An attorney from the Center for Constitutional Rights (CCR) urged Tuesday a Periodic Review Board (PRB) at Guantánamo to recommend that Mohammed Kamin be cleared for release.

Kamin, who is from Afghanistan and has been held in U.S. custody for more than 11 years, is among those designated for indefinite detention at Guantánamo: men who are not cleared for release or transfer, but who will also never be charged with a crime. The PRB is a forward-looking, administrative process to determine whether “detention is necessary to protect against a continuing significant threat to the security of the United States.”

“There is no reason to continue to hold Mr. Kamin at Guantánamo. He will be welcomed home, into a stable and supportive family and village life,” said Center for Constitutional Rights Senior Managing Attorney Shayana Kadidal. “If the president is ever to close Guantánamo, he must end the legal limbo in which men like Kamin are trapped and, once they are cleared, must transfer cleared men without delay. The only way to close the Guantánamo is to reduce the prisoner population to zero.”

There are currently 52 cleared prisoners at Guantánamo, many of whom have been cleared for release or transfer for several years. As it has with all of its Guantánamo clients, CCR submitted a letter to the PRB offering to provide appropriate support in order to aid Kamin in his transition home.

Kamin was charged in April 2008 with one count of material support for terrorism. However, the convening authority withdrew the charges in 2009, and subsequent rulings in federal court have held that material support is not a charge triable by military commission. Kamin will therefore never be charged with a crime.

Moreover, his attorneys note that President Obama has repeatedly stated that the US’s direct involvement in the conflict in Afghanistan has ended, definitively terminating any purported legal authority to continue detaining Kamin.

Kamin is also represented by Paul Rashkind at the Florida Federal Public Defender’s Office. Additionally, two military officers appeared at today’s hearing as Mr. Kamin’s “personal representatives,” to advocate on his behalf.

The Center for Constitutional Rights has led the legal battle over Guantánamo for more than 13 years – representing clients in two Supreme Court cases and organizing and coordinating hundreds of pro bono lawyers across the country, ensuring that all the men detained at Guantánamo have had the option of legal representation.

By Emma Scully and Daniel A. Tovar*

Henrique Capriles Radonski, opposition politician and governor of Venezuela’s Miranda state, disclosed a pressing reality of Venezuelan politics in an interview with the Spanish newspaper El País on June 13. When asked if the Venezuelan opposition is unified, Capriles, two-time presidential candidate who came close to defeating Nicolás Maduro in the 2013 elections, expressed confidence that the opposition is “going to be unified,” thus confirming the existence of intra-opposition divisions that have gradually chipped away at the fabric of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (Democratic Unity Roundtable; MUD), the electoral coalition of Venezuelan opposition parties.[1] The purpose of this article is to trace and outline the sources of the divisions within MUD that have transformed it into a splintered opposition coalition plagued by party factionalism. Failure to resurface as a cohesive coalition may help the current government to retain a majority in the national assembly in this year’s parliamentary elections on December 6.

This article will begin by illustrating the height of oppositional unity during the 2012 primary elections, locating some of the underlying tensions that later grew into palpable disputes during the opposition protests of 2014. After detailing the decay of unity from the 2012 elections to the present day, Capriles’ recent interview with El País will provide a deeper understanding of his intentions and help explain his shift away from more radical factions of the opposition. The disputes between these factions are rooted in strategy and logistics. Capriles, now a more moderate opposition member than some of his MUD allies, is focused on gaining power through constitutional measures, primarily in the form of a democratic electoral victory. Having moderated his critique of Chavismo, Capriles has sought to appropriate a quasi-Chavista image as he adjusts his rhetoric to appeal to poor and working-class Venezuelans, perhaps at the cost of alienating his former base of support within the middle class. Moreover, Capriles’ tactics compete with a more radical wing of the opposition, which once endorsed Capriles as MUD’s presidential candidate but whose tactics have included a call for “La Salida,” that is, for the “exit” of Maduro from office well before a constitutionally permitted recall referendum could be legally exercised halfway through the president’s term.

Antigovernment Opposition in Venezuela: A Brief History

Criticism of Chavismo has always emerged from both the Right and the Left. The Left opposition denounces the lack of trade union leadership in the country, governmental bureaucracy and corruption, and the inability thus far of Chávez’s model of communal councils to effectively challenge capitalism.[2] However, the rest of the hemisphere often overlooks these criticisms, as opposition from the Right is continuously bolstered by the media power of its members and the political and material support of its friends in Washington.

Since the election of Hugo Chavez as president in December 1998 and the subsequent creation of Venezuela’s current “Bolivarian” constitution through a constituent assembly and national referendum, rightwing opposition in Venezuela has decried the Bolivarian government as authoritarian or undemocratic. This opposition has harbored a number of different tendencies. Some sectors of the opposition on principle seek the restoration of a neoliberal economic model and a privatized oil industry; others, seeking a return to power, desire the return to dominance of former political parties Acción Democrática (Democratic Action; AD) and the Social Christian Party, Copei, which catered to the small oligarchy that was intertwined with the state oil company Petróleos de Venezuela, S.A. (PDVSA). Despite varying interests, a number of opposition political parties, the Venezuelan Federation of Chambers of Commerce (Fedecámaras), and a number of opposition media outlets were sufficiently unified during the overtly undemocratic coup in 2002 that displaced Chávez from power for three days.

One can consider the 2002 coup a symbol of antigovernment unity within the old guard of the opposition; however, the popular uprising that helped restore Chavez to the presidency represented the loyalty of the military at the lower levels and the exceptional strength of Chávez’s base. The failure of the coup, along with many subsequent attempts to dislodge the government, including an oil strike (December 2002 to March 2003) and a recall referendum (2004), ultimately exposed an opposition that was too blatantly tied to the ancien régime to garner popular support. These failures of the antigovernment opposition to depose Chávez have led some opponents of the Bolivarian revolution to try a new approach to altering the political landscape in Venezuela—the most prominent figure in this new wave being Capriles.[3] The consolidation of the MUD in January 2009 marked this shift and increased the visibility of two other notable actors in the current opposition: Leopoldo López, a Harvard-educated former mayor of Chacao who founded the party Voluntad Popular (Popular Will; VP) in December 2009 under MUD; and Marina Corina Machado, former member of the National Assembly. The paths of these three figures reveal a series of internal struggles that led to the opposition’s current inability to capitalize on the economic crisis.

The 2012 Primary Elections: The Apex

To supporters of the Venezuelan opposition, the primary elections in February 2012 represented the pinnacle of accordance between MUD’s prominent actors. Five candidates from the coalition ran, including Capriles, López, Machado, Pablo Pérez, and Diego Arria. Capriles ran on the platform of education reform, which he believed would rid the country of poverty, as well as insisting he would establish a moderate and diverse economy like that of Lula da Silva in Brazil.[4]

Despite the various political platforms crafted for the public, the opposition candidates were unified under a common vision for Venezuela, which was outlined in a document entitled “Guidelines for the Program of the Government of National Unity.” Signed by four out of the five MUD candidates (excluding only Arria) the leaked document provides an extended criticism of the current government and details the reforms MUD would pass if it were it to gain power. The proposed economic reforms were neoliberal in essence, such as creating an environment “conducive to private investment,” emphasizing property rights, and opening up the oil industry to “private actors.”[5] Less ideologically driven reforms included a new gun control law and anti-corruption efforts.

The document was a policy agreement between certain politicians in MUD, but it did not represent a truly unified anti-government movement. In fact, many smaller parties began to revoke their support for the opposition coalition after this document was released.[6] Instead, the document only highlighted the class-based ideological homogeneity of the most powerful actors in MUD, namely Capriles, López, and Machado.

The common interest in advancing the opposition’s cause among these three candidates persisted throughout the primary elections—and it was noticeable. The strength of their alliance was heavily underscored when López, already considered by many to be a rival of Capriles, withdrew from the race to endorse Capriles one month before the election.[7] Capriles won in the primary but lost the October 2012 presidential election against Chávez by a significant 11-point margin.

