When the Iranian revolution embarked against Muhammad Reza Shah’s regime in the late 70s, it wasn’t a social revolution aiming at changing the society, but rather a political one with legitimate demands similar to what Syrians once were looking forward to achieve in 2011. When all this started in Iran, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the most central and inspirational figure in the Iranian revolution was still in exile. This is a story that happened 35 years ago and we cannot but see the rhyming of its events with the current Syrian imbroglio.

In 1975 the regime of the Shah took further steps to consolidate its power over Iranian people. It abandoned the existing two-party system and introduced a single political organization – the Resurgence Party. While the sole party was gaining more control over territory and population, it threatened groups previously enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy from the government, namely the bazaar merchants and religious clerics (Ulama). Like in Syria, the Iranian one-party regime benefitted from its apparatus to keep people in check and to enforce its policies – while at the same time glorifying the monarchy at the expense of Islamic scholars, controlling bazaars and reducing Islam in daily life. These policies angered both the Ulama and bazaar merchants triggering an alliance between them against the regime.

The alliance between opposition forces and Ulama was to add pressure to liberalize and perhaps to topple the regime of the Shah. Westernized urban professionals, students from the new secular universities and theological seminaries, bazaar merchants and Ulama were protesting actors against the Shah. Many of them were driven by political, economic and social factors; quite few were driven by religious motivations.

Introducing court reforms for trials of political dissidents and releasing political prisoners due to US pressure didn’t help the Shah much. The Iranian regime’s violations of human rights and its use of torture against political prisoners were staggering much like what we see in the Syrian regime’s torture chambers and prisons. The opposition factions became emboldened to speak out organizing themselves into professional associations and student organizations, publishing pamphlets and distributing manifestos criticizing the regime’s violation of human rights and demanding freedom of press and assembly and escalating its activities by resurrecting old political organizations and forming new ones, notably the National Front and the right wing of the Ulama.

The religious clergy didn’t have an action plan against the Shah. Indeed, the majority of them thought that it was not their place to partake in political activities. While some opposition forces were reformist believing in restoring the constitution and establishing a constitutional monarchy under the shah such as Mehdi Bazargan, a reformist politician and a representative of the forces of the secular National Front, some were more intransigent and militant, such as Khomeini, accepting no deal with the Shah and aimed at overthrowing him and installing a new system.

Khomeini’s proposal was to create an Islamic state modeled on the Quran and the community of the prophet and led by the men of religion because their knowledge of Islamic law is vital for managing the affairs of state. Although Khomeini’s proposal was declined by the majority of opposition forces, his words found resonance during the momentum of the revolution across Iran attracting more people on his side.

Many urban workers were recent migrants from the countryside living in crowded shantytowns in and around Tehran. Marginalized in their rural areas and not yet fully incorporated into urban life, they were receptive to the calls for protest by the spokesmen of Islam. Working classes joined students, merchants and Ulama in streets against Shah’s repression. Exactly as in Syria, demonstrators’ cries for reform, freedom and restoration of the constitution took a more radical tone demanding the death of the Shah and the return of the Khomeini. More religious terms started to slip into protestors’ slogans replacing the older “non-religious” ones. The revolutionary protests reached a peek during the ten days of the month Muharram, a period of ritual mourning for the death of Imam Husain important in the Shiite calendar. Framing anti-regime protests in this ceremonial period firmly puts the whole revolutionary movement in religious framework.

After the Shah had left Iran for his own good in January 1979, the triumphant Khomeini was welcomed by huge crowds as he returned in February to Iran. This point in specific was a decisive conjuncture in the Iranian trajectory towards the future. Should Iran now be dominated by religious establishment or secular elites or both? In an attempt to answer this question about Iran’s future orientation, thousands of lives were lost. Now we know the answer – the religious establishment won.

Khomeini appointed Bazargan as a prime minister to bring political order and economic stability, but the latter failed to do so effectively due to his limited powers compared with a ruling organization known as the Council of the Islamic Republic, which issued laws and decrees to constantly veto Bazargan government’s policies. Transformation into religious frameworks continued starting from schoolbooks to the highest forms of education, enforcing Islamic teachings in social life and creating a religiously coloured rhetoric in media and political discourse.

Universities closed for two years in an attempt to review all educational subjects so they comply with Islamic teachings. We see the same changes happening in Syria especially in rebel-held areas and refugee camps inside and outside the Syrian borders. All non-religious books were substituted by religious or religiously coloured ones. Should Syria avoid the scenario of Afghanistan when warlords had control on specific regions and continued their attempt to violently keep hold on them, Syria is more likely to move in the direction of a Sunni, perhaps more fragmented, Iran in the Middle East.

By G. Padmaja*

It is one year since Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook a bilateral visit to Nepal on August 3-4, 2014. This was a historic visit because an Indian prime minister was undertaking a bilateral visit to Nepal after 17 years, the last one was in June 1997. Also it was Prime Minister Modi’s second bilateral visit abroad after assuming office, the first being to Bhutan. All this was indicative of the seriousness and commitment with which India wanted to pursue relations Nepal and with its immediate neighbourhood. The visit marked a definitive change in the manner in which India-Nepal bilateral relations would be conducted. The goodwill that this visit generated has been sustained throughout this one year despite some misgivings. India has been able to maintain cordial relations with all the political parties and stakeholders of the peace process in Nepal. The impression which was earlier present that India was not comfortable with Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) (UCPN-Maoist) no longer holds true. Correspondingly, the last one year has also seen a broad consensus within Nepal regarding relations with India.

Revisiting Modi’s Bilateral Visit of August 3-4, 2014

The visit enabled discussions on the entire gamut of issues concerning the two countries. Both countries stressed that bilateral institutional mechanisms should be convened regularly and the reactivation of the India-Nepal Joint Commission at the level of foreign ministers after 23 years was a significant development. No issues were brushed aside and both agreed to revise, adjust and update the Treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950. Nepal would first give specific proposals in this direction which would then be discussed. The Boundary Working Group (BWG) was formed to look into and resolve all pending India-Nepal boundary issues. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj stressed that 98% of the boundary with Nepal has been agreed upon. Security concerns arising from the open border and the necessary measures to prevent it from being misused were also discussed. In the context of the vital importance of transit rights to Nepal, the two countries agreed to simplify transit procedures for Nepal.

India announced a credit of US $1billion on infrastructure and energy development projects to be identified by Nepal. As culture is an integral part of the bilateral relations, the proposal for a Buddhist circuit covering places in both countries was discussed as was India’s assistance regarding conservation and restoration in the Pashupatinath Complex. The Nepal–Bharat Maitri Shiksha Karyakram focussed on deepening education assistance to Nepal. The issues discussed included ways to enhance sub-regional cooperation in the areas of trade, transit, connectivity and hydropower. The issue of cooperation on hydro-power generation was approached with rare degree of trust. Prime Minister Modi gave a HIT formula for Nepal saying that India wants to build Highways (H), Information highways (I), and Transways – transmission lines (T).

The Indian prime minister addressed the Constituent Assembly and Legislature Parliament of Nepal and through his address brought out the importance of the peace process and reached out to all the political parties and the people of Nepal.

The Other Developments

When Modi visited Nepal once again, this time to attend the 18th SAARC Summit in November 2014, bilateral relations were also discussed. The Pashupatinath Express bus service from Kathmandu to Delhi was flagged off; an MOU on National Police Academy to be located in Nepal and constructed by India was arrived at; other MOUs were in the field of tourism, health, youth affairs, hydropower. Prime Minister Modi also handed over one Dhruv Advanced Light Helicopter (ALH) Mark III to the Nepal Army which has been fully designed and developed by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL).

The earthquake in Nepal resulted in Operation Maitri – India’s largest ever disaster assistance effort abroad valued at nearly four billion Indian rupees. India pledged assistance of $1 billion towards recovery and reconstruction of Nepal over and above what it had committed bilaterally during Modi’s visit.

On June 15, 2015, the transport ministers of Bangladesh, Bhutan , India and Nepal (BBIN) endorsed and signed in Thimphu, the BBIN Motor Vehicles Agreement for the Regulation of Passenger, Personal and Cargo Vehicular Traffic between them . This step towards sub regional cooperation would have a positive impact on India–Nepal bilateral relations too.

The problem however arises in implementing what has been agreed upon. The prime ministers of Nepal and India expressed concern over the slow pace of implementation of projects under bilateral economic cooperation during Modi’s bilateral visit in August 2014. Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj while on a visit to Nepal on June 25, 2015, to attend the International Conference on Nepal’s Reconstruction said in a statement with reference to the developmental activities India is associated, “…We also hope that the early implementation of important projects such as Pancheshwar, Arun III and Upper Karnali Hydropower projects and Nijgarh Airport and Kathmandu–Nijgarh Fast Track Road Projects will create new avenues for people’s livelihood, enhance Governments revenue and contribute towards speedy post quake recovery and rehabilitation.”

The India-China understanding in May 2015 to expand border trade at the Lipulekh Pass led to many politicians and commentators in Nepal questioning this move of both India and China as they consider Lipulekh Pass as falling under its territory. Some commentators were of the view that Nepal should have been informed and its views also taken into consideration. The issue however did not escalate.

The Road Ahead: Building on structures of trust

Presently Nepal is debating the draft of its constitution with a desire to promulgate it by mid August. This internal process of Nepal has seen an open dissatisfaction from many quarters with respect to many provisions of the draft constitution. Nepal is going through a difficult phase and the country will continue to face difficult times even if a constitution is promulgated by mid August. However, it can safely be said that stresses and strains of this internal process will not adversely affect the India-Nepal bilateral relations. There will definitely be difficult times bilaterally for the internal tensions within will tend to spill over into India. Aspersions and accusations will be made on India. Already the timing of leaders of Nepal who have already visited India, like former prime minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ in July and Sher Bahadur Deuba in August while the constitution is in a crucial stage is being questioned. It is being argued that this reflects India’s desire for a leverage and stake in the new constitution.

India has repeatedly stated that it stands for drafting of an inclusive constitution based on widest possible consensus. The channels of communication carefully built by India with all the major parties will see that the relations are not rocked. However, India should carefully construct its responses to developments in Nepal which are in a crucial sensitive phase. It should focus on implementing agreements and regularly interact through the bilateral institutional mechanisms. Indeed, the structures of trust built in this one year will stand good heed in these difficult times.

*G.Padmaja, a former UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research) Visiting Research Fellow at the United Nations, Geneva is an independent researcher writing on SAARC and India’s Foreign Policy towards its immediate neighbours. She can be reached at sri2003ja@yahoo.com

The Philippine House of Representatives should fast-track its investigations of alleged human rights abuses by state security forces, Human Rights Watch said today. Congress is only now acting on the 22 resolutions that legislators have filed with its Committee on Human Rights since 2013 that call for investigation of specific allegations of human rights violations by the military and police.

Congress is convening on August 13 and 14, 2015, an “initial omnibus legislative inquiry” into human rights abuses that is designed to jumpstart congressional attention to those resolutions. The inquiry, which will gather more information about the cases in each resolution by interviewing victims and witnesses, will take place on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao where many of the alleged human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, enforced disappearances, and torture, have occurred.

• July 3, 2012, of Wilhemus Johannes Geertman, a Dutch missionary in Pampanga province;
• August 26, 2013, of anti-mining activists Anting Freay and his 16-year-old son Victor in Davao del Sur;
• December 6, 2013, of tribal leader Pedro Tinga in Compostela Valley province;
• March 15, 2014, of Romeo Capalla, a former political prisoner and fair-trade activist in Panay province; and
• March 26, 2014, of human rights defender William Bugatti in Ifugao province.

