sanctions on Tehran, vindicates New Delhi’s prudent strategy that acknowledged the problems with the Iranian nuclear programme, called for a peaceful resolution of the dispute, and focused on India’s own liberation from atomic sanctions.

New Delhi’s attitude to Iran’s proliferation became Washington’s touchstone in accepting India’s atomic exceptionalism under the controversial civil nuclear initiative unveiled by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W Bush in July 2005.

Many on the left and right in New Delhi demanded that India blindly back Tehran against Washington. If New Delhi had taken that advice, India might be gnashing its teeth today, as Tehran, in the name of “heroic flexibility”, offered multiple concessions to Washington to secure the deal.

Like the US-India civil nuclear initiative, the understanding between Washington and Tehran is bound to face intense scrutiny from opponents in both capitals who are determined to undermine it. The arguments will be heated and focused on a range of technical issues. But the real issues are political.

The deal is not just about preventing Iran’s nuclear proliferation. It is also about normalising relations between Washington and Tehran after three and a half decades of intense hostility since the 1979 Islamic revolution ousted the Shah of Iran, one of America’s leading allies in the region.

President Barack Obama is persuading America to overcome decades of demonizing Iran and accept Tehran’s critical role in shaping the future of the Middle East. As the US-Iran nuclear deal rearranges the regional balance of power, there will be many significant opportunities and challenges for India.

For one, the lifting of international sanctions will bring large amounts of Iranian oil into the market and push petroleum prices down for an extended period of time and boost India’s macroeconomic stability. At a broader level, Indian companies will be able to partake and benefit from Iran’s renewed economic growth.

The good news on the economic front is leavened with new political challenges that will emerge from the nuclear accord. The US-Iran political thaw has generated deep anxieties among America’s traditional allies in the region – including Israel and Saudi Arabia.

The rise of Iran has pushed these two into an unlikely partnership; and both of them are likely to take steps of their own to deal with the consequences of Iran’s new status in the region.

It is not unreasonable to assume that the current tensions between Iran and Israel, and between Tehran and some of its Arab neighbours, are likely to sharpen in the coming months and years.

While India’s opportunities in Iran are prospective, its current engagement with the region is weighted heavily towards the Arab Gulf and Israel. New Delhi, then, will have to devote greater attention to the region and learn to navigate the region’s new contradictions.

India’s thinking about the Middle East, whether from the UPA or NDA, has tended to be ideological and rooted in their domestic political considerations. Prime Minister Narendra Modi needs to break from this tradition and develop a strategy towards the Middle East that is firmly anchored in realpolitik.

As the Middle East becomes more complex and demanding, India’s options in Central Asia and Afghanistan are likely to expand rapidly as Tehran’s isolation ends. Iran’s role as India’s gateway to Central Asia, amidst Pakistan’s reluctance to offer overland transit facilities, has already begun to acquire renewed salience for the Modi government.

Iran’s rise as a regional actor will also open new options for India in Afghanistan amidst the current gloom about New Delhi’s declining capacity to influence the events in the country after US troops have ended their combat role there.

While the situation is not entirely similar to the mid 1990s, when New Delhi and Tehran actively collaborated to counter the influence of Pakistan and the Taliban, there will be room for much coordination between India and Iran. If America and Iran do begin to cooperate against violent extremism in the Greater Middle East, it should have many positive consequences for combating terrorism in the subcontinent.

As Iran and America move from nuclear accommodation to political cooperation, New Delhi must discard its shibboleths on the Middle East and embark on a vigorous and pragmatic engagement with all the key actors in the region, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi, and a Contributing Editor for Indian Express

Courtesy: Indian Express

The post Iran Nuclear Deal Gives India Room In Greater Middle East – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Over the past year, number of Indians and people of Indian origin have been associated with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Mantraya.org profiles these individuals who have shared different categories of alliances with the Islamic State as fighters, propagandists, fan-boys, wannabe extremists and even people willing to live and perish in the established Caliphate. There is no agreement on the actual number of Indians or people of Indian origin associated with the Islamic State. This database by Mantraya.org, the only one of its kind till date, focuses on the confirmed participants.

By Surya Valliappan Krishna and Bibhu Prasad Routray*

1. The MODULE

Imran Khan Muhammad Sharif

Imran Khan Muhammad Sharif was the leader of the first Islamic State module in India. Comprised of four other members – Wasim Khan, Mohammad Rizwan, Anwar and Mazhar – the module was busted and all five men were arrested in Ratlam in Mandhya Pradesh on 15 April 2015 on charges of planning terror strikes within India. Chemicals used to manufacture explosives were reportedly recovered from Imran Khan.

Imran Khan was the son of a clerk in Madhya Pradesh government’s rural education department. In 2001, he dropped out of an undergraduate business course at Royal College in Ratlam, having completed just four semesters. Immigration stamps on his passport detail five trips undertaken to Dubai and one to Saudi Arabia. While his family insists that these trips were made in search of employment, nothing materialised from these visits. Frustration and economic reasons led Khan to turn religious. In 2012, Khan joined Ahl al-Suffah, an Islamic proselytising and charity group led by a local resident Amjad Khan. However, he was expelled from the group after displaying radical tendencies. Wasim Khan, Mohammad Rizwan, Anwar and Mazhar were Ahl al-Suffah members.