Despite the visible unity during parliamentary elections, Capriles’ strategy contained undertones of what would later grow into tensions within the opposition. Specifically, Capriles limited criticism of Chávez or Bolivarian socialism, and he vowed to maintain the missions, albeit without the adjunct political and ideological features, if elected. Capriles chose not to criticize Chávez on grounds of ideology or policy, only emphasizing that Chávez’s health problems kept him from walking and talking with the people (he was diagnosed with cancer the previous year). [8] Capriles also tried to eclipse the president’s populism by parading himself as a youthful alternative to an ailing Chávez—but not to a dying Chavismo. Whether or not López and Machado recognized the implications of Capriles’ strategy in 2012 is unknown; however, it was widely acknowledged that Capriles was seeking to appropriate features of Chávez’s image, warranting the withdrawal of support from opposition leader Aldo Cermeno, a former governor and leader of Copei, who called Capriles a “photocopy” of Chávez.[9] Nonetheless, Capriles’ blatant populism was undoubtedly an early seed that would later rupture the opposition’s unity.

Chávez’s death in March 2013 was a pivotal event for MUD, which was hoping to see a subsequent change in Venezuela’s political tides. In April 2013, vice president Nicolás Maduro, chosen as Chávez’s successor, ran against Capriles, winning the election by an extraordinarily narrow margin of only 1.6 percent.[10]

The tightness of the election paired with Maduro’s general inability to imitate Chávez’s charisma and popularity instilled renewed confidence in Capriles and his followers in MUD. Machado demonstrated her support for Capriles as the face of opposition electoral politics by accompanying him on a trip to Europe and—without a single shred of evidence—accusing the National Electoral Council of Venezuela (CNE) of carrying out a fraudulent election. In a display of solidarity, Machado told Spanish online newspaper Libertad Digital that, despite losing the vote, “everyone knows Capriles is the legitimate president of Venezuela.”[11] The CNE performed an audit of every ballot box and found that the elections were legitimate. However, the result of the audit was not significant to Capriles or Machado domestically; instead it brought a surge of international attention for Capriles and prompted a dialogue in the corporate media surrounding the mistakes and corruption of the Venezuelan government.[12] The major Latin American and Caribbean associations, however, generally backed the legitimacy of the April 2013 elections.

2013 Municipal Elections: Decay

The municipal elections on December 8, 2013 were the last instance of oppositional unity. Still claiming to have held the majority in April’s presidential election, Capriles had faith in his own popularity.[13] Enhancing this confidence, President Maduro, who had inherited an already troubled economy, had not significantly improved Venezuela’s financial situation, which included (and still includes) shortages, inflation, and a vast black market for U.S. dollars. Beaming with confidence, Capriles declared that the municipal elections would be a plebiscite on Maduro and the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), the party of Chavismo.

However, Capriles’ confidence turned out to be a great show of hubris. Capriles inaptly stated that the plebiscite on Maduro reminded him of the one against Chilean military dictator Augusto Pinochet.[14] The contradictions of this comparison were a mere reflection of Capriles’ miscalculation of his own impending political destiny. The outcome of the municipal elections was a loss for Capriles and MUD in more ways than one. First, the Great Patriotic Pole (GPP; Gran Polo Patriótico), the alliance of Chavista parties, won 256 municipalities, while MUD won only 81. Thus, Chavismo saw a victory of 72 percent, almost three quarters of the country’s municipalities.[15] Moreover, the PSUV alone was the leading party, winning 240 of the 256 municipalities. Indeed, Capriles’ call for a plebiscite failed him; out of the total ballots cast, the PSUV won 49 percent, compared to 43 percent by MUD. The fact that the margin of Maduro’s victory had risen from 1.6 percent in April to six percent in December meant the opposition had undeniably lost the plebiscite.[16] MUD’s defeat in December 2013 was the climax of opposition politics, as the regional elections were an ultimatum López and Machado placed on Capriles. Capriles’ multifaceted loss was also, in the eyes of hardliners, his failure to justify his inclination towards an electoral strategy, and the election marked a distinct rupture in the alliance between Capriles, López, and Machado. The executive secretary of the MUD resigned and the coalition fell into disarray.

La Salida and Capriles’ Populism

If the municipal elections of 2013 fostered a turning point in opposition politics and a break in oppositional unity, then La Salida (“the Exit”) was part of the fallout from this break. Beginning as a student movement and endorsed by López and Machado, La Salida called for the early exit of Maduro from power. More radical anti-government protesters, however, took to engaging in a series of violent protests and street barricades throughout the first quarter of 2014. The violence left 43 people dead, some at the hands of government forces.[17]

Although Capriles attended some of the protests, he did not endorse the movement, criticizing López and Machado for creating “unrealistic expectations” and urging the opposition not to engage in violence.[18] Capriles’ lack of endorsement for La Salida was a concrete example of strategic disputes between Capriles and some of his MUD counterparts.

Another comment by Capriles was even more telling. He stated that La Salida had mobilized the middle class and students, but “by necessity” the movement “must include the popular sectors,” referring to the poor and working classes that make up the majority of Venezuelans.[19] In saying this, Capriles most likely knew that the popular sectors, which were deeply suspicious of La Salida, had been the steady base of Chavista power for over a decade. Capriles sought to tap into that massive power base, hoping to accomplish what Chávez had done: win an election by popular vote.

A clear dialectical relationship exists between these two wings of the opposition: the more extreme López and Machado appear for advocating Maduro’s “exit,” the more compromising Capriles becomes. The prime example of this relationship is López’s arrest during the early stages of anti-government street protest. Charged with inciting violence during the protests, López was arrested on February 12, 2014 and was taken to prison, thus assuming the image, among his supporters, of a silenced political prisoner and martyr. Initially, Capriles remained in solidarity with López by boycotting a requested national dialogue with Maduro that would try to quell political unrest.[20] Even though this boycott was a reaction to López’s imprisonment, by April 2014, López was still in jail as Capriles sat down with Maduro for a dialogue.[21]

The outcome of Capriles’ change of heart, on balance, was probably good for his political image—which was becoming an increasingly populist one. To many viewers, Capriles’ participation in the talks seemed like a difficult compromise. Moreover, the strategy of violent street barricades was not a crowd-pleaser. According to a poll by Hinterlaces, 73 percent of Venezuelans interviewed rejected this strategy, and 78 percent of the same group believed that those who instigated the violence should be held accountable by authorities.[22] In addition, subsequent to the dialogue, tensions sharply reduced on the streets. In total, Capriles may have looked like the moderate and sensible populist politician whose performance could realistically surpass that of Maduro. More importantly, Capriles could overshadow Machado—who had been stripped of her seat in the National Assembly only weeks before the talks and was barred from holding office on July 15 of this year—as well as López—who remains in jail over a year after the dialogue started.[23]

Divisions Intensify

The year 2015 has marked a deepening conflict. According to Bloomberg Business, Capriles called for a unified opposition in January, saying, “We may not coincide in how to confront the government, but we are in agreement that we want the country to change and the government to change.” Admitting that divisions within the opposition stem from disputes over strategy, Capriles went on to add that such change must come through constitutional means, upholding the same position that inspired his abstention from La Salida.[24]

However, Capriles’ plea for unification and constitutional tactics was in stark contrast with the concurrent agendas of López and Machado. With López still in jail and awaiting trial, López and Machado joined Antonio Ledezma, mayor of Caracas and fellow opposition politician, in signing a document entitled the “National Agreement for Transition,” which was to be released on February 12.[25] Though the document itself is principally symbolic and arguably ambiguous in its implications, Ledezma’s alliance with López and Machado was significant, emphasizing the growing distance between VP and MUD.

