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Brazil: Recent Waves Of Killings In Amazon Part Of Larger Trend Of Violence – Analysis

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By Sofia Rada*

Public discussion regarding police brutality in Brazil has intensified following two waves of homicides in the Amazon city of Manaus.[1] Violence has increased in Manaus, an emerging hub for the South American drug trade, as rival cartels battle for control over smuggling routes in the Amazon rainforest.[2] However, Manaus is no anomaly; homicide rates across the entire country are at peak levels and are increasingly tied to the police.[3]

The police are believed to have been involved in the first wave of killings, which occurred between July 17 and July 20, leaving 35 people dead.[4] While investigators have not officially linked the murders to law enforcement authorities or found the perpetrators, they acknowledge that it is uncommon for those outside the police force to have access to the ammunition that was used in many of the homicides. Despite speculation that the killing spree was linked to the drug trade, a strong line of investigation suggests the recent fatal shooting of a police officer could have motivated the perpetrators.

The second wave of murders in the city occurred just weeks later during the first weekend of August, leaving nine dead.[5] Five of the cases occurred in less than 10 hours. The region’s security forces are currently being reinforced to battle the spiking violence.

High levels of homicide, however, are not a phenomenon exclusive to Brazil’s Amazon region, but part of a larger nationwide trend. Of the 50 cities in Latin America with the highest instance of homicide, 22 are in Brazil.[6] Especially disconcerting is that these levels of violence seem to be increasing. According to a report by the U.N., armed crime in Brazil was higher in 2012 than it had been in the past 35 years, with over 50,000 homicides reported that year. [7] The report blames a slow justice system, flawed police investigations, and the widespread availability of firearms for the lethal violence.

In this atmosphere broad segments of Brazilian society have come to accept a violent police force as a necessary, if perhaps unseemly, means to control crime. Conservative politicians have made strides in Congress, where 21 legislators now form what is called the “bullet caucus,” which has sought to lower the age of criminal responsibility from 18 to 16, among other measures involving law enforcement.[8] Although data has shown that Brazilian adolescents are far more likely to be victims of crime than perpetrators, the argument that this measure would help battle crime rates prevailed and the lower house of the Brazilian Congress approved the amendment.[9] The strengthening support for tough-on-crime policy has been seen by many as granting the police forces near immunity, allowing them to operate without fear of consequence throughout Brazil.

Unlike in the United States where police brutality has drawn significant opposition, in Brazil, the phenomenon has been met with little popular uproar.[10] While U.S. law enforcement agents have killed 11,090 people over the past 30 years, their Brazilian counterparts have killed 11,197 people in a period of just five years.[11] Still, despite episodic demonstrations, a growing movement like the one in the United States seems to be absent from Brazilian society and politicians feel comfortable in boasting how many people they killed while security officers.[12]

Police officers too often turn to violence as their first resort because they view criminals as deviants beyond reform.[13] Additionally, they often view arresting criminals and imprisoning them as fomenting crime, rather than fighting it, since many jails are controlled by criminal organizations. In the state of Rio de Janeiro alone, the police killed at least 563 people in 2014, a 35 percent increase from the year before, according to the state’s Institute of Public Security.[14] Across Brazil, police killed an average of six people a day between 2009 and 2013.[15]

Especially alarming is the increase in the numbers of young Brazilian men killed by the police, particularly those of African descent. More than half of those killed in 2012 were men under the age of 30 and two-thirds were identified as black, according to the U.N. report on violence in Brazil. While many of these young men are involved in criminal activity, many others were innocent, killed by police by mistake.

Although Brazil was a slave colony and nation—it imported 5 million slaves, 10 times more than the United States—and was the last country to end slavery (in 1888), issues of race are seldom discussed.[16] Many view the country as one free of prejudice and believe there is a “racial democracy” because the country never had laws separating the races as in the United States. However, there is an increasing body of research revealing the prejudice and racial disparity in Brazilian society. A study by the University of São Carlos concluded that 58 percent of all people killed by the military police in the state of São Paulo were black.[17] Ignácio Cano, a researcher from Rio de Janeiro State University, has found that blacks in Rio de Janeiro are three times more likely to be wounded or killed by police than would be expected by their share in the population.[18]

Regardless of their skin color, however, the deaths of young Brazilians are often seen as the inevitable price that must be paid in police efforts to fight crime. Yet, current and former police officials run much of the country’s criminal activity.[19] These officers perpetrate violence through membership in militias, criminal organizations that often operate with impunity.

Last year, in a case decidedly similar to the recent one in Manaus, the killing of 10 civilians in a northern Brazilian city by a group of masked men brought attention to this issue.[20] The men were suspected to have been seeking revenge for the killing of a police officer that was accused of being involved in a militia. With precedents such as this one, many have speculated that the recent series of murders in Manaus are new cases of police-related violence.

*Sofia Rada, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:

[1] http://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2015/08/policia-faz-operacao-contra-crimes-em-manaus-apos-9-mortes-diz-ssp-am.html ; http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/07/21/Weekend-violence-in-Manaus-Brazil-leaves-35-people-dead/3811437508895/

[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/americas/suspicion-falls-on-the-police-after-dozens-of-execution-style-killings-in-brazil.html

[3] http://www.latimes.com/world/brazil/la-fg-ff-brazil-crime-20150522-story.html

[4] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/21/world/americas/suspicion-falls-on-the-police-after-dozens-of-execution-style-killings-in-brazil.html

[5] http://g1.globo.com/am/amazonas/noticia/2015/08/policia-faz-operacao-contra-crimes-em-manaus-apos-9-mortes-diz-ssp-am.html

[6] http://www.elperiodico.com/es/noticias/internacional/brasil-investiga-homicidios-ocurridos-fin-semana-4373407

[7] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-32747175

[8] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/17/brazil-rightwing-caucus-lower-age-criminal-responsibility

[9] Ibid; http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jul/02/brazil-age-of-criminal-responsibility-16

[10] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/29/ferguson-missouri-michael-brown-brazil-rio-black-teenager-lucas-lima

[11]http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/11224872/Brazilian-police-kill-11000-people-in-five-years.html

[12] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/15/world/americas/bullet-caucus-in-brazil-signals-a-shift-to-the-right.html?_r=0

[13] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/world/americas/police-killings-brazil-rio.html

[14] Ibid

[15]http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/southamerica/brazil/11224872/Brazilian-police-kill-11000-people-in-five-years.html

[16] http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/soccer/2014/06/22/brazil-faces-issues-around-racism-despite-image/11232763/

[17] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/24/opinion/vanessa-barbara-in-denial-over-racism-in-brazil.html

[18] http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/22/world/americas/police-killings-brazil-rio.html

[19] http://time.com/3576606/brazil-belem-amazon-militia/

[20] Ibid


Ireland Won’t Extradite Terrorist To US, Claims Prisons Too Inhumane

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Throughout the world, the U.S. prison system is often seen as inhumane and excessively large.

The American prison system is so reviled, in fact, that Irish officials recently refused to extradite an alleged terrorist to the U.S. The court cited concerns that if he were sent to the U.S., he would probably be placed in Colorado’s “Supermax” prison, ADX Florence (Administrative Maximum Facility). The prison is nicknamed Colorado’s “Alcatraz of the Rockies.”

Irish High Court Justice Aileen Donnelly went as far as to write a 333-page report about why the suspect shouldn’t be extradited. One highlight from the court’s ruling was that incarceration at ADX Florence prison would amount to “cruel and unusual punishment.”

Donnelly said the prison “amounts to a breach of the constitutional requirement to protect persons from inhuman and degrading treatment and to respect the dignity of the human being.”

“[P]rolonged exposure to involuntary solitary confinement exacts a significant physiological toll, is damaging to the integrity of the mind and personality, and is damaging to the bodily integrity of the person,” she continued.

According to the Los Angeles Times, “An Irish resident originally from Algiers, Damache, 50, [is]accused of using online chat rooms to recruit American women into a would-be terrorist cell operating in this country and Europe.

One man and two women, including Damache’s wife, have already been convicted in U.S. courts of providing material support to terrorists. And Damache was captured by Irish authorities in 2010 in Dublin on a separate charge of making a telephone death threat and held without bail.”

In 2011, Damache was indicted from a distance in a Philadelphia court on “charges of plotting to assassinate a Swedish cartoonist who depicted the prophet Muhammad as a dog.”

Damache was released in May after serving his time, but the U.S. is still pushing for his extradition.

“I always had faith in the Irish legal system,” he said in a statement presented by his lawyers. “After more than five years in jail, I am looking forward to moving on with my life here.”

The Colorado prison has held some of the most well-known criminals in American history, keeping them in solitary confinement with extremely limited access to outside communication. Notorious inmates include Timothy McVeigh and other people accused of high level terrorism—such as Zacarias Moussaoui, the only person convicted in a civilian court for involvement in the 9/11 attacks.

Lawyers have even argued that incarceration at ADX Florence is worse than the death penalty. Defense expert Mark Bezy called it “a mechanism to cut off an inmate’s communications with the outside world.”

The Irish court’s refusal to extradite Damache adds to a growing trend of nations that opt to exercise their own sovereignty amid pressure from powerful American influence.

Such nations are increasingly moving to decide issues for themselves as they refuse to be persuaded into following the orders of a more powerful empire.

Xenophobia And Fear Drive The West’s Debate On Refugees – OpEd

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By Yohannes Woldemariam*

The current drastic displacement of African people has not occurred since the days of the slave trade. The Mediterranean and the waters between Indonesia and Australia are now a graveyard for Eritreans, Sudanese, Somalis, Syrians, and Afghans – all leaving their homes in search of protection and an end to persecution. They are humans – mothers, fathers, brothers, sisters, daughters, and sons. As conditions in their home countries continue to deteriorate, they are left with little choice to stay. Worldwide an unprecedented 59.5 million people are displaced.

The tragedy mounts around the world but complacency and apathy also abound. Millions of people struggle to seek protection from predatory governments but the affluent world turns a blind eye with many nations insisting the burden of accepting refugees is too great and claiming refugees take advantage of entitlements without working – a myth not supported by facts. This is done using rhetoric like ‘asylum shopping’ and ‘economic migration’ to delegitimize refugees and claim they seek opportunity without responsibility under the guise of protection.

The European Union, Australia, Canada, the United States and Israel disregard international refugee law , for example; Australia patronizes Papua New Guinea as an offshore detention center, allegedly paying smugglers to return refugees to Indonesia. Italy’s former Prime Minister Berlusconi made deals with the late Libyan leader Gadhafi to curtail refugee flow.

Israel describes refugees as ‘infiltrators’ who ‘dilute the Jewish character of the nation,’ and rejected all but 4 of over 17,000 asylum requests while planning to expel more refugees to Uganda or Rwanda. Among the victims of the Islamic State’s beheadings were some who left Israel to escape unbearable warehousing and detention centers to Rwanda and Uganda, and continued on to Libya in search of safe haven.

The British Prime Minister David Cameron described asylum seekers as “swarms” while promising to spend [url=http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/30/world/europe/britain-and-france-scramble-as-channel-crossing-attempts-by-migrants-continue.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=mini-moth&region=top-stories-below&WT.nav=top-stories-below$11 million[/url] to beef up security along the English Channel bordering Calais in France.

Denmark produced a flawed study to justify denying Eritrean asylum seekers asylum, but before the ink was dry on the Danish study, the U.N. commission of inquiry on human rights produced a damning picture of Eritrea. Moreover, the Eritrean scholar Professor Gaim Kibreab of London South Bank University whose testimony is extensively quoted in the Danish study has since disassociated himself from the conclusions of the “study.” Norway is also negotiating a deal with the Eritrean government to try to return Eritrean asylum seekers to Eritrea. This is all ironic, since western governments widely consider President Isaias Afeworki of Eritrea to be one of the world’s most oppressive leaders.

Accusations of economic migration usually cite that ‘legitimate’ refugees would stop in the first country of arrival, but doing so is not always realistic. For Eritreans, there are few safe havens in the whole East African region, let alone in neighboring countries. Crossing over into neighboring Sudan is unsafe. Trafficking gangs operate around refugee camps in the east, abducting displaced people to hold them for ransom while security forces are known to kidnap Eritreans to return them home. In neighboring Ethiopia, Eritrean asylum seekers risk getting sucked into the low-level conflict between the two countries since the 1998-2000 border war. Eritreans seeking asylum in the first, second, or even third country of arrival is simply not a viable option.

The use of an irrational fear of asylum-seekers for political and electoral purposes while prohibiting boats on the high seas (Australia) and building walls and fences (Israel, Hungary, and Spain) is a growing practice for many states. Australian Prime Minister Abbot’s ‘stop the boats’ policy utilizes its navy to intercept boats carrying asylum seekers, which is in violation of the U.N. convention. Interception at sea and other measures to curb Eritrean and African migration often results in violations of the non-refoulement principle, which is the cornerstone of the international refugee regime intended to prevent people from being returned to countries where their lives and liberty would be at risk.

Dublin II is another EU agreement that stipulates asylum requests be determined in the first country of arrival. This puts the responsibility to protect on the countries situated in the south and east of the EU. Contemporary conditions demand expanding legal channels of entering the EU. The EU’s rules on allocating responsibility for processing asylum-seekers needs to be reviewed to give better protection for asylum seekers and to harmonize an EU-wide policy. Yet, the EU struggles with how to share 40,000 refugees, a drop in the bucket compared to the need.

The current system of resettlement of individuals recommended for refugees to enter safe countries involves waiting for indefinite periods in dangerous neighboring countries and is replete with problems while delivering unsatisfactory results. The United States takes in 80% of the resettlement cases in the world but only authorized 17000 eligibilities from the entire Africa for fiscal year 2015. The affluent world has more than a moral responsibility to refugees. Western countries take on just a fraction of the world’s displaced persons. According to the U.N. Refugee Agency, of the 21 countries that hosted over 1 million refugees between 2003 and 2012, just one European country (France) made the list. As of 2014, 86% of the world’s refugees were hosted in developing countries.

Lack of “burden sharing” by the developed states may provoke poor countries to abandon this regime. Sadly, even in the ANC ruled South Africa, “Jacob Zuma’s son, Edward, mused…that foreigners were not only drug dealers but a ‘security threat’ and must go, he was reflecting an entrenched idea linking migrants to criminality, held by 55 percent of South Africans, according to a SAMP survey.” I hear an echo of Donald Trump coming from an African.

The answer really is to strengthen the refugee protection based on enlightened self-interest: the promotion of human rights and the health of the global economy, security, and stability. If the developed world shirks its responsibility to protect by refusing to accommodate the paltry number such as in Calais, Italy, Greece and Malta, it is likely that developing countries will abandon the norm of “burden-sharing.” What kind of a world will that be?

Refugee protection should also engage refugees themselves. We are not dealing with passive sheep. These are highly motivated and hardworking human beings who find themselves in unfortunate situations and want to survive, regroup and join their scattered families. Refugees are not helpless as Germany is finding out with its Syrian refugees who are contributing to its economy and helping to rescue its demographic labor imbalance. Actually, it is the refugee producing countries who are losing from this exodus due to brain drain.

To callously suggest that refugees be returned to the circumstances that forced them to leave their home countries betrays a serious lack of compassion, and a refusal to engage with the motivations for why people flee their countries. It is also a refusal to acknowledge, at least partial responsibility by the countries who dominate the international economy, and who contribute to militarization and war. To state this is not to absolve dictatorial regimes, but puts the issue in its global context.

* Yohannes Woldemariam teaches international relations at Fort Lewis College in Colorado, USA.

The Challenge Of Frugal And Greener Winter Olympics – OpEd

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Recently, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) awarded the 2022 Winter Games to Beijing, in a joint bid with the city of Zhangjiakou, the capital’s “northern door” adjoining mountains with ski resorts.

In the West, the response has been apprehensive, presumably because of concerns about cost and environment.