Khan’s entry into the Islamic State network was facilitated by Muhammad Shafi Armar (also known as Yusuf). The two met and interacted on the Islamic State social media pages and Islamist forums, while Khan was seeking to further radicalize itself by trawling pro- Islamic State Facebook pages run by its supporters.

2. THE KALYAN CLIQUE

Areeb Majeed

Areeb Majeed is the most well-known face of the four-member Kalyan Clique which travelled to Iraq on a religious pilgrimage and then broke away from the group to travel to Mosul to join the Islamic State. Son of a doctor father, Majeed was a 22-year old civil engineering diploma student from an affluent family. A story nothing short of dramatic, he was reported dead in late August 2014 but made a surprise return to India three months later, in late November. Arrested upon his return, investigations threw up many facts of Majeed being a trained suicide bomber, that the Islamic State had lethal plans for India and also that Majeed was disillusioned with the menial work he was assigned in the conflict zone rather being allowed adventurous Jihad.

Majeed studied at a polytechnic college in Vashi, Mumbai. His radical tendencies were also initiated and sustained by internet chat rooms and Jihadist forums. He also claimed to have been lured by a love interest, Tahira Bhatt on social media. He was particularly motivated after watching violent videos relating to the Israel-Palestine situation. The radicalised Majeed had donated his denims and shirts, and avoided using cellphones a month and half before he left home. Relatives reported that Majeed would stop her sister, a doctor, from watching films and working. On one occasion he even brought her back home from the hospital by force. In a letter left at home before he left for Iraq, Majeed censured his family for “sinning”, “living luxurious lives”, “watching television” and “not praying”.

In the Islamic State-held territory Majeed was reportedly injured by a bullet while working on a construction site. He recovered in a week. Unconfirmed reports indicate that the Islamic State gave him US$2000 and dropped him on the Turkey border to go home. He is currently in custody of the investigative agencies.

Shaheen Tanki

Shaheen Tanki, a 25 year old high school dropout and a call centre employee, was one of four boys from Kalyan who flew to Baghdad on 23 May 2014 to join the Islamic State. Tanki is believed to have been radicalised online, looking at violent content on the internet and was subsequently brainwashed by Adil Dolare, an employee at the Islamic Guidance Centre in Kalyan. Unconfirmed reports of Tanki’s death surfaced in mid-January 2015, although his family rejected those reports.

Fahad Sheikh

Fahad Sheikh, a 25 year old mechanical engineering student at the Nagpada College in south Mumbai, joined the Islamic State after leaving his home in Kalyan in March 2015 and travelling to Iraq. Fahad had become a friend of Areeb Majeed after both met at a mosque and possibly was radicalised by Majeed. Only son in a family with four sisters, Fahad had turned radical and on occasions told his sisters not to watch movies and music and not apply makeup.

According to media reports in March 2015, Fahad was in regular touch with friends and family via telephone and social media and was known to be based in Iraq. During such interactions, Fahad Sheikh reportedly expressed his desire to remain in the Islamic State territory and not return to India.

Aman Naim Tandel

27-year old Aman Tandel, only son of his parents, was in the third year of mechanical engineering course when he left home for Iraq along with the three other members of the Kalyan clique and joined the Islamic State. Belonging to an affluent and educated family, Tandel was described by his neighbours as a “gentle, well-mannered boy” and “like a friend to his father”. He is known to be fighting on behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq.

3. THE OVERSEAS CONNECTION

Haja Farukuddin Usman Ali

Haja Farukuddin Usman Ali, originally from Tamil Nadu, was a 37 year old supermarket manager who had obtained citizenship of Singapore in 2008. In 2007, Ali had met Maracchi Maraicar at Cuddalore where the former had visited as a volunteer on a religious missionary trip. Both became friends because of their radical outlook and their contacts deepened after Maraicar became a permanent Singapore resident in 2008, the same year Ali got his citizenship in that country. In 2013, Ali travelled to Syria with financial support from Maraicar, training briefly in a camp housing Chechen jihadists. Later, he returned to Singapore, and served as a node for the Chennai students who were recruited to serve in Syria. In January 2014, Ali flew out of Singapore with his wife and three children (then aged between 2 and 11) to Turkey and then crossed over the border to Syria. In Jihadist circles, Ali went by the name of Abu Talha and had planned to fund a network of radical Muslims through his contacts in the country.

Abu Rumaysah

Abu Rumaysah (also known as Abu Rumaysah al Britani) is the assumed name of Siddhartha Dhar, born to a British-Indian Hindu family of Bihar-Bengal origin. He had converted to Islam during his teens and had long been estranged from his family. He was a key member of Al-Muhajiroun, led by Bangladesh-origin Islamist Anjem Choudary that has been at the forefront of campaigning for the Islamic State in the United Kingdom. According to reports, there is no record of Rumaysah having visited India in the past several years.