Additionally, the public statement came only 24 hours prior to government reports of a coup plot; Ledezma was arrested shortly after on charges of sedition and conspiracy.[26] While the government has aired video, audio, and other evidence of the plot, some opponents of the government deny the conspiracy ever took place. Whatever the truth is surrounding the reported coup plot, it had the effect of widening the gap between Capriles and VP.

Divisions were epitomized on May 30, when López began a hunger strike from prison and called for a peaceful street protest to demand the release of political prisoners. An estimated two to three thousand protestors convened (some estimates are significantly higher), gathering around Machado and López’s wife, Lilian Tintori, to display their discontent with the current government and their solidarity with Leopoldo Lopez.[27]

However, while Capriles said he planned to attend, MUD did not endorse this demonstration for reasons that were solely “logistical and technical,” as Executive Secretary Jesús Torrealba told CNN.[28] MUD also released a public statement urging the opposition not to call for protests abruptly but to channel the population’s discontent into more organic political mobilization. Moreover, MUD emphasized the polarizing nature of this march and the damaging effect it would have on the outcome of the parliamentary elections, stating that the “road [to change] is electoral” and that “unity is mandatory.” The letter also included a backhanded criticism of López’ singular, martyr-like image, declaring, “not one organization nor one leader is more important than the people united and mobilized.”[29] This letter and MUD’s abstention clearly and palpably indicated these divisions. Although Torrealba’s letter portrayed the march as divisive, it incited anger among opposition supporters who felt that MUD should have been less critical and supported the hunger strike.

Capriles the Chavista?

To revisit the interview with El País, Capriles revealed more than just his cognizance of disunity within the opposition and the necessity of reunification in order to “obtain an electoral victory.” He also expressed the culminating product of the dialectical struggle between two vying strategies, with Capriles’ opting for a more moderate and pragmatic approach and López and Machado pursuing a hard line that has marginalized them within the country.

The interview began with a discussion about the recent visit of Felipe González, former president of Spain, to Venezuela to meet with opposition leaders, including López. After commending González for his sophisticated speech on diplomacy and freedom, Capriles asserted that he “maintains permanent communication with González.” However, in spite of this close relationship, Capriles said that to those in the Valle del Tuy, referring to a vast portion of Venezuela’s popular class, González “represents nothing.” Capriles, in turn, revealed that as an opposition politician he distinguishes himself not only from González but also from López and Machado, and that this distinction comes from his consideration of the interests of the poor and working classes of Venezuela. “I am not rightwing,” Capriles stated, assuring that “there will never be a rightwing government” in Venezuela, and that he is “concerned that there is an opposition that does not intend to turn around and consider the poor.”

The interview was not the first instance of Capriles stressing the need to continue to enfranchise Venezuela’s poor and working classes (this dialogue was already seen during the months of La Salida), but it did indicate a bold evolution of Capriles’ stated intention to build a base of support among the popular sectors. This time, Capriles’ words went so far as to reveal a key component of his political strategy. When asked if he would negotiate with President Maduro, Capriles began to underline his political pragmatism, stating that “Chavismo is a political reality” that cannot simply be repudiated. Capriles then went on to stress a theme he launched during his last bid for president, declaring, “The Chavista people is one thing, and Maduro is another. In my opinion, Maduro does not represent the Chavistas.” Without associating himself with Chavismo entirely, Capriles deliberately separated his opposition to the Maduro government from an outright and total rejection of Chávez and Bolivarian socialism. Capriles apparently aims to tap into a fresher and larger base of power by appealing to the moderate opposition and independents, Venezuelans who are committed to the electoral process (and thus are alienated by the tactics of López and Machado), and even those who traditionally vote Chavista but are disillusioned with Bolivarian project and are not satisfied with Maduro’s handling of the economic crisis.

Moreover, Capriles is well aware that his populism can never overshadow that of Chávez; as the Venezuelan political and social analyst and pollster Oscar Schemel of Hinterlaces points out, the culture and symbols of Chavismo now dominate the vast portion of Venezuelan society. Therefore, attempting to drive a wedge between Maduro and Chavismo is part of Capriles’ attempt to gain the support of the majority of Venezuelans and separate himself from traditionally anti-Bolivarian and anti-Chávez opposition figures. Capriles has definitely begun to execute this plan. Through the strategy of VP’s wing of the opposition—namely, agitation in the streets to call for an “exit” of Maduro from office—López and Machado have emerged as darlings of the Western corporate media and garnered support from a number of human rights organizations. López’s imprisonment has inspired a plethora of support in the form of Twitter hashtags and solidarity marches. However, the duo has failed to produce this enchanting effect within the Latin American nation, and they have yet to represent a viable option for Venezuelans who wish to see constitutional change through democratic procedures. By pursuing La Salida instead of waiting for Venezuelans to cast their ballots, the hardline right has painted itself into a political corner. In contrast, rather than becoming an international icon, Capriles has chosen to remain grounded inside Venezuela and make serious efforts to appeal to the popular mass of voting Venezuelans.

Simultaneously, Capriles faces his own hindrances; he is stuck in limbo in terms of class-based support. His background—his origins from one of the wealthiest families in Venezuela and his early efforts to undermine the Bolivarian process—will always limit the possibility of poor and working-class Venezuelans identifying with him. Moreover, the middle class, who once supported Capriles and constituted his base of power during the 2012 primary elections, has watched the politician’s inconsistent transition into populism, and some of these constituents may no longer feel represented by Capriles, questioning whether or not he is a genuine threat to Maduro or Chavismo.

Nonetheless, it is unclear how far Capriles has distanced himself from his neoliberal and conservative roots, especially in light of his economic plan released on July 14. Presenting the measures he would take to mend the economy, Capriles announced his plan to return inoperative expropriated businesses to their original owners (a regression from the point of view of the Bolivarian process), in addition to increasing worker salaries by 50 percent.[30]

In summary, neither Capriles and MUD nor López and Machado have yet to take advantage of the Venezuelan people’s mounting discontent. Divisions within the MUD have already begun to jeopardize the opposition’s political power, causing the coalition to lose positions in the National Assembly. Ricardo Sánchez, former opposition member and substitute legislator for Machado, is critical of the opposition and has recently joined a new, pro-Chavista party called the Alianza para el Cambio (Alliance for Change).[31] On August 3, President Maduro welcomed Sánchez and two other former opposition activists onto the GPP’s ballot for this year’s parliamentary elections, appearing to use the ineptitudes of the coalition as a motive to recruit former opposition supporters, particularly youth and women, who have been “neglected and discriminated against” by MUD.[32] With a strong showing by the PSUV in their primaries and revelations of new divisions with the temporary exclusion of Copei from MUD, the opposition’s prospects in the upcoming December 6 parliamentary elections are not very bright. Yet at the same time, the dwindling patience of the base of support for Maduro in the face of persistent shortages of basic goods could also be a game-changer. Venezuela is at a crossroads. As Oscar Schemel of Hinterlaces explains, “The balance of power now lies between Chavismo and the vote of discontent”—but discontent does not equate to a vote for the opposition.[33]

*Emma Scully and Daniel A. Tovar, Research Associates at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[1]http://internacional.elpais.com/internacional/2015/06/13/actualidad/1434150800_150794.html

[2] Salas, Miguel Tinker. Venezuela: What Everyone Needs to Know. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2014),169.