“Plug-and-play” Olympics

As costs have soared and environmental effects accumulated, the pride of hosting Olympic events has lost much of its luster in recent years. The 2004 Athens Summer Olympics left Greece with $11 billion in debt. In turn, the costs of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics soared to $51 billion.

Last year, the IOC presented its Olympic Agenda 2020 seeking to promote sustainability and contain costs. It seeks to transform hopes the Olympics into a “plug-and-play” event. Moreover, selected host cities must fit the games into their environments with minimal damage.

In 2008, the Beijing Summer Olympics required shutdowns against pollution and cost $44 billion. In 2022, Beijing Winter Olympics hopes to portray a greener China, with the construction budget of barely $3.1 billion.

At the same time, the capital region is likely to benefit from infrastructure investments that parallel preparation to the Winter Games – including the Beijing-Zhangjiakou intercity railways, expansion of Beijing subway, upgraded highway networks, and another regional airport.

What about the environmental effects?

Frugal, green Olympics

Beijing’s vision is to develop a winter sports market for more than 300 million people in northern China. The plan is to reuse 11 of 12 venues built for 2008. The goal is to integrate the games with sustainable development plans for the wider region, focusing on clean energy, green technology, ecological improvement, and air quality.

In 2008, polluting facilities were moved out of the Beijing, while anti-smog provisions were deployed during the games. Afterwards, the smog returned with revenge. In 2022, the city’s air is expected to be significantly better, thanks to the government’s $7.6 billion anti-smog programs, which are not directly linked to the bid.

The skiing events will take place in the mountains of Zhangjiakou, Hebei; one of China’s most polluted province. In the arid region, the ultimate challenge is to manufacture snow to make the games possible.

In Sochi, Russia stockpiled the snow. Beijing’s goal is to manufacture most of it in an environmentally friendly way. The IOC has suggested that Beijing may be overestimating its supplies and underestimating the water that’s needed for snowmaking. Nevertheless, the Commission believes “adequate water for Games needs could be supplied.”

The 2022 Olympics rely on efforts to clean the air with long-term regional solutions that have potential to have an enduring, positive effect for northern China. The stakes are high for both Beijing and the IOC.

The shift of the Olympic torch

In addition to costs and environment, the IOC’s decision to make Beijing the first city to host both the winter and summer Olympics has been criticized. But in view of the fact that every fifth human being in the world is in China, Beijing’s role as the host of both Olympic games is hardly surprising.

Skeptics also argue that many Beijing-Zhangjiakou residents are critical of the Olympics. Yet, in December 2014, the IOC’s independent poll regarding the public support for Beijing’s bid demonstrated overwhelming support for the games in Beijing (88%), Hebei (93%) and China (92%).

What is changing is the role of host cities and their nations. Winter Olympics were initiated in France in 1924. The games have not been immune to scandals and controversies, from allegations of bribery and doping to Cold War politics.
And yet, for nine long decades the Winter Olympics took place mainly in advanced economies, while several countries – including Switzerland, the U.S., and Japan – hosted the games twice, or more. Nor did criticism stop the winter games even when Adolf Hitler opened the games in 1936.

Nevertheless, in the past few years criticism seems to have become more vocal.
Perhaps one reason is that, with Russia in 2014, South Korea in 2018 and China in 2022, Olympic torch is shifting from advanced economies to emerging nations. That, however, only reflects the shift of economic power from the West to emerging Asia.

In the past, Winter Olympics were dominated by advanced economies. As emerging economies join in, the games are only gradually becoming truly global.

This is a slightly longer version of the original, which was released by China Daily on August 11, 2015

Sri Lanka Releases 40 Indian Fishermen

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Sri Lanka has released 40 Indian fishermen on Wednesday. The fishermen had been detained in the island nation for the last two months on charges of trespassing into Sri Lankan territorial waters.

The Mannar Magistrate court and the Magistrate Court in Point Pedro ordered the release of 40 Indian fishermen in Sri Lankan custody.

This gesture was taken in view of Indian Independence Day anniversary which falls on August 15, the Sri Lanka government said.

The 14 Rameswaram fishermen were produced before the Mannar court and the rest were produced before the Point Pedro court, the Sri Lanka government said.

The Sri Lankan Navy handed over 40 Indian fishermen released by Sri Lanka to the Indian Coast Guard.

Spain Asks UN To Declare International Youth Employment Decade

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The Government of Spain gave a boost on Wednesday to the International Campaign: Youth Employment Decade, which was presented at the Institute for Young People (Spanish acronym: INJUVE) and which seeks for the United Nations General Assembly to declare this period as official and generate a movement for reflection, thought, debate and action on the important of fostering stable employment for young people around the world.

The main aim is to call on Member States to highlight youth employment as a priority of their public policies and to commit to attaining a series of goals on this matter. This campaign, which was originally promoted by the Novia Salcedo Foundation, has been signed up to by 361 organizations from 49 countries: 84% from Europe, 7% from Latin America and the Caribbean, 7% from Africa and 2% from Asia.

This presentation coincides with the celebration of International Youth Day. In order to give a renewed boost to the campaign, INJUVE is preparing an official visit to Spain in October by Admad Adhlendawi, the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy on Youth.

According to the statements made by the Director General of INJUVE, Rubén Urosa Sánchez, communication and awareness-raising actions will be the priorities under the campaign: maintaining the webpage www.youthemploymentdecade.org; the creation of an online center to promote communication between countries on issues such as education, entrepreneurship and gender equality; offering visibility to good practices carried out by different countries and organizations; and creating centers for debate on the role of youth employment on issues such as the eradication of poverty and economic growth.

Moreover, the road map of the campaign, which is still subject to modification, underlined the importance of research in opening up dialogue based on evidence, to which end research will be actively promoted, including identifying factors for success, analyzing educational systems, studying policies to drive job creation and providing methodological support for those countries that need this.

The campaign committee, which is headed up by the Ministers of Health, Social Services and Equality, and of Employment and Social Security (or delegates thereof with the rank of state secretary), met for the first time on 28 July with the participation of more than 30 representatives, including from the Government, Juan Pablo Riesgo Figuerola-Ferreti, State Secretary for Employment; Susana Camarero Benitez, State Secretary for Social Services and Equality, and Rubén Urosa Sánchez, Director-General of INJUVE, among others.

At this meeting, business organizations and the self-employed were also urged to work in favor of quality jobs and permanent employment contracts.

The Government of Spain is aware of the importance of tackling problems of integration in the labor market for ensuring a better future for young people. In February 2013, the Entrepreneurship and Youth Employment Strategy was set up. This contains 100 measures to alleviate the serious problem of youth unemployment in Spain. To date, this has benefited 430,000 young people, plus those who have benefited through the actions implemented by the regional governments and other bodies that have signed up to the strategy.

Biased Views On India’s Nuclear Program – OpEd

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Mr Usman Ali Khan’s OpEd (India’s Sprawling Nuclear Quest, Eurasia Review, July 24th) reveals a totally biased view on India’s nuclear power program. Mr Khan passionately supports Pakistan’s nuclear programme; however, he considers “Massive Indian Nuclear build up plans” as alarming. I have a broader view. Nuclear energy can play a vital role in all developing countries including India and Pakistan.

Usman criticized his compatriot Dr. Pervez Hoodbhoy, for opposing Pakistan’s plan to construct two Chinese-supported nuclear power reactors in Karachi (Nuclear Energy Viable Option, Pakistannewsviews.com, April 14, 2014). However, Mr Khan quotes (Late) Praful Bidwai, for whom anti-nuclear sentiment is an article of faith to criticize India’s nuclear program.

Mr Bidwai remained anti-nuclear till his last breath. Mr Khan must know that both Dr Hoodbhoy and Mr Bidwai are birds of the same feather! Ideologically, Bidwai was India’s Hoodbhoy and Hoodbhoy is Pakistan’s Bidwai!

While referring to the way the Government treated anti-nuclear movements in India, Mr Khan wrote thus: “The protestors shouldn’t be treated like ignorant and misguided children to be coached and disciplined by a nanny state. Their leaders are well-informed professionals, including S.P. Udayakumar, who has taught at a US university, M. Pushparayan, a lawyer, and Tuticorin’s Bishop.”

Bidwai wrote these words over three years ago on October 18, 2011 (“People’s power vs nuclear power”). He would have forgiven Khan for his indiscretion in copying his words!

“If one looks at the history of nuclear power projects in India, practically each reactor took longer to build, cost more than projected, and performed worse than had been envisaged when plans were made.” Khan asserted.

This was exactly what Dr M V Ramana, an acerbic critic of India’s nuclear program wrote two years ago (Paragraph 10, “The Limited Future of Nuclear Power in India“).

Usman sourced selected information on India’s nuclear program exclusively from anti-nuclear activists/writers such as M V Ramana. As is the practice recommended by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board rates events in nuclear installations in India based on their safety significance and publish them in its annual reports. Anti nuclear activists such as Ramana portray a laundry list of such events as catastrophic and diabolic. Rather than parroting these views blindly, if Mr Khan seeks the views of the officials in Pakistan Nuclear Regulatory Authority (PNRA), he may realize how baseless are Dr Ramana’s opinions on the safety status of India’s nuclear plants.

Mr Khan invokes the memories of Bhopal to highlight the consequences of a nuclear disaster in India. Thus: “Memories of the Bhopal tragedy, which killed an estimated 10,000 people in 1984, are still fresh, and so is the mismanagement of the fallout by the government of the day, including letting the senior management of U.S. firm Union Carbide escape scot free.”

Mr Kabir Tarneja, a journalist, made the same statement in The Diplomat on December 13, 2013 (Lessons from Japan for India on Nuclear Energy).

Linking the Bhopal tragedy with nuclear power is inappropriate.

Mr Khan asserted that “the details of nuclear programme information on several fronts are unavailable to the public”.

“These include the question on: What exactly is the purpose of the nuclear programme- production of energy, or use of nuclear technology for ‘peaceful’ purposes, for India’s security or for all purposes keeping in mind the story of CANDU reactors? What is the extent of nuclear energy potential in India on the basis of fuel to be used? What is the extent to which technology is imported from other countries? How much is spent on the development of nuclear technology and individual projects in India?” he added.

Khan reproduced these questions verbatim from what Ms Manju Menon wrote exactly four years ago (Who knows, who cares? Environmental and social safety violations in nuclear projects in India, 08 / 2011)

One can answer these questions based on publicly available documents.

“Apart from the law that shields the nuclear programme from the public, it is the nuclear bureaucracy that guards its projects and schemes.” Khan repeats another claim of Ms Menon in the same article.

Ms Menon’s statements which Usman uses indiscreetly seem to be on the secrecy provisions in the Atomic Energy Act 1962. Those provisions are similar in other countries with similar stakes. The Honourable Supreme Court of India has upheld the constitutional validity of such provisions (http://indiankanoon.org/doc/516862/)

Usman copied para six starting with “Second,…and ending with “security culture”(148 words) describing a few nuclear events in India’s nuclear reactors, which Kabir Tareja wrote on November 13, 2011 (http://defence.pk/threads/indias-nuclear-energy-plans-face-post-fukushima-hurdles.142420/).

In summary, Mr.Usman Ali Khan uses without attribution large portions of articles from many authors to show India’s nuclear program in poor light. Because of this practice, this article on India’s nuclear program is biased and “tellingly short on facts and abundantly long on unsupported opinions”, as I wrote earlier (Muddled Up Views On India’s Nuclear Program, Eurasia Review, June 13, 2015) while responding to “India’s Nuclear Muddle” (Eurasia Review, May 15, 2015).

Rapid Regeneration Of Irregular Warfare Capacity – Analysis

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By Stephen Watts, J. Michael Polich, and Derek Eaton

There is widespread agreement among the public and in the foreign and defense communities that the United States should avoid “another Iraq” or “another Afghanistan”—that is, another large-scale, long-term, and high-cost stability operation. President Barack Obama’s reluctance to put “boots on the ground” in Iraq is but the most recent example of this reaction against the high costs and questionable outcomes of the conflicts in those two countries. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates may have been particularly blunt when he declared that anyone advising a future President to pursue forcible regime change in the developing world “should have his head examined,” but the sentiment is widespread.1

Worse than having to fight another Iraq or another Afghanistan, however, would be if the United States were yet again unprepared for such a contingency—as occurred when it divested itself of counterinsurgency capabilities after the policy community united against “another Vietnam.” This article considers the challenge of maintaining readiness for large-scale irregular warfare (IW) contingencies when the national mood has so decisively turned against such operations.

The need to hedge against such a contingency is recognized in both the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Whereas both documents are widely interpreted as rejecting large-scale counterinsurgency and stability operations, they actually provide more nuanced guidance. Although U.S. forces will not be sized to conduct such operations, the QDR insists that “we will preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.”2 It is less clear what this guidance means in practice. To sketch the outlines of such an “adaptability hedge,”3 we first review the history of large-scale IW operations to determine the timelines that intervening forces have historically needed to adapt to such contingencies, how quickly they have adapted in practice, and the costs of slow adaptation. Second, we examine the sorts of ground forces that are typically required for such operations and—using simple metrics—estimate the amount of time required to regenerate them. Based on this analysis, we suggest which capabilities could be regenerated relatively quickly for large-scale IW contingencies as the need arises and which would be priorities to keep in the ground force structure due to the long lag times associated with rebuilding these capabilities once they are lost. Finally, we briefly review the pipeline for regenerating IW capabilities and how to ensure the pipeline could function rapidly if needed.

The Imperative of Rapid Adaptation for Large-Scale IW

Even if they accept that the United States might at some point get drawn into another such contingency, many observers are skeptical of making sizable investments in standing capabilities for large-scale IW. These skeptics generally make three arguments. First, because insurgencies typically last many years, intervening forces have considerable time to adapt to the operational theme and environment.4 In contrast, conventional contingencies may conclude in victory or defeat in mere weeks. If one cannot pay the price necessary to be prepared for every kind of conflict, it is better to be prepared for conventional contingencies and, if necessary, adapt over time to irregular warfare rather than vice versa.

Second, IW is typically fought by small units on a highly decentralized battlefield—a much easier task militarily than coordinating fire and maneuver across large numbers of higher echelon formations. The skeptics of IW investments maintain it is easier to adapt from more complex military tasks to less complex ones than it is to go in the other direction.5 Again, such an argument suggests that the bulk of investments should be made in conventional warfighting capabilities. Finally, skeptics of IW contend that counterinsurgency and stability operations have historically been “wars of choice” fought by the United States in less strategically vital regions of the world. These skeptics maintain that if fiscal austerity imposes the need for U.S. Armed Forces to accept a higher degree of risk than usual, this risk is best assumed in less-vital IW capabilities.

While defensible, each of these arguments overstates its case and minimizes the extent of the risk the United States would incur by failing to invest in standing IW capabilities or the ability to regenerate them quickly.

How Long Do Militaries Have to Adapt to IW? The answer to this question in any particular case obviously depends on circumstances. But history provides an approximate answer that can be used for force planning. While insurgencies typically last for more than 10 years (15 years, more recently), foreign militaries usually intervene in them for much shorter periods of time—at least when they are deployed in large numbers by democracies. Looking at the best-known cases of expeditionary counterinsurgency by democratic interveners, we see that democracies that have deployed 25,000 or more forces have done so for only 5 years on average, and rarely—if ever—for more than 8 years.

Even these numbers, however, probably overstate the amount of time a democratic power such as the United States has to adapt to the requirements of IW. For instance, although the United States deployed large numbers of forces in South Vietnam from 1965 to 1972, it was searching for a way out after the Tet Offensive in January–February 1968—a mere 3 years after escalating its involvement. Similarly, the United States intervened on a large scale in Iraq from 2003 to 2011, but by 2007—less than 4 years after its invasion—the United States had committed to either win the war through the so-called surge or withdraw. And the United States is not alone in this respect. In the case of the large-scale French counterinsurgency in Algeria (1954–1962), many observers argue the war became unwinnable for France as a result of its widespread use of torture in the Battle of Algiers, which ended in 1957—3 years after the escalation of French involvement. Similarly, India completely withdrew its forces from large-scale counterinsurgency operations in Sri Lanka within 3 years (1987–1990), and Israel withdrew the bulk of its forces from Lebanon in less than 2 years (1982–1983).