On 27 September 2014, the 31-year old left along with his family for Syria through Paris to join the Islamic State. Dhar was among nine men, including Anjem Choudary, who had been arrested and questioned by police in early September 2014 on suspicion of terrorism offences before being released on bail and ordered to return to police stations in December. However, he jumped bail and later mocked through his Twitter account the “shoddy” British security services which could not prevent him from joining the Islamic State. He expressed his joy in living in the Islamic State, and upon request from followers even posted pictures with his son and rifle on Twitter.

Prior to his flight from Britain, Abu Rumaysah was a familiar face on television representing the Islamist narrative and arguing in favour of the imposition of Shariah Law. On many occasions he spoke in support of the Islamic State and even said that he wished to travel to join the militants. In 2015, Abu Rumaysah published “A brief guide to the Islamic State”, a travel guide of sorts which included sections on food, weather, technology, transportation, people and education facilities in the established caliphate.

Muhammad Hamza Khan

Muhammad Hamza Khan, a 19-year old American citizen of Indian origin was arrested along with his two siblings at the O’Hare International Airport, Chicago on 4 October 2014 where he was planning to fly to Vienna and then onward to Istanbul to join the Islamic State. Khan, his 16-year old brother, and his 17-year old sister appeared to have been radicalised online.

Described as a “gentle boy” by his neighbours, a three page letter left by Khan for his family before attempting to fly out of the country revealed his state of mind and extent of radicalisation. In the letter, he invited his family to the Islamic State, an obligation of every Muslim and cited United States’ brutal foreign policy in the Middle East as the reason for his decision. His sister had previously used the Twitter handle @DeathIsTheeNear to send a favourable tweet about a video of beheadings. She even placed a smiley emoticon in the text.

Police investigations in addition to recovery of pro-Islamic State writings and drawings revealed that Khan was in touch with “an agent” whom he met online. This individual was to escort Khan to Islamic State territory. Khan was keen on a getting public service role with the Islamic State– humanitarian or combat. Khan faces up to a 15 year jail term.

Gul Mohammad Maracchi Maraicar

Gul Mohammad Maracchi Maraicar, a resident of Cuddalore in Tamil Nadu worked as a systems analyst with IBM in Singapore, where in he obtained permanent residency in 2008. He was stripped of his residency status and repatriated to India in February 2014 after investigators found that Maraicar had radicalised Singaporean national Haja Farukuddin Usman Ali who had migrated to Syria along with family members to join the Islamic State. Maraicar had also financed an earlier trip of Ali to Syria where the latter trained with the Chechen jihadists. Upon his repatriation, Maraicar told the Indian authorities that jihadists had successfully recruited two students from a college in Chennai. Maraicar is reportedly cooperating with the investigating authorities in India.

Islamic State India Cadres Chart
(Graphical representation of the alliances Indians and people of Indian origin share with the Islamic State, on the basis of information available till July 2015.)

4. THE INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN CONNECTION

Sajid Sheikh

30 year old Muhammad Sajid alias Baba Sajid was a senior member of the Indian Mujahideen (IM). He along with Sultan Armar was involved in the IM attacks of 2008 in Delhi, Ahmedabad and Jaipur that killed more than 166 people. Based in Pakistan, Sajid in 2014 was known to be fighting on behalf of the al Qaeda in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. It is unclear as to when he joined the Islamic State. Known as Abu Turab al-Hindi in the Islamic State, Sajid was reported to have died fighting on 3 July 2015 by the Isabah Media, the propaganda and media wing of Ansar al-Tauhid (AAT).

Muhammad Shafi Armar

Born in 1987 in Karnataka state’s Bhatkal town, Muhammad Shafi Armar alias Yusuf is an IM operative now associated with leading the Indian Jihadists in Iraq and Syria. He recruited and guided Imran Khan on building explosives, acquiring weapons and selecting targets for operations. In May 2015, Islamic State chief Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced that Shafi Armar would be the emir of AAT, a recruitment organization for the Islamic State.

Abdul Khadir Sultan Armar

40 year-old Sultan Armar, brother of Muhammad Shafi Armar was the founder of AAT. A fugitive in Pakistan since 2008, Armar broke away from the Karachi based Riyaz Bhatkal-led IM faction and pledged allegiance to the Islamic State. The AAT motivated Muslims to join its training camps along the Af-Pak border. In 2014, Sultan Armar was suspected to have appeared as a masked jihadist in a series of propaganda videos inviting Indian Muslims to train at jihad camps in Pakistan’s North Waziristan. Through such propaganda he managed to recruit group of men from Rajasthan who were arrested for planning attacks in India. AAT Jihadists who went on to fight with the Islamic State formed a group called Ansar-ul-Tawhid fil’Bilad al-Sham. Sultan Armar was reportedly killed while fighting near Kobane on the Syria-Turkey border on 6 March 2015.