[3] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/01/us-venezuela-election-capriles-idUSBRE83008Y20120401

[4] http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/americas/venezuela/120209/henrique-capriles-opposition-venezuela-primary-chavez

[5] http://static.eluniversal.com/2012/01/23/lineamientosmesaunidad.pdf, http://www.talcualdigital.com/Nota/66059/De-Oposicion-A-Unidad

[6] http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7248

[7] http://www.buenosairesherald.com/article/90828/venezuelas-l%C3%B3pez-pulls-out-of-presidential-race

[8] http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/01/us-venezuela-election-capriles-idUSBRE83008Y20120401

[9] http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/7296

[10] http://www.coha.org/the-municipal-elections-in-venezuela-as-a-plebiscite-on-chavismo/

[11] http://www.libertaddigital.com/internacional/latinoamerica/2013-07-06/maria-corina-machado-todos-sabemos-que-henrique-capriles-es-el-presidente-legitimo-de-venezuela-1276494592/

[12] http://www.coha.org/the-municipal-elections-in-venezuela-as-a-plebiscite-on-chavismo/

[13] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130810/capriles-insiste-en-que-el-8d-tiene-que-convertirse-en-un-plebiscito

[14] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/130723/capriles-hears-testimonies-about-how-chileans-defeated-pinochet

[15] http://eltiempo.com.ve/venezuela/elecciones-municipales/psuv-gano-7164-de-municipios-pero-tiene-23-alcaldias-menos/117958

[16] http://www.coha.org/the-municipal-elections-in-venezuela-as-a-plebiscite-on-chavismo/

[17] http://www.cepr.net/blogs/the-americas-blog/venezuela-who-are-they-and-how-did-they-die-new

[18] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140217/capriles-aseguro-que-la-salida-creo-expectativas-que-no-son-reales

[19] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/140217/capriles-aseguro-que-la-salida-creo-expectativas-que-no-son-reales

[20] http://www.dw.com/en/venezuelas-capriles-rejects-national-dialogue-with-maduro/a-17454732

[21] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-26985114

[22] http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/10679

[23] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150715/comptroller-general-machados-disqualification-is-administrative-in-nat

[24] http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-01-14/capriles-calls-for-united-venezuela-opposition-as-crisis-deepens

[25] http://www.eluniversal.com/nacional-y-politica/150212/venezuelan-dissenters-issue-national-agreement-for-transition

[26] http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11238

[27] http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/27/jailed-venezuelan-leader-street-protest-divided-opposition-leopoldo-lopez; http://www.wsj.com/articles/venezuelas-opposition-supporters-protest-government-1433019209

[28] http://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2015/05/28/mud-no-apoya-marcha-convocada-por-leopoldo-lopez-por-cuestiones-logisticas/

[29] https://www.google.com/search?q=translate&oq=translate&aqs=chrome..69i57j69i60j0l4.630j0j7&sourceid=chrome&es_sm=119&ie=UTF-8

[30] http://runrun.es/nacional/venezuela-2/212841/capriles-explico-su-plan-economico-aqui-un-resumen-en-10-puntos.html

[31] http://www.aporrea.org/actualidad/n275132.html

[32] http://venezuelanalysis.com/news/11463; http://www.noticias24.com/venezuela/noticia/291361/ricardo-sanchez-avelino-alvarez-y-carlos-vargas-se-unen-a-las-filas-del-gpp-anuncio-maduro/

[33] http://www.hinterlaces.com/analisis/politica/oscar-schemel-describe-los-principales-factores-politicos-de-2015

By Daniel Kochis*

While Moscow’s aggressive actions have changed the way many in NATO view the threat posed by Russia, NATO’s eastern members have long considered Russia an existential threat and have planned accordingly. Poland, because of its large size, geographic location, and historical experience has become the lynchpin of security in Eastern Europe since joining NATO in 1999.

The U.S. can and should do more to assist Poland in building strong defense capabilities, improving interoperability, and increasing political willingness to use its influence to improve security in the Alliance. It’s also vital that the upcoming NATO summit, which will be held in Poland in July 2016, sees real improvement in the capabilities of the Alliance.

Geographically Important

Poland is situated in the center of Europe, sharing a border with four NATO allies, as well as a long border with Belarus and Ukraine, and a 144-mile border with Russia alongside the Kaliningrad Oblast. Poland is the only NATO member state with a land border to the Baltic states. Poland’s 65-mile border with Lithuania, as well as Polish ports and airspace, will prove vitally important should the Baltics come under attack. According to reports, NATO contingency plans for liberating the Baltic states, codenamed Eagle Guardian, call for heavy reliance on Polish troops and ports,[1] which has made some in Warsaw fearful about their own defense in such a scenario.[2]

In June 2015 in the town of Nowa Sól, the local government removed a memorial to the brotherhood in arms of Polish and Soviet soldiers during WWII, which led to warnings of “most negative consequences”from Russia.[3]

The Poles know from experience not to consider Russian threats to be empty. The best way to alleviate Polish concerns is for the U.S. to show a renewed commitment to NATO with a permanent and robust presence in Europe. NATO contingency plans must address the risk posed by Kaliningrad and Belarus to Poland. These plans must be frequently put to the test in exercises with strong U.S. participation.

A Net Security Provider

In Independence, Missouri, on March 12, 1999, Polish foreign minister Bronislaw Geremek spoke at Poland’s accession ceremony to NATO, promising that “we will not lack the determination, courage, and imagination, needed to reinforce our own capability as a member of the Alliance.”[4] Poland has made good on that promise, spending 1.8 percent of GDP in 2014 on defense expenditures, a figure that is expected to grow to 2.2 percent by the end of this year. Additionally, Poland has served and sacrificed side by side with the U.S., losing 44 soldiers in Afghanistan and 23 in Iraq. Poland currently retains 150 troops in Afghanistan under NATO’s Operation Resolute Support.

Poland spends a greater percentage of its defense budget on actual equipment (31.1 percent) than any NATO member except Luxembourg and double the NATO average (15.3 percent). Poland plans to spend $42 billion in the next decade to upgrade its military capabilities, including its submarine fleet, helicopters, missile defense systems, and armored personnel carriers. The U.S. should welcome the new Polish investments and maximize their interoperability with U.S. and NATO capabilities.

Ties with U.S.: Growing, But Permanence Needed

In April 2014, in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the U.S. deployed 150 temporary troops to the Baltic states and Poland. In June 2015, the U.S. announced a temporary pre-positioning of 250 tanks, Bradley fighting vehicles, and artillery across six NATO member states including Poland. While the U.S. has operated a small aviation detachment in Poland since November 2012, in 2014, the U.S. temporarily deployed F-16s to Lask Air Base and 12 U.S. A-10 Warthogs to a Polish air base in Łódź. Finally from March 20 to April 1, 2015, 400 American soldiers and 100 vehicles marched miles across Eastern Europe, including Poland, in a show of resolve named Operation Dragoon Ride.

In the European Command’s 2015 Posture Statement, the commander of U.S. forces in Europe, General Philip Breedlove, stated: “Our permanent presence also allows us to maximize the military capabilities of our Allies. Permanently stationed forces are a force multiplier that rotational deployments can never match.”[5] While the new temporary deployments are a welcome step in the right direction, the U.S. should permanently station troops and equipment in Poland.

The Way Ahead

Poland is the lynchpin of security in Eastern Europe and a vital ally deserving full U.S. support. In the year leading up to the 2016 NATO Summit, the U.S. should:

• Work on making the upcoming Warsaw Summit a success. As NATO focuses again on collective security, it is only fitting that Poland will host the next NATO summit in July 2016. The U.S. should work with Poland to lay the groundwork now for a successful summit that includes enlargement and fulfillment of promises made at Wales in 2014.
• Improve interoperability. The U.S. should encourage frequent NATO exercises, including scenarios that take into account the specific risks that Kaliningrad and Belarus could pose to Poland in the event of a Russian attack. The U.S. should practice robust and consistent participation in NATO exercises.
• Station U.S. troops in Poland permanently. The rotational and temporary deployments of U.S. assets are a step in the right direction. However, only a robust, permanent presence will show long-term resolve on the part of the United States to help defend its NATO ally. The U.S. must also invest in Host Nation Support for Poland, which will be critical in the event of a Russian attack on the Baltic states.
• Allow Poland to join the Visa Waiver Program (VWP). Allowing Poland to join the VWP will send a strong message that the U.S. stands with the Poles on strengthening security on both sides of the Atlantic while gaining diplomatic, economic, and security benefits. Poland, one of only seven NATO allies who have not yet been admitted to the VWP, should not be automatically disqualified because its visa-refusal rate is above 3 percent.
• Support the Military Police (MP) Center of Excellence (COE). Poland is home to the NATO Military Police COE, whose mission is to improve the MP capability of the member nations, and to improve interoperability. The U.S. should actively participate in the COE.
• Lift energy export restrictions. Russia supplies around 60 percent of Polish natural gas imports and 91 percent of oil imports. A new supply of liquid natural gas (LNG) and oil from the United States, combined with the newly built LNG terminal at Świnoujście and the Gas Interconnection Poland–Lithuania (GIPL), a natural gas pipeline between Lithuania and Poland expected to be completed in 2019, will help decrease Polish dependence on Russian energy.
• Speed up the implementation of a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. The threat of ballistic missiles from Iran or Russia has only increased. The U.S. should deploy a layered, comprehensive missile defense system in Europe, while also supporting efforts by Poland to increase its own BMD capabilities.
• Promote the export of battle-tested U.S. defense equipment. The U.S. should, when appropriate, promote the export of U.S. defense equipment to Poland. When a government buys American military equipment it not only receives battle-tested equipment, it also gains a deeper military relationship with the U.S.

Conclusion

Poland has invested in hard military capabilities and has shown a serious commitment to collective defense, becoming a key security contributor within NATO. The Poles have shown themselves deserving of U.S. political and military support. By assisting Poland, the U.S. can advance security in Europe while helping Poland take on a larger leadership role within the Alliance.

About the author:
*Daniel Kochis is a Research Associate in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for National Security and Foreign Policy, at The Heritage Foundation.

Source:
This article was published by The Heritage Foundation.

Notes:
[1] Ian Traynor, “WikiLeaks Cables Reveal Secret Nato Plans to Defend Baltics from Russia,” The Guardian, December 6, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/dec/06/wikileaks-cables-nato-russia-baltics (accessed August 11, 2015).

[2] Edward Lucas, “The Coming Storm,” Center for European Policy Analysis, June 2015, p. 8, http://www.cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20%282%29.compressed.pdf (accessed August 11, 2015).

[3] Marcin Goettig and Polina Devitt, “Russia Outraged by Poland’s Removal of Soviet War Memorial,” Reuters, July 4, 2015, http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/07/04/us-russia-poland-monument-idUSKCN0PE0H220150704 (accessed August 11, 2015).

[4] Bronislaw Geremek, address delivered at the ceremony of deposition of Protocols of Accession, Independence, MO, March 12, 1999, http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1999/s990312d.htm (accessed August 11, 2015).

[5] U.S. European Command, “Posture Statement,” 2015, http://ww.eucom.mil/mission/background/posture-statement (accessed August 12, 2015).

Prior to the advent of human-caused global warming in the 19th century, the surface layer of Earth’s oceans had undergone 1,800 years of a steady cooling trend, according to a new study. During the latter half of this cooling period, the trend was most likely driven by large and frequent volcanic eruptions.

An international team of researchers reported these findings in the August 17, 2015 issue of the journal Nature Geoscience. The study also indicates that the coolest temperatures occurred during the Little Ice Age–a period that spanned the 16th through 18th centuries and was known for cooler average temperatures over land.

The concurrence of cooling events on both land and sea suggests that a global cooling phenomenon was erased by subsequent human-caused global warming.

“Today, the Earth is warming about 20 times faster than it cooled during the past 1,800 years,” said Michael Evans, second author of the study and an associate professor in the University of Maryland’s Department of Geology and Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center (ESSIC). “This study truly highlights the profound effects we are having on our climate today.”

Compared to the atmosphere, the oceans can absorb much more heat and trap it for longer periods of time. Thus the ocean can buffer short-term changes in global temperature. But when events such as volcanic eruptions cluster together in a relatively short period of time, the temperature changes can become prolonged.

“Volcanic eruptions have a short-term cooling effect on the atmosphere, but our results showed that when volcanic eruptions occurred more frequently, there was long-term ocean cooling,” said lead author Helen McGregor, an Australian Research Council (ARC) Future Fellow at the University of Wollongong in Australia. “With this research, we now have new insight into the century-scale global sea-surface temperature variations that came before man-made greenhouse gas forcing.”

The scientists are the first to combine 57 previously published marine surface temperature reconstructions that cover all of the world’s oceans, from near-polar to tropical regions. The team compiled the data within 200-year brackets to observe long-term trends, and then compared the findings to land-based reconstructions, which revealed similar cooling trends.

“No matter how we divided the data set, the cooling trend stands out as a robust signal,” McGregor said.

To investigate the cause of the cooling trend, the researchers turned to climate models. They examined how sea-surface temperatures reacted to various “forcing” factors, such as changes in solar output, Earth’s orbit, land use, volcanic activity and greenhouse gases. Only volcanic events resulted in a cooling trend that matched the team’s real-world observations.

Understanding how forcing factors changed ocean temperatures in the past can open a window into future climate change.

“Model simulations by others have shown us that the oceans can impart a substantial delay in the warming of the surface climate,” said Evans, who is also the lead of the Ocean2k working group of the Past Global Changes (PAGES) program. “With much of the heat from global warming entering our oceans, recent ocean surface warming may foreshadow additional future warming, in the same way ocean cooling appeared as a long-term response to large and frequent volcanic events in recent centuries.”

“We are still learning how the oceans mediate climate variations,” Evans added. “Further work combining both observations and simulations of ocean climate will refine our understanding of the ocean’s role in climate change.”

When the jar holding sustenance civic-water is broken, fragmented in countless small pieces, it seems foolish to waste time seeking superglue to put it back together. We would be wiser instead to acknowledge and accept the loss and, without delay or commiserating on all possible reasons for our misfortune, revisit our pottery skills and create a vessel to keep us from political dehydration… before it’s too late.

And that’s precisely what has happened to our political jar held by politicians of the two parties ruling the land; politicians mimicking ideals of conservatism and liberalism, but jointly exploding democracy to smithereens for their selfish, personal benefit… which entails selling their services, openly and unashamedly, to a small ruling elite of both domestic and extra-national special interests.

Enter Lawrence Lessig, professor of Law at Harvard; a multi-talented, multi-honored true visionary who acknowledges we don’t have a representative democracy in America today… and that our system has been corrupted and it is now the problem. A week ago, he brought up the possibility… no, the probability, of entering the presidential race with a unique and simple platform of fundamental change that would take money out of American politics, fixing – one would hope constitutionally, by amendment – a rigged system. This rigged system is not just poisonous for the citizenry of America but, given this nation’s multi-faceted influence in the world, also destructive to the economic, civic and peaceful wellbeing of the entire planet.

We wholeheartedly agree with Lessig that we do not have a representative democracy in America today, no matter the romantic and patriotic notions that many of us might have. The system, our system, has become the problem and we are in need of drastic, fundamental change. Congress is definitely an integral part of the problem, and the professor’s idea of building a mandate to force change peacefully via a “referendum president” not only makes sense but clears a path for democracy to take an evolutionary course in effecting consensus achieving all types of change: civic (racial), economic, and most definitely political; change obtained in democratic agreement without the uncertainty of what a second American revolution might bring the nation: perhaps social justice, but also the possibility of a dictatorship.

The simplicity, yet potential efficacy, of this referendum presidency offers promise to the concept that reform must be at the head of any presidential candidate’s list of needs/changes, not at the end. And that, in fact, that list at this moment of democratic struggle might be best if just carrying a single issue, not a dozen of them… an issue that at this critical stage would unify us all: Reform – divorcing money from politicians and politics. Lessig is providing at this time a macro approach to running for the presidency, and much operational work needs to be done to make things clear. For starters, credibility for such lofty undertaking should not be under the auspices of either the Tweedledee (Democratic) or the Tweedledum (Republican) parties, or credibility would not be there. An independent, reform party would be force majeure to show fairness and have a chance to succeed, even if drafted for a specific purpose and duration – in this case probably best if projected for dissolution within the elective 4-year term.