In short, there appears to be a small window of time before an intervening democracy such as the United States reaches a “culminating point” by which it must be on a clear path to an acceptable outcome or face strong domestic political pressures to withdraw.

How Long Does It Take to Adapt to the Requirements of IW? There is no way to measure exactly what “good enough” adaptation looks like and how long it has taken across a range of contingencies. Instead, an examination of a single case—the U.S. experience in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF)—is helpful to illustrate how long it took U.S. forces to adapt in a recent war.

There is some debate about what constituted sufficient adaptation in Iraq and how long it took. A few observers—mostly counterinsurgency skeptics—argue that U.S. forces adapted within the first year of their deployment in theater.6 Others, however, point to General Stanley McChrystal’s memorandum of November 2009 outlining counterinsurgency guidance for forces in Afghanistan as evidence that substantial portions of the force still had not mastered critical aspects of IW.

But a review of the literature suggests that these observers are outliers. Most sources agree that U.S. forces required 3½ to 4 years to adapt at least reasonably well to the exigencies of OIF. There is widespread acknowledgment that the U.S. military was initially ill-prepared for the insurgency it encountered in Iraq despite the efforts of individuals to do the best they could with what they had under extraordinarily trying circumstances. A survey by Colonel William Hix and Kalev Sepp reportedly found that only one-fifth of units demonstrated counterinsurgency proficiency in August 2005.7 On the basis of detailed examination of multiple units, one of the best empirical studies of adaptation in OIF found that many of the key breakthroughs occurred in 2006 and early 2007.8 A Joint Staff–sponsored retrospective on Iraq and Afghanistan concluded that:

operations during the first half of the decade were often marked by numerous missteps and challenges as the U.S. government and military applied a strategy and force suited for a different threat and environment. Operations in the second half of the decade often featured successful adaptation to overcome these challenges.9

Three problems of adaptation in the early years of OIF stand out from these various studies: insufficiently discriminate use of force, inadequate nonlethal enablers to conduct effective civil-military and intelligence operations, and insufficient (and often inappropriate) resources devoted to the advisory (foreign internal defense) function. These problems are summarized in table 1.watts-table1

The math is both clear and troubling. On average, countries such as the United States have only 5 years (at best) to adapt to the requirements of large-scale irregular warfare abroad before they come under extraordinary political pressure to draw down their presence. But the United States recently required between 3½ and 4 years to adapt at least reasonably well to these sorts of contingencies.10 In other words, the United States was ill-adapted to the requirements of IW for—at a minimum—approximately two-thirds to four-fifths of the time that it has typically had to fight such wars on a large scale.

What Are the Consequences of Being Poorly Adapted to the Requirements of IW? Slow adaptation entails one of two costs: either worse outcomes, or higher costs paid to obtain the same outcome. The former has been framed in terms of a so-called golden hour, the early period in an intervention during which popular expectations are set and insurgents can begin to organize. Once formed, popular expectations can become highly resistant to change, making it extremely difficult for counterinsurgents to gain popular backing after a poor start. Moreover, insurgents are at their most vulnerable when they first start to organize, making it critical that counterinsurgents are effective in this early stage. Once violence and instability spread, they provide opportunities for additional latent conflicts to turn violent and for hatreds and suspicions to harden, leading to an intensification of the conflict. Observers have detected such dynamics in the U.S. “attritional” strategy in Vietnam as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. While counterinsurgents can still potentially obtain their objectives in the end even if they perform poorly in the early days of a conflict, the price is likely to be much steeper.11

Nor is IW likely to be confined to peripheral regions of little strategic significance to the United States as contended by skeptics of significant investments in maintaining the ability to quickly regenerate large-scale IW capabilities. Many observers of conflict trends believe that irregular and conventional warfare are likely to blend in so-called hybrid conflicts.12 In looking to potential future conflicts, most of the ones that appear to be both relatively more likely to occur and most significant in their impact involve likely hybrid threats—contingencies such as state collapse and loose nuclear materials in North Korea or a future nuclear-armed Iran. IW does not represent a set of lesser strategic concerns for the United States—“wars of choice” that can be easily avoided. To the contrary, IW is a likely element of many or most of the highest-risk scenarios the United States currently faces.

Rapid Adaptation to Large-Scale IW

Building readiness for future IW contingencies is not fundamentally different from building readiness for other types of war. As in all readiness debates, policymakers face tradeoffs among cost, military effectiveness, and time.13 In this era of fiscal constraints, policymakers are seeking to limit costs by reducing military readiness for large-scale IW contingencies, while still paying for the necessary infrastructure to regenerate such capabilities quickly if needed.

This approach is reasonable in principle. In practice, it requires answering difficult questions: How quickly can such capabilities be regenerated? Can they be regenerated quickly enough, given the relatively short timelines for IW adaptation discussed in the previous section? Capabilities in high demand for IW that can only be built or achieve adequate readiness over long periods of time are candidates to be retained as forces in being. Capabilities required for IW that can be built or achieve readiness relatively quickly are candidates to be regenerated on demand. Once we know which capabilities need to be kept as forces in being, and what infrastructure is necessary to maintain a pipeline to regenerate other forms of IW capacity, we can determine (at least roughly) the price tag associated with the 2014 QDR’s pledge to “preserve the expertise gained during the past ten years of counterinsurgency and stability operations protect the ability to regenerate capabilities that might be needed to meet future demands.”

Estimating Requirements for Capabilities in Being. Once the need for adaptation is recognized, it can occur in many domains relatively quickly. Training and doctrine, for instance, can be oriented toward the specific circumstances of new irregular contingencies within as little as a few months. Similarly, facilities can be adapted, with mockups of foreign villages built and role-players hired on a contract basis, in relatively short order. Such adaptations are necessary, and the following section will detail some of the infrastructure necessary to ensure they are executed rapidly. But for IW, the long pole in the tent is typically human capital—the development of military leaders who can rely on the education and experience they have gained over many years (or even decades) to adapt to a complex environment. Such leaders cannot be regenerated quickly if decisionmakers have guessed incorrectly about the nature of future contingencies.14

What types of leaders are most in demand? Studies have found that several types of units were particularly stressed by IW requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan: combat arms, rotary aviation, military intelligence (especially assets related to human intelligence), military police (particularly law enforcement), explosive ordnance disposal (EOD), and special operations forces (SOF).15 Nor are these demands unique to Iraq and Afghanistan; many of these same types of units were in high demand in a variety of other IW campaigns, both counterinsurgency (in Vietnam) and other forms of stability operations (for instance, in Bosnia and Kosovo).

Unfortunately, many of the types of units in highest demand for IW are rank-heavy formations filled with personnel with many years of experience in their fields. For example, personnel comprising a Brigade Combat Team (BCT) possess approximately 4 years of service on average. Many enablers, such as transportation or administrative units, require far less experience; the personnel in quartermaster companies or light- and medium-truck companies possess approximately 3 years of service on average. In contrast, many of the enablers in high demand for IW contingencies possess personnel with considerably more experience. Personnel in interrogation battalions, law and order detachments, tactical military information support operations detachments, civil affairs teams, and EOD companies all possess between 5 and 7 years of service on average—approximately twice that of the logistical support units discussed above and substantially higher than the experience in a BCT. Moreover, the average years of service in these units is approximately as long as the United States ever remains committed on a large scale to IW contingencies. Regenerating these capabilities on demand, in other words, is probably not practical unless decisionmakers are willing to accept dramatic declines in quality, no matter how large the pipeline for regeneration.

Capabilities that are in high demand for IW and have lengthy development times are high-priority candidates to be retained in disproportionately large numbers if the Department of Defense (DOD) makes a commitment to quickly regain critical IW proficiencies and capacity. These capabilities include aviation, certain types of military intelligence, law enforcement, EOD, and SOF. They could be retained as formed units, or their leadership could be retained in disproportionately large numbers in a “grade over-structure” or cadre that would serve as the basis for regenerating fully formed units in times of need.16 Regardless of how these capabilities are maintained, DOD needs to ensure that it gains appropriate experience operating in real-world environments, ideally through security cooperation and similar activities. True proficiency in tasks conducted in “wars among the people” is simply too difficult to attain in the classroom or in artificial training environments.

Maintaining a Pipeline to Regenerate Other IW Capabilities. Clearly, the United States cannot afford to maintain all the capabilities it needs for large-scale IW in capacities sufficient to meet the requirements of many plausible scenarios. Particularly where regeneration times are relatively rapid (for capabilities that require relatively less expertise) or where the overall numbers of forces involved make it impractical to maintain a force optimized for IW (as is the case for combat arms other than SOF), the United States will need to regenerate capacity and proficiency for IW as quickly as possible.

Three elements of the Services’ activities are especially important in providing a basis for regenerating IW capability in the future: organizations, exercises, and school curricula. To ensure that the Services maintain their pipelines for regenerating IW capabilities, DOD should ensure adequate funding and attention for each of these elements.

Both the Army and Marine Corps created many organizations to develop proficiency for large-scale IW during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army’s focal point for this area was the Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell, which helped to coordinate IW-related activities among the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, Asymmetric Warfare Group, Center for Army Lessons Learned, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Similarly, the Marine Corps established the Center for Irregular Warfare, Security Cooperation Group, and Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning. These organizations that study and codify IW operations formed DOD’s intellectual foundation for preserving expertise.

In a period of fiscal constraint, these organizations’ budgets have already come under pressure; the Army Irregular Warfare Fusion Cell, for instance, closed on October 1, 2014.17 There is ample precedent to anticipate further such cuts. Service culture celebrates command functions and operational experience, and the leadership is largely drawn from the warfighting branches. If money and manpower allocations are tight, Service priorities are likely to favor deployable units and operational functions over institutions—like IW organizations—whose product is less tangible and longer term. For example, the post–Cold War drawdown resulted in sizable reductions in Army institutions (particularly at the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command). Similarly, when units were under pressure to deploy at full strength during the 1990s, the Army moved to increase manning in operational units at the expense of manning in the its institutional base. Therefore, we should expect that lower priorities are likely to be accorded to doctrine writers, training developers, experts in training/advising foreign forces, and even experts at the combat training centers. For these reasons, DOD should monitor the size of IW institutions and the seniority of their staff to assess their well-being and capacity to contribute to preserving IW capabilities.

Just as the Services developed organizations to gain IW proficiency over the past decade, they also oriented their training programs to the requirements of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the withdrawal of most American troops from both countries and the rebalancing of U.S. defense capabilities toward the Asia-Pacific region, the Services are justifiably reorienting their training to regain proficiency in conventional warfighting. Yet this reorientation does not mean the Services have abandoned IW. In fact, both the Army and Marine Corps have adopted scenarios based on hybrid threats, and both plan to incorporate these features into their major exercises. Steps have already been taken to test and refine these concepts.

As with institutional budgets, however, training budgets are also coming under pressure. Moreover, there are a finite number of days in a year, making it difficult to retain proficiency in as many operational themes as might be desirable. Consequently, DOD should also monitor IW proficiency by monitoring units’ performance at the Services’ premier exercises, such as the Army’s combat training centers and Marine Corps’ predeployment exercises. DOD should track data on the content of exercises (goals, types of threats, operational environment, tactics executed and evaluated, and so forth), performance of the trainee units,18 and percentage of leaders in key positions—battalion commanders, S-3s, executive officers, company commanders—who actually execute a premier exercise rotation emphasizing IW skills during their tenure in that position.

Assuming that the scale of current operations declines as expected, fewer military leaders will have direct experience in IW. As a result, professional education courses will represent a critical means through which IW knowledge and skills will be inculcated in future cohorts of officers and noncommissioned officers. School curricula, however, are limited in the amount of student instructional time available; each domain of expertise must compete with others for curriculum hours (or “blocks of instruction”). How, then, could defense leadership monitor the curriculum profile to gauge the adequacy of IW focus? Previous studies have made a start by calculating occurrence of key words and phrases related to IW.19 A more complete monitoring effort would establish goals and criteria for determining which skills and knowledge are most important and then use small panels of knowledgeable veterans (preferably at the O-4 or O-5 level, who have IW experience and some academic research training) to monitor and track the extent to which these skills are taught in professional military education at all levels.

DOD cannot afford to maintain the Services’ current levels of proficiency in IW, nor is it necessary to do so for the majority of U.S. forces. Outside of the high-demand, long-development time capabilities for IW discussed above—capabilities such as aviation, law enforcement, certain types of military intelligence, EOD, and SOF—the goal should be rapid regeneration of IW readiness should such a contingency require it. Maintaining organizations dedicated to retaining U.S. intellectual foundations for such warfare, continuing to require some degree of proficiency in IW in the Services’ key exercises, and continuing to give substantial attention to IW topics in school curricula should all help to speed the regeneration process.

Conclusion

As much as all Americans may wish to avoid another Iraq or another Afghanistan, the country cannot afford to allow its capabilities for large-scale irregular warfare to atrophy as it did when decisionmakers insisted the United States would never again fight another Vietnam. Although the United States should certainly avoid such conflicts whenever possible, trends in violent conflict toward hybrid wars suggest that it would be prudent to invest in a hedge against the possibility of U.S. involvement in another such war.

Determining the precise composition of such a hedge or its pricetag is beyond the scope of this article. Instead, we have emphasized four critical points about the broad outlines of such an IW hedge.

First, adaptation to irregular warfare is a lengthy process and the United States is unlikely to have much time to adapt to such conflicts before it comes under considerable political pressure to demonstrate tangible progress or draw down its forces.

Second, the costs of being poorly adapted to IW are substantial. Poor adaptation significantly reduces the likelihood of achieving acceptable outcomes and raises the price of whatever success is realized. Moreover, we cannot be confident that poor readiness for IW represents “acceptable risk” because IW contingencies are likely to occur only where peripheral U.S. interests are engaged. To the contrary, many highly plausible and high-impact scenarios entail substantial IW elements.

Third, the ability to adapt rapidly to large-scale IW requires both maintaining certain capabilities in being and maintaining the pipeline to regenerate other capabilities. Those capabilities that are both in high demand for IW contingencies and that depend on senior leaders—particularly certain capabilities in aviation, military intelligence, law enforcement, EOD, and SOF—represent priority candidates for retention in larger numbers as forces in being, either as formed units or in a grade over-structure or leadership cadre.

Finally, DOD should closely monitor resources and readiness levels associated with the pipeline to regenerate IW proficiency between maneuver and other forces as needed.