5. INDIAN YOUTHS ABROAD

Adil Fayaz

Adil Fayaz, a 26 year-old MBA student at Queensland University, Australia joined the Islamic State in Syria in 2013 by travelling via Turkey and Jordan. Adil was a bright student; had completed his undergraduate studies in Business Administration and Masters in Commerce from Kashmir University before moving to Australia. His father, Fayaz Ahmad Waida, ran a successful contracting business and went on to open a supermarket chain which allowed him to fund his son’s education overseas.

Adil Fayaz had shown no inclination towards political issues but was struggling to find a job in Australia and then in the Middle East after his graduation. In 2013, he found a job of a teacher in Malaysia and travelled to Kuala Lumpur in September that year. Less than a month later, he told his family that he has found another job with an NGO in Turkey. Adil is the first Indian from Kashmir to join the battle against the Bashar al-Assad regime. Australia’s intelligence services believe that the NGO Adil joined is in fact an Australian group, Street Dawah Australia (SDA), closely linked to the Islamic State. The SDA was notorious for its propagation of Islamist narrative and some of its members have joined the ranks of the Islamic State.

Muhammad Hanif Waseem

27 year-old Muhammad Hanif Waseem, one of the three sons of a hotel and real estate businessman in Hyderabad, completed his B.Tech. from Shadhan College of Engineering and Technology in Hyderabad and went to the United Kingdom for his Master’s course in 2011. Subsequently he started working in Dubai. He visited his family in Hyderabad in September 2014 and got engaged to a local girl, a student pursuing Bachelor of Dental Surgery (BDS). A few days after his engagement, Waseem left for Dubai. In February 2015, he called up his father Mohammed Aleem and told him that he was not interested in marriage and he wanted to join the jihad in Syria. He reportedly called up his fiancée and apologised to her and told her to marry someone else. It is believed that radical social media content played an important role in his radicalisation. His family kept this hidden from security agencies fearing social stigma. Waseem reportedly died in fighting in Iraq/Syria April 2015. Subsequently his family approached security officials for help.

Unidentified Hyderabadi Woman

An 18 year-old Hyderabadi woman living in Qatar since 1998 attempted to join the Islamic State in November/December 2014. She was reportedly influenced by the Islamic State literature available online and also by a roommate, a girl from Yemen in Doha who wanted to accompany her. In September 2014, both reached Istanbul where they were stopped by the immigration authorities and were sent back to Doha. Subsequently she returned to her family in India. No action was taken against her by the police although she was provided with counselling sessions.

6. WANNABE JIHADISTS

Group of 14 from Hyderabad

Fourteen students from Hyderabad attempting to travel to Syria were arrested at the Hyderabad airport on 6 May 2015. They were all students from different engineering colleges and were subsequently counselled and investigated for suspicious links.

Group of Nine in Turkey

Nine Indians travelled to Istanbul on tourist visas on 24 December 2014 and attempted to cross the border into Syria but were deported to India by Turkish authorities on 30 January 2015. The group members were identified as 24 year old Ibrahim Nowfal from Hassan and Javed Baba from Telengana; the other seven members belonged to a Chennai based family identified as Muhammad Abdul Ahad, his wife and five children. Ahad finished his Masters Computer Science from Kennedy-Western University, California. Javed and Nowfal were qualified engineers.

Two college students from Chennai

According to reports in July 2014, two unnamed college students from Chennai went missing from their homes and landed in Syria becoming a part of the Islamic State. Both reportedly were radicalised by Haja Fakkurudeen Usman Ali, a Tamil Nadu-born Singapore national, who left the country for Syria in January 2014. According to last reports, the Indian government was trying to repatriate them with the help of international agencies.

7. THE PROPAGANDIST

Mehdi Mansoor Biswas

Mehdi Mansoor Biswas, originally hailing from Gopalpur in West Bengal state, was a management executive at a multinational company in Bangalore. He handled a pro-Islamic State Twitter account @ShamiWitness and began posting pro-jihadist information on the account from early 2011. Introducing himself as a Libyan man living in the United Kingdom he kept his identity a complete secret. He was both a source of information and incitement for fellow jihadists around the world. He was particularly effective with the English speaking Jihadists and according to an estimate two-thirds of Islamic State’s foreign fighters on Twitter were among 17,700 of his account followers. Mehdi Biswas was arrested by the police on 13 December 2014 following an investigation by British television Channel 4 into the person behind the twitter account.

With old parents and two elder sisters back in West Bengal to take care, Mehdi was particularly critical of the Indian Muslim population, and said they were not capable of waging Jihad. He believed that the Islamic State was fighting the “real war”. Mehdi did not share any direct linkage with the Islamic State and was no more than a fan-boy. Investigation revealed that he was comfortable playing the role of a strategist and rather than fighting on the ground. The account still exists on Twitter.

*Surya Valliappan Krishna is a post-graduate student at the Department of War Studies, King’s College, London. Dr. Bibhu Prasad Routray is Director of Mantraya.org. This Special Report is a part of Mantraya.org’s “Islamic State in South Asia” project. Surya is a lead researcher with the project.