Separate congressional resolutions since 2013 have also called for the investigation into the torture of detainees at a police facility in Laguna, as well as the harassment of members of grassroots groups such as Pamalakaya, which represents small-scale fisherman known as “municipal fisherfolk.” Two other resolutions call for investigations into the enforced disappearance on August 21, 2013, of Bryan Epa, an organizer for Katribu, an indigenous peoples group, and Benjamin Villeno, a coordinator for the leftist political party Bayan Muna.

Legislators have also issued resolutions looking into alleged cases of children falsely accused by the military of being child soldiers. They also want to investigate the so-called Tagum Death Squad, which was allegedly financed and controlled by police and local government officials.

Calls for accountability by government officials have not brought an end to the extrajudicial killing of activists and journalists, torture, or enforced disappearances. Although the number of such cases has decreased since 2010, when President Benigno Aquino III took office, they still occur fairly frequently. President Aquino had made several commitments in the past to address these abuses, but his administration has to date produced few significant results.

A “superbody” that Aquino created in 2012 to resolve extrajudicial killings has not made significant progress. Torture by the police and other security forces remains routine and elements of the military continue to be implicated in serious abuses. Police have been linked to summary killings, particularly “death squad” operations carried out in complicity with local officials in Tagum City and other urban areas.

“Congress needs to demonstrate that it’s on the side of rule of law and the victims of human rights violations by supporting thorough and transparent investigations into such abuses,” Kine said. “Congress can show that it’s serious about tackling impunity by fast-tracking investigations into alleged human rights abuses and supporting the congressional inquiry in Davao City.”

The excessive use of force by our police against peaceful protests staged by various Dalit lawmakers and activists demanding a Dalit-friendly constitution reflects both the oppressive and suppressive mentality of the present government and of the so-called upper caste citizens who have played a dominant role in the country’s governance for centuries.

Media news emerges daily on Dalit issues such as Dalits not being allowed to drink from the same wells and taps, not being allowed to enter temples, or not being able to drink from the same cups at tea stalls. For how long can we, or should we, close our eyes? There has been a backlash of violence from the higher castes against those who challenge untouchability and against efforts to organize and fight discrimination with official policies.

This long established form of social segregation may be compared to the crime of apartheid. Dalits are denied entry into upper caste houses, temples, restaurants, teashops, and food factories. They have suffered atrocities and injustices for centuries not just by society in general but the practice has been institutionalized by the state itself excluding and marginalizing them in the policy and decision making process. Are the Dalits not human beings? When will we end this oldest social discrimination? Is it not a crime against humanity? Is it not a gross violation of human rights of a significant proportion of our population?

Statistics demonstrate that there are 4.5 million Dalits in Nepal – almost 20 percent of the total population. There are more than twenty Dalit caste groups, and eighty percent of the Dalit population lives below the poverty line. How can society as a whole, its laws and the state neglect them and their needs? Are there not serious implications and consequences whenever development policies and programmes are formulated? The halting of caste discrimination was an important issue in all our past democratic struggles and revolutions: it has been part of the manifesto of the political parties, and an election slogan. Why then does it still exist? Have we done anything positive to solve the problem?

Rampant untouchability despite law

The Dalits have already attained equal status at least as far as black letter law is concerned. Not long ago, an amendment to the Civil Code accepted that untouchability practices and boycotts or restrictions against any person on the basis of caste, religion or class constituted a crime. The Interim Constitution accepts the right to protection from caste-based discrimination and untouchability as a fundamental right.

Moreover, a recent parliamentary act, the caste-based Discrimination and Untouchability Act 2011, criminalizes caste-based discrimination and untouchability in both private and public spheres. So far so good. However, Dalit communities continue to suffer: they face discrimination in housing, in schools, and in access to public services. They are denied access to land, are forced to work in degrading conditions, and are routinely abused at the hands of the police and upper-caste community members. Their cases are often not reported, investigated or prosecuted properly. Dalits have endured discrimination for centuries and this discrimination continues today. Does it not bring shame on us all in the 21st century? Is it not time to end this centuries-old social practice? The passing of laws has been a great achievement, but it is however only the first step towards safeguarding effective protection of Dalits rights.

First, our new constitution must go much further than its predecessors in securing the rights of Dalits. Dalit voices must be reflected within the constitution without prejudice. Are Dalits not citizens of Nepal? Caste discrimination involves massive violation of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights. Caste-affected communities are denied a life in dignity and equality. Nepal has committed to several international human rights treaties and mechanisms which oblige the state to enforce the rights of victims of caste-based discrimination. It will be a gross failure to uphold our international legal obligations if the new constitution fails to secure the rights of Dalits, untouchable and of other vulnerable citizens.

Second, there is an important question for all us to consider. Can constitutional and legal provisions alone suffice to eradicate this evil social segregation? From our own experiences, the straight answer is no. Making laws alone is not enough. Despite the fact that untouchability was officially banned in our country nearly six decades ago, discrimination against Dalits remains pervasive.

Our attitude towards Dalits must change. The dominant and oppressive attitudes and manners of so-called high caste individuals must change. Economic, social and development policies must be formulated based on equality towards Dalits. A strong enforcement mechanism for existing laws must be introduced, and Dalit abusers must be punished. However, to have any real impact, systematic reform and change, education and creating public awareness are critical. To achieve this, we must teach our children from the beginning to respect and tolerate others. We must teach our children that all human beings and individuals are equal and born free.

Finally, each one of us together with stakeholders in society such as the media, NGOs and civil society and the Dalits themselves are the key to achieving change. Are the so-called leaders and activists who are advocating the rights of the Dalits acting above partisan interest? As Ambedkar said,’ ‘Ours is a battle not for wealth or for power. It is a battle for freedom. It is a battle of reclamation of human personality.’ The Dalit rights struggle must be a battle for all of us aimed at building a new country, a new society and a new way of life based on respect and values between different castes, cultures, religions and political beliefs. Are Dalit rights activists truly serving the real interests of Dalits? Are all Dalits united and able to establish a common voice and common agenda? We should, and they must, give serious thought to these important questions.

In a free and democratic society, every citizen, irrespective of his caste or social origin is entitled to exercise his or her constitutional, civil and political rights that enable him to live with dignity and respect. The country must evolve concrete plans and policies that implement laws and programmes to respect protect and fulfill the rights and dignity of the Dalit. The demand for proper inclusion of Dalit rights in the new constitution must emerge as the common voice of us all, the common agenda and must be seen as the crucial key if we wish to establish a human rights-based and just society. As Goethe famously stated, ‘Knowing is not enough; we must apply. Willing is not enough; we must do’. The evil social practices widely known as ‘hidden apartheid’ in our country must be brought to an end.

The National Iranian Oil Company says it will not increase oil production until international sanctions are removed.

The Oil and Energy website reports that company director Rokneddin Javadi said any increase in oil production is conditional on the lifting of sanctions.

“Our assessment indicates that we can increase our oil production to the extent of the lost market [share]; however, we believe that in the short term, that is, in the one or two months following the elimination of sanctions, the oil market will not be able to absorb any more than 500,000 to 600,000 barrels a day and we are able to increase our production to that rate in less than a month,” Javadi explained.

He estimated that it will take anywhere from six months to a year for Iran to regain the share of the international petroleum market it had captured prior to the sanctions regime.

He said Iran used to produce about four million oil barrels a day prior to the sanctions.

Iranian Oil Minister Bijan Zanganeh has said that Iran produces 2.7 million barrels of oil a day and exports one million barrels of that.

Libya’s only internationally recognized legitimate leader, Prime Minister Abdullah al-Thinni, has announced his resignation.

His Cabinet, working from hotel rooms in the eastern city of Tobruk and before that, in Benghazi, after armed insurgent groups seized the capital of Tripoli one year ago, has been criticized as ineffective in stopping Libya’s violence. The House of Representatives, installed in a Tobruk hotel, moved to a nearby naval base in December 2014 after a suicide bomber attacked the hotel.

He announced his intent to formally resign Tuesday during a television interview in which he answered questions from angry citizens.

“If I’m the obstacle to this nation, then my resignation will be submitted,” he said on the privately owned Libya Channel.

His resignation adds chaos to a situation, four years after the regime of Muammar Ghaddafi was overthrown, in which Libya has two competing governments, each with a coalition of armed militias.

Daesh (ISIS) has also made inroads and alliances in the country, which has the largest proven oil reserves in Africa. The government in Tripoli, while not recognized by the international community, controls most key ministries and state offices. Rival factions control parts of most Libyan cities, and citizens have complained about safety and shortages of fuel and medical supplies.

By Ed Adamczyk

Original article

Deep-sea fishermen and fishing communities are feeling the economic effects of a European Union ban on fish caught by Sri Lankan-flagged vessels. The EU began enforcing the ban in January after blacklisting Sri Lanka for failing to combat illegal fishing.

The EU in fact accuses Sri Lanka of allowing ships to fish the Indian Ocean without marine satellite equipment, making it difficult to track their movements and therefore control illegal fishing. However, in commenting the situation to the media Father S.N. Shelton Dias said it was larger foreign-owned boats using sophisticated equipment that were violating EU rules, not Sri-Lanka’s fishermen, who often rely on small boats with old-fashioned nets and know strategies to fish while protecting the ecosystem.

W.A. Sunil Fernando, president of the fisherman’s cooperative in Chilaw, a large city along the north-western coast, also said that fishermen didn’t know about the ban until a few months before it went into effect, leaving them an inadequate amount of time to lobby the government or to defend themselves.

The fishing boats provide jobs for about 26,000 families in Chilaw. However, the figure doubles considering the network of satellite jobs needed to service the industry, with security guards, net weavers, ice suppliers etc. “When the fishing industry profits are down, the ripples are felt across the region”, said Fernando.

A government source said in late July that Sri Lanka, which exported a significant amount of tuna and swordfish to EU countries, has suffered a loss in revenue of $75 million since January.

Prime Minister Ranil Wickramasinghe said he expects the country to be in compliance with EU regulations by the end of 2015. The government is installing monitoring equipment on 1,500 boats free of charge and establishing a center to track the movements of ships that have the monitoring device installed.

ISIS is challenged not only on the battlefield, but also ideologically by mainstream Muslim scholars and within militant circles.

Hundreds of mainstream Muslim scholars have spoken out at international and local levels, both individually and collectively.[2] The most important one being the Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi.[3]

The ideological challenge also comes from within militant circles especially rival groups operating in Syria and Iraq such as Jabhah Al-Nusrah and in other places such as Al-Qaeda which based in Yemen.[4]

One of the many criticisms directed against ISIS is its permissiveness in the practice of takfir (declaring a Muslim as apostate) which makes it status as a takfiri group deserved. This equates ISIS to the Kharijites who remain traditionally denounced and despised by Sunni and Salafi Muslims.

This article seeks to analyze ISIS’ response to these challenges by mainstream Muslims and rival militants based on materials distributed online by sources known to have an affiliation to ISIS and distributors of its materials.

Takfir according to ISIS

ISIS’ doctrine on takfir could be found in a 40-points list entitled `Aqidah Wa Manhaj Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-Takfir (ISIS’ Creed and Methodology of Takfir).[5]

The list carries many similarities with ISIS’ publication entitled Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid Li Al-Mu`askarat (Standard Text for Islamic Creed for Military Camps), dated 1436 (Hijrah calendar) / 2015.[6]

Some of the points are also found in another ISIS publication titled Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna (This is our creed and our way).[7]

All the above mentioned documents are distributed online by ISIS online machineries and among its online supporters.