It should be Americans’ fervent hope that such investments in rapid adaptation for large-scale irregular warfare prove unnecessary. But hope, as they say, is not a policy. As the 2014 QDR recognizes, hedging against such contingencies represents sound policy. Now it is time to ensure the resources follow to make good on such policy commitments.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 78 which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes:

  1. Thom Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq and Afghanistan,” New York Times, February 25, 2011.
  2. Quadrennial Defense Review 2014 (Washington, DC: Department of Defense , March 2014), vii.
  3. This article is adapted from a classified study conducted by the RAND Corporation for the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. See Stephen Watts et al., Adaptable Ground Force Structure for Irregular Warfare, RR-120-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2014).
  4. On the contention that there is adequate time to adapt to the requirements of irregular warfare (IW), see, for instance, Gian P. Gentile, “A Strategy of Tactics: Population-centric COIN and the Army,” Parameters, Autumn 2009, 5–6.
  5. When asked which of the possible future challenges the Army should prepare for, the incoming head of the U.S. Army War College, Major General Tony Cucolo, stated, “You focus on the hardest one. . . . The hardest one is high-intensity combat operations. . . . f we focus on ‘deter and defeat,’ I firmly believe we can do almost anything else.” Quoted in Sydney J. Freedberg, Jr., “Wake Up and Adapt, Incoming War College Chief Tells Army,” AOL Defense, April 3, 2012, available at <http://defense.aol.com/2012/04/03/wake-up-and-adapt-incoming-war-college-chief-tells-army/?icid=related1>.
  6. See Gian P. Gentile, “Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army’s Conventional Capabilities,” World Politics Review, March 4, 2008.
  7. Cited in James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War: Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005–2007 (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2011), 5.
  8. Ibid. See also Thomas R. Mockaitis, The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007); and Chad C. Serena, A Revolution in Military Adaptation: The U.S. Army in the Iraq War (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011).
  9. Joint and Coalition Operational Analysis (JCOA), Decade of War, Volume I: Enduring Lessons from the Past Decade of Operations (Washington, DC: JCOA, June 15, 2012).
  10. The United States is not alone in this regard. On other nations’ experience with slow adaptation, see Rod Thornton, “Getting It Wrong: The Crucial Mistakes Made in the Early Stages of the British Army’s Deployment to Northern Ireland (August 1969 to March 1972),” Journal of Strategic Studies 30, no. 1 (2007), 73–107; and John Kiszely, “Learning About Counterinsurgency,” RUSI Journal, December 2006, 16–21.
  11. Perhaps the single most commonly cited source on poor adaptation to irregular warfare is Andrew Krepinevich’s study of the U.S. Army’s slow adaptation to the realities of the Vietnam War and its implications for outcomes; see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). For a more recent similar treatment of the slow adaptation of American warfighting approaches to the context of Vietnam, see Lewis Sorley, A Better War: The Unexamined Victories and Final Tragedy of America’s Last Years in Vietnam (San Diego: Harcourt, Inc., 1999). For an examination of the costs of slow adaptation in Afghanistan, see Daniel Marston, “Realizing the Extent of Our Errors and Forging the Road Ahead,” in Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare, ed. Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian (Long Island City, NY: Osprey Publishing, 2008). On “golden hours” generally and the costs of slow adaptation in Iraq specifically, see James Stephenson, Losing the Golden Hour: An Insider’s View of Iraq’s Reconstruction (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, Inc., 2007). On the broader military implications of the golden hour, see Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., An Army at the Crossroads (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2008), 47–54. On insurgent organization and vulnerability, see Steven Metz, Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007); and Mark Irving Lichbach, The Rebel’s Dilemma (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1995).
  12. Proponents of this view include former Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age,” Foreign Affairs 88, no. 1 (January/February 2009), 3; Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009), 34–48; and T.X. Hammes, The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2006). This view has since become embedded in a wide range of Defense Department doctrinal publications.
  13. Richard K. Betts, Military Readiness: Concepts, Choices, Consequences (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1995).
  14. The 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance states, “The development of mid-grade officers and non-commissioned officers has been the historical limiting factor in expansibility. Experienced and effective leaders are not grown quickly.” See 2012 Army Strategic Planning Guidance (Washington, DC: Headquarters Department of the Army, April 19, 2012), 12.
  15. See Michael L. Hansen et al., Reshaping the Army’s Active and Reserve Components, MG-961-OSD (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2011), 32–35; and Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II: Transition to the New Campaign (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute Press, 2008).
  16. See Watts et al. for more precise analysis of historical IW utilization and the characteristics of the priority capabilities for retention.
  17. Kevin Lilley, “Irregular Warfare Center to Close Oct. 1,” Army Times, September 1, 2014.
  18. For a related evaluation effort, see Bryan W. Hallmark and James C. Crowley, Company Performance at the National Training Center: Battle Planning and Execution, MR-846-A (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1997).
  19. Stephen J. Mariano, “Between the Pen and the Sword: 40 Years of Individual and Institutional Attitudes Toward Small Wars,” Harvard University, Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, 2012 (PowerPoint briefing summarizing a Ph.D. thesis in war studies at the Royal Military College of Canada).

Devalued Yuan Seeks Reserve Currency Status, But US Dollar Dominates – Analysis

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Investors and economies cling to and strengthen the US dollar, despite many glaring imbalances.

By Will Hickey*

With the US Federal Reserve poised to hike interest rates soon amid a sea of devaluing currencies and quantitiative easing, the US dollar has became the defacto currency of choice among nations. The dollar accounts for nearly 90 percent of all foreign-exchange transactions.

The International Monetary Fund has designated four currencies as reserve currencies available for stabilizing monetary markets: the US dollar, the Japanese yen, the euro and the British pound. The IMF reviews the basket’s composition every five years, and the next one is scheduled for November.

China, the world’s second largest economy, is striving for its renminbi to join that group. To be considered for IMF reserve currency status, a currency must be freely useable in foreign commerce. An IMF report urged delay on the renminibi’s entrance, suggesting the currency should be more responsive to market forces. That spurred a series of devaluations by the Bank of China that rocked global financial markets.

Any inclusion of the renminbi would likely be grounded more in symbolism and politics than economics and amount to no more than 15 percent compared with the 42 percent for the dollar. The renminbi is still loosely pegged to the dollar. If added, the currency would account for 1.1 percent in total world foreign-exchange transactions (see graph).

China’s efforts are centered in demonstrating its status as an equal among world powers, arguably a superpower, to the rest of the world and especially to Chinese citizens.

Yet China’s total debt to GDP is now nearing 300 percent, above the average of most developing countries and even developed ones such as Australia, Germany and Canada. The US total debt to GDP is 333 percent.

Safe havens: China would like yuan to join the IMF's basket of currencies with reserve status; the US dollar has long been the preferred currency for international trade (US Treasury data)
Safe havens: China would like yuan to join the IMF’s basket of currencies with reserve status; the US dollar has long been the preferred currency for international trade (US Treasury data)

The US, with its deeper and transparent markets is simply more capable of handling higher debt loads than secretive, misanthropic Chinese markets which tend to reward big players first and only.

Overextended real estate prices account for the largest share of these debts. Home costs in Shanghai and Beijing come close to rivaling those in Sydney, New York and Paris. Other debt is in the form of non-performing loans to state-owned enterprises, or SOEs. Creation of the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank may be a possible indicator of this protection of SOEs.These indicators would tend to reinforce a weakening currency strategy.

Other countries face the same challenges. External devaluation alone cannot bring about prosperity. There are also “internal devaluations.” The eurozone is one currency union but a mix of various economies. Unlike Vietnam, Venezuela or Nigeria, the European Central Bank simply cannot devalue externally but must resort to internal mechanisms to achieve balances, which entail reducing labor costs, slashing pensions and reducing social benefits. Greek reforms are emblematic of these challenges. While painful, such internal austerity measures did succeed in keeping Ireland and Latvia in the eurozone.

The United States – much like Europe and Japan and soon China – confronts lurking problems associated with an aging population. The retirement of a critical mass of so-called baby boomers in the United States, about 75 million people born between 1946 and 1964 – will exacerbate the national debt load. Without changes, the US debt is predicted to soar to $20 trillion by 2017 – more than $6500 for every man, woman and child.

Yet, the United States does not need to keep foreign exchange reserves to shore up its public finances. Reserve currency status, with attendant market psychology, continuously ensures the United States, along with a few others like the EU, has a free pass from the problems facing the rest of the world due to weakening currencies and overspending.

Economist Nouriel Roubini has called the dollar “the tallest small midget in the room.” Its recent resurgence over the past two years, despite the liquidity and vast amounts of quantitative easing with the central bank printing money and pumping that into the system, fortify this view. Simply, the US, along with others, prints money in order to reduce debt fundamentals – “more paper to cover the hole.” The Japanese yen and Swiss franc are historically stable and sound currencies, but are not viable alternatives to the dollar. Their total liquidity available for world trade is too tiny.

Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa are desperate to diversify away from dollars, but most of these BRICS countries have underlying currency problems, be it trust, historic devaluations, commodity declines or simply inconvertibility. Any potential currency union of that group would be considered at arm’s length especially after the Greek budget fiasco and the lack of honesty on fiscal affairs among eurozone partners.

Russia and Venezuela’s economies, along with many others, are largely driven by fossil fuel exports. A recent downtick in oil prices has produced pandemonium in those weakening currencies. The financial crisis in 1998, largely tied to falling oil prices that wiped out life savings for many and permanently eroded trust in domestic currencies and governments despite abundant natural resources. World risk perceptions still crown the fiat US dollar king.

Argentina, a darling of world economic growth in the late 1950s, has shown that financial mismanagement can derail even the most promising of stories. For Indonesia, Nigeria and others, the prices of hard assets and property in the developing world are baselined in dollars rather than a local currency despite rules to the contrary.

This world addiction for dollars has allowed the US government to largely insulate its citizens and politicians from making needed policy changes. By all traditional economic measures, printing mass amounts of currency and expanding the balance sheets of the US Treasury – bond purchases with created money – since 2009 should have depressed the dollar, weakening it considerably. In fact, the opposite has occured.

In a world of uncertainty, the dollar has risen to the supreme currency of choice against other currencies in the IMF basket of reserve currencies. Many countries took the signal from the US quantitative easing program to print vast amounts of currency on their own, in particular Japan and then Europe, in the vain hope of jumpstarting export-led growth. Every country seems to have something to sell, but few actually want to buy from others with currency wars and protectionism rising.

The effect of all this is that strong reliance on dollars places global economic policy on the shoulders of a US Federal Reserve that may or may not be reflective of macroeconomic conditions in other countries. Most nations will feel the economic change in terms of soaring costs for imports, domestic property bubbles and anything financed in dollars including bridges, toll-roads and powerplants where people pay fees, electric bills and taxes in local currencies that are consistently devalued. Life is getting more expensive and difficult for many due to, at the core, a lack of trust in their own governments’ fiscal regimes. Trusting that US economic policy is better than their own, no matter how misguided.

The key takeaway is that as long as the US dollar remains the currency of trust and use for virtually all world transactions in absence of a viable alternative, it will maintain predominance in global trade, no matter how out-of-synch US economic issues remain. Perceptions and trust are perhaps the true designators of a reserve currency, not macroeconomic fundamentals or economic idealism.

*Will Hickey is associate professor and capability advisor for the School of Government and Public Policy in Indonesia. 

US General Discusses Afghan Forces, Security, Islamic State Threat

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By Cheryl Pellerin

Afghan forces are fully responsible for their nation’s security but still need and deserve the broad support of U.S. and coalition forces under the Resolute Support mission, the Resolute Support deputy chief of staff for communication said Thursday.

U.S. Army Brig. Gen. Wilson A. Shoffner briefed the Pentagon press corps live from Kabul by telephone, discussing Afghan forces, the 2015 fighting season, Afghanistan security, and the movement of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant into Afghanistan with fighting between ISIL and the Taliban.

Afghan forces, Shoffner said, have “definitely been tested this fighting season, but they’re holding their own and they have demonstrated their courage and resilience. Every day we see the remarkable men and women of the Afghan security forces, all of whom are volunteers, continuing to put their lives on the line to protect their people and their country.”

But it’s clear that they “still require broad support, and that’s one of the reasons why the Resolute Support mission remains critical,” he added, noting “capability gaps” in close air support, aviation, intelligence and logistics, and that the fighters will require help “over the next few years.”

Fighting Season

During the current fighting season, Afghan forces have learned hard lessons but achieved significant results, the general said.

“They’ve conducted deliberate, planned operations that are well resourced and they’ve performed very well,” Shoffner said. “We’ve seen this starting in January in Helmand province [in southwest Afghanistan], we saw that in Zabul province and Ghazni [in southeast Afghanistan], and we’ve seen that in the last two weeks in Nangarhar province [in the east].”

On the downside, he added, “whenever they employ their forces hastily or do so in an uncoordinated manner — and by that I mean the army doesn’t coordinate with the police … or with air or fire support — they’re far less effective.”

In terms of security in Afghanistan, the general said the number of enemy-initiated attacks for 2015 is 8 percent lower than it was last year, but Afghanistan is experiencing an increase in the use of homemade bombs and high-profile Taliban attacks in Kabul.

Strategic Importance

“Kabul remains an area of strategic importance for the insurgency as a … symbol of the government of Afghanistan’s authority,” he said. “The [Taliban] attacks are an attempt to garner widespread coverage that … leads to a perception that the Afghan government is unable to provide adequate security.”

Shoffner said the Afghan government has a delegation in Pakistan now, “and we’re watching that closely, we’re watching the Taliban closely. He added that the Taliban, many of whom are Afghans, have an opportunity now to strike for peace with the Afghan government and rebuild their own lives in Afghanistan.

The Afghan government has invited the Taliban to join it as part of the political process, and the general said the Resolute Support mission strongly supports the Afghan government in that action.

Ending Violence

“We stand with the international community and support any outcome that the Taliban or any armed opposition group may use to pledge to end violence, to break associations with international terrorism and to accept the Afghan constitution,” Shoffner said.

In response to a question about the movement of ISIL into Afghanistan, Shoffner said their presence is an issue of great concern to the Afghan government.

ISIL is also an issue of great concern to the coalition, he added, noting that the coalition and Afghanistan share intelligence and information on ISIL.

“We categorize [ISIL] in Afghanistan as operationally emergent,” the general said. “We do not see them as having operational capabilities so we do not see them as having the ability to coordinate operations in more than one part of the country at a time. We do have reports of them operating in different parts of the country but not in a coordinated fashion.”

Islamic State in Afghanistan

Shoffner said that some funding is flowing to ISIL in Afghanistan, but not a significant amount, and that their capabilities are increasing but not to the point where they can conduct the sort of operations they’re responsible for in Iraq and Syria.

“We do note the potential for them to evolve into something more dangerous,” he added, “and we take that very seriously.”

Shoffner also said there is some fighting in Afghanistan between ISIL and the Taliban.

“Usually this is a result of [ISIL] incursion into Taliban territory and interfering with established Taliban operations,” he said, noting that fighting between the groups has been seen in Nangarhar province, northern Helmand and elsewhere, with the most intense fighting in Nangarhar.

Destabilizing Influence

“We do expect to see this throughout the fighting season,” the general said, adding that fighting between the insurgent groups in Afghanistan isn’t a positive thing for the nation or the coalition.

“It’s a problem because it’s a destabilizing influence and … unfortunately the victims are Afghan civilians, so that’s a security issue that we are committed to helping the Afghan government resolve,” he said.

“[ISIL] and terrorism pose a common threat to all the states in this region, so it’s not just an Afghan problem, it’s a regional problem [and] we support the government of Afghanistan … to work with other national partners to contain and dismantle this threat.”

Political Risks In India-North Korea Ties – Analysis

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North Korea’s latest expression of interest in humanitarian help from India has brought into new focus the whole issue of economic engagement between the two countries. India may well have to weigh the political risks at stake, given Pyongyang’s close strategic links with both China and Pakistan.

By Sojin Shin*

How has the political and economic relationship between India and Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea hereafter) evolved? The Government of India defines that India-North Korea relations have been “generally characterised by friendship, cooperation, and understanding”.2

Such friendship, cooperation, and understanding are probably the norms that dictated the positive response by India’s External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to a request from Ri Su Yong, North Korea’s Foreign Minister, to visit India for humanitarian assistance.3 The visit took place in May 2015. This came as a surprise, though. North Korea might have already stepped on India’s toes because of Pyongyang’s long suspected nexus with Pakistan in its nuclear-weapons and ballistic-missile programmes that had threatened India’s security.

At the same time, North Korea’s recent approach to India is strategic, since its ties with China have become flexible. This paper briefly discusses the evolution of India-North Korea relations.

The Underdeveloped Communist Connection

The political links between India and North Korea can be traced to the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s when both countries were strongly influenced by socialist orientation. Since the 1960s, delegations between the two countries have usually included communist party functionaries and trade union leaders.4 Further, Indian newspapers were once used by the North Korean Consulate in India to carry propaganda for Kim Il-Sung in the 1970s.5 As such, the governments in both countries maintained a political connection that did not harm each other’s interests during the period, even though India pursued non-alignment on the international stage.