The post Islamic State’s Indian Brigade – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

By Prerna Bakshi

While history recounts the plunderous eras when pirates reigned over high seas, sabotaged trade and caused anarchy on land, Somalian piracy materialises this into the grim reality of the 21st century. What started off in the war torn region of Somalia as a local effort by fishermen to protect their coastline, soon evolved into one of the deadliest installations of modern day maritime piracy with pirates infesting waters as far as 1000 nautical miles off the coast of Somalia into the Indian Ocean and as strategic for global trade as the Gulf of Aden.[1]More than 30,000 vessels annually transit the Gulf of Aden (GOA) and more than 20% of global trade moves through this route.[2] With nearly 4000 crewmembers of 125 different nationalities captured by 2012, 150 ships reportedly ransomed for an estimated $US385 million, and insurance premiums increased by almost 10 fold for ships transiting this route,[3] Somalian piracy exerts its influence on world trade, international relations and global politics and has assumed a ‘pandemic’ status worldwide.

Certainly, this malady of the seas has not gone unnoticed by the international community. In 2009, the United States Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT) created the ‘Combined Task Force 151’ with naval forces of multifarious countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Italy, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. In addition, NATO sent two missions in 2008 and EU launched ‘Operation Atalanta’ in 2009, to aid in the difficult issue of tackling pirate activity.[4] However, these missions seemingly proved ineffective as Somalian piracy levels shot to an all time high in 2011, attributed to over 200 attacks, 700 hostages and 30 boats held in the year. [5] It wasn’t until late 2012 that piracy levels began to wane and were finally brought under control by 2013. This multifaceted episode triggers numerous questions. For instance, did the International community play a role in abetting Somalian Piracy? What role did it play in curbing piracy? Why did the various missions meet with initial failure? Can the era of Somalian piracy really be deemed as over? In my paper, I attempt to address Somalian piracy with regard to these questions, and analyse whether Somalian piracy is an independent ‘disease’ or merely a symptom of the real ailment on-shore.

Lennox[6] categorises Somalian Piracy into two phases, each of which have a correlation to socio-political events in the country. It is no coincidence that the first phase of Somalian Piracy surfaced in 1991, immediately following the fall of Somalia’s government and supplant of Barre’s regime by clan-based warlords. The second phase, from 2005 onwards, saw an escalation of piracy in terms of quantity, value and ransom demanded. This phase correlates to the 2004-2006 famine that scorched Somalia aggravating poverty, limiting access to essential resources and stimulating further clan based conflict.

It is evident that the off-shore problem of piracy has on-shore roots, however there is need to analyse the current cause-effect relationship between the two. Piracy is certainly the result of a larger problem in Somalia: of poverty, complete state failure, lack of government and inter-clan conflict. However, piracy has evolved into and additionally functions as an aggravating factor for its on-shore problem.

According to a UNSOM report, pirates and pirate financiers advance and finance other criminal activities as well and have built significant paramilitary capacities on land. They thus possess the potential, resources and motivations to destabilise the region and have effectively been doing so.[7] Hence, given the current scenario, piracy has forged a complex relationship with its roots in Somalia. It not only stems from these roots but has evolved to further cultivate them. Viewing piracy independently as a disease has always been a fallacy; it can more accurately be classified as a symptom that has dangerously metastasised. Treating Somalia’s state failure or Somalian piracy exclusively rather than mutually has limited potential in eradicating either problem.

While the relationship between piracy and civil conflict in Somalia is evident and direct, indirect factors play a substantial role in the creation of this situation. Falling under the purview of global governance, the situation in Somalia can be greatly attributed to several macro factors. In essence, it can be considered representative of neglect, exploitation and poor global governance by the international community. In 2002, Abdiqassim Salad Hassan, the president of the Transitional National Government, expressed deep disappointment at the lack of support from the international community for rehabilitation in Somalia. During a press conference in Mogadishu, he said if the international community “keeps neglecting us”, Somalia could become “a safe-haven” for local terrorists who collaborate with international terrorists.[8] His concerns were certainly not unfounded as following the 9/11 attacks Somalia was viewed as a breeding ground for transnational terrorism.

Even after, the restoration of a Somali government became part of a counterterrorism strategy, rather than a way to deal with the root causes of state collapse and conflict. Policies of big players have also been criticised as having played a role in creating the conditions that led to a famine in Somalia in 2011.[9] ‘Al-Shabaab’, the clan based organisation controlling majority of Somalia, withheld aid from local populations and worked primarily towards their own economic and politic motive. On the other hand, aid agencies were banned from providing assistance in areas where supplies or money might end up in the hands of Al-Shabaab operatives. This effectively created a vacuum where both sides neglected the people of Somalia.

Although, it is well established that civil conflict has transnational repercussions, this truth was ignored by the international community for a prolonged period of time. While Wilson,[10] postulates that the stabilisation of Somalia would be the first step to overcoming piracy, Menkhaus,[11] cautions that delayed external action to revive and support failing states only compounds the difficulty of state building later; this is exactly what happened in the case of Somalia.