As for the candidacy to the presidency: Lawrence Lessig, unquestionably.

Logically, for a single term of non-partisan politics in order to cement “an equality of citizens,” as Lessig states, and what some might interpret as the return of the US prodigal democracy to Washington. Politics of the Right, or the Left, or the Center would then resume… but cleansed from inequality in voting, the tainting by special interests’ money, and the undemocratic perversion created by gerrymandering.

Obviously the task at hand, to be realistic and honest, will require a financial effort that will need far more a million dollars in seed money. My humble suggestion to Lessig is that if he’s serious in his personal quest, which I am convinced he is, he extends the period in which to declare his candidacy from Labor Day to Thanksgiving, forgetting about this first phase of the primaries’ cycle and, most definitely, not under the tent of either the GOP or the Democratic Party. And to retain credibility, perhaps refrain from splurging any admiration for candidates… more specifically, Bernie Sanders.

We don’t know whether there is a donor, patron, benefactor, or protector of American democratic politics out there in billionaire-land, but the country, not just the professor, could sure use the financial help to foot the enormous bill. Someone who in humble silence now, although honored by history later, would become a sponsor of democracy, a Mecenas of Greco-Roman extraction, financially helping Lessig with a dream, a dream that it’s also ours: we who believe in a government of the people, by the people and for the people.

Run, Larry, run…

Desserts that stimulate digestion through biotechnology strengthen the immune system, prevent the development of respiratory and intestinal diseases or benefit people with cancer are some examples of the functional food produced by the Mexican company Kuragobiotek, taken to the market through their own system of management technology.

Tasty food that provides a health benefit is the philosophy of the company, which through partnerships with various institutions such as the Center for Advanced Technology (CIATEQ), the University of Guadalajara and the laboratory More Pharma has achieved to position in the market functional foods supported by scientific research.

The engineer Antonio Cruz Serrano, director of the company, commented that they produced a mango jelly that is beneficial for people with cancer. It functions as a probiotic and prebiotic that contains agave inulin and generates metabolites markers which modulate important components, such as interleukin, involved in the elimination of cancer cells during radiotherapy.

The work at CIATEQ was to perform in vitro testing of potential products, while the research protocol is carried out in specialized hospitals like the National Cancer Institute that works in with women who have cervical cancer.

Moreover, the reason why they have positioned themselves in the market with this type of product is because a technology management model that performs monitoring, planning, and empowerment of all the projects with a scientific basis in order to introduce them successfully into the market of functional foods, ensuring its acceptance among the buyers.

Another product that has been consolidated in the market from this management model is called Nutrigel gelatin, which is made from fish oils and probiotics. Like all Kuragobiotek food, it has the support of the biotechnology sector.

From their scientific and technological research and its system of management, Kuragobiotek won the National Prize for Technology and Innovation 2014.

It was recently introduced to the market a digestive gel that generates a continuous flow, which is ideal for lactose-intolerant people. It is sold next to the yogurt and milk products in the supermarkets and pharmacies of Guadalajara.

Another product that is already marketed, is a custard that was incorporated to the dining menu of a factory in Guadalajara. The director has proven the effectiveness of using biotechnology, in order to significantly reduce the number of occupational disabilities as a result of stomach and respiratory diseases.

In this case the effectiveness of the dessert was proved by recording that employees were not ill with gastrointestinal or respiratory problems during the time they consumed the food, which stimulates the immune system.

In the future, a line of foods for diabetics will be launched, containing anti inflammation and detoxification cycles ideal to manage weight and regenerate cartilage. This alliance was made with a group of industrialists of the state of Guanajuato, in Mexico.

Source: Agencia ID

An estimated half-a-million children with disabilities have been shut out of South Africa’s education system, Human Rights Watch said in a report released today at a joint event with South Africa’s Human Rights Commission.

The 94-page report, “‘Complicit in Exclusion’: South Africa’s Failure to Guarantee Inclusive Education for Children with Disabilities,” found that South Africa has failed to guarantee the right to education for many of the country’s children and young adults due to widespread discrimination against children with disabilities in enrollment decisions. Human Rights Watch research in five out of South Africa’s nine provinces showed that children with disabilities face discriminatory physical and attitudinal barriers, often beginning early in children’s lives when government officials classify them according to their disabilities.

“The South African government needs to admit that it is not providing quality education to all of its children – in fact, no schooling at all to many who have disabilities,” said Elin Martínez, children’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch, and author of the report. “The job is not done until all children count just the same in the education system.”

Although the government claims it has achieved the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of enrolling all children in primary schools by 2015, Human Rights Watch found that in reality across South Africa, many children with disabilities are not in school.

In 2007, South Africa was one of the first countries to ratify the UN Disability Rights Treaty, which requires the government to promote an inclusive education system. Such systems are designed to ensure that all children learn together and acquire the same skills on an equal basis, that barriers to learning are removed, and that children with disabilities get adequate support to prevent them from falling behind.

The government has had a policy since 2001 to end the exclusion of children with disabilities from the country’s schools and to provide education for all children in inclusive schools. But the government has not yet put into operation fundamental aspects of the policy. Among other things, the government uses the majority of its already limited resources for learners with disabilities for special schools, to the detriment of inclusive education.

An estimated half-a-million children with disabilities have been shut out of South Africa’s education system.

Contrary to the government’s international and national obligations, many children are turned away from mainstream schools and referred to special schools by school officials or medical staff simply because they have a disability. The referrals system needlessly forces children to wait for up to four years at care centers or at home for placement in a special school.

A lack of understanding of children’s disabilities and a lack of adequate teacher training means that many teachers and school officials do not know how to work with children with disabilities in classrooms, Human Rights Watch found. In some cases, children suffered physical violence and neglect in schools.

Ouster of Shwe Mann suggests that Myanmar’s military leaders are in control, setting strict limits on reforms.

By Bertil Lintner*

The sudden removal of one of Myanmar’s most powerful men sent shockwaves through the diplomatic community in the old capital of Yangon, where foreign embassies are still located. It seemed more like a midnight coup than an ordinary leadership reshuffle – security forces in the new capital, Naypyidaw, entered the headquarters of the de facto ruling party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party, or USDP, late August 12. The following day, it was announced that Shwe Mann, the speaker of the Lower House of Myanmar’s bicameral parliament, a former general and anticipated by some foreign observers to be the country’s next president, had been ousted.

Despite the drama, his removal reconfirmed the widely held belief that the country’s military is not about to relinquish real power. The power shift in Naypyidaw is also unlikely to change the big powers’ attitudes towards the military in Myanmar.

Parliamentary elections are scheduled for November 8. Early next year, an electoral college consisting of elected parliamentarians along with army officers will select the head of state of a country. After decades under solid military rule, Myanmar is supposedly edging towards a more democratic order. For many Western pundits, Shwe Mann was the favorite for the post, regarded as a “bridge” between the junta that had ruled the country until elections were held in November 2010 and the quasi-civilian government that took over in March 2011 as well as the democratic forces headed by the main opposition leader, Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi.

Before becoming parliamentary speaker, Shwe Mann was considered the third most powerful man in the then-ruling junta. As a nominally civilian parliamentarian, he was often seen with Aung San Suu Kyi and began speaking in favor of reforms aimed at limiting the power of the military. Myanmar’s constitution was drafted under military supervision and adopted in 2008 after a referendum dismissed by most observers as fraudulent. Under the constitution, the military holds 25 percent of all seats in the parliament and regional assemblies. Since major changes in the constitution’s clauses require 75 percent approval, the military enjoys what amounts to veto power over any major changes in the country’s power structure.