However, the India-North Korea political ties could not blossom much because China was always concerned about those dynamics. Especially, the North Korea-China friendship was very close in the 1960s and the 1970s. Even though India-North Korea relationship was not bad in the same period, Pyongyang supported China rather than India when India and China had an issue over their conflicting national interests. For example, North Korea pursued anti- India propaganda during the Sino-Indian War in 1962. The Government of India noted in 1963 that North Korea “falsely accused India of committing aggression on Chinese territory and of spurning Chinese efforts to solve the border question through negotiations”.6

As China opened its economy and society to the outside world for the purpose of economic growth in the past several decades, the so-called “lips and teeth” relationship between China and North Korea began to change substantially. Beijing seems to have realised that its close relationship with North Korea might hinder China’s further growth in many ways, even as China’s relations with the international community, and the US in particular, began warming up.7 The slogan of “lips and teeth” relationship now looks very obsolete indeed. This change may have compelled Pyongyang to approach India as a humanitarian partner that could help North Korea with economic aid programmes.

Another reason why the India-North Korea relationship could not develop much was Pyongyang’s close relations with Pakistan over its nuclear-weapons programme. The nuclear projects have drawn heavy criticism from neighbouring countries such as India, South Korea, and Japan and the international community including the US. Both North Korea and Pakistan are known to assist each other in the fields of liquid-fuel long-range ballistic missiles, missile technology, and components. This nuclear-and-missile nexus between the two countries seemed to have been enhanced in the 1990s when Pakistan provided North Korea with weapons-grade uranium while North Korea supplied Pakistan with missiles in turn.8

The Government of India has revealed its concern about the North Korea-Pakistan nuclear nexus. Jaswant Singh, who served as the Minister of External Affairs in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government under Vajpayee’s leadership, had said, “The reports [about the North Korea-Pakistan nexus] are not new to us; they confirm the validity of government’s own assessment. Government has conveyed to its interlocutors our concern about the adverse effects on India’s security from continuing nuclear and missile proliferation in Pakistan, despite the existence of various export control regimes and declarations of restraint by supplier countries”.9 The Japanese Government also mentioned, “As for the reports that Pakistan cooperated with North Korea on the North’s nuclear weapons programme, we are naturally concerned with a (relevant) report related to North Korea’s nuclear weapon programme. We will continue to observe this issue closely”.10

Poor Outlook in India-North Korea Trade and Investment

In June 2014, North Korea integrated three different state agencies that promote foreign trade, foreign investments, and special economic zones into the Ministry of External Economic Affairs. It aims at extending its trade relations to Russia, Japan, and many other countries in the Middle East and Africa. India is also in the picture.

According to the Korea Trade-Investment Promotion Agency (KOTRA) under the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy in South Korea, India was third in North Korea’s trade volume in 2013.11 As can be seen in Table 1, India took up 1.3% of total trade volume of North Korea showing the dramatic growth of imports from North Korea. Despite the dramatic change, China has been far ahead of trade and investments into North Korea.

Table 1: North Korea’s Major Trading Partners in 2013
Table 1: North Korea’s Major Trading Partners in 2013

According to the Government of India, the total amount of trade between India and North Korea until 2014 was US$ 199 million.12 Various items have been exported from India to North Korea including ores, minerals, drugs, pharmaceuticals, machinery, and many others while the main items of import from North Korea are limited to iron and steel.

However, bilateral trade between India and North Korea recently declined mainly due to North Korea’s financial inability. A source of the Government of India said,

DPRK [North Korea] expressed keen interest in importing consumer goods from India every year on ‘deferred payment basis’. These items include leather shoes, stockings, undergarments, school bags, bicycles, kitchen utensils, etc. They also proposed barter trade by supplying items like steel, magnesia clinker zinc, etc. in case deffered payment option is not acceptable to India. They also welcomed participation of Indian companies, Chambers of Commerce, Business houses, etc. in their annual trade fairs and various other events for promoting Indian products in DPRK market. They also welcome participation of Indian companies in joint ventures and FDI.13

Recently, the Kim Jong Un regime in North Korea has aggressively begun attempts to attract foreign investments, through economic reforms, especially to the special economic zones. Pyongyang appeals to big companies from South Korea and Japan to build infrastructure projects in North Korea. However, the companies seem to be hardly convinced that their businesses would be successful, given the continuing political and economic uncertainty of North Korea.

Challenges and Suggestions

The political and economic regimes in India and North Korea have evolved in considerably different ways for the past 60 years, although the two countries were heavily influenced by socialist orientation in the 1950s. India is the biggest democratic country and one of the most powerful emerging market economies in the world, while North Korea is an isolated communist state in poverty. North Korea’s approach to India seems very strategic, as its relations with China have become estranged.

India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s recent visit to China and South Korea was aimed at enhancing India’s economic relations with those countries. It must have been threatening to North Korea’s relations with its neighbouring countries, given its economic backwardness. If investors from India want to enter the North Korean market, they need to pay particular attention to the North Korea-Pakistan and North Korea-China relations. When the Indian companies feel secure not only about the political risks relating to North Korea’s ties with Pakistan and China but also about their capacity to compete with the Chinese companies in the North Korean market, investments to North Korea may have a chance of success.

About the author:
* 1 Dr Sojin Shin
is Visiting Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. She can be contacted at isassos@nus.edu.sg. The author, not ISAS, is responsible for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Brief Number 382 (PDF)

Notes:
2. Government of India, the Ministry of External Affairs. “India-DPR Korea Relations.” Data is available at http://mea.gov.in/indian-mission.htm?504/Korea_DPR (accessed on 23 April 2015).
3. Ri Su Yong expressed appreciation for India’s food assistance worth US$1 million in 2011 and sought additional assistance from India. Due to the ongoing financial difficulties in North Korea, the scope of bilateral relations between the two countries has been widened to cover humanitarian assistance from India to North Korea.
4. See Government of India, various issues of Rajya Sabha Debates, for the list of two-way delegations from India and North Korea.
5.The newspapers include various national and regional branches of The Hindu, The Indian Express, The Daily Milap, Times of India and many others. See Government of India (1971), “Advertisements in Indian News Papers by North Korean Consulate.” Rajya Sabha Debates. Issued on 16 June. Accessed on 27 April 2015.
6.Government of India (1963), “Anti-India Propaganda by North Korean Journals.” Rajya Sabha Debates. Issued on 19 March. The Ministry of External Affairs: New Delhi. Accessed on 23 April 2015.
7.The problems between China and North Korea, for example, include the issue of North Korean refugees to China. See Anne Wu, “What China Whispers to North Korea.” The Washington Quarterly, 28(2): 35-48.
8. See Government of India (2002), “Pakistan’s help to North Korea”. Rajya Sabha Debates. Issued on 28 November. Ministry of External Affairs: New Delhi. Accessed on 27 April 2015.
9. Government of India (2001), “Suspected Nexus between Pakistan and North Korea”. Rajya Sabha Debates. Issued on 9 August. Ministry of External Affairs: New Delhi. Accessed on 27 April 2015.
10. Government of India (2003), “Japan’s Opposition on Transfer of Nuclear Technology to North Korea”.
Rajya Sabha Debates. Issued on 8 May. Ministry of External Affairs: New Delhi. Accessed on 27 April 2015.
11. KOTRA (2013), 2013 Nyun Bukhan Daeoeimuyeokdonghyang [The Trend of Foreign Economic Policy in North Korea 2013]. Accessed on 19 May 2015.
12. Government of India, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry. See the footnote 2.
Data is available at http://www.commerce.nic.in/eidb/iecnt.asp (accessed on 30 April 2015).
13. Government of India, op. cit. See the footnote 2.

Somalia: No ‘Political Legitimacy’ Without Genuine Reconciliation – OpEd

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As the old saying goes, the more things change, the more they remain the same. On one hand, Somalia seems ahead of the curve as the debate on what might be the best process that could ensure legitimate outcome in upcoming election (Aug 2016) is already underway.
 
On the other hand, the fact that the whole debate on political legitimacy is exclusively confined within the parameters of the upcoming election in and of itself indicates that nothing has changed. 
 
The Somali state did not disintegrate because of elections or lack thereof. It disintegrated because of institutional injustice and chronic foreign meddling. That is why the state imploded, over million people died, and clan-based balkanization or “federalism” became the rapidly spreading cancer that is actively destroying an already ailing state and keeping it in a state of perpetual dependency and subjugation.
 
Make no mistake, the most serious existential threat facing the Somali nation is the status quo.
In other words, anytime that the peripheries resort to the cultivation  of international relationships that are wholly independent of the center, haphazardly sign agreements of serious consequences with foreign countries, and build clan militaries, they make the latter wholly irrelevant and the recovery of the state an impossible task.

What’s On First?   

In broken nations where the political system and all essential elements that keep societies function in unison go haywire, all political issues of contention must be renegotiated and indeed reconciled before a nation is pieced back together and the healing process is set in motion. Through such process, trust is cultivated and sustainable peace is achieved. Naturally, the process must be both genuine and indigenous.
 
Failing to recognize these fundamentals, or, as usual, haphazardly rushing into a power-sharing arrangement, would only exacerbate the matters. Somalia has a quarter of a century long experiment to prove that. Placing the Somali political dilemma within the fallacious framework that election is a panacea undermines the direly needed debate on justice, reconciliation, and how to break the shackles of foreign dependency. 

What Might Be A Viable Alternative?

Under the current system where foreign political actors, mainly Ethiopia/Kenya tag-team, dominate the process, genuine reconciliation is simply a fantastic pipedream. Therefore, total transformation of the current system that perpetuates status quo is an imperative prerequisite. After all, it is not only the Somali state that failed; the steam engine of squanderance or the international community model has also failed.
 
By default or otherwise, the system at hand has sustained itself by periodically reinventing itself. Domestically, by partnering with ‘leaders’ who possess relentless appetite to hoard executive power by keeping an entire branch of the government on an ‘on-the-job-training’ by annually changing prime ministers and cabinets.
 
Regionally, by partnering with frontline states, such as Ethiopia and Kenya, who are legally in Somalia as part of AMISOM while in reality implement their own thinly disguised zero-sum schemes to co-opt Somali political actors in order to expand their spheres of influence.
 
Internationally, by bringing in UNSOM to replace the stained UNPOS,  but still act the same- keep Somalia in a perpetual transition where decisions are dictated, lucrative security projects are sustained, corruption and economic exploitation as in Soma Oil and Gas are facilitated, and shadowy characters are allowed backdoor entries to keep the fire burning and the cash endlessly flowing.
 
Despite what they were initially intended for, currently, the abuses and financial costs of the international community and its regional partners far outweigh their benefits.
 
As I have argued in a number of articles before: it is time to cut this umbilical cord of dependency. It is time to focus on bilateral strategic partnerships in which parties could hold each other accountable. The benefit is self-evident. Practically all foreign financed successful development projects in Somalia are the byproducts of nation to nation relationships. 

Misplaced Focus, Erroneous Outcome

Currently, a few election-focused alternatives were proposed by a few individuals. The most prominent of said proposals argues, in essence, that political legitimacy requires sidelining the federal parliament, empowering regional actors and their clan exclusive parliaments, arbitrarily keeping political parties with any Islamic identity at bay. This proposal, needless to say, considers reconciliation before power-sharing as irrelevant, the Somaliland issue as an independent problem, and that constitutional reform should take place before any reconciliation.
 
While these may satisfy certain domestic and foreign actors and special interests groups who may see benefit in another four years of transition, they, by no means, ensure legitimacy as these authors argue.
 
By contrast, Gurmad Movement underscores the importance of reclaiming Somalia’s right to independently shape its political future and craft its own strategy to pull the nation out of its  current subservient dilemma. Real legitimacy, according to Gurmad, could only be attained through a Somali-led process that is negotiated in the interest of the collective good. Not by drive-thru legitimization process that may or may not be motivated to maintain the status quo.
 
All said proposals agree that an election of a sort would be necessary in Aug 2016. But, according to Gurmad’s proposal, the current federal parliament should be given a conditional two year extension at which point said institution would complete, among other things, the establishment of the Constitutional Court and National Reconciliation Commission, and elect (an interim) president for that duration.
 
The election process must be widely open for a fair participation of any and all candidates who possess fresh ideas to salvage this dying nation. 

No More Scotch Tape Solution  

Despite the façade of sustainable recovery, beneath the veneer of Mogadishu’s rapid development is societal erosion rooted in innate hopelessness perpetuated by lack of genuine reconciliation.
 
Against that backdrop, the need for indigenous discourse and a process to repair this broken nation and inspire its demoralized and beaten psyche out of seemingly perpetual cynicism is a dire priority. But, you would not know that from the current political actors, domestic and foreign. And that is why Somalia is caught in that stubborn Sisyphus effect where we as a nation periodically roll up the bolder of peace to the top of the hill only to helplessly watch it roll back to the bottom.
 
One of the most prevalent fallacies that prolonged the status quo of distrust, division, sporadic hostilities in Somalia —not to mention hopelessness and chronic dependency—is the erroneous claim that the multi-faceted Somali political conundrum could be solved by holding an election, and in pigeonholed ways that are entirely independent of one another. 

Herded Leadership

Herded leadership of many shepherds has been one of the corrosive phenomena that facilitated the systematic destruction of the Somali nation. The current government is just one example, though considering the irrefutable failure of its political strategy, failure to pay its soldiers for over six months and as a result causing insecurity to exacerbate, and for its earned reputation as the posterchild of corruption, it certainly occupies a unique space in history’s pages of infamy. 
 
Granted, the herded leadership—both in the center and the peripheries—as well as some within the civil societies who are direct beneficiaries of the current arrangement, might attempt to torpedo any transformative effort that threatens the status quo. However, neither of these entities have the necessary public support to sustain their immanent resistance.     
 
At this do or die moment, Somalia needs more than random political belches from its so-called leaders. Granted, at all times, leaders ought to be judged, not by what they promise, but by what they deliver. It needs leaders who would govern ethically and justly, who would lead the nation in the best interest of Somalia and its people.
 
Difficult as it may seem, history attests to the fact that when the human will is driven by good intention and willingness to compromise for peace, it can beat all odds and overcome all obstacles. Failure is not a permanent status unless those who experience it opt to make it so!
 
It goes without saying; the Somali people and nation desperately need transformational leaders with vision, strategy, courage and willingness to sacrifice for the common good and help pull the nation off the current tracks of self-destruction.

A Necessary Foundation

Reconciliation is the foundation that is yet to be built for sustainable peace to materialize. Somalia is a broken nation that is handicapped by a generation long bloodshed and trauma.
 
Contrary to the conventional wisdom of Somalia’s political elite and power brokers, reconciliation is not the express powwows, artificial communiques, and photo opportunities orchestrated by regional actors or international community in banquet halls. It is a deliberate and a systematic process driven by a comprehensive strategic plan implemented by Somalis who are not blinded by the musical chairs of being appointed for symbolic governmental posts or in the clan-based political dirty fights. 
 
Reconciliation is necessary as it deflates the hate narrative that sustains inter-clan distrust and enmity. It helps open a new page for negotiating the terms of permanent social contract and indeed for coexistence. It will enable the center and the peripheries to recognize their interdependence. It plays a significant role in teaching future generations that impunity and the habit of sweeping problems under rugs only makes matters worse. It sets in motion a genuine process of repairing our broken nation.
 
Finally, reconciliation is a critical post-conflict element necessary for healing and trust-building; it is a noble objective and a process that takes time. Neither its pace nor its broad impact could be rushed for political expedience. 
[Disclosure: This author is one of Gurmad’s founding members, though this piece is an independent viewpoint]   

Central Asians’ View Of Democracy Not Same As Westerners?

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As countries in Central Asia move toward more authoritarian governments and concerns over human rights abuses increase, a new book explores why the West’s efforts to promote democracy in the region have failed.

In “Democracy in Central Asia: Competing Perspectives and Alternative Strategies,” Mariya Omelicheva, associate professor of political science at the University of Kansas, argues that the idea of democracy in Central Asia has been adapted to the local contexts and borrow more from the Russian and Chinese models than the ideals spread through the U.S. and European Union.