Neglect is not the only adverse contribution of the international community towards the situation in Somalia. Illegal fishing and toxic waste dumping are accused of provoking piracy by inducing local fishermen to protect their coastline at all costs. The United Nations estimated that illegal fishing companies from Europe and Asia rob Somali coastlines of over $300 million a year. In addition to this stimulus, a private British company, Hart Security, provided military training to Somali fisherman in the 1990’s in an effort to create a “Fisheries Protection Agency”[12].

The bulk of training was dedicated towards “how to handle weapons and board boats at high sea”[13] – the exact tactics currently used by Somali pirates. In fact, Somali pirates are so conditioned that they portray themselves as the nation’s unofficial coast guard, fighting against illegal fishing and waste dumping by foreign corporations. Somalian pirates are also abetted by international sponsors; Somali refugees as far as Canada and the United States contribute money to the cause, in addition to financial backing from sources in Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen and Al Qaeda.[14]The political structure operational in Somalia also has its roots in foreign intervention. Wais Kassim H. Dahir[15] notes that the militarisation of Somalian government can be attributed to Soviet Union’s post cold war support. He also points out that when the cold war ended, superpowers left behind large amounts of weapons that turned Somalia into an armed camp. Subsequently, every household had more arms than food which kept the civil war going. Thus, it is once again apparent with the case of Somalia that civil conflict is both influenced by and influences the international sphere, re-emphasising the need for good global governance.

Having established the role foreign factors have played in indirectly encouraging piracy, it follows to question why their direct efforts to eradicate the same met with initial failure. One of the major reasons for the growth of piracy despite multinational counter-efforts was the purely naval nature of foreign response. The initial strategy to tackle piracy seems to be based on the assumption that piracy was the ‘disease’ to be independently remedied and not the ‘symptom’ that it more rightly is. Causes of piracy may have started with grievance and shifted to greed, but the roots of the problem, including poverty and conflict, cannot be addressed with a naval response.[16]

It is important to consider that waning pirate attacks in 2012 and 2013 could, in part, be related to the establishment of a government in Somalia.[17] However, spending on capacity-building in Somalia is still only equivalent to 1.5% of piracy’s annual cost. The need of the hour is for nations to realise that their trade revenue interests go hand in hand with capacity building in Somalia.[18] While Somalian piracy has fallen sharply in the recent years, this may well be a suppression of the problem than its complete eradication. If Somali piracy is going to be combated using solely sea-based tactics it will require a critical mass of warships and air assets to maintain a constant presence in the region.

However, it would be wishful thinking to expect this sort of a presence to continue for any prolonged period given the cost of modern naval deployments. The GOA is a large body of water, and warships are not a long-term cost effective method of providing commercial vessels with protection from Somali piracy. Without a two-pronged approach it is only a matter of time till the naval forces move out of Somalian waters and Somalia’s poverty and conflict find global expression through piracy or other internationally detrimental means.

The efficacy of a two-pronged approach is implicitly outlined in the UNSOM 2013 report. Among other capacity building initiatives, the report mentions the Security Council’s decision that UNSOM support the Federal Government of Somalia on governance, security sector reform, the rule of law, the disengagement of combatants, maritime security and mine action. It also states the agenda to strengthen the fisheries sector, by creating strong institutions and developing the policy and legal frameworks. In this context, extensive work is being carried out by rehabilitating feeder roads, clearing land for agriculture, and constructing water catchments in Somalia. These efforts are indicative of the dawning realisation for a more comprehensive strategy to address the complex issue.

The complete impact of recent and ongoing capacity building efforts on piracy remains unclear and difficult to determine due to its nascent nature. Conversely, the present situation in Somalia strongly suggests one hard truth. The naval forces may have successfully suppressed piracy but cannot provide a long-term solution. Hence, by no means can 2013 be regarded as the end of Somalian piracy. While the two-pronged approach will prove to be a panacea in the long run, a shift in scope to include targeting not only the perpetrators but also the enablers will help the strategy gain momentum. In addition, it is crucial to establish a sound judicial system to set the foundation of stability. Blanket amnesty, punishment and lustration are all possible ways of addressing such issues, which once dealt with will make the road ahead smoother.