Precisely what had made Shwe Mann popular among foreign diplomats, academics and think tanks became, in effect, the cause for his fall. A number of political reforms and seemingly liberal initiatives were introduced after the new government took over in 2011 such as the release of political prisoners, more press freedom, and the right of political parties to operate openly. Such steps were not taken because the military had little intention of giving up power. The strategy was to remain in power and, at the same time, improve the country’s image and its strained relations with the West, which had imposed sanctions on the junta for its abysmal human-rights record. During that time, Myanmar had become heavily dependent on China. Internal military documents dated as far back as 2004 suggested that the country was losing its independence to its powerful northern neighbor.

The solution was simple: make some reforms – and the West would reciprocate by welcoming Myanmar back into the international community.

The United States in particular viewed the spread of Chinese influence in Myanmar with increasing concern. The reforms provided an opportunity for Washington to normalize relations with Naypyidaw. At the end of November 2011, then–Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to the nation, the first top-level US visit in half a century. A year later, President Barack Obama traveled to Myanmar. In May 2013, Thein Sein, became the first Myanmar president to visit the United States since 1966. Relations were on track as Myanmar distanced itself from China. The US was no doubt pleased.

Before long, it became increasingly clear that Myanmar was not undergoing an organic democratic transition from military dictatorship to elected civilian rule. Newspapers and magazines were not closed, but critical journalists and editors were charged with “libel,” “defamation” and even “trespassing.” Student activists and people protesting against land seizures were thrown into jail. Some parliamentarians sought to change the constitution, but the military intervened to prevent that from happening.

Just before his second visit to Myanmar in November 2014, Obama said that Myanmar’s transition from military rule had not been as fast as hoped, and the government was “backsliding” on some reforms. Observers began to question whether Myanmar was really “backsliding” – or if the initiatives towards more openness were limited from the start.

Shwe Mann, evidently, stepped out of line by trying to go further. Long-time Myanmar observers see striking similarities between his ouster and a 2004 purge that saw the fall from grace of then prime minister and once powerful former intelligence chief Khin Nyunt. He was also a maverick. Like Shwe Mann, he amassed enormous political and economic power for himself and his family. Shwe Mann’s two sons, Aung Thet Mann and Toe Naing Mann, are prominent businessmen involved in numerous deals that certainly will come under scrutiny.

And one cannot help but wonder if Shwe Mann is really a “closet liberal” or an opportunist who, in the end, bet on the wrong horse by fraternizing with Aung San Suu Kyi? In the late 1980s, he saw combat against Karen rebels along Myanmar’s eastern border, earning the honorific title thura, or brave hero. A cable from the US embassy in Yangon dated March 15, 2007, made public by WikiLeaks, stated that he had “utilized civilian porters, including women and children, on a massive scale during operations against Karen insurgents.” The cable’s headline read “Shwe Mann: Burma’s Dictator-in-Waiting,” and outlined his military career. He was also allegedly involved in the crushing of the 2007 so-called Saffron Revolution, a democracy movement led by Buddhist monks. In November 2008, Shwe Mann led a secret military delegation to North Korea, where he signed a memorandum of understanding on military cooperation. He visited an air base, a missile factory and other defense industries near Pyongyang.

During his time in the army, Shwe Mann was a loyal officer, showing no sign of dissent. Ironically, he led the purge against Khin Nyunt and his henchmen in 2004. Now Shwe Mann’s own followers in the USDP and elsewhere may face the same fate as the former intelligence chief’s. Apart from being parliamentary speaker, Shwe Mann also led the USDP, a post now held by Htay Oo, a former major general close to Thein Sein who, in turn, has the backing of the military. The party’s General Secretary Maung Maung Thein and other Shwe Mann loyalists have also been removed. A “rejuvenated” USDP is poised to contest the November election.

These internal purges are unlikely to have much impact on Myanmar’s foreign relations. Washington may grumble, but no one there wants to push Myanmar back into China’s embrace, and China is pragmatic enough to adjust to the new realities so as not to jeopardize its fragile relations with Naypyidaw. Of special importance are gas and oil pipelines that China has built from the Bay of Bengal through Myanmar to the southern Chinese province of Yunnan. In July, Naypyidaw ratified the agreement to set up the China-led Asia Infrastructure and Investment Bank, a relationship that China won’t upset by interfering with an internal power struggle in Myanmar.

If anyone had doubts, it’s clear that the military still calls the shots in Myanmar.

*Bertil Lintner is a former correspondent with the Far Eastern Economic Review and author of several books on Burma/Myanmar, including “Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948” (published in 1994, 1999 and 2003), “Land of Jade: A Journey from India through Northern Burma to China,” and “The Kachin: Lords of Burma’s Northern Frontier.” He is currently a writer with Asia Pacific Media Services.

The United National Party led United National Front for Good Governance won the General Election in a convincing fashion, winning 93 out of the 196 seats on offer, polling a total of 5,098,927 votes.

The UNFGG won in many electorates that were UPFA bastions for many years, by huge majorities.

The UNFGG bagged 93 seats, UPFA 83, JVP four, ITAK 14, SLMC one and EPDP one. The Democratic Party of Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka failed to win a seat.

The 15th Parliament will comprise 106 members from the UNFGG with the allocation of 13 slots from the national list, while the number of UPFA members in the new Parliament will also increase up to 95 with the allocation of 12 seats from the national list.

The Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kachchi and the People’s Liberation Front will also receive two slots from the national list each. The UPFA won by slim majorities in Gampaha, Panadura, Kalutara and Dambadeniya polling divisions which were won by the party with overwhelming majorities at the last parliamentary election in 2010.

The Divulapitiya electorate was won by the UPFA by a thin majority of 3000 votes.

The UNFGG’s victory in the backdrop of a vicious and malicious campaign launched by the UPFA in connivance with other chauvinistic elements is a clear endorsement of good governance policies of the government transcending political differences.

This historic victory confounded all critics and analysts who predicted a close finish in the Parliamentary race.

The UNFGG won many bastions of the UPFA recording mind boggling majorities. The party managed to comfortably win its long standing pocket boroughs, such as Senkadagala, Mahiyangana and Colombo Central and Colombo city by huge majorities.

The UPFA also lost the Kekirawa electorate which was a stronghold of the party for years, at this election.

The UNFGG increased its vote base greatly in almost all electorates. The Front which was able to secure only two seats with 112,886 votes in the Badulla district at the last parliamentary election in 2010, managed to increase its vote base to 256,844 securing five seats.

The UPFA faced a serious setback in many electorates where they emerged victorious at the last parliamentary election in 2010.

The UPFA which polled 203, 689 votes securing six seats from the Badulla District at the 2010 General election was reduced to two seats with 179, 459 votes.
The election results are a clear endorsement of the government’s endeavour to find a long standing solution to the issues of the people in the North and East and promote reconciliation.

It is to the credit of the intelligent voters that they were not swayed by numerous promises and material benefits and were wise enough to understand the dangers inherent in handing over the reins of power to an authoritarian regime with no regard to democratic values and good governance.

Operation Fiela, a national crime blitz by the South African Police Service (SAPS) and other agencies that has netted over 9,000 suspects, has had an impact on crime over the past few months.

Major General Charl Annandale, the head of the Police’s specialised operations, said this when he briefed the Portfolio Committee on Police in Parliament, on Wednesday.

“Operations are on-going in all provinces. There is a task from the NATJOINTS [National Joint Operational and Intelligence Structure] that there should be a minimum of two operations per week per province.

“The impact that the operations are having on the crime operations is showing preliminary positive results in certain crime categories if we look at the raw data during our crime analysis,” he said.

The Major General said that between April and June 2015, 9,968 suspects were arrested across all nine provinces during operations conducted by the SAPS and joint departmental role players.

He said 3 064 arrests were made in Gauteng, 1,314 in Limpopo, 1,264 in the Western Cape, 1,225 in Mpumalanga, 916 in KwaZulu-Natal and 881 in the North West.

A further 561 suspects were arrested in raids in the Northern Cape, 460 in the Eastern Cape and 283 in the Free State.