This article will focus on the 40-points list on takfir because of its concise and easily digestible content which also directly addresses the topic at hand.

The 40 points could be summarised as follows:

• The point begins with a warning against all types of extremism in takfir.
• ISIS rejects the Murji`ite’s doctrines, a) al-irja’ (deferred judgment on faith) that views God as the sole authority to judge who is Muslim and who is not in the Afterlife, and b) Muslims should regard any person who is outwardly Muslim as part of the Muslim community even if he commits grave sin because sin has no adverse effect on salvation as long he remains faithful.
• ISIS’ stand on takfir is based on the creed of the Sunni and guided by the tradition of noble Sunni scholars.
• ISIS regards all who proclaim the Shahadah (Testimony of Faith) as Muslims, until proven otherwise.[8]
• ISIS’ method of takfir on a specific person or organisation is premised on the following conditions
  – it must be based on clear and strong evidences that are soundly established, not speculations
  – it must meet all the necessary requirements required by the shari`ah
  – it must be free from inhibitions recognised by the shari`ah
  – the person involved must be presented with the right argument and evidence first
  – it must be issued by ISIS’ authorised bodies.[9]
• ISIS do not perform takfir on all Muslims today, or those who commit sins except if they regard them as halal,[10] or those who do not join ISIS, or those who differ, criticise or fight ISIS, or Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries.[11]
• ISIS rules the following people as kafir (disbelievers)
  – a person who performs any ofthe ten nullifiers of faith[12]
  – all Twelver Shiites – both ordinary person and scholars[13]
  – those who reject the takfir of Twelver Shiite scholars(not the takfir on an ordinary person), as disbelievers
  – all parties based on communism, secularism, nationalism and liberalism;[14] proponents of democracy and those who participate in its process; all governments that do not rule by the shari`ah and members of its military, police officers, intelligence, executive and judiciary apparatuses[15]
  – all those who seek to judge by civil laws[16]
  – those who mock and insult the Prophet and his noble family members[17]
  – all Baathist[18]
  – all leaders of Islamic Party of Iraq, not its ordinary members
  – all practitioners of sorcery.[19]

Unmasking ISIS

One feature which stands out from ISIS’ materials on the issue of takfir is its attempt to deflect criticism from various parties that it is a takfiri movement which is deserving of its status as a modern day Kharijite who is denounced in various authentic hadiths and in Sunni tradition and to subsequently portray itself as a staunch Sunni movement that deserves support especially from jihadist circles and from Sunni Muslims in general.

This could be deduced from the way the list was composed.

Firstly, the first point in the list ironically asserts ISIS’ denunciation of all forms of extremism in takfir.

Secondly, the first eight points seeks to inform what ISIS is not in the matter of takfir, instead of describing what its stand on takfir actually is. This indicates its apologetic tone due to various accusations of takfirism against it. This accusation which comes together with the Kharijite label does not come only from prominent individual scholars and Muslim bodies all over the world but also from radical jihadist circles such as leaders of Al-Qaeda.

Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who led Al-Qaeda in Iraq – the group that preceded ISIS – was counselled by his religious mentor Abu Muhammad Al-Maqdisi on, among other things, the former’s permissive approach to takfir as a justification for Al-Qaeda’s indiscriminate bombing of Iraqi civilians.[20]

However, three examples could be highlighted here that would expose ISIS’ mask of fidelity to mainstream Sunni tradition and its claim of rejection of all types of extremist understandings of takfir.

Example no. 1

First example is ISIS’ pronouncement of takfir on Hamzah Yusuf and Yasir Qadhi.

Hamzah Yusuf is a Muslim scholar who heads Zaytuna College based in Berkeley, California, United States of America.[21]

Yasir Qadhi is also a Muslim scholar based in the United States. He holds a doctoral degree in religious studies from Yale University and a teaching position in the Religious Department of Rhodes College and is also the Dean of Academic Affairs at Al-Maghrib Institute.[22]

This pronouncement was publicly made known in Dabiq,which is ISIS’ official online magazine, issue number 7. Photo of both scholars were published with the caption “murtad” (apostate) for their condemnation of the assault on Charlie Hebdo.[23]

Theologically, this pronouncement falls under takfir mu`ayyan (takfir made against specific individuals or organisation).

Other than the photos with the above mentioned caption published under an article that seeks to offer theological justification for the attack on Charlie Hebdo and condemn those who denounce it, there was no detailed explanation for this specific takfir based on the statement made by both scholars such as which aspects of the statements are deemed to cause apostasy and why and on what theological basis do these statements cause apostasy. There was also no clear explanation on the part of ISIS in detailing the process it has taken to make such pronouncements; whether ISIS has communicated to them its ruling and given them a chance to defend themselves against ISIS’ arguments and who were the scholars involved in making such rulings.

These are pertinent questions which require answers which are as pertinent from ISIS based on the takfir methodology that it has laid down for itself in the list – takfir cannot be made based on speculation and must go through proper processes and no Muslims should be ruled otherwise except with evidence that is beyond doubt (yaqin).

On this respect, ISIS has failed to adhere to its own doctrine of takfir. Since this is a serious theological matter, this failure is a serious non-compliance to the shari`ah on the part of ISIS.

Example no. 2

The second example which exposes the fundamental flaws of ISIS is its pronouncement of takfir on all Muslims who accept democracy, regard it as compatible to Islam and participate in its process.

This pronouncement is problematic on many grounds.

Firstly, the issue whether democracy is compatible with Islam or Muslims’ participation in it could be ruled permissible on rational and pragmatic ground are contentious among Muslim scholars.

However, many Muslim scholars today would support democratic governments and permit Muslims’ participation in its process, regardless whether they live in Muslim countries or non-Muslim countries or their participation involves them being voters, election candidates or members of parliament.[24]

In addition to many works that promote such position such as Al-Qaradhawi’s Fiqh Al-Dawlah (Islamic Jurisprudence on Government),[25] it is also supported by the participation of Islam based parties in democratic processes and also democratic governments in many Muslim majority countries which include Muslim scholars amongst their membership.

Not only did ISIS’ pronouncement go against the mainstream position of Sunni Muslim scholars, it is also tantamount to pronouncing takfir on them and a significant number of ordinary Muslims.[26]

Secondly, the established Sunni doctrine is to restrain from takfir in contentious theological issues where differences of opinion out of ijtihad (independent reasoning) is inevitable such as the case of democracy in Islam. Many conservative scholars who reject the compatibility of democracy with Islam and discourage Muslims’ participation in it prefer prudence and refrain from pronouncing takfir on the opponents due to the seriousness of takfir in Islam[27] and guided by a hadith (the Prophetic tradition) that says, “Avert the legal penalties from the Muslims as much as possible, if he has a way out then leave him to his way, for if the Imam makes a mistake in forgiving it would be better than making a mistake in punishment.” (Narrated by Al-Turmuzi)

It is argued that this pronouncement of takfir by ISIS itself contradicts point 10 of the list that proclaims the foundation of ISIS’ creed and doctrine on the premise set by Sunni Islam which it explicitly affirms in Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid.[28]

Example no. 3

The third example is ISIS’ pronouncement of holding Sunni Muslim scholars in high esteem and respect, although it also denounces those who take the crooked path and sell the religion for worldly pleasures.

This pronouncement is problematic in view of the letter signed by more than 100 Muslim scholars from all over the world denouncing ISIS. The letter lists down more than 20 points of ISIS’ serious transgression of Islamic teachings.

Takfir is one of the points addressed by the letter. It states;

“…..disbelief requires the intention of disbelief, and not just absentminded words or deeds. It is not permissible to accuse anyone of disbelief without proof of the intention of disbelief. Nor is it permissible to accuse anyone of being a non-Muslim without ascertaining that intention. It is, after all, possible that the person was coerced, ignorant, insane or did not mean it. It is also possible that he misunderstood a particular issue….

It is forbidden to interpret the implications of a person’s deeds; only the person himself or herself may interpret their own deeds – particularly when there is a difference of opinion among Muslims regarding that particular deed. It is also forbidden to declare others non-Muslim (takfir) based on any matter in which there is a difference of opinion among Muslim scholars. It is forbidden to declare an entire group of people non-Muslim. Disbelief applies only to individuals depending on their deeds and intentions….. scholars – including Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn Al-Qayyim Al-Jawziyyah – distinguish between the actions of a disbeliever (kafir)and declaring people non-Muslim (takfir). Even if a person performs a deed that has elements of disbelief, this does not necessitate that that person be judged as a disbeliever for the reasons presented earlier. Al-Dhahabi related that his teacher, Ibn Taymiyyah, used to say near the end of his life: ‘I do not declare any member of the ummah non-Muslim … The Prophet said: “Anyone who maintains his ablution is a believer”, so whoever observes the prescribed prayers with ablution is a Muslim.’….”[29]

The above statement from the letter is relevant to ISIS’ pronouncement of takfir against Hamzah Yusuf and Yasir Qadhi mentioned in the above first example where there is no explanation on the ground and processes that lead to it.

The statement also contradicts ISIS’ use of takfir in contentious theological issues such as the permissibility and compatibility of democracy with Islam.

Up till now, there is no known response to this letter from ISIS.

Finally, ISIS’ application of takfir against a wide range of people such as all members of unIslamic government apparatuses and unIslamic political parties is permissive and go against the prudence recommended in the final part of the quoted statement.

ISIS’ doctrine and application of takfir contradicts also with the Amman Message that have been endorsed hundreds of eminent Muslim scholars and thinkers. This, in particular, relates to ISIS’ declaration of all Shiites as disbelievers.

The Amman Message pronounces,

“1) Whosoever is an adherent to one of the four Sunni schools (Mathahib) of Islamic jurisprudence (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi`i and Hanbali), the two Shi’i schools of Islamic jurisprudence (Ja`fari and Zaydi), the Ibadi school of Islamic jurisprudence and the Thahiri school of Islamic jurisprudence, is a Muslim. Declaring that person an apostate is impossible and impermissible. Verily his (or her) blood, honour, and property are inviolable [emphasis added]. Moreover, in accordance with the Shaykh Al-Azhar’s fatwa, it is neither possible nor permissible to declare whosoever subscribes to the Ash`ari creed or whoever practices real Tasawwuf (Sufism) an apostate. Likewise, it is neither possible nor permissible to declare whosoever subscribes to true Salafi thought an apostate.

Equally, it is neither possible nor permissible to declare as apostates any group of Muslims who believes in God, Glorified and Exalted be He, and His Messenger (may peace and blessings be upon him) and the pillars of faith, and acknowledges the five pillars of Islam, and does not deny any necessarily self-evident tenet of religion.”[30]

This declaration also rejects ISIS’ claim that Sunni Muslim scholars are in consensus about the disbelief of all Shiite scholars which it subsequently used to justify takfir against those scholars who refuse to perform it on Shiite scholars after explanation has been given (to the Shiite scholars).

Any person familiar with Islamic jurisprudence would know that any claim of consensus (ijma’) among scholars is hardly uncontested, be it in the classical period or current times. This declaration is a contemporary testimony to it.

It must be highlighted that the Amman message pre-exists ISIS. If ISIS is truthful about honouring Sunni scholars and the creed of Sunni Islam, it must not disregard the message. At the very least, it should explain why it deviates from the pronouncement endorsed by hundreds of contemporary eminent scholars.

The third source highlighting the contradiction between ISIS’ doctrine of takfir and the position held by Sunni Muslim scholars is the Mardin Declaration.

The declaration is an outcome of the Mardin conference which was attended by a group of renowned Muslim scholars in March 2010.