[1] ICC International Maritime Bureau. Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships: Annual Report 2009. London: IMB, 2009. Print.
[2] Johnson, La’Nita M. “The Consequences of Somali Piracy on International Trade.” Global Tides 8.1 (2014): 5.
[3] Do, Quy-Toan. The pirates of Somalia: ending the threat, rebuilding a nation. Washington DC: World Bank, 2013.
[4] Blanchard, Christopher M., et al. “Piracy off the Horn of Africa.” Washington: Congressional Research Service (2009).
[5] Malm, Sarah. “European Court Chides France Over Somali Pirate Arrests.” Mail Online. N.p., 2014. Web. 10 Jan. 2015.
[6] Lennox, Patrick. Contemporary piracy off the Horn of Africa. Canadian Defence & Foreign Affairs Institute, 2008.
[7] United Nations Assisted Mission in Somalia. Secretary-General’s Report On Piracy And Armed Robbery At Sea Off The Coast Of Somalia. New York: United Nations, 2013. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.
[8] IRINnews.“SOMALIA: President Disappointed At Lack Of International Support.” N.p., 2002. Web. 14 Jan. 2015.
[9]Bradbury, Mark. “How Do You Solve A Problem Like Somalia?” Newint.org. N.p., 2012. Web. 13 Jan. 2015.
[10] Wilson, Brian. “Effectively confronting a regional threat: Somali piracy.” Conflict trends 1 (2009): 11-18.
[11] Menkhaus, Ken. “Governance without government in Somalia: spoilers, state building, and the politics of coping.” (2007).
[12] Al Jazeera, English. “Firms Reap Somali Piracy Profits – Africa.”Al Jazeera English. 9 Sept. 2009. Web. 15 Jan 2015
[13] ibid
[14] Kellerman, Miles G. “Somali Piracy: Causes and Consequences.” Student Pulse 3.09 (2011).
[15]Dahir, Wais Kassim. “Learning The Lessons: The Root Causes Of The Somali Conflict.” Somaliland Times 2002. Web. 12 Jan. 2015.
[16] Hall, Andrea. “Piracy And The Experience Of Somali Women.” Canadian Military History. N.p., 2013. Web. 11 Jan. 2015.
[17] ibid
[18]Oceans Beyond Piracy. Latest Oceans Beyond Piracy Report. 2014. Web. 7 Jan. 2015.

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Is Lithuania sending weapons to Ukraine or not? Marius Janukonis, Ambassador to Ukraine, caused a political earthquake in June after acknowledging that Lithuania is ready to become the first country to officially arm Kiev with deadly weapons. Prime Minister Algirdas Butkevicius, on the other hand, blasted Janukonis, labelling his statements as having been “out of line”, and saying that even if the political will exists, the State Defence Council will have the final word on the topic. However, despite this smoke and mirrors game, it’s only a matter of time before hawkish President Dalia Grybauskaitė will triumphantly inform the nation that Vilnius shall become the first EU member to actively ensure Ukraine’s territorial security and give it the means to counter Russia’s aggression. But is it really the wisest course of action?

Standing in stark contrast with Vilnius, the Ukrainian Institute of Strategies of Global Development and Adaptation in Brussels arranged and moderated an international teleconference with the modest aim of reaching a broader political compromise between Ukraine, Russia, and the European Union (EU). The conference was titled “Context and Prospects of Settlement of the Conflict in the East of Ukraine,” and was led by several academic experts in fields of political science, philosophy, and international relations from Kiev, Moscow and Brussels. The goal was to establish stronger ties between the civil societies and intellectual leaders of the EU, Russia and Ukraine. Unlike Grybauskaitė’s rhetoric, such a conference in a time of heavy hostility gives an opportunity to take a fresh look at the conflict, through a dispassionate viewpoint and break through the media fuelled frenzy.

Indeed, the current trend has been one of a continuous game of upping the ante, exacerbating fears on all sides, spreading beyond Russia and Ukraine to neighbouring EU countries. These countries, such as Lithuania and Poland, still harbour fresh memories of being swept under Soviet rule, memories too painful for their leaders not to take Russian aggression seriously. It is not surprising then that President Grybauskaitė has reinstated a divisive military draft on 11 May for young people. Naturally, her hawkish stance, propelled by an understanding that Moscow could engulf the southernmost Baltic country within hours, enjoys high support in Lithuania.

Lithuania’s sensitivity may not be so surprising given its history; nevertheless, its swiftness to return to a cold-war logic is rather distressing. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea has shattered the European dream of living in a post-modern, peace-prone society. In a flash, the continent returned to a reality ruled by the zero-sum game; one where a president has to re-enact a draft, write a survival manual instructing its public on what to do in case of a Russian attack, train troops and throw herself even deeper into the conflict by sending heavy weaponry to one of the participants.

This is taking place on a continent that has already went through hundreds of wars; one where the EU was created precisely to forego future aggression by leading the European community through effective soft power means. This kind of Union is what drew in Lithuania, Poland, and other central and eastern European members. This kind of Union is what attracted Ukraine to sign the DCFTA, and instigated the conundrum in which it currently finds itself with Russia. Surely, the Union’s peaceful practices cannot immediately go to waste because Moscow is playing a different kind of game, one more suited for the 20th century.

Rather than using the logic of power politics played by Grybauskaitė and her ilk, she should use that pugnacious energy and tremendous European political capital and use it to foster dialogue, a dialogue that generates peace and security, and would spearhead a solution for Ukraine.

Dialogue?

Let’s not kid ourselves, dialogue is by no means a fool’s tool. Dialogue was used to set the stage for the end of the Cold War in 1975 with the Helsinki Final Act, a time where tensions were considerably higher than now and when all European militaries were on a high alert. These accords also established the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which was the first of its kind in using a comprehensive strategy agreement that involved bilateral and multilateral relations. The agreement was a “victory of reason”, according to Brezhnev, one where all peoples, both socialist and capitalist, won. If in a time of such deep divisions a peace agreement could be established and sustained, surely another win-win circumstance can prevail for all sides now. Indeed, a recent report on OSCE’s involvement in Ukraine shows that an expansion of conflict prevention mechanisms and a better deployment of multi-track diplomacy are needed to bridge the gap that prevents a solution for the conflict.