“These competing perspectives of democracy, which are often derided and dismissed in the West, should be taken much more seriously because it partly explains why the U.S. and EU are losing ground in this territory and why Russia and China still hold a lot of leverage on these governments,” Omelicheva said.

The book reflects months of field work in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Omelicheva collected data from focus groups of students who had participated in U.S. exchange programs, allowing them to reflect on the similarities and differences in politics and cultures. She also conducted one of the region’s first public opinion surveys on people’s knowledge and perceptions of democracy.

While popular belief holds that democracy is a universal ideal, Omelicheva’s research found more than half of the Central Asians she surveyed would support any political regime capable of maintaining order. And more than 85 percent of the respondents didn’t see a government priority in enacting democratic principles.

“Democracy does not have a universal meaning despite its immense popular appeal and frequent references by politicians and ordinary people,” Omelicheva said. “Democracy and the related concepts of civil society, human rights and the rule of law are cultural creations and products of political and social contexts.”

Respondents spoke of personal freedoms, such as being able to wear what they wanted, but they had trouble articulating the core principles of human rights. For example, many didn’t recognize that job promotions based on age and clan standing, not merit, violated human rights.

“They didn’t believe that was a violation of their rights. They didn’t even voice a possibility of challenging those social practices,” Omelicheva said.

Focus group participants in Kyrgyzstan referred to the concept of democracy as “hot air” and “rubbish.” In Kazakhstan, participants linked democracy to having a strong leader and spoke of the need to draw on the region’s historical roots when building a democratic country.

Citing human rights violations following Sept. 11 and the use of military to enact foreign policy, Central Asians said they were disillusioned by American-style democracy. With off-the-shelf techniques and a condescending approach, the West’s efforts to spread democracy in the region haven’t been well thought out, Omelicheva said.

“That is not going to work in Central Asia,” Omelicheva said. “What has been proposed is not culturally sensitive, consistent or credible in the eyes of the population or government.”

Omelicheva is also the author of “Counterterrorism Policies in Central Asia” and is the principal investigator on a project that will map organized crime and terrorism hotspots in Eurasia.

New ‘Arctic-Proof’ Drone To Track Effects Of Climate Change

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Drones generally get a bad press but there’s far more to them than destruction and war – for example drone technology can help save lives in disaster zones reaching places that no humans can tread. Now researchers from Laval University in Canada have revealed another surprising and positive drone application – tracking the impact of climate change in the Arctic.

Laval University’s Argo drone can survive in the extreme conditions of the Arctic Ocean, plunging depths of almost 2 000 metres to collect data about marine organisms. This means that it can collect previously inaccessible information to improve our understanding of the Arctic marine ecosystem and track the effects of climate change.

The Argo drone is a few years in the making – in 2000, the UNESCO Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission and the World Meteorological Organisation launched the Argo programme with the aim of creating a global network of beacons for an integrated global ocean observing system.

Now there are thousands of Argo ‘floats’ or drones in our oceans however the unforgiving conditions in the Arctic mean that it hosts very few, as Brigitte Robineau, executive director of Québec-Océan explained: “There are now nearly 4,000 Argo floats deployed in the oceans. However, because of the constraints imposed by the cold sea ice and icebergs, there are very few in the Arctic Ocean. As these instruments can provide valuable data to researchers who conduct work, the team of Marcel Babin and Claudie Marec undertook the design and manufacture of a float adapted to this environment.”

According to José Lagunas-Morales, a specialist embedded systems engineer on the project, the main challenge was to protect the drone from the threat posed by ice. The drone actually spends most of its time under water but it is when it surfaces and possibly collides with ice that the telecommunications equipment, temperature sensors or other equipment could get damaged. Or it could become trapped by the ice – which would be very costly.

Lagunas-Morales noted, “We have to avoid the device getting trapped in ice because it would then become useless for research. Any error in design or programming could be very costly, literally and figuratively, since each tag is worth about $90 000 (EUR 80 300).”

With this in mind, Lagunas-Morales developed an optical system which allows Argo to detect the presence of ice: “When it nears the surface, it emits a laser beam and the reflected light is collected and analyzed which allows it to distinguish the ice-free water. The float needs only 1 metre squared of free water to the surface, but we programmed it with a safety margin of 3 metre squared.”

It has already been tested in the waters of Baffin Bay, located between Baffin Island and the southwest coast of Greenland. According to the University of Laval, if the tests are successful, four Argo floats equipped with this optical ice detection system will be deployed in the Arctic Ocean in the coming months.

Within three years, it is expected that researchers will be able to rely on data from an armada of 23 devices. The drone has an impressive ‘battery life’ of four years. As engadget notes, ‘If everything goes well, however, the drone will be tracking the biological effects of climate change within a matter of months.’

Source: CORDIS

Panic In The Kremlin – OpEd

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By Brian Whitmore

(RFE/RL) — You know things are getting really bad when Sergei Lavrov blows his cool.

The Russian foreign minister is usually smooth as silk in public, shamelessly and effortlessly twisting, spinning, distorting, and lying on behalf of Vladimir Putin’s regime.

But this week, Lavrov was caught on camera — and on mic — sputtering a string of expletives during a joint press conference with Saudi Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir.

It’s unclear what sparked Lavrov’s odd outburst — and it doesn’t really matter. The fact that it happened is a sign of the times.

The past couple weeks have witnessed a series of incidents that suggest that all is not well in the Kremlin elite.

Russian customs and health officials have staged quasi-ritualistic burnings of European cheese and other foodstuffs, as well as of Dutch flowers.

Its parliamentary speaker, Sergei Naryshkin, has penned an article in the official government daily Rossiiskaya Gazeta accusing the United States of “zombifying” its European allies and plotting a major provocation against Moscow.

Naryshkin has also called for an international tribunal on the United States’ use of the atomic bomb in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945.

And Russia has submitted a formal claim to the North Pole at the United Nations.

Did I miss anything? Perhaps. The weird and wacky has been so fast and furious lately that it would be easy to do so.

“There is panic at the top of the Kremlin,” political analyst Andrei Piontkovsky wrote in a recent article in Apostrof. “This is evident in Naryshkin’s article, in the burning of foodstuffs at the border, and in Lavrov’s behavior at the press conference with Saudi officials.”

In recent years, it’s been fashionable and tempting to view Vladimir Putin as the man with a plan, the master of the universe, the spinner of vast conspiracies.

While that may have once been the case, an increasing number of Kremlin watchers are coming to the conclusion that the wheels are coming off the Putin machine.

Moscow-based commentator Igor Yakovenko wrote recently that the system is “running amok.”

And in an op-ed in The New York Times, political analyst Ivan Krastev noted, citing former Kremlin insider Gleb Pavlovsky, that Putin has been increasingly disengaged from day-to-day decision making. Krastev added that the policymaking process resembles “the music of a jazz group; its continuing improvisation is an attempt to survive the latest crisis.”

At the heart of the crisis gripping the elite is a paradox: They can’t live with Putin. And they can’t live without him.

Increasing numbers of Russia’s ruling class — or at least its smarter members — understand that the Putin system has reached the end of its usefulness. It’s hit the point of diminishing returns.

Putin has boxed himself into a corner in Ukraine. He has run the economy into the ground. And he has isolated Russia from the world. And there don’t appear to be any more rabbits he can pull out of his hat.

If the status quo continues, Piontkovsky wrote, the elite “understands perfectly well that this will lead to their loss of billions of dollars” and could eventually cause “the fall of the regime.”

And this appears to be paralyzing Putin himself.

The Kremlin leader has been behaving oddly for awhile. Recall his strange — and still unexplained — disappearance from public view back in March following the assassination of opposition leader Boris Nemtsov; and his peculiar gestures and facial expressions during a press conference in Minsk last summer.

A withdrawn Putin is a big problem because the system has no direction — and tends to go haywire — without his hand guiding it.

“Putin has successfully made any political alternative unthinkable, and his entire country is now trapped by his success,” Krastev wrote.

“In other words, Mr. Putin’s enormous popular support is a weakness, not a strength — and Russia’s leaders know it.”

Which, he added, leads to a sense of eschatology among his inner circle as they worry how they will live with Putin — and if they can live without him.

“The Kremlin is populated not by mere survivors of the post-Soviet transition but by survivalists, people who think in terms of worst-case scenarios, who believe that the next disaster is just around the corner, who thrive on crises, who are addicted to extraordinary situations and no-rules politics,” Krastev wrote.

“That complex and unpredictable context, rather than the vagaries of Mr. Putin’s mind alone, is the key to understanding contemporary Russian politics.”

And this all makes the coming months a dangerous period indeed.


Small Burundi Could Ignite Big Conflict – Analysis

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Corruption, ethnic tensions, refugees, chaos could spread from small, poor Burundi after troubled election.

By Itziar Aguirre*

A third term in office for Burundi’s 51-year-old President Pierre Nkurunziza mocks the nation’s constitutional limit of two terms and perpetuates rampant corruption with regional and international implications.

Ethnic violence could spread, threatening foreign aid, foreign investment and the credibility of international peacekeeping in Africa and destabilizing the region. Internationally isolated, crippled by corruption and facing intensified ethnic conflict, Burundi could emerge as yet another sick regime in Africa.

The United Nations, the European Union, the United States and other western observers contend the elections, mired in controversy, lacked credibility. In defying the two-term limit set by the constitution, Nkurunziza emulates other Sub-Saharan African leaders, presidents Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and Teodoro Obiang of Equatorial Guinea, who have rooted themselves as authoritarian leaders. Among the continent’s large oil producers, Equatorial Guinea boasts one of the highest per capita incomes in the world. This doesn’t translate into welfare for its people. While Mugabe managed an economic rebound with GDP growth of 4 percent last year after years of decline, Zimbabwe’s unemployment rate is the highest in sub-Saharan Africa.

Among the string of pivotal elections for Africa’s Great Lakes Region, the Democratic Republic of Congo is set to vote in 2016 and Rwanda’s are scheduled for 2017. Nkurunziza’s victory on July 21 with 69 percent of the vote could pave the way for neighboring heads of states to try extending their rule, inviting new waves of activism and harsh repression. Nkurunziza’s reelection campaign stoked fear and, in turn, unleashed a new round of violence.

The constitutional court, under political pressure, granted Nkurunziza eligibility to run for a third term on the grounds that he was appointed by parliament rather than elected by voters his first term. A leading opposition candidate called for a delay; the vote proceeded because the constitution calls for an election at least a month prior to the end of the president’s term. Nkurunziza was expected to win, given that 17 opposition parties boycotted the elections. “The country has sunk into a political and security mess which in no way can allow for peaceful, transparent, free or credible elections,” the opposition representatives declared in a joint statement. “Endorsing such a process is equivalent to supporting a predictable civil war in Burundi.”

More than 100 people have been killed since April, when Nkurunziza first announced his intention to run for reelection. Brutal clashes between police and protesters have driven more than 170,000 refugees into the Democratic Republic of Congo, Tanzania and Rwanda to escape “targeted campaigns of intimidation and terror,” as described by United Nations monitors. The UN Refugee Agency expects those fleeing Burundi to reach 200,000 by November, adding pressure for host nations and increasing demand for already scarce resources.

The reports eerily recall the 1994 violence in neighboring Rwanda that later ignited genocide, with an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus killed over the course of 100 days.

Like Rwanda, Burundi consists of a Hutu majority and a Tutsi minority. Since attaining independence in 1962 from Belgium, tension between the usually-dominant Tutsi minority and Hutu majority that make up about 85 percent of the population has haunted Burundi.  Ethnic tensions fueled Burundi’s civil war from 1993 until 2003, leaving an estimated 300,000 dead. Nkurunziza, a former Hutu rebel leader, took office in 2005 following the peace agreement signed in Arusha. The volatile country could not hold direct elections at that time, and he was elected by parliament.

Unrest in Burundi could lead to tensions between Hutus and Tutsis spilling into Rwanda to the north and the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of Congo. Rwandan foreign minister Louise Mushikiwabo has expressed concern that rebels based in the Democratic Republic of the Congo could take advantage of the unrest.

Both nations are landlocked, counted among Africa’s smallest, each about the size of Massachusetts, and among Africa’s densest in terms of population. According to the World Bank Development Indicators, the two are the poorest in countries in East Africa. Both depend on foreign donors, with 40 percent of their national budgets financed by external sources.

Twenty years after the brutal genocide, real GDP growth for Rwanda increased from 4.7 percent in 2013 to 7.0 percent in 2014, expected to rise to 7.5 percent for 2015 and 2016. Still, serious challenges in democracy and governance persist. Rwanda’s per capita income is $638; Kenya’s is $1,245 and Tanzania’s is $912. Economic development has benefited few, with 80 percent of Rwandans living on less than $2 per day.

Rwanda’s President Paul Kagame, a Tutsi, played a critical role in leading the Rwandan Patriotic Front to victory and ending the genocide. He is unlikely to stand by if fellow Tutsis are killed in Burundi. During the 2003 presidential campaign, Kagame depicted himself as a Rwandan rather than a Tutsi and won a landslide victory, vowing to build national unity and strengthen Rwanda’s economy.

Burundi remains fragile: The country received $522 million in total aid for 2012. US bilateral aid totaled $30 million in fiscal year 2014 for food, health and “military professionalization,” according to the US Congressional Research Service. Food, medicine and electricity are considered extravagances in a nation where 67 percent of the people live below the poverty line.

Burundi is deemed by Transparency International as one of the most corrupt countries in sub-Saharan Africa with nepotism, bribery and uncertainty over property rights. Corruption leads to economic stagnation, and investors shy away from the chaos. The government seeks foreign investment, granting large discretionary exemptions to foreign companies by presidential decree or ministerial ordinance; the the US State Department notes that such practices undermine the country’s tax law and investment code.

Bujumbura, the capital and largest city, should be a hub for the region’s resource flows. China’s Exim Bank announced plans to fund a railway linking the Kenya port of Mombasa with Nairobi, requiring three years to complete, followed by links to Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and South Sudan.

The European Union has threatened sanctions. The United States enforces visa bans on several Burundian government officials. US Ambassador Dawn Liberi to Burundi has confirmed that the United States will review its level of aid for Burundi.

Aid will shift from the government to civil society. Initially, Europe withheld some money allocated for polls, then released €4.5 million in humanitarian assistance for Burundi refugees. Belgium disbursed half of the €4 million it had allocated for the polls, but withhold the rest and withdrew from a €5 million police cooperation deal sponsored jointly with the Netherlands.

UN human rights chief Zeid Raad al-Hussein has advised the UN Security Council, “the risk to human life, and to regional stability and development is high” due to escalating politically motivated violence and Burundi’s history of bloodshed.

Civil war in Burundi could disrupt activities of peace force troops stationed in Somalia, operated by the African Union and sanctioned by the United Nations. With 5,432 troops, the Burundi contingent is the second largest within the African Union Mission in Somalia. Since 2007, the United States has spent more than $100 million on training and equipping Burundi’s military forces. In 2014, the United States signed an agreement to give the Burundian army an advanced anti-terrorist formation as well as a State of Forces Agreement, which permits the United States to set up a military base in Burundi with diplomatic status for its members. The US intention in helping Burundi to become an international peacekeeper was to combat terrorism and build peace on the continent.

Corruption and poverty promise more dissent, violence and instability – and an unending cycle of decline for the region.

*Itziar Aguirre is a freelance writer and a property sector analyst at HFF. She holds an MBA in accounting and finance from the University of St. Thomas and an MSc in Comparative Politics from the London School of Economics.

Octopus Genome Sequenced

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The first whole genome analysis of an octopus reveals unique genomic features that likely played a role in the evolution of traits such as large complex nervous systems and adaptive camouflage.

An international team of scientists sequenced the genome of the California two-spot octopus – the first cephalopod ever to be fully sequenced – and mapped gene expression profiles in 12 different tissues. The findings were published in Nature on Aug 12, 2015.