It was convened to discuss the use of Ibn Taimiyah’s fatwa by radical and extremist groups to justify takfir, shedding blood of Muslims deemed to have apostatised and waging perpetual violent jihad against non-Muslims.

Among the content of the declaration is;

“1) Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa concerning Mardin can under no circumstances be appropriated and used as evidence for leveling the charge of kufr (unbelief) against fellow Muslims, rebelling against rulers, deeming game their lives and property, terrorizing those who enjoy safety and security, acting treacherously towards those who live (in harmony) with fellow Muslims or with whom fellow Muslims live (in harmony) via the bond of citizenship and peace. On the contrary, the fatwa deems all of that unlawful, not withstanding its original purpose of supporting a Muslim state against a non-Muslim state. Ibn Taymiyya agrees with all of this, and follows, the precedent of previous Muslim scholars in this regard, and does not deviate from their position. Anyone who seeks support from this fatwa for killing Muslims or non-Muslims has erred in his interpretation and has misapplied the revealed texts….

7) The notion of loyalty and enmity (al-wala wa al-bara) must never be used to declare anyone out of the fold of Islam, unless an actual article of unbelief is held. In all other cases, it actually involves several types of judgement ranging according to the juridical five-fold scale: (permissible, recommended, not-recommended, non-permissible, and required). Therefore, it is not permissible to narrow the application of this notion and use it for declaring a Muslim outside the fold of Islam.”[31]

This declaration also precedes ISIS. Similar to the Amman Message, ISIS ought to explain its takfir doctrine vis-à-vis this declaration if it is truthful in honouring Muslim scholars, past and present. Al-Qaeda of the Arabian Peninsula, at least, took the effort to explain its disagreement with the content of this declaration via the late Anwar Al-Awlaki in its official magazine, Inspire no. 2.[32]

Here, it could be concluded that the above mentioned letter to Al-Baghdadi, the Amman Message and the Mardin declaration endorsed by hundreds of contemporary Muslim scholars are enough evidences that ISIS’ doctrine of takfir is incompatible with the position held by many contemporary Sunni scholars.

ISIS’ doctrine does not tally with the position of contemporary Sunni scholars and in view of the contradiction, ISIS’ claim of upholding the scholars in high esteem is, in reality, a hollow statement. Its position also deviates from the Prophet’s advice, “My people/followers will not be in agreement over misguidance. When you differ in opinions, be with the Al-Sawad Al-A`zham (the majority).” (Narrated by Ibn Majah).

Conclusion

ISIS’ attempt to deflect the label of takfiri and Kharijite falls apart in view of the above three examples cited in this article.

The examples expose ISIS as a wolf in the sheep’s clothing. ISIS tries to paint an image of a movement that is truthful to Sunni Islam but the reality is that it is an enemy that is destroying it.

The analysis by this article is significant because it provides an ideological challenge and contestation which further downgrades ISIS’ appeal. One who is familiar with the online debate especially when they come from within jihadist circles can appreciate why such ideological contestations matter to ISIS. An example can also be found in several issues of Dabiq where ISIS dedicates lengthy article disparaging Al-Qaeda and its associates in response to their ideological challenge.[33]

Notes:

[1]I would like to thank Mr. Hafiz Kusairi for his valuable technical assistant in preparing this article.

[2]Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mustazah Bahari, “An Analysis of Muslim Voices Against IS”, Eurasia Review, 1 October 2014.

[3]See www.lettertobaghdadi.com (11 Aug. 2015)

[4]Muhammad Haniff Hassan and Mustazah Bahari, “An Analysis of Muslim Voices Against IS”, Eurasia Review, 1 October 2014; Abdullah Ladadwi, Conclusively scholarly opinion on ISIS, available at http://www.islam21c.com/politics/conclusive-scholarly-opinions-on-isis/ (4 Aug. 2015); Muhtasib Al-Sham, Al-Halqah Al-Thaniyah Min Niqash Hadi’ Hawl Fikr Tanzim Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-`Iraq Wa Al-Sham, available at http://islamsyria.com/portal/article/show/4721 (4. Aug. 2015); Mu`taz Al-Khatib, “Tanzim Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah: Al-Buniyah Al-Fikriyah Wa Ta`qidat Al-Waqi`, Aljazeera Center For Studies, 24 Nov. 2014, available at http://studies.aljazeera.net/files/isil/2014/11/2014112355523312655.html (4 Aug. 2015)

[5]`Aqidah Wa Manhaj Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Fi Al-Takfir, available at http://justpaste.it/l8mp (4 Aug. 2015)

[6]Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah Hai’ah Al-Buhuth Wa Al-Ifta’, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid Li Al-Mu`askarat, 1436H, available at https://dump.to/muqarartawhed (4 Aug. 2015).

[7]Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna, Maktabat Al-Himmah, available at http://justpaste.it/matweat (4 Aug, 2015).

[8]See Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid, p. 31-2; Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna, p. 3-4.

[9]See Ibid; Ibid, p. 3.

[10]See Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna, p. 3.

[11]See Ibid, p. 4.

[12]See Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Muqarrar fi Al-Tawhid, pp. 23-50.

[13]See Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna, p. 4.

[14]See Ibid.

[15]See Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid, pp. 34-9.

[16]See Ibid.

[17]See Ibid, p. 2; Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid, pp. 41-2.

[18]See Hazih `Aqidatuna Wa Haza Manhajuna, p. 4.

[19]See Ibid, p. 43-6.

[20]See Joas Wagemakers, (2011) “Reclaiming Scholarly Authority: Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi’s Critique of Jihadi Practices”, Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 34: 7, pp. 523-39.

[21]See Hamza Yusuf’s short biography at https://www.zaytuna.edu/academics/faculty/hamza_yusuf and http://shaykhhamza.com/biography/ (4 Aug. 2015).

[22]See Yasir Qadhi’s short biography at http://almaghrib.org/instructors/yasir-qadhi#profile and https://www.facebook.com/yasir.qadhi/info?tab=page_info (4 Aug. 2015).

[23]“The extinction of the gray zone”, Dabiq no. 7, Rabi` Al-Akhir 1436H, pp. 60-1.

[24]Tauseef Ahmad Parray, Democracy in Islam: The Views of Several Modern Muslim Scholars, The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences, 27:2, pp. 140-8; Yaser Ellethy, Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy, New York: Routledge, 2015; Rashid Al-Ghanushi, Al-Dimuqratiyah Wa Huquq Al-Insan Fi Al-Islam, N.p: Aljazeera Centre for Studies and Arab Scientific Publishers, 2012; Muhammad `Ammarah, Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah: Bayn Al-`Ilmaniyah Wa Al-Sultah Al-Diniyah, Qahirah; Dar Al-Shuruq, 2007; Muhammad Salim Al-`Awwa, Fi Al-Nizam Al-Siyasiyah Li Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Qahirah: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2007; Muhammad, Muslih, Muslih Muhammad and Browers Michaelle. “Democracy”, The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World. Oxford Islamic Studies Online, available at http://www.oxfordislamicstudies.com/article/opr/t236/e0185 (10 Aug. 2015).

[25]See Yusuf Al-Qaradhawi, Min Fiqh Al-Dawlah Fi Al-Islam: Makanatuha, Ma`alimuha, Tabi`atuha, Mawqifuha Min Al-Dimuqratiyah Wa Al-Ta`addudiyah Wa Al-Mar`ah Wa Ghayr Al-Muslimin, Qahirah: Dar Al-Shuruq, 2001.

[26]See “Most Muslim Want Democracy, Personal Freedom and Islam in Political Life”, Pew Research Center’s Global Attitude Project, 10 July 2012, available at http://www.pewglobal.org/2012/07/10/most-muslims-want-democracy-personal-freedoms-and-islam-in-political-life/ (11 Aug. 2015).

[27]See “Ruling on democracy and elections and participating in that system”, Islam Questions and Answers, available at http://islamqa.info/en/107166 (11 Aug. 2015).

[28]Al-Dawlah Al-Islamiyah, Muqarrar Fi Al-Tawhid, pp. 32-3.

[29]See Open Letter to Al-Baghdadi, point 9, available at www.lettertobaghdadi.com (4 Aug. 2015).

[30]See The Three Points of the Amman Message, available at http://ammanmessage.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=91&Itemid=74 (4 Aug. 2015).

[31]See The New Mardin Declaration, available at http://www.binbayyah.net/portal/en/tasrehaat/1038 (4 Aug. 2015).

[32]Shaykh Anwar Al-Awlaki, “The New Mardin Declaration: An Attempt at Justifying the New World Order”, Inspire no. 2, Fall 1431 – 2010, pp. 33-40.

[33]See Dabiq no. 7, 8 and 9.

On 3 August, President Obama launched the enhanced version of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)’s original proposed Clean Power Program. This sets ambitious targets for reducing greenhouse gas emissions and pollution from the US power sector. The plan has many features that could be of interest to India, and perhaps even more relevant ​ in the context of emission reductions.

The basic features of Obama’s plan may be summarized as follows – (1) New national carbon pollution standards for the first time for power plants, aimed at cutting carbon and particulate emissions (2) Reduction (over 2005 levels) from the power sector of oxides of Carbon (32 percent), Sulphur (90 percent) and Nitrogen (72 percent) (3) Transition to cleaner sources of energy, especially to renewable energy. The projected economic benefits of the plan are Climate related benefits ( $20 billion), Health related benefits ( $14-34 billion), and avoiding each year 3600 deaths, 1700 heart attacks, 90,000 asthma attacks and loss of 300,000 work and school days due to illness.

The plan is based on (1) close partnerships between the Federal government and State governments (2) separate standards for coal/oil and natural gas based plants (3) State level targets in terms of CO2 per kilowatt hour (kWH) of power, and total CO2 emissions. (4) State level incentives for clean and renewable energy (5) Flexible mechanisms for implementing plans. .These targets are to be met singly or in combination with other states (including through emissions trading etc.) during 2022-2029. The mechanisms offer flexibility to the States which are required to submit final plans by September 2016.

The flexible mechanisms bear some similarity with the Clean Development Mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol at the international level, where states can work together to meet carbon emission targets.

The US power sector has a total capacity of 1060 Gigawatts (GW) (2013), and the mix is thermal/fossil (72%), Nuclear (9.3%), Hydro (7.5%), and Wind (5.7%). The total electrical energy generated in 2013 was 4113 Tera Watt Hours (TWH), with major contributions from Coal/oil (39%), Gas (27.7%), Nuclear (19.2%), Hydro (6.5%), Wind (4.1%) and other renewable sources (2.1%).

The US is giving high priority to renewable energy. By 2013 12.9 % of energy production came from renewables, up from 9% in 2002. Despite lower availability of sunlight, US solar photovoltaic power generation has shot up from 1 TwH in 2011 to 16 TwH in 2014 and is set to grow at high rates. The growth rates may accelerate further given rapid advances in technology.

This mix of power generated by source is comparable to that of India. India has total power generation capacity of 272 GW (2015), which comes from Coal/Oil (61.1%), Gas (8.5%),Nuclear (2.1%), Hydro (15.2%), Other renewable sources (13.2%). The coal and other renewable sectors have shown high growth rates in recent years. It is planned to add 84 GW more capacity from coal/gas powered plants in the next two years. India, being a rapidly growing economy naturally will need to have high growth in power generation to sustain this growth rate.

There are some aspects of the Obama plan that may be relevant to the Indian situation. Standards on emission levels for coal and gas based plants would be useful for India. ​Being a federal democracy like the US, state level targets and flexible mechanisms including emissions trading among states could also be ​relevant for India​. Reliance on coal as the main source has disadvantages. The quality of Indian coal is lower and the average production of power from Indian coal is 0.7 kg/kWH, while for the US it is 0.45 kg/kWH. Dependence on imported coal is likely to increase leading to pressures on balance of payments and energy insecurity. Thus India has to move out of coal based power production in the long term.