Less publicized efforts and communication tools remove pre-conceived notions of hope, and levels the playing field allowing participants to just talk and listen – to have an open dialogue. Such efforts create new channels for conversation, when such channels have become quite limited. The Minsk Agreements were accompanied by high expectations and were billed as the way forward. They failed. The advantage in engaging in grassroots diplomacy is that experts and academics in the field are not necessarily as emotionally charged as politicians. Their distance to the situation gives them an advantage in being able to hypothetically reach a consensus at a safe level, before brokering a compromise later at the political level. This setting allows an open discussion among the major parties and moves past the antiquated zero-sum realism that has, once more, plagued the continent. Isn’t this what Europe was supposed to be about? Isn’t this why Eastern countries joined the Union in the first place?

*Tom Liutkus is a Lithuanian expat and EU affairs consultant based out of Brussels, but working frequently in Eastern Europe. Liutkus specialises in evaluation and performance audits and has done a significant amount of consulting work on structural funds in particular. Liutkus’ has been featured before on Real Clear World and Lithuania Tribune.

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A few days ago I received a disturbing email that set of alarm bells and signals of concern. In a limited but analytical study, Dean Hoke, the founder of Edu Alliance, an education management-consulting firm based in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, disclosed disturbing figures of people with bogus degrees living and working in the GCC.

Hoke, who has an extensive background in the fields of higher education, broadcasting and community relations, used a recent New York Times expose on the bogus degree practices by the Pakistan corporation called Axact and gleaned out the names of the fake universities offering fake diplomas. He then cross checked names of these institutions on the LinkedIn website with GCC professionals who professed to carry credentials from these universities. What he found out was indeed alarming.

There were over 3,000 people with bogus degrees living in the GCC. Hoke provided five examples of people who state on LinkedIn that they have a degree from the bogus schools and what they do for a living:

• Saudi Arabia: General Manager at Healthcare Services Company
• UAE: Principal at International Private School Abu Dhabi
• Qatar: Head of Project Controls at Qatar Gas Company
• Kuwait: Safety Site Superintendent
• Bahrain: Deputy General Manager of a Islamic Bank

As Hoke describes in his study, “The New York Times determined hundreds of online universities are likely to be linked to Axact’s operation. I decided to look further into the list of universities to determine how many people have a degree from one or more of these schools. I went into my LinkedIn account and began a search of each university, which generated a list of individuals who reported being a graduate of one of the bogus school. I restricted my search to the GCC countries (Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman).”

He summarized his findings as follows: The UAE had the highest number of bogus degree holders followed very closely by Saudi Arabia. What was particularly significant to me was the companies in the Kingdom that employed these fake charlatans. Saudi ARAMCO has four bogus degree holders on their payroll. Al Marai, Abdul Lateef Jameel and STC also have imposters working within their organizations, and the list keeps going on and on. The list includes a variety of organizations from airport expansion to civil works that have been duped by these frauds who are currently on their payroll and no doubt have been instrumental in the project delays and high costs.

I had long admired ARAMCO as the premier organization in the Kingdom. But in recent years I have been receiving a stream of complaints from some of my readers about the growing ills within the company. Charges of nepotism, bureaucratic inefficiencies and a general malaise were some of the items brought up.

Some ARAMCOANS told me they decided to opt for early retirement on account of the gradual shift from what was a highly fine-tuned organization run according to high Western standards to the state of affairs as they claim it is today. Findings by Dean Hoke shore up their credibility because if ARAMCO has indeed employed bogus degree holders then they have slipped very far down the ladder.

Hoke also warns us that this list was gleaned only from the names of bogus universities that Axact was using. “The bad news is that there are many hundreds of others doing the same thing.” And it is not simply bogus degrees that such companies provides. “Apart from the alleged sale of fake diplomas and degrees through its online universities and colleges, Karachi-based IT company Axact has also been offering its services as ‘proxy students’, filling in for all the academic work originally assigned to students enrolled in reputable educational institutions in US.” This is indeed disturbing and will continue to proliferate in a region that needs quality rather than quantity.

It is important to remember that Hoke’s study was a limited one. I shudder to imagine what more can he reveal with another exhaustive study and with unlimited resources at his disposal. It is time to send a strong message to such charlatans that their bogus credentials will not be tolerated. The media must play a bigger role in alerting society of such ills. The Shoura Council must make immediate legislation to penalize all those proven to be carrying fake degrees with hefty fines and jail sentences.

Otherwise we may one day find ourselves undergoing heart surgery or flying on an aircraft manned by one of these impostors.

*The author can be reached at talmaeena@aol.com. Follow him on Twitter @talmaeena. This article appeared also in the Saudi Gazette.

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