The researchers discovered striking differences from other invertebrates, including widespread genomic rearrangements and a dramatic expansion of a family of genes involved in neuronal development that was once thought to be unique to vertebrates. Hundreds of octopus-specific genes were identified, with many highly expressed in structures such as the brain, skin and suckers.

The results serve as an important foundation for evolutionary studies and deeper investigations into the genetic and molecular mechanisms that underlie cephalopod-specific traits. The work was conducted by teams from the University of Chicago, University of California, Berkeley and Okinawa Institute of Science and Technology as part of the Cephalopod Sequencing Consortium.

“The octopus appears to be utterly different from all other animals, even other molluscs, with its eight prehensile arms, its large brain and its clever problem-solving capabilities,” said co-senior author Clifton Ragsdale, PhD, associate professor in the Departments of Neurobiology and Organismal Biology and Anatomy at the University of Chicago. “The late British zoologist Martin Wells said the octopus is an alien. In this sense, then, our paper describes the first sequenced genome from an alien.”

Octopuses, along with squids, cuttlefish and nautiluses, are cephalopods – a class of predatory molluscs with an evolutionary history spanning more than 500 million years (long before plants moved onto land). Inhabiting every ocean at almost every depth, they possess unique adaptations such as prehensile arms lined with chemosensory suckers, the ability to regenerate complex limbs, vertebrate-like eyes and a sophisticated camouflage system. With large, highly-developed brains, cephalopods are the most intelligent invertebrate and have demonstrated elaborate problem-solving and learning behaviors.

To study the genetics of these specialized traits, Ragsdale and his colleagues sequenced the genome of the California two-spot octopus (Octopus bimaculoides) to a high level of coverage (on average, each base pair was sequenced 60 times). To annotate the genome, the team generated transcriptome sequence data – which can be used to measure gene expression based on RNA levels – in 12 different tissues types.

Short-range brain

The team estimates the O. bimaculoides genome is 2.7 billion base-pairs in size, with numerous long stretches of repeated sequences. They identified more than 33,000 protein-coding genes, placing the octopus genome at slightly smaller in size, but with more genes, than a human genome.

The large size of the octopus genome was initially attributed to whole genome duplication events during evolution, which can lead to increased genomic diversity and complexity. This phenomenon has occurred twice in ancestral vertebrates, for example. However, Ragsdale and his colleagues found no evidence of duplications.

Instead, the evolution of the octopus genome was likely driven by the expansion of a few specific gene families, widespread genome shuffling and the appearance of novel genes.

The most notable expansion was in the protocadherins, a family of genes that regulate neuronal development and short-range interactions between neurons. The octopus genome contains 168 protocadherin genes – 10 times more than other invertebrates and more than twice as many as mammals. It was previously thought that only vertebrates possessed numerous and diverse protocadherin genes. The research team hypothesized that because cephalopod neurons lack myelin and function poorly over long distances, protocadherins were central to the evolution of a nervous system whose complexity depends on short-range interactions.

Other gene families that were dramatically expanded in the octopus include zinc finger transcription factors, which are mainly expressed in embryonic and nervous tissues and are thought to play roles in development. The octopus genome contains around 1,800 C2H2 zinc finger transcription factors, the second largest gene family so far discovered in animals (olfactory receptor genes in elephants are the largest at around 2,000).

Overall, however, gene family sizes in octopuses are largely similar to those found in other invertebrates.

A “Cuisinart” genome

A unique feature of the octopus genome appears to be widespread genomic rearrangements. In most species, specific cohorts of genes tend to be close together on the chromosome. However, most octopus genes show no such connections. Hox genes, for example, control body plan development and cluster together in almost all animals. Octopus Hox genes are scattered throughout the genome with no apparent linkages.

The octopus genome is enriched in transposons, also known as “jumping genes,” which can rearrange themselves on the genome. While their role in octopuses is unclear, the team found elevated transposon expression in neural tissues. Transposons are known to affect the regulation of gene expression and play major roles in shaping genome structure.

“With a few notable exceptions, the octopus basically has a normal invertebrate genome that’s just been completely rearranged, like it’s been put into a blender and mixed,” said Caroline Albertin, co-lead author and graduate student in the Department of Organismal Biology and Anatomy at the University of Chicago. “This leads to genes being placed in new genomic environments with different regulatory elements, and was a completely unexpected finding.”

The researchers also found evidence of extensive RNA editing, which allows the octopus to alter protein sequences without changing underlying DNA code. Many edited proteins are found in neural tissues, and these proteins are thought to act as a switch to regulate functions such as neural activity.

Hundreds of octopus-specific genes were identified, large numbers of which were found in the nervous system, retina and suckers. The team noted several specific gene families of interest. The suckers, for example, express a set of genes that resemble receptors for the neurotransmitter acetylcholine. However, the proteins these genes code for lack the ability to bind acetylcholine, and are suspected to function as chemosensory receptors involved in the octopus’s ability to taste with their suckers.

Six octopus-specific reflectins, genes involved in light manipulation and camouflage, were identified. Octopus reflectins are relatively dissimilar to reflectins in other cephalopods, suggesting that a single gene was present in a cephalopod ancestor, which then duplicated and evolved independently in different species. This is consistent with the team’s estimates that the octopus and squid lineages diverged around 270 million years ago.

Albertin and Ragsdale are now studying the molecular and genetic mechanisms responsible for the development of the octopus, particularly its brain. Efforts to sequence the genomes of other cephalopods are currently underway through the Cephalopod Sequencing Consortium.

“The octopus genome makes studies of cephalopod traits much more tractable, and now represents an important point on the tree of life for comparative evolutionary studies,” Ragsdale said. “It is an incredible resource that opens up new questions that could not have been asked before about these remarkable animals.”

Susiya: Injustice On Display – OpEd

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Susiya is but another example of the Netanyahu government’s flagrant and callous disregard of the Palestinians’ fundamental right to live with dignity. The mere thought of demolishing Susiya, not to speak of actually executing it, will be another nail in the coffin of the Israeli peace process. Netanyahu, more than any other Israeli Prime Minister, will be judged harshly for destroying the prospect for peace bit by bit.

By Dr. Alon Ben-Meir*

The pending order to demolish the small Palestinian village of Susiya in the southern Judean Mountains in the occupied West Bank represents the most blatant violation of human rights. The order calls for the forcible removal of several hundred Palestinians who have been living on their land from the time of the Ottoman Empire and still have the ownership deeds to prove their claim. Prime Minister Netanyahu, who never misses an opportunity to remind the world that Israel is a democracy guided by moral principles, seems to care less about displacing Palestinian women and children for the fourth time. His excuse is that this dusty village, established in 1830, is the site of archeological remains both of a 5th century synagogue and a 10th century mosque and it must be preserved.

The real reason is that Netanyahu is leading a coalition government which is committed to preventing the Palestinians from building anywhere in Area C, which represents 61 percent of the West Bank, and is openly seeking its outright annexation.

This policy is repeatedly reinforced by the government’s refusal to grant building permits to Susiya residents, when at the same time it is providing all the funding for facilities and security to a religious communal Israeli settlement established in 1986 with the same name only a short distance south of Palestinian Susiya.

It is hard to express how outrageous the behavior of Netanyahu’s government is when only hours after Israel’s High Court of Justice ordered the demolition of two illegally-built structures in the West Bank settlement of Beit El, Netanyahu authorized the immediate construction of 300 units in the same settlement.

In response to the Court ruling, Naftali Bennett, the leader of the ultra-conservative Jewish Home party, said: “This is an unfortunate ruling by the High Court…[that] will bring about a wave of construction across the settlements.” Bennett’s statement was strongly echoed by Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked, no less, who said that while the Court order must be accepted, they will immediately rebuild. “This is the Jewish way—you don’t lose hope and you keep building, building, building.”

The implications of this inhuman action, should it be carried out, transcends the demolition of one Palestinian village. It points out not only the hypocrisy of Netanyahu and his cohorts, but the moral decadence of a government that seems bent on defying the international community and the basic tenets of civilized behavior.

Susiya is but another example of the Netanyahu government’s flagrant and callous disregard of the Palestinians’ fundamental right to live with dignity – indeed, I am reminded of a passage in Steinbeck’s The Grapes of Wrath, which, although about a different time and place, speaks directly to what is taking place in the West Bank: “If it was the law they was workin’ with, why we could take it. But it ain’t the law. They’re a-working away at our spirits. They’re a-tryin’ to make us cringe an’ crawl like a whipped bitch. They’re tryin’ to break us… They’re working on our decency.”

At a time when Israel’s image is tarnished, demolishing Palestinian Susiya will only intensify the already massive international condemnation of the Israeli occupation and the Netanyahu government’s insatiable thirst for more Palestinian land.

Netanyahu’s demagoguery has been time and again put on full display when he talks about a two-state solution, but then continues to expand the settlements by providing them with amenities while at the same time depriving scores of Palestinian villages of their basic need for water and electricity, including Susiya.

The mere thought of demolishing Susiya, not to speak of actually executing it, will be another nail in the coffin of the Israeli peace process. Netanyahu, more than any other Israeli Prime Minister, will be judged harshly for destroying the prospect for peace bit by bit.

There is nothing that he can say or do to justify the demolition of Susiya or any other Palestinian village or housing unit built in the West Bank—on their own territory—to accommodate natural growth and enable them to live a life without fear and intimidation.

The Israelis who support the demolition of this poor village are rendering the most ghastly disservice to Israel’s image and its very future as a democratic state, and have become complicit in the despicable act of uprooting law-abiding Palestinians. No Israeli with a conscience should remain silent and allow the Netanyahu government to devour what little the Palestinians have left.

After 47 years of occupation, the time has come for all decent Israelis to think about the future of their country. Where is Israel heading, and for how much longer can the occupation and the injustices continue without jeopardizing Israel’s very existence?

Making the lives of Palestinians unbearable in the hope that they will eventually leave is a pipe dream as the infliction of unforgiving horrible pain on the young and old will only strengthen their resolve to stay. They have the entire international community behind them, and no Israeli force can dislodge them as they would rather die than succumb to tyrannical edicts.

I applaud the Israelis who joined the Palestinian demonstration against the potential demolition of Susiya on July 24. Hundreds of thousands more should follow in their steps. Indeed, in the final analysis, the public, not the government, can shape the country’s destiny.

It is understandable that the Israelis’ fatigue with the Palestinian conflict has led to complacency, but this is not a luxury that any Israeli can afford at this juncture.

The Palestinians will not fade away, and only the Israeli public can stop this morally corrupt bunch, the so-called Israeli leaders in the government, from destroying the moral foundations on which Israel was established.

*Dr. Alon Ben-Meir is a professor of international relations at the Center for Global Affairs at NYU. He teaches courses on international negotiation and Middle Eastern studies.

AIPAC And The Iran Nuclear Deal – OpEd

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By Jamal Doumani

You want yet another glimpse of the immense reach by the Israeli lobby into the workings of US foreign policy in the Middle East? Then consider the battle royal — traditionally a fight between two combatants that is fought until only one fighter is left standing — between the White House and the leaders and foot soldiers of that lobby over the Iran nuclear deal.

The lobby may yet succeed in scuttling that deal, which Republican leaders in the House and the Senate have promised to bring to a vote in September. And Republicans are virtually unanimous in their opposition, as they are responsive to the demands — some will say, dictates — of the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), the most influential pro-Israel lobbying organization in the US, with 100,000 members, seventeen regional offices and a vast pool of doors.

The kind and degree of influence that this group has exerted since its founding in 1951 is now the stuff of legend.

This group is so powerful, and so self-confident that, since the brouhaha over the Iran nuclear deal erupted, it has picked a fight with no less a figure than the American president and no less an august institution than the White House. The chief executive and the boys soldiering on at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue moved hurriedly to meet with AIPAC representatives in an effort to appease them. Late last week, President Obama, who regards the deal as a landmark achievement of his administration, found time to meet with two of its leaders to reassure them that, well, as they say in some circles, honest, “it’s good for the Jews.”

Those leaders, reportedly, were neither impressed nor reassured. They made it clear that they were going to be out there raising hell, leaning even on Democrats in Congress to tear the deal to shreds. Their first victory was to gain Sen. Chuck Schumer, the legislator who hopes to lead Senate Democrats in the next Congress, to their side.

How did they do it? By wily means. The group sent 60 pro-Israel activists to the senator’s office to lobby him, while Citizens for a Nuclear Free Iran, an off-shoot AIPAC outfit formed to launch a $25 million advertising campaign against the deal, ran television spots in New York, the state he represents. (Maybe they didn’t have to try that hard, for the Jewish Schumer is already an ardent, perhaps even fanatic, supporter of Israel.)

Then look at the, well, chutzpah of the group. Last week, after White House officials learned that AIPAC would fly 700 of its members from across the country to Washington to pressure their members of Congress individually to reject the deal, Obama’s officials reached out in turn to the group and invited them to a briefing at the White House. The officials were told, no. You want to address us, send your people over to the downtown hotel where we are gathered.

The White House ate humble pie, took it all on the chin and agreed to do just that. Several of these government officials, including the White House Chief of Staff and a high Treasury official who handles sanctions, all gave presentations to the Jewish activists, except they were prevented from taking questions.

Have all these shenanigans enraged the president? According to news reports, they have indeed. But you want to lock horns with the lobby, go ahead. Do so at your own peril. President George H. W. Bush did that in 1992 when he tried to hold up $10 billion in loan guarantees that Israel needed to build housing for newly arrived Russian immigrants till the US government got assurances that the money would not fund the building of colonies in the occupied Palestinian territories. He lost the election, which many analysts attributed to the influence of AIPAC.

An exaggerated view of the Jewish community’s influence in the US? Not at all, when you look the facts — and the figures.

Jews, who live predominantly in urban centers, such as (in that order) New York, Miami, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco and Boston, have the highest percentage voter turnout of any ethnic group in the country. Roughly 94 percent live in 13 key electoral college states, worth enough electoral votes to elect a president.

The issue of support for Israel by a candidate — how ardent that support for Israel is — could result in a sizable number of Jews, many of whom are one-issue voters, to switch parties, in large enough numbers to tip the scale in national or state-wide elections. Former AIPAC President Howard Friedman was quoted by John Meirheimer and Stephen Walt, in their seminal 2007 book, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy, as saying this: “AIPAC meets with every candidate running for Congress. These candidates receive in-depth briefings to help them understand the complexities of Israel’s predicament and that of the Middle East as a whole. We even ask each candidate to author a position paper on their views of the US-Israel relationship, so it’s clear where they stand on the subject.”

How could a minority, you ask, representing a niggardly 2 percent of the population (the Pew Research Center puts the figure at just under 7 million), exert such disproportionate influence in a country of 300 million, a country recognized as a big power with immense wealth and unmatched global reach? Search me. But it’s all food for thought for Arab Americans.

Tunisia Year Five: Caught In A Tightening Vice – OpEd

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By Samuel Albert*

Thousands of young Tunisians drown trying to make their way to Europe, hoping that the West can offer a life that their own country cannot. Thousands are going to neighbouring Libya or other countries to wage jihad against what they perceive as the Western way of life, thirsty for vengeance against the West and its values.

What these two different situations have in common is that for many young Tunisians, accepting the lives they’ve been given is not an option. The March 2015 massacre of 22 people at the Bardo Museum, one of Tunis’s main cultural tourist attractions, and then the June murder of 38 Europeans at a beach resort in Sousse, demonstrated that Tunisia can’t escape being caught between the contending forces fighting for the allegiance of people across the region. On the one hand, millions of lives and futures are stunted or shattered by the conditions created by the world market and globalised finance, while the monopoly capitalists who rule the imperialist countries prosper. On the other, Islamist political rule is represented as the only alternative to what the West calls “democracy”, the political, social and ideological institutions whose function is to stabilize this intolerable situation.