Indian natural gas based power plants which have greater efficiency and lower carbon emissions, are suffering from a shortage of natural gas. The dependence on natural gas via LNG or pipelines through neighbouring countries will increase, again leading to energy insecurity. Fossil fuels, including coal and gas are a depleting resource and represent only a tiny fraction of solar energy trapped over millions of years. The nuclear power scenario is also not encouraging, with very high capital costs, long gestation periods, and issues of safety, security, and radioactive waste management. Therefore India has no choice but to go in for renewable energy on a large scale.

In the renewable sector, solar power in particular offers great promise. India receives per year some 5 million TwH of solar energy, compared to only 938 TwH of total electricity consumption in 2014. The US has already achieved a levelized tariff of 4 cents (Rs 2.6) per kWH for solar power, which could make it competitive in India. Solar power can be generated in a decentralized mode, requiring less investment in transmission and distribution systems. There is rapid advance in technology in the direction of making photovoltaic cells more efficient and cheaper to manufacture. Tapping solar power in a big way would create jobs, skills and boost economic development, besides strengthening energy security, price stability, and access to energy for all. It would be a boon for the rural sector and scattered communities.

Besides solar power, wind energy and hydro power especially from the North East and Bhutan offer promise. These sources are actually derived from solar energy. India has already added considerable wind energy capacity of 23 GW and can add more in future.

It follows that any Indian approach to clean power will have to provide incentives for renewable energy. Incentives could be in the form of carbon credits, higher feed in tariffs, better tax and depreciation regimes, lower cost credit, etc. A vast untapped capacity exists in the area of small solar power at household level. To unlock this resource, a smart grid using net metering combined with incentives will be needed.

Under an approach similar to the Obama plan, Indian states could go ahead with any or all measures to tap renewable energy in a large way. Many forms of energy such as coal, oil, gas, hydro, and wind are actually derived from solar energy. So why not go to the root and tap it ? This could strengthen India’s economy and also meet international commitments to improve energy intensity in GDP​, as part of the global effort to reduce climate change.​

By Cheryl Pellerin

Six U.S. Air Force F-16 fighter aircraft and about 300 personnel arrived Monday at Incirlik Air Base in Turkey to support Operation Inherent Resolve in Iraq and Syria, Navy Capt. Jeff Davis said.

The F-16s will begin flying missions against ISIL in the coming days, the Pentagon press operations chief added.

“The primary strategic benefit of [operating from Turkey] is that it gives us greater proximity to the targets we need to strike against ISIL, he said.

The detachment is from the 31st Fighter Wing based at Aviano Air Base in Italy, according to a statement from U.S. European Command, and follows Turkey’s decision to host the deployment of U.S. aircraft conducting counter-ISIL operations.

As members of a more than 60-nation coalition, the United States and Turkey “are committed to the fight against ISIL in the pursuit of peace and stability in the region,” the statement said.

Incirlik Air Base is a U.S. Air Forces in Europe installation. About 1,800 U.S. personnel are stationed at the NATO base, Davis said.

Before the F-16s arrived at Incirlik, Davis said, “we had been conducting armed [unmanned aerial vehicle] flights out of Turkey that started about a week before. Prior to that [they flew] unarmed UAVs for the purpose of [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance].”

Strange how intellectual discussion concerning the so-called “Arab Spring” has almost entirely shifted in recent years – from one concerning freedom, justice, democracy and rights in general, into a political wrangle between various antagonist camps.

The people, who revolted across various Arab countries are now marginalized in this discussion, and are only used as fodders – killers and victims – in a war seemingly without end.

But how did it all go so wrong?

There was once a time when things were so simple, so easy to understand and explain: People, who were long oppressed, revolted against their oppressors (Arab regimes) and benefactors (western powers).

Unable to effect change using peaceful channels – for Arab civil societies either did not exist or were tightly controlled – Arab masses took to the streets, each nation with a unique struggle of its own yet united around a set of basic demands.

In fact, in the early months of 2011, Arabs united briefly. A sense of nationhood emerged, from the blood and dust of revolutions, where Arab masses attempted, at least symbolically, to define who they are as nations first, and then their larger identity as Arabs.

It all started with “Al-Shaab yurid isqat al-nitham” – ‘the people want the overthrow of the regime!’ That much was clear. Hate for oppressive, authoritarian regimes that stifled freedoms and deprived the people from their countries’ wealth and natural resources was the unmistakable priority, which was often reduced to the term ‘Irhall’, meaning ‘Leave.’

‘Irhall’ was beyond empowering. Imagine, millions of poor people standing in the main squares of their cities, some in tattered clothes, others hungry, fatigued, teetering between hope and despair, all chanting at once in a thundering voice: “Irahal!” – just ‘Leave’. And they, the dictators, began leaving, one after the other.

Emboldened by their ability to effect real change, the narrative of the Arab revolutions evolved and matured. Symbols of Arab unity – attempting to unify a common Arab goal – began taking shape, where Tunisia, Cairo and Sana’a raised the same flags and articulated, more or less the same demands.

Symbols of unity between Christians and Muslims also began to transpire, despite attempts by regimes to sow the seeds of division. This was demonstrated more in Egypt, but other societies reflected on their unity as well, challenging tribalism, regionalism, sectarianism, and all the divisive ‘isms’ that crippled Arab nations for generations.

With time, other narratives also came to the fore, expressing deep-seated grievances and injustices, ranging from women’s rights to access to education and the equal distribution of wealth.

The ultimate evolution of popular Arab revolutionary narrative was accentuated in the Egyptian slogan: ‘khubz, hurriyah, ‘adala igtimayiah’ – ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice.’

Through that phase of the “Arab Spring”, television debates, newspaper articles and social media discussions labored to match the narratives imposed by the Arab collective, who chanted and protested long enough to place their agenda on everyone one. And the media took notice, as its own narrative also evolved from ‘regime change’, to general references to ‘freedom’, ‘democracy’ and finally to ‘development‘ – all becoming Arabic buzzwords throughout national and pan-Arab media.

Things were rather simple then, if not a tad naïve, as well. The general assumption was that, once Egypt’s Tahrir Square was cleared of the evidence of revolution and Libya was cleansed of the war machinery and ordnances (for, thanks to NATO, a regional uprising in Libya morphed into a most deadly war), the countdown for a lasting democracy and economic development would begin to take shape.

Of course, history is not shaped by wishful thinking or even good intentions. It would take much more than a chant, no matter how powerful, or a slogan, no matter how expressive, to reverse vicious cycles of corruption, poverty and authoritarian rules that have lasted the entirety of modern history.

In almost every single post-Arab revolt scenario, the responsibility of guiding these nations back to the path, political and economic recovery was handed back to the very elites that either previously ruled or co-existed and benefited from the very dictators who were, supposedly, overthrown.

It was an interesting and strange spectacle to see the revolutionary momentum in each rebelling Arab country coming to a sudden halt, or change directions all together. Egypt was a prime example of these contradictions. It was not the lack of fervor or passion about these revolutions but rather the innocent and naive assumption that the ruling elites would design a system of equitable economic opportunity and economic transparency, all on their own.

The flimsy transitions that defined every Arab revolutionary experience were all that the old regimes and their benefactors needed to regain initiative and reverse the gains, however symbolic of the Arab masses. It was telling that British Prime Minister, David Cameron was the first foreign Head of State to visit Egypt after the January 25 Revolution (only ten days after Hosni Mubarak was overthrown), since he was also joined by representatives of major arms dealers and military contractors. He came to offer weapons to Egypt’s military rulers, which was the last thing that poor Egypt needed at the time.

It is also quite rational to also read recent headlines such as ‘Kerry Sees Improved Egypt Ties Despite Human Rights Tensions’, as Bloomberg reported on US Secretary of State, John Kerry’s visit to Cairo on August 2, also offering fighter jets and other weapons.

The “Arab Spring” has not, as of yet, achieved any of its objectives, for neither bread is available in abundance, nor is freedom any closer, nor is social justice at hand. It did, however, energize Arab elites, armies and regimes, which became more aware than ever before of their own vulnerabilities.

Fear is now gripping most Arab countries which once thought of themselves as invincible and of their own people as forever docile. That realization has resulted in a massive regional conflict and political realignments, which has turned every single Arab popular revolt into a regional conflict or war that crossed borders, inspiring extremist groups and inviting yet more western intervention and war.

The Arab world, and the Middle East, in general, has not experienced such a major geopolitical upheaval since the early 20th Century, when Ottoman territories were divided among old colonial European powers, all the way to War World II. The outcome of this upheaval is likely to be as earth shattering as these past experiences, if not more, due to the popular element in these conflicts.

But one of the most defining shifts of “Arab Spring” priorities is the reversal of the narrative from its basic, innocent, unifying, empowering and popular articulation, into a complicated, cunning, disuniting, disempowering and elitist one, where the people do not matter, in the least.

Language is an essential tool, if one aims to understand political priorities of any historical phase situated in time and place. The language at work in the Middle East is one that speaks of a conflict between regional rivals, utilizing sects, tribes and religions to achieve political objectives. As for the people, they are increasingly pushed back to the margins, only to emerge briefly when state ceremonies compel them to wave flags that long ceased to hold much national meaning, and posters of rulers – smiling, triumphant and, as ever, brutal.

The Short-Term Energy Outlook (STEO) released on August 11 forecasts that North Sea Brent crude oil prices will average $54 per barrel (b) in 2015 and $59/b in 2016, which is $6/b and $8/b lower than projected in last month’s STEO, respectively (Figure 1).

The price decline reflects concerns about lower economic growth in emerging markets, expectations of higher oil exports from Iran, and continuing growth in global inventories. WTI prices are expected to average $5/b below Brent in both 2015 and 2016.

EIA’s updated projection remains subject to significant uncertainties as the oil market moves toward balance. During this period of price discovery, oil prices could experience periods of heightened volatility. The oil market faces a host of uncertainties heading into 2016 including the pace and volume at which Iranian oil reenters the market, the strength of oil consumption growth, and the responsiveness of non-OPEC production to low oil prices. In the more immediate future, there is potential downward price pressure heading into the fourth quarter if refinery runs drop by more than expected during the fall maintenance season.

The current values of futures and options contracts continue to suggest high uncertainty in the price outlook (Market Prices and Uncertainty Report). WTI futures contracts for November 2015 delivery, traded during the five-day period ending August 6, averaged $47/b, while implied volatility averaged 37%. These levels established the lower and upper limits of the 95% confidence interval for the market’s expectations of monthly average WTI prices in November 2015 at $34/b and $64/b, respectively. The 95% confidence interval for market expectations widens over time, with lower and upper limits of $27/b and $103/b for prices in December 2016.

EIA forecasts OPEC crude oil production to increase by 0.8 million b/d in 2015 and remain relatively flat in 2016. Iraq is expected to be the largest contributor to OPEC production growth in 2015. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding Iraq’s ability to sustain the higher production and export levels, particularly in light of the infrastructure constraints in the southern terminals.

OPEC member Iran is another source of uncertainty regarding production. On July 14, the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and Germany) and Iran reached an agreement that could result in relief from United States and European Union nuclear-related sanctions (which include some oil-related sanctions). If sanctions relief occurs, it will put additional Iranian oil supplies on a global market that has already seen oil inventories rise significantly above historical levels over the past year. This forecast assumes sanctions relief occurs in 2016, contributing to an annual average increase in Iranian crude oil production of 0.3 million b/d from 2015 to 2016, with most of the increase coming in the second half of the year.

The August STEO forecasts U.S. crude oil production will average 9.4 million b/d in 2015 and 9.0 million b/d in 2016, 0.1 million b/d and 0.4 million b/d lower, respectively, than in July’s STEO. EIA estimates total U.S. crude oil production declined by 100,000 barrels per day (b/d) in July and will generally continue to decrease through mid-2016 before growth resumes late in 2016. The decrease in the crude oil production forecast reflects a lower oil price outlook that will reduce expected oil-directed rig counts and drilling and well-completion activities throughout the forecast period.

Expected crude oil production declines are largely attributable to unattractive economic returns in some areas of both emerging and mature onshore oil production regions, as well as seasonal factors such as anticipated hurricane-related production disruptions in the Gulf of Mexico. Reductions in 2015 cash flows and capital expenditures have prompted companies to defer or redirect investment away from marginal exploration and research drilling to focus on core areas of major tight oil plays. Reduced investment has resulted in the lowest count of oil-directed rigs in nearly five years and well completions that are almost half of 2014 levels. Further, the reversal in June and July of the short-lived recovery in crude oil prices and lowered outlook for oil prices over the forecast period are expected to prolong and deepen onshore production declines.

Despite the downward revision to U.S. crude production growth, total non-OPEC supply is expected to increase by 1.4 million b/d in 2015 and remain flat in 2016. This output, combined with OPEC supply increases, will exceed demand in both 2015 and 2016, resulting in continued large inventory builds. EIA currently expects world inventory builds of 2.0 million b/d and 0.9 million b/d in 2015 and 2016, respectively.

U.S. average gasoline and diesel fuel prices decrease

The U.S. average retail price of regular gasoline fell six cents from the week prior to $2.63 per gallon as of August 10, 2015, 88 cents lower than at the same time last year. The West Coast price led the declines, down 12 cents per gallon to $3.36 per gallon. The Gulf Coast price decreased six cents per gallon to $2.34 per gallon, while the East Coast price declined five cents to $2.52 per gallon. The Midwest price was down four cents to $2.47 per gallon, and the Rocky Mountain price decreased three cents to $2.80 per gallon.

The U.S. average diesel fuel price decreased five cents from last week to $2.62 per gallon, $1.23 per gallon lower than the same time last year. The West Coast and East Coast prices both fell six cents, to $2.85 per gallon and $2.71 per gallon, respectively. The Gulf Coast, Midwest, and Rocky Mountain prices each decreased five cents, to $2.49 per gallon, $2.52 per gallon, and $2.64 per gallon, respectively.

Propane inventories gain

U.S. propane stocks increased by 2.4 million barrels last week to 92.8 million barrels as of August 7, 2015, 22.5 million barrels (32.0%) higher than a year ago. Gulf Coast inventories increased by 2.5 million barrels and Rocky Mountain/West Coast inventories increased by 0.2 million barrels. East Coast inventories decreased by 0.2 million barrels while Midwest inventories remained unchanged. Propylene non-fuel-use inventories represented 5.0% of total propane inventories.

Twitter has seen an increase in government demands for account information in the first half of this year, with the U.S. followed by Japan topping the list for such requests, PCWorld reports.

The increase is the largest ever seen between reporting periods by Twitter, wrote Jeremy Kessel, Twitter’s senior manager for global legal policy, in a blog post.

The Transparency Report from the company indicated that government requests for account information in the first half were 52 percent more and affected 78 percent more account holders than in the second half of last year.

The scope of the report has been expanded to include information on notices of alleged trademark violations and a section where users can check how different email providers handle the privacy and encryption of email messages from Twitter.

The total number of government requests for account information worldwide was 4,363 in the first half and referred to 12,711 accounts across Twitter, Vine and Periscope. Twitter received 2,436 requests from the U.S. that specified 6,324 accounts, which came largely in the form of subpoenas, which are usually orders to testify or provide information. In the second half of last year, the U.S. had made 1,622 information requests affecting 3,299 accounts.

Content removal requests were also on the upswing at 26 percent higher in the first half of this year in comparison to the second half of last year, and came primarily from Turkey and Russia. The number of accounts impacted also went up by 11 percent.

The increase in content removal requests reflect growing sensitivity in some countries over the use of social media for propaganda and communications by terror groups and political extremists. A court in Turkey blocked in April access to a number of sites, including Twitter and YouTube, as these were used to spread an image of an Istanbul prosecutor held by terrorists at gunpoint.

The content removal requests came through court orders, numbering 442, or requests by local governments including law enforcement agencies, which added up to 561 in the first half. Turkey accounted for a whopping 408 removal orders from courts and another 310 requests through government and law enforcement agencies. Content removal requests resulted in the withholding of 147 accounts and 1,723 tweets for Russia and Turkey alone. Twitter is also seeing an increase in requests for content removal in the last six months from Iraq, Malaysia and Mongolia.

The company, under its “Country Withheld Content” policy, sometimes withholds access on request to certain content in a particular country to meet local regulations, but does not block it from being viewed outside the country. Since its first report was published in 2012, Twitter has used CWC in nine countries, including Brazil, France, Germany, India, Japan, the Netherlands, Russia, Turkey and the UK.

Both Vladimir Putin’s plans for Ukraine – his initial one of absorbing much of Ukraine and his “Plan B” of having the West force Ukraine into agreeing to make concessions– have failed, Andrey Piontkovsky says; and “the interests of Putin and his closest entourage” now “seriously diverge, with the latter searching for his replacement.

In a comment for Apostrophe.com.ua, the Russian analyst says that the only things Putin can try is to step up his aggression or stage a provocation to prompt the West to desert Ukraine. If he does the former and tries to seize Mariupol or a land corridor to Crimea, the West has said it will increase sanctions and sell lethal arms to Ukraine (apostrophe.com.ua/article/world/ex-ussr/2015-08-13/v-rossii-nashli-zamenu-putinu-vse-reshitsya-v-blijayshie-nedeli/2095).

“But this is not all the West’s response could be,” Piontkovsky continues. Other options include: “the seizure of the accounts of Russian officials and oligarchs in Western banks, stepping up the pressure against Moscow regarding the shooting down of the Malaysian airliner, the Litvinenko murder and a mass of other things.”

But not increasing his acts of aggression also constitutes a threat to Putin “as a man responsible for a serious foreign policy defeat.” He thus doesn’t want to back down, but for his entourage, “military escalation is absolutely unacceptable for Putin’s entourage and for the majority of the Russian political establishment.”

Those people “understand perfectly well that this will lead to their loss of billions of dollars and to the rapid overthrow of the regime,” Piontkovsky says. But if Putin were to suddenly change course, he would in the eyes of those around him be “guilty of a defeat,” and they would desert him.

It is worth remembering what happened to Nikita Khrushchev after the Cuban missile crisis, the analyst continues. “He was forced to pull back after which his days in power were numbered … for the establishment, the lesser evil is to withdraw, part ways with Putin, and establish some kind of peaceful coexistence with the West.”

Members of the Russian elite have been sending signals to the West in this regard for several months, Piontkovsky says. Now, the situation has become more serious; and he suggested that “everything will be resolved already in the coming weeks.”

If Putin is going to expand his aggressive actions in Ukraine, he will have to do so in August or September. “October is not the season for a military advance.” But what may be even more likely, the Kremlin leader may try to stage “an enormous provocation” designed to shift the blame on Kyiv and thus cost Ukraine the support it has in the West.

Ukrainian leaders have to be very aware of this danger and act with restraint and care on the battlefield lest they fall into a trap, he says. But at the same time, they need to launch “an aggressive diplomatic offensive.” They must tell the UN Security Council that Moscow is escalating its aggression.

What Moscow will do next is “difficult to predict now because the Kremlin ‘top’ is in a panic,” Piontkovsky argues, as shown by Naryshkin’s article on the burning of foodstuffs at the border and Lavrov’s behavior at a press conference after meeting with Saudi officials.

The Russian analyst suggests that “Moscow understands” that it has no really good options in Ukraine and consequently many there are considering what to do in the Russian capital. If his entourage can force Putin out, Piontkovsky says, “the most probable figure” to replace him is Sergey Ivanov.

“Formally, [Ivanov] occupies a non-political post as head of the Presidential Administration. Nevertheless, he unceasingly gives interviews to foreign media” in which he portrays himself as someone who could be “a constructive partner for the West.”

“Will Putin’s departure change Moscow’s policy?” Piontkovsky asks rhetorically, answering that “undoubtedly” it will even though those who will replace him will come out of the same part of the elite he did. And in support of that argument he cites what happened after Stalin died.

Stalin’s successors “essentially changed the foreign policy of the USSR,” he writes. “The same thing will happen in our case. A 20^th congress of the United Russia Party will take place at which the serious errors of Comrade Putin in the Ukrainian question will be condemned.”

By Geethanjali Nataraj*

Despite being one of the fastest growing regions, South Asia continues to remain the most disconnected region in the world. Membership of SAARC has not made a significant difference to the intraregional trade and connectivity in this region. Besides differences on the bilateral front, there are various structural, geographical, ethnic, political and historical factors which have resulted in lack of cooperation among SAARC countries. As a result, the subregional cooperation as envisaged in the SAARC Charter (Article VII) is on the rise. The idea of subregional cooperation goes as far back as 1996 when the idea of the South Asia Growth Quadrangle (SAGQ) was initiated. Since then, there have been several attempts to integrate transport and improve connectivity at the subregional level.

In recent years, one such sub-grouping which has gained importance is the Bangladesh-Bhutan-Nepal-India (BBIN).

To start with, the four countries have sealed a Motor Vehicle Agreement (MVA) for the “regulation of passenger, personal and cargo vehicular traffic” on June 15, 2015, in Bhutan with the aim to provide impetus to trade and other economic activities. The agreement has been endorsed by the Cabinets of the four countries. The ministry of road transport and highways notes that the “BBIN countries will be benefit through mutual cross-border movement of passengers and goods for overall economic development of the region. The people of the four countries will benefit through seamless movement of goods and passengers across borders.”

According to the joint statement, the BBIN MVA aims at regulation of passengers, personal and cargo vehicular movement between Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal, which was drafted on the lines of SAARC MVA. On the finalisation of BBIN MVA, land transport arrangements between and among the four countries will be initiated. The agreement seeks to facilitate easy cargo, vehicle and people movement across the borders and ensure traffic rights.

However, the draft stated that all the countries will require permits for the movement across the border based on the specific terms and conditions which will be fixed bilaterally, trilaterally or among the four countries. The agreement also stated that the admission of the non-regular vehicles will be granted temporary admission on a case-to-case basis for a period of up to 30 days and the permit for regular passenger transportation and cargo for multiple entries will be valid for one year and is renewable every year subject to a maximum of five years. This complementary instrument is expected to significantly reduce trade and transaction costs in this subregion and hence give a boost to the region’s trade.

The pact will promote safe, economical, efficient and technologically-sound road transportation in the region through the creation of an institutional mechanism. The agreement will also permit passengers and cargo movement in the four countries without the need to change vehicle at the border based on each country’s terms and conditions.

For instance, three routes for bus service have been identified between India and Nepal which can make the movement without any break at the border posts and changing vehicles.

• Kathmandu-Bhairahawa-Sunauli-Gorakhpur-Lucknow-New Delhi.
• Kathmandu-Bhairahawa-Sunauli-Azamgarh-Varanasi-New Delhi.
• Pokhara-Bharahawa-Sunauli-Gorakhpur-Lucknow-New Delhi.