The Islamist 23-year old graduate student who shot the tourists in Sousse was striking out at a situation where youth from poor families in the interior feel cut off from the modern world as it is enjoyed by some on the coast and people in the West in general. Their fathers work, when they can, wherever they can, in back-breaking construction, and their mothers in investor-owned fields under the thumb of merciless labour contractors who act as if they own them. Workers in factories and call centres are at the mercy of overseas orders. The educational system, especially in the technological fields, fills students with a narrow “input” of skills they can hope to “output” in a vocation promising a different life than their parents – until at last, emerging with diploma in hand, they tumble into the abyss of unemployment or mindless jobs with no prospects.

The phosphate mines that bring much of the country’s wealth produce serious environmental problems and few jobs for the people who live around them. The tourism “industry” touted as the country’s hope is driven by real estate speculation and prostitution, and the huge number of people trapped in prostitution reveals what values and future the West has to offer Tunisia.

In this situation – and in a world with no socialist states and few genuine revolutionary movements, where a reality-based revolutionary vision has not yet become the property of widespread masses of people – the powerful attraction of political and jihadi Islam, now presenting itself as the main challenger to the status quo imposed by Western imperialism, is tragic but not surprising.

The political motives behind the Sousse attack are no mystery: it was a demonstration of Islamism’s strength, not just militarily but in the contested sphere of ideology and the coherence of its politics. It was an armed critique of the country’s subjugation and its unjust, illegitimate and morally corrupt establishment, a demonstration that Islamism is the only political alternative. It dealt a very serious blow to the tourism industry the country and regime depend on. It compelled the army and security forces to spread out in the big cities and coastal areas instead of concentrating on the mountainous region near Algeria and the Libyan border, where they had been mounting an offensive against fundamentalist operational zones.

President Beji Caid Essebsi’s response was to declare a state of emergency to enable new repressive measures against strikes, sit-ins and other movements that have nothing in common with jihadism, and even ban public gatherings and cultural events. “Since 2011 the country has been like a school-yard recess and now that has to end,” declared a pro-government pundit. Essebsi emphasized that his political rivals and fractious friends too had to “get into line” with his government and its Western approved programme. For the sake of stability, he said; well-connected prominent businessmen, widely hated for robbing the public, would be protected from legal action.

In short, the country whose “success” was contrasted with the daunting of the Arab Spring in Egypt, has become like Egypt, in many aspects, if not all.

Like Egypt, the U.S. has been drawing Tunisia closer, providing significant funding and loan guarantees (even though unlike in Egypt, U.S. moves in Tunisia are always at least tinged by rivalry with France, Tunisia’s historic overlord). In May 2015, on the heels of the Bardo museum attack, Essebsi visited Washington, where Obama named Tunisia a “Major Non-Nato ally”, a status bringing more military aid and “strategic cooperation”. In July, Tunisian media reported that a U.S. military base and regional listening post now located in Sicily would be moved to Tunisia.

For the U.S., especially, Tunisia matters most as a “security problem”. Trying to “fix” Tunisia’s “dysfunctional” security services, the U.S, UK and France are taking charge themselves in some matters – for example, the UK’s Scotland Yard is running the investigation of the Sousse massacre.

This increasingly direct interference, motivated by these imperialists’ perceived regional and national interests and not the good of Tunisia, will not save Tunisia from disaster any more than it did in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria and elsewhere . Rather, it heightens the danger that Tunisia will be pulled into the maelstrom of the regional and civil wars between those lined up with the U.S. and groups like Daesh who are the main challenge to its interests at the moment.

What has the “democracy” so praised by the West and its apologists brought Tunisia? And why does the rise of Islamism seem so unstoppable? The answer lies in the way the two trends reinforce each other, even as they ferociously contend for the country’s future.

The hated president Ben Ali is gone, toppled by the opening act of the Arab Spring, but the uprising left the state apparatus fundamentally unchanged. The police forces organized to brutally protect the old regime remain intact. They aggressively beat youth on the streets in poor neighbourhoods and towns as much as ever, and still torture prisoners, political and otherwise. Social movements in the interior are viciously repressed. The military, which supervised the so-called “democratic transition”, continues to make its will known through threats to political parties and the general public. It has held key ministries and governorates (provincial authorities). Prime Minister Habib Essid is only the most prominent figure among the former regime’s men who, rather than losing their authority, have been promoted. The people have had no relief from the bureaucracy that governs much of everyday life and the fate of citizens like Mohamed Bouazizi, the young fruit vendor in Sidi Bouzid who set himself and the country on fire on 17 December 2010.

The country’s economy is the same as it was, structured over decades to depend on foreign markets and capital. There have been no serious proposals to change Ben Ali’s economic orientation by any of the major parties. The continued privatization of state enterprises has brought even more obscene wealth to wealthy partners of French, U.S., Saudi and Qatari capital, while promises have sputtered out for projects for economic development in interior areas like Kasserine and Sidi Bouzid where the revolt started. Unemployment is worse than ever.

The electoral system has gathered most of the opposition to the old regime into its fold and turned them into its servitors. The enlistment of former radicals into the “political class” – the set of people allowed to practice politics – has brought cynicism and discredit to the “leftist” ideals they once professed. Less than half of the potential voters bothered to cast a ballot in the last elections.

Unlike the jihadis, the opposition politicians (including so-called “leftists”) most definitely don’t seek or believe in radical change. Lately they have been encouraging Tunisians to hope that new oil deposits (which supposedly have already been found but whose existence is being covered up for obscure interests) can save the country, just as phosphate exports were once hailed as the country’s future. Has having plenty of oil saved Algeria, or instead delivered it even more deeply into the clutches of the global market and its implacable demands, while subsidizing the rule of a handful of men who are that cruel market’s local representatives?

Tunisia’s economic development in 1990s brought the society to where it is today. Its Association Agreement with the EU helped make the country a subcontractor for automotive and electric parts, clothing and call centres, while unable to feed itself without the imports that in turn require ever more economic subordination and massive waste of the potential of the country’s people.

In response to the Sousse massacre, the government has had little to deploy but troops. A government that forbids men under 35 to travel freely – for fear they will join the thousands of Tunisians waging jihad abroad, and then come back – is declaring that it cannot even dream of waging a struggle for the country’s youth, let alone offer a credible alternative. It can do nothing to change a situation which generates wave after wave of Islamists, not only because of the jihad raging in nearby countries but also because under today’s circumstances, the society itself is a matrix for Islamism.

There are different currents of Islamism, but the dividing line between jihadism and electoral Islamism is extremely porous in theory and practice. The leaders of Tunisia’s Ennahda party, who come out of the Egyptian Moslem Brotherhood current and like to compare themselves with Erdogan’s AKP in Turkey, used jihadi methods before the fall of Ben Ali opened up the way for them to share power in an elected government. During that latter period, Ennahda provided practical and ideological cover for sworn jihadis.

The difference between armed Islamism and electoral Islamism is not a question of loyalty to “democracy”. Any class that rules over an exploitative and oppressive system, in the world’s most developed countries like anywhere else, will opt for whatever form of political rule necessary to preserve its rule. Islamism is defined by its goals, the imposition of Islam as the legal regulator of political and social life (which is very different than defending people’s right to voluntarily practice their religion), and not by whatever means to achieve those goals that might seem most effective at any given moment.

Many reactionary armed forces, including the U.S., encourage young people to murder innocents to assuage their feelings of having been wronged. Islamism can mobilize the blind loyalty of some desperate people among the lowest masses and the resentment of the petite bourgeoisie. It may offer a path to social advancement for many individuals that the status quo does not make available to them. But in terms of class interests, it represents old and new exploiters among imperialist-dominated nations.

The goal of Daesh, al-Qaeda and, in a somewhat different way, the Moslem Brotherhood and the AKP is not to challenge capitalism but to win a new place for themselves that has not been possible under the geopolitical order in the Middle East that the U.S. built to serve its supremacy. While the alignments of class forces differ from country to country in the Islamic world, it is surely no accident that the leadership, ideological training, financing, logistics and arms used by today’s two main strands of Islamism come from the predominantly capitalist ruling classes of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, often in alignment with Turkey, on the one hand, and on the other, the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are outstanding examples of regimes whose ruling classes with roots in pre-capitalist modes of production have become inseparable from the private accumulation of capital amid the globalized production relations of the imperialist system and its ineluctable economic logic. Conflicting interests and not just religious differences between Shias and Sunnis explain why Islamists can line up on opposing sides or alternately be used by and oppose imperialist projects.

At the same time, Islamism has its own dynamic as an ideology and political movement, a momentum where what is perceived as its advance against foreign-imposed humiliation favours more advance. The basis for Islamism in material conditions and its congruency with and usefulness to reactionary class interests should not lead to underestimating the great importance of the ideological factor in its rise. A major reason for its attractive power is the absence of a clearly-posed ideological and political alternative to the status quo that has the potential strength of being based on a true understanding of reality and the real interests of the vast majority of people.

Given the reactionary nature of Islamist goals, it follows that they would be faithful students of imperialism when it comes to using terrorism against the masses for political aims. Theirs is not a blind violence but something even worse – deliberate barbarism meant to create terror among people for political goals, just as the imperialists have done from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima to U.S.-backed Israeli assaults on the people of Gaza and Lebanon and the American-led rampage that destroyed Iraq.

Because of its reactionary nature, Islamism often has ambiguous relations with imperialism and its local regimes. In Algeria, for instance, the 1990s civil war between Islamists and the ruling military had a dimension of a mutual war against the people, the slaughter of intellectuals and others that both sides hated. We’ve seen this in Tunisia, too. In fact, today’s Tunisian government itself rests on an uneasy and unstable alliance between forces representing imperialism and its traditional local flunkies on the one hand and Islamism on the other.

After initially dismissing the significance of the Sousse massacre, President Essebsi declared, “If such incidents happen again, the state will collapse.” One reason for his alarm is that his governing Nidaa Tunes party, answerable to both France and the U.S, was elected on its promise to overturn the Islamisation process initiated by its predecessor in government, Ennahda. At the same time, it cannot (and does not want) to govern without Ennahda’s parliamentary support.

But the problem goes deeper than electoral opportunism. Since Tunisa’s formal independence the country’s rulers have always used religion and religious identity (the constitution’s first article defines Tunisia as a Moslem country) to disguise their fealty to imperialism. They have never forgone the legitimacy of religion and tradition and the religious suffocation of those it governs. This has been combined with repression, including against Islamism when it presented problems – when Ennahda was in rebellion against the government rather than one of its pillars.

Now, especially because today’s Tunisian government suffers from the inherited illegitimacy of the Ben Ali regime, whose ignominious downfall at the hands of the people has not been forgotten even by those currently politically inactive, and because it has even more reason than Ben Ali to fear the masses of people, it is extremely unwilling to confront Islamism, especially in ideological terms, but in other ways as well.

For instance, take the 2013 assassination of Chokri Belaid, a major leader of the Tunisian electoral left and an important symbol to many secular intellectuals and others. The fact that he had defended the Islamists under the Ben Ali regime did not stop Islamists from killing him. Neither the Ennahda government at the time nor today’s supposedly secular government tried very hard to elucidate this crime. In July 2015, when 30 men accused in connection with the murder were summoned for trial, most of them refused to appear in court. The government did not dare try to defeat this challenge to its legal system and moral authority in the name of Islam.

After the Sousse massacre president Essebsi called for the shuttering of 80 mosques he said were run by Salafists, but religious fundamentalism is thriving throughout the extensive state-supervised religious establishment, the public educational system and the dominant culture in general, pressuring and intimidating the many millions who are not eager to live in a society governed by religious law. For instance, the police have started arresting people for public possession of beer, which is not illegal and until now not uncommon, with the explanation that such behaviour by Moslems (and all Tunisians are presumed to be Moslem) constitutes “public debauchery”. Foreigners with non-Moslem-sounding names are free from the religious restrictions the police have taken upon themselves to enforce.

How can a ruling class and power structure that constantly reproduce Islamism, and depend on it ideologically and politically, confront armed Islamism without endangering its own existence? This seems to explain Essebsi’s warning about how the state might not be able to withstand another Islamist attack, not because it would be defeated militarily but because of its own explosive political and ideological contradictions.

While Ennahda’s role in the current government is small, no major political force considers its Islamist project out of bounds or opposes the growing Islamization of Tunisian society as a matter of principle rather than taste or lifestyle preference. This is especially striking in the case of many people in the “leftist” Popular Front, the self-appointed representatives of the country’s “patriots” and “democrats”, which in the last elections supported Essebsi in the name of opposing Ennahda.

More recently, in response to Islamist pressure, the Front’s spokesman, the former “communist” Hamma Hammami (in reality an opponent of the revolutionary communism represented by China’s Mao Tsetung) declared that he had no “ideological problem” with Islamists because he, too, is a Moslem. Regardless of his personal beliefs (and “leftists” perpetuating and worshiping traditional thinking is an old and serious problem in most countries), the society any kind of Islamists want is totally unacceptable, even if only considered from the point of view of what it means for women, half of the world’s population, not to mention other aspects of the emancipation of humanity from ignorance and superstition, and all forms of oppressive social relations. If some political organizations, whether Trotskyist or falsely self-proclaimed Maoists, can use the excuse of opposing imperialism to find anything to support in Islamism, that speaks volumes about what kind of society they are willing to accept or help govern.

Not unexpectedly, the Front’s response to the Sousse massacre was capitulation of another sort. In the face of imminent danger, they demand the beefing up of the army – whose job is to defend the status quo for imperialism. It is all too typical to see “leftists” who never considered how to make a real revolution scuttle back and forth from tailing Islamism to throwing themselves into the arms of the imperialists.

The architectonic forces that began to break through the surface in December 2010 are still at work. That revolt involved a broad section of the people, spurred by youth in the interior and relayed by students in coastal cities and finally the capital. People from all social classes took part, including elements of the bourgeoisie excluded from Ben Ali’s favoured inner circle or those who felt that dumping him was the best available alternative to a prolonged and cascading upheaval. That unity of “the people” quickly hit the limits of the fundamentally antagonistic class interests at work. Islamists as such played very little role in the revolt. But those domestic and foreign observers who congratulated the Tunisian people for the “moderation” of the outcome, which they attributed to a supposed Tunisian character, misjudged the depth of the crisis and what it would take to resolve it.

What has come even more clearly to light after the Sousse attack is not the importation of exterior conflicts into Tunisian society but a particular, localized and explosive expression of contradictions at work on a world scale. There would be no modern-day Islamism without the economic and social changes in the predominantly Islamic countries brought about by imperialist development. Further, the criminal actions of the U.S. and its allies in recent years (in Palestine, Iraq, etc.) have been inseparable from this development. Without all that, Islamism would still be a minor trend with little future.

Instead it has become a “perverse expression”, as Bob Avakian has put it, of the fundamental contradiction at work in today’s world: between the socialization of production that is drawing the whole globe into productive processes and transforming economic relations, and the private – and therefore exploitative and competition-driven – appropriation of the surplus value thus produced. This is what has led to the accumulation of capital in the hands of the monopoly capitalist rulers of the imperialist countries and the horrendous and unbearable intensification of the world’s inequalities and lopsided development.

It is a “perverse expression” because instead of a solution, it is an obstacle to resolving this contradiction by moving toward a world where the abolition of the private ownership of the necessary means to live, and all the social relations and ideas based on that, enables everyone to work for the common good while fully blossoming as individuals. Imperialism and Islamism can be called “the two outmodeds” because neither represents what the world could be if the enormous productive forces developed by humanity, and most basically the people, could be liberated and enabled to transform the world and themselves.

Tunisia cannot be a haven from the world’s storms. It remains a country whose contradictions cannot be solved by anything other than a full revolution – the emergence of a flag, programme, party and broad revolutionary movement whose goal is to defeat the forces of the old state and establish a new kind of political power that can free the people at the bottom, along with the middle strata and intellectuals and others, to begin transforming society in a far more radical and liberating fashion that Islamism or imperialism could even pretend to offer.

Otherwise, the conflict between the “two outmodeds” will continue to rage and wreak death and destruction, with the masses of people deluded victims instead of conscious protagonists.

* Samuel Albert writes for A World to Win News Service.

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