The agreement also ensures financial independence as each party will bear its own costs arising from the implementation of this agreement and, in case of any implementation difficulties, BBIN MVA platform provides for a mechanism to resolve the issue based on the provisions in the agreement.

The transport ministers have prepared a six-month working plan from July to December 2015 for the implementation of BBIN MVA. Before the agreement gets rolled out, it will undergo three phases of preparation. The first will include the preparation of necessary protocols and bilateral, trilateral or quadrilateral agreement for implementation of the MVA. The second includes negotiations and approval of additional agreements and protocols by September this year. This will also require upgrading and installation of IT systems, regulatory systems and necessary infrastructure to be approved in the third phase by December 2015.

However, effective implementation is hugely dependent on the finance and technical capacity of the least developed countries. Given the lack of experience of the least developed countries of the group (Bangladesh, Bhutan and Nepal), the role of aid for trade is extremely vital for the subregional MVA for staged implementation from October 2015.

BBIN MVA is a positive development for the sub-regional grouping and India’s willingness to lead and persuade its ambitious goal for South Asian integration is the need of the hour. Seen as a major diplomatic victory for India, it is a serious effort put in by the group which may influence Pakistan to join the initiative, though it had opposed SAARC MVA in the SAARC Ministerial in Nepal in November 2014. The implementation of this agreement will not just guarantee accessibility to the member countries and their markets but also to the larger ASEAN market, thereby generating new economic opportunities, particularly in border areas. However, the BBIN countries would need to provide impetus to each other’s infrastructure development and extend support in terms of financial and technical knowhow to reap the benefits of economic integration objectified by the MVA.

The ministers of the four countries have laid out a sound draft of the agreement. However, it remains to be seen how effectively the MVA gets translated on the ground. Efficient and speedy implementation of all the modalities of the BBIN will help the region realise the full benefits of the agreement and strengthen regional cooperation.

*The author is a Senior Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: The Financial Express, August 10, 2015

By Busisipho Siyobi*

By Julia Paley*

After years of secret negotiations and silence in the media, the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) has risen to headline news. Now that Congress has voted to give President Obama “fast-track” trade promotion authority to push the deal through the House and Senate with limited debate and no amendments, efforts to finalize the agreement among member countries are proceeding in earnest.

But even if negotiators can reach a final accord, which is far from certain, the pact must still be approved by other national legislatures. And here, the United States is not the only country we should be watching. In Chile, where the administration of President Michelle Bachelet has moved forward with the TPP negotiation process, opposition is strong in the legislature. Even Bachelet’s minister of foreign affairs has indicated that Chile won’t sign the agreement if the TPP doesn’t meet certain criteria.

The Chilean controversy over the TPP highlights some of the biggest problems with the agreement — for working people in Chile, the United States, and around the world — and it makes plain the false promises the Obama administration used to push Democrats to support fast track.

That a no vote from Chile might unravel the agreement as a whole — or inspire other legislatures to follow suit — may be wishful thinking. But growing opposition in that country is a reminder of what’s at stake and why it’s so important for national legislators — in the United States and abroad — to take a stand against bad trade deals. And it highlights the power that organized citizens have to hold politicians accountable and make the TPP vulnerable.

Corporate Boondoggle

The TPP would unite 12 Pacific Rim countries — Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States, and Vietnam — in an agreement so big it would account for 40 percent of the global economy. The deal extends far beyond conventional areas of trade policy to encompass issues normally decided by national legislatures, such as intellectual property rights and access to affordable prescription drugs.

And it would be a landslide victory for large corporations.

Transnational corporations in the pharmaceutical, entertainment, and banking industries, among others, are shaping rules that apply to copyrights, medicinal patents, food labeling, and financial regulation. Over 600 advisers, mainly from corporations, have direct access to the text — unlike national legislatures and civil society organizations around the world, from whom the document has been kept secret. What information is known publicly has largely come from leaks.

If their influence over the scope of the treaty weren’t enough, the TPP has provisions that allow corporations to sue national governments in unaccountable tribunals if a regulation passed after the treaty goes into effect cuts into their future profits. In many cases these “investor-state dispute settlement” (ISDS) mechanisms are enough to prevent countries from passing such regulations in the first place.

Undermining Democracy

Under ordinary circumstances, signing on to a free trade agreement would be a no brainer for Chile. It has agreements with more countries than any other nation, and additional ones are on the way. In fact, Chile already has trade agreements with all the other countries involved in the TPP.

And yet this specific agreement is raising alarm in Chile.

Many of the concerns — concerning ISDS and the secrecy of the text — are shared across countries, with critics organized into international and regional networks. But what’s interesting to note is the different foci of criticisms in the United States and elsewhere. While the U.S. Congress highlighted issues such as currency manipulation and potential job loss as its members deliberated about whether to approve fast track, Chilean organizations have pointed to a set of issues that affect everyone, and yet have an especially hard impact on countries outside the United States, especially developing countries.

A primary concern is the dominance of U.S. corporate interests. Although the agreement is billed as a trade pact among 12 nations, in reality the United States and its large corporations play a primary role.

As Marcela Ortiz from the Santiago office of Consumers International points out, as a condition for each country signing on to the pact, the United States can require changes in any one of the participating countries’ laws. Through the process called legislative certification, explains an anti-TPP group’s website, “U.S. officials can define another country’s obligations; become directly involved in drafting that country’s relevant law and regulations; demand to review and approve proposed laws before they are presented to the other country’s legislature; and delay certification until the U.S. is satisfied the new laws meet its requirements.” This is a direct assault on representative democracy, one to which a number of TPP countries have explicitly objected.

And the text of the treaty can override national law. For example, in 2010, Chile went through an extensive process of public consultation and congressional debate, which eventually resulted in its 2010 intellectual property law. Provisions in the TPP, an agreement written in secret by non-elected authors, would supersede aspects of that law, which had been created through a participatory democratic process.

A Chilling Effect

The TPP not only challenges prior laws. It impedes countries’ abilities to set future policy.

For instance, provisions under consideration limit the functioning of state-owned companies. That could deter a country like Chile from creating government-run businesses in areas such as clean energy, health, development banking, and pensions. It would also limit regulation of genetically modified ingredients, additives, and pesticides in food products. A recent report by the U.S. Trade Representative — the very office representing the United States in TPP negotiations — shows that it classifies many policies that member countries are trying to institute at home to protect the public interest as “barriers to trade.”

Of particular concern in Latin America is the ability to regulate the flow of capital.

It’s widely acknowledged that deregulation of the banking sector in the United States and Europe contributed to the international financial crisis of 2008. “In contrast,” Carlos Furche, a former Chilean trade official, wrote in 2013, “regulations in emerging countries, such as Chile, have allowed them to stay out of the financial crisis.” Given that, he continued, “it is not reasonable or acceptable to allow for amendments” aimed at “further liberalizing capital flow control, as it seems to be the intention of the U.S. negotiators.”

In its own free trade deal with the United States, Furche continued, “Chile managed to retain powers of its Central Bank” that enable it to “regulate the entry and exit of capital in situations of crisis in the balance of payments.” Agreeing to more lax standards for the flow of capital under TPP could have potentially devastating consequences for the future. This is one area in which Chile has aimed to make progress in negotiations.

The treaty also potentially affects Chile’s international relations. In making the case domestically for the TPP, the Obama administration has framed the agreement as a way to counter China’s influence in Asia. Yet China is already Chile’s largest trading partner. Moreover, other neighboring countries in Latin America are involved in trade blocs — the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), for example — that are intended to counterbalance U.S. and European global economic predominance. Not only does Chile not have a direct stake in advancing U.S. foreign policy goals, but doing so might cause tensions with some of its regional allies in Latin America.

Rewriting the Rules

Chileans have joined others in objecting to the curtailing of rights and social benefits in three other major areas: health, culture, and the Internet.

As critics in many countries agree, the TPP is expected to harm health by extending the duration of patents for medicines and medical procedures, making them unaffordable for millions of people and increasing the cost of implementing public health measures. The TPP is predicted to limit culture and education by increasing the time before movies, music, and books enter the public domain — thereby keeping the price too high for low-income people as well as schools and libraries. And the TPP could curtail Internet freedoms by impeding innovation and criminalizing popular forms of sharing. All of these, which could impact people in the United States as well, hit other countries especially hard.

What’s particularly thorny for Chile is that standards for these issues were already hammered out in bilateral agreements with the United States and other countries. The concern is that joining the TPP will be tantamount to renegotiating the terms of trade — and coming out with less favorable results than before.

Taking a Stand

Opposition in Chile first began to grow during the presidency of Sebastián Piñera, Bachelet’s right-wing predecessor.

At that time, major figures in the country’s trade sector voiced intense skepticism of the TPP. They were joined by 34 congressional representatives and 15 senators, who in concert with civic leaders submitted a declaration to the government demanding that the TPP be opened to public scrutiny and debate.

They echoed a host of civil society organizations, including Derechos Digitales and Consumers International, who — along with international allies and regional counterparts — launched forceful critiques of the deal. The outcry among lawmakers extended internationally, with representatives launching the site “TPP Legislators for Transparency“ to rally critics of the deal across borders.

Bringing their resistance to art, Chilean organizations invited hip hop artist Ana Tijoux to create a song about the TPP. Her 2013 music video “No to the TPP“ shows photos of protests around the world. The lyrics say, in part,

Tell me, tell me who is the thief
If you steal everything out of control …
A treaty is not democratic if it is made behind the people
And your deal is not a deal if it is made secretly and without consensus …
Who is behind the darkness and who benefits?
Large multinational companies full of greed
We all have the right and we all want to decide
The future and present of our children and how they want to live

Glimmers of Hope

Michelle Bachelet incorporated many of these political, civic, and cultural concerns about the TPP into her 2013 presidential campaign. She wrote in her political program that it was time to slow down the TPP process, conduct an “exhaustive” review of the treaty to examine the impacts it might have on Chile, and make sure that joining the TPP didn’t amount to losing gains Chile had already secured in its trade deal with the United States.

On becoming president in 2014, Bachelet established a cuarto adjunto — a “room next door” — to share select information and conduct discussions with businesses and non-governmental organizations. And she aimed to influence the TPP’s provisions during negotiations.

Although the cuarto adjunto increased the flow of information about the negotiation process and created additional space for organizations to express their concerns, it didn’t change the underlying problem: The text remained unavailable for public view, and civil society groups have not been part of the decision-making process. In the words of Claudio Ruiz, executive director of Derechos Digitales, “Has the cuarto adjunto served to decelerate the negotiation? Has the cuarto adjunto been useful in making an exhaustive review of the benefits of the treaty for Chile? Substantively, has anything in the scenario changed de fondo in these months? The answer to all of these questions is a resounding no.”

Meanwhile, many of the provisions in the TPP would actually undercut other policy goals of Bachelet’s progressive government. These include her plan to make medicine more affordable and available, her proposals for making art and culture accessible through school and public libraries, and her promise to promote greater protection of the environment. More broadly, the pact puts a damper on any effort to create public policy, since any change can be subject to restriction and challenge under the rules of the TPP.

Leverage in Congress?

The fact that Chile already has free trade agreements with all the other countries in the pact means it has no particularly strong incentive to sign on. Unlike countries such as Malaysia and Vietnam, whose access to investment and export markets are likely to increase substantially under the TPP, the agreement won’t bring major trade benefits to Chile. Meanwhile, the costs to the country — in terms of its own ability to create laws in the future and extensions of intellectual property protections — could be high.

As the negotiation process nears a close, congressional representatives in Chile have renewed their opposition. On May 19, the Chilean House of Deputies held a special session regarding the TPP. Four deputies wore t-shirts bearing the words #NoTPP and yet more voiced their disagreement with the pact. In the words of former student leader and current deputy Camila Vallejo, “I raise my voice making a formal request to President Bachelet that she make use of her leadership and stop the private negotiations of the TPP, begun under the previous government. We do not want more submitting of our people to international corporate interest. We demand sovereignty and emancipation for the people of Chile.”

Some deputies put forward a proposal that would require the president to demonstrate that signing on to the TPP would bring concrete economic benefits to Chile. This did not pass.

However, Minister of Foreign Affairs Heraldo Muñoz made declarations about how far the Bachelet government was — and was not — willing to go. In response to deputies’ concerns, he declared that in the area of intellectual property, patents, and services, Chile would not accept any terms worse than those already negotiated in its existing free trade agreements. Specifically, in relation to patent protection for pharmaceuticals, he said that Chile would insist on the five years allowed for in existing treaties and not agree to the 12 years proposed for the TPP. “If there isn’t an agreement that’s acceptable, we won’t sign it,” he declared. Moreover, with regard to the U.S. certification process, he affirmed, “we will not accept any interference in our sovereignty, and if that were the case, the agreement would not go into effect.”

In Washington, DC on July 17, Muñoz expressed these concerns directly to U.S. Vice President Joe Biden and U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman. And he indicated at a press conference that although Chile will “continue negotiating constructively… we don’t want TPP at any cost.”

These were strong declarations. They mean that, even while moving ahead with negotiations, the Chilean government is standing firm on certain provisions that still have not been resolved to its satisfaction.

Like their Chilean counterparts members of the U.S. Congress — particularly Democrats — face a fundamental choice between the interests of their constituents, who would lose out in the TPP, and the pressure they’re getting to go along with “free trade.” That’s what makes citizen pressure to defeat this legislation so important. Legislators — in the United States and abroad — need to use the power they still have to vote no on this treaty.

If members of Congress don’t do that now, down the road they’ll find they don’t have much power at all.

*Julia Paley is a contributor to Foreign Policy In Focus.

By Saeed Asadi*

Perhaps, when the ongoing crisis started in Syria and in its early stages, talking about the true nature of this crisis and criminal hands that plotted it from behind the scenes would have been construed within the framework of the “conspiracy theory.” However, later revelation of evidence about the unbridled foreign support for armed extremist groups gradually shed more light on the role of the United States, Israel and some regional states in fomenting this crisis as well as in the creation of ISIS and spread of terrorism across Syria and Iraq.

The crisis in Syria, which according to the calculation of its masterminds, that is, the United States and Israel, was supposed to led to the fall of the Syrian President Bashar Assad in less than two months, pursued a strategic goal from its outset, which was to put an end to regional resistance front; a goal which had not been achieved through Israel’s previous wars on Lebanon and the Gaza Strip. This goal was to be achieved through overthrow of the Syrian government, followed by the spread of violence and terrorism across the region and spread of instability, crisis and risk of disintegration to Iraq.

As Islamic uprisings reached their climax in the region, the emerging Takfiri ideas which had their roots in Saudi-backed Wahhabism, could be used as the best ground to promote Islamophobia in order to attack the Syrian government as one of the main elements of the regional resistance. Since a project to spread fear of the Shiite Iran among Sunni regional states had been put in gear since a long time ago, the Islamophobic regime of Israel tried to get Saudi Arabia and other regional countries in line with the project that aimed to undermine the resistance front, which was led by Iran.

The subtle goals of this project, as was brought up at the Herzliya Conference in 2014, were to shift the crisis to enemy’s territory and hide behind internal conflicts of the Islamic countries and groups. This plan aimed to pay the cost of countering Islam through the lives and properties of Muslims themselves.

Since the beginning of the crisis, the role of countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey in providing funds as well as arms and logistical support to armed opposition forces in Syria was evident. But perhaps it was difficult for some people to believe the role of the United States and Israel in the creation of the Syrian crisis and ISIS terrorist groups.

• In April 2013, the US Department of State pledged to provide armed opposition groups in Syria with “non-lethal” assistance. At the same time, other reports showed that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had taken steps to transfer “lethal” weapons into Syria through Turkey and Jordan since a year ago.
• In May 2013, US Senator John McCain entered Syria illegally through the Turkish border and met with leaders of Syrian opposition groups, pictures of which were published by mass media.
• The US-based Washington Post newspaper published a report on the dispatch of light arms, military vehicles, advanced communication equipment and medical packages by the CIA for the Syrian militants in September 2013.
• A while later, the Brookings Institution published a 30-page report in December 2013, revealing how unbridled support of some Persian Gulf states, which are US allies, for radical armed groups in Syria fanned the flames of sectarianism and even internal clashes among these groups in Syria.
• Such supportive measures became gradually more evident until the Pentagon officially announced in February 2015 that it had signed three-year agreements with Turkey and Jordan for the equipment and annual training of more than 5,000 armed opposition forces in Syria and had allocated USD 500 million to this purpose. In reality, however, such training had started since two years earlier. In 2015, the Washington Post quoted a report by the Intelligence Committee of the US House of Representatives as saying that CIA had spent one billion US dollars a year to train, equip, and transfer about 10,000 forces into Syria.
• The Daily Telegraph newspaper reported in March 2013 that in a matter of only about four months, 3,000 tons of arms belonging to the former Yugoslavia were sent to the armed militants in Syria through 75 flights via Zagreb to airports in Turkey and Jordan. This project was masterminded by the United States and funded by Saudi Arabia. According to the same report, this was just a small part of the foreign aid provided to terrorists in Syria while other shipments were also sent for them, including via Britain.
• US Vice President Joe Baiden made a speech at the Harvard University in October 2014, which was echoed far and wide and for which he was later forced to apologize. During that speech, he said, “Our allies in the region were our largest problem in Syria…. The Turks were great friends, and I’ve a great relationship with [Turkish President Recep Tayyip] Erdogan, … the Saudis, the Emiratis, etc. What were they doing? They were so determined to take down [Syrian President Bashar al-]Assad and essentially have a proxy Sunni-Shia war. What did they do?” Biden asked, according to a recording of the speech posted on the White House’s website. “They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and tens of thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad, except that the people who were being supplied were al-Nusra, and al Qaeda, and the extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world,” he added.
• While the United States is leading the so-called anti-ISIS coalition, a confidential document belonging to the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and dated August 12, 2012, which has been recently released by the group known as the Judicial Watch, read in its pages 290 and 291 that Western countries, the Persian Gulf states, and Turkey have been the main backers of the armed opposition in Syria. It also predicted that continuation of this process could lead to the emergence of a “Salafi emirate” in the eastern part of Syria, noting that this was exactly the same goal that countries supporting the Syrian opposition sought to achieved due to the fact that survival of the incumbent Syrian government is now beyond doubt and establishment of this emirate can further isolate this government. The report also predicted that the terrorist organizations in Iraq and Syria could come together and form an “Islamic state,” and this would be a major threat to territorial integrity of Iraq.

However in addition to the United States, Israel was directly involved in providing training, consultation and medical services to Takfiri forces in the Golan Heights, Quneitra, Otaiba and other border regions between Syria and the occupied territories.

• In February 2014, a visit to the injured elements of the so-called Free Syrian Army by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, along with Israel’s minister of intelligence and chief of the army, at a field hospital in the north of Israel was covered by the media. Following that visit, the Israeli newspaper, Haaretz, reported that about 700 Syrian militants had been treated in Israeli medical centers in Taiba, Zaif, Nahariya, Rambam Health Care Campus (in the city of Haifa), Bouria, and one of the bases of the Israeli army.
• Former CIA contractor and whistleblower, Edward Snowden, also revealed by releasing a secret document that the intelligence services of the United States, Britain and Israel had implemented a joint project called “Operation Hornets Nest” through which they created ISIS. The document also made it clear that the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi had completed intensive military, ideological and oration courses under the eyes of the Israeli spy agency, Mossad, for an entire year.
• According to a report by Lebanon’s al-Akhbar newspaper, information obtained by hacking computers of some leaders of ISIS in Iraq and Syria and by gaining access to computers of Israel’s security services through ISIS computers, show that Israel, through financial support of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, has been managing several armed Takfiri terrorist operation rooms with various goals in Turkey, Jordan and even Europe and the United States.
• Former Iraqi prime minister, Ayad Allawi, in his recent unofficial visit to Lebanon, has informed some political figures in that country of Saudi Arabia’s plan to counter the resistance axis from Syria to Lebanon in order to prevent Iran from making the most of its nuclear deal with world powers.

Now, almost four months have passed since the beginning of Saudi Arabia’s onslaught against the oppressed people of Yemen in which Riyadh has used all kinds of nonconventional weapons including cluster, phosphorus, napalm, and chemical bombs as well as extra-heavy bombs. Apart from expert analysis, there is ample evidence showing that in its war against Yemen, Saudi Arabia is taking advantage of Israel’s political, intelligence and military support.

• The remarks made by a Saudi squadron leader in this regard are noteworthy when he said, “I was just lining up for a beauty precision strike on a truck load of Houthis, or it could’ve been a wedding, it’s hard to tell from 30,000 feet, when this F-16 with a Star of David cut me off and napalmed the whole lot of them. Zionist f****r didn’t even give me the traditional ‘thumbs up’ afterwards. And no he cannot be ‘my wingman any time.’”
• Finding Israeli weapons at the Saudi embassy in the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, as well as finding remains of Israeli weapons in areas attacked in Yemen, admission to the role of Israel in Saudi Arabia’s air raids against Yemen by the Israeli Daily website, and an extended report by the Global Research on the role of Israeli fighter jets in Saudi Arabia’s aggression against Yemen, are just a few examples of the instances in which Israelis have been directly involved in the war against the oppressed people of Yemen.

In fact, through multifaceted relations with the United States and Israel and playing their game, the aforesaid regional countries first provided unbridled support for terrorist groups in Syria and Iraq, which have marred the image of Islam through unimaginable violent measures that they are taking in the name of religion in these two countries. In the second stage, they are currently fomenting unrest and wreaking havoc in the world of Islam through massacre of the oppressed, Muslim and Arab nation of Yemen whose main motto is hostility against Israel, thus getting attuned to the United States’ and Israel’s plans in the region.

Perhaps, punishment of ISIS and other terrorist groups involved in this project is not possible through an international tribunal as they lack any international legal identity, and they should be punished in the battlefield, but, in view of well-documented cases some of which were explained above, their creators and supporters can be tired for war crimes. More importantly, however, is their punishment in the court of history, which will be certainly more devastating for them.

*Saeed Asadi
Middle East Analyst

The Islamic State (IS) claimed responsibility for Thursday’s morning’s truck-bomb blast that left scores dead and injured at a market in the Shiite-majority Sadr City area of the capital Baghdad.

In a statement released to the international media, the Sunni Islamist militants hailed “the blessed operation that allowed the Islamic State soldiers to blow up a truck”.

In a tweet, IS specified that the target was posts of militants it has been combating for over a year in northern and western Iraq. A refrigerator truck was blown up at the Jamela market, the city’s largest wholesale vegetable market at around 6:30am local time, among the busiest times with people shopping for the weekend.

The toll of the attack remains uncertain, in absence of an official toll the international media is reporting between 60 and 76 dead, with dozens of injured, up to 200. Reporters are also referring that groups of residents have gathered in protest against the government over the new attack.

Meanwhile, the German government firmly denounced a chemical attack in the past days against Kurd combatants, shown by evident respiratory problems suffered by many injured. No specification was made on who was responsible: the German Defence ministry is currently training Peshmerga fighters who are combating IS.