The leading arrests, based on crime categories during this period, were traffic offences, where 3 189 people were arrested, followed by 1,017 arrests for possession of drugs.

Operations also netted 250 people for dealing in liquor, 105 for possession of firearms and 145 for assault with an intention to do grievous bodily harm.

During the national operation, 695,020 grams of dagga were seized, 1,611 grams of tik, 236 grams of heroine and 4,622 tablets of mandrax were also taken from suspects.

Annandale said a total of 102,216 persons were searched during the same period, as well as 19,305 and 21,835 vehicles.

He said on other operations conducted on 30 and 31 July, 3,050 suspects were arrested, with a bulk of those coming from Gauteng (1,211), KwaZulu-Natal (448), Free State (403) and Western Cape (379).

During this period, 30,457 searches were conducted on persons across the country, 4,130 on properties and 12,815 on vehicles.

Again, traffic offences netted the most arrests (1,088), followed by arrests relating to the possession of drugs (624), dealing in liquor (151) and assault causing grievous bodily harm (108).

Annandale said police have been tracking the progress of cases to assess the conviction rate of those that were arrested in priority areas which include, amongst others, illegal firearms, ammunition and explosives; illicit drug trafficking; contraband; liquor; second hand goods; human trafficking; prostitution; crimes against women and children; hijacking; illegal occupation of land/ buildings; defacing of historical statues and symbols; illegal businesses and trio crimes.

“We monitor the progress of the investigations and court processes on arrests made for crimes relating to the 12 priorities specifically and in that process we monitored 2,514 arrests in 2,629 cases.”

He said 1,417 of those cases are on the court roll and 284 cases have been withdrawn.

“Nine persons have been acquitted and 487 found guilty on cases ranging from illicit drug trafficking, road safety and property-related crimes,” he said.

He said the figures were accurate as at 21 July 2015.

Meanwhile, Annandale said 6,781 foreign nationals were screened during operations between April and July 2015.

He said the screening outcomes netted 84 wanted individuals, 490 individuals linked to new cases, 429 awaiting trial with no prior convictions, 691 individuals awaiting trial with prior convictions and 2 829 individuals with no convictions.

By Igor Jovanovic

Maja Kocijancic, the European Commission spokesperson, said that “in the current circumstances” a Serbian-Russian joint military exercise would “send a wrong signal”, the Belgrade-based Beta news agency reported on Tuesday.

“We expect Serbia to act in accordance with its obligations under EU accession process,” Kocijancic added.

In response, the Serbian Defence Ministry on Tuesday said it tried to run a balanced international cooperation policy in accordance with Serbia’s proclaimed military neutrality and national interests.

“When it comes to activities with the Russian Armed Forces the Ministry of Defence pays equal attention to all other key partners,” a statement said.

According to Serbian media reports, Russian, Belarus and Serbian military units will organize a joint military exercise in September named “Slavic brotherhood” on Russian territory.

Joint military exercises were discussed during the meeting of the Serbian and Russian defence ministers, Bratislav Gasic and Sergei Shoigu, on August 15 in Moscow.

Shoigu reportedly invited Serbian Army special units to take part in a military drill with Russian special forces next year.

The Serbian army has also planned several military drills with NATO member armies this year.

Aleksandar Radic, a military expert in Belgrade, said the Serbian government will now face a challenge in maintaining good relations both with the Russia and the West at a time when their relations remain shaken due to the conflict in Ukraine.

Radic told BIRN that Serbia will have to decide what is the greater priority – holding military drills with Russia or continuing smoothly with European integration.

Drills with the Russians would not “significantly improve” Serbia’s military capacity and the exercises sent a political message, he said.

“On the other hand, from the EU’s perspective, Serbia has to harmonize its foreign policy with the EU,” Radic told BIRN.

Zoran Dragisic, a professor at the Belgrade Faculty of Security Studies, agreed that Serbia has to harmonize its policy with the EU if wants to become a member state.

He told BIRN that staging such exercises with Russia will not affect Serbia’s standing immediately, but may weaken it in in the long run.

“Flirting with Russia is a thorn in the West’s eye and that could affect Serbia’s position negatively,” Dragisic said.

Serbian relations with Russia are a sensitive issue in the EU accession process because Belgrade has refused to join the EU sanctions imposed against Moscow over Ukraine.

The Serbian government has stressed on numerous occasions that EU integration is its priority but that it also wishes to maintain warm relations with Russia, Serbia’s traditional ally.

Serbia proclaimed its military neutrality in December 2007 and the current government under Aleksandar Vucic has announced no plans to change the policy.

However, Serbia is a member of the NATO’s Partnership for Peace programme. In March, Serbia concluded the Individual Partnership Action Plan with NATO, IPAP, which is considered the highest level of cooperation with NATO for a non-member country.

Serbian officials are keen to recall that they cherish good military relations with Western partners as well.

Bratislav Gasic, the Defence Minister, on August 17 at a meeting with US Ambassador Michael Kirby, praised the army’s cooperation with the US.

Gasic said the Plan of Bilateral Military Cooperation for 2016 envisaged 127 joint activities, excluding the education of Serbian army members in the US.

US Defense Secretary Ash Carter hosted Georgian Defense Minister Tinatin Khidasheli at the Pentagon to discuss regional security issues and the U.S.-Georgia defense relationship, Pentagon Press Secretary Peter Cook said.

In a statement summarizing Tuesday’s meeting, Cook noted it was the first time the two defense leaders had met.

“Secretary Carter commended Minister Khidasheli for Georgia’s ongoing commitment to Afghanistan as the second-largest overall troop contributor to the NATO Resolute Support Mission,” Cook said in his statement. “Secretary Carter also emphasized that the United States, together with our allies, remain committed to supporting Georgia through the NATO-Georgia Commission and the Substantial NATO-Georgia package agreed at the 2014 Wales Summit.”

The leaders reviewed ongoing U.S. security assistance to Georgia’s armed forces, Cook said, including plans for the $20 million in additional funding in 2015 through the European Reassurance Initiative.

“Secretary Carter also reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to continuing defense cooperation with Georgia, including through annual bilateral and multilateral exercises and training,” the press secretary added.

By Bhaskar Roy*

The Chinese Communist Party mouthpiece, the People’s Daily (August 10) clearly indicated that President Xi Jinping was preparing to strike at the powerful former President and party Chief Jiang Zemin. The newspaper carried a signed article titled, “Dialectally View the Phenomenon of ‘Tea Turns Cold When People are Away’,” a message that few in China could miss.

The author’s background was not given suggesting it could be a pen-name, and the article carried the views of a powerful person or group having the influence to dictate to the party mouthpiece. The language and context was reminiscent of the Maoist era when a political target was identified through parables or historical characters.

The commentary said that over the years many senior cadres had moved away after retirement and refrained from intervening in the work of the new leadership. It gave examples of Wan Li, Tian Jiyun, Zhu Rongji and Hu Jintao, among others stating such senior leaders and veteran cadres earned everyone’s respect.

Thereafter, the article singled out a “highly positioned cadre” who when in power placed his trusted aides in top positions to manipulate power after his retirement. It went on to say that after years of retirement he is still unwilling to relinquish power and when he is unhappy with something, he laments, “Tea turns cold when people are away”.

This practice undermines the Party’s unity, creates cliques and internal power struggle the article said. It also averred that such “cold tea” is the norm, it should not be heated and brought back to the table.

The metaphor invited a surge of comments on China chat website Sina Weibo, where Jiang Zemin was indirectly identified as the target. Ginger tea is not an uncommon drink in China and ginger is called “jiang” in Chinese.

Jiang Zemin’s lust for power is well known as is his reputation for manipulation and favouritism. Appointed by Deng Xiaoping as Party Chief and then President in the aftermath of the 1989 Tiananmen Square upheaval, he retired in 2002. But he kept the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) for almost two more years till pressured by the old veterans to stand down and hand over the post to his successor, Hu Jintao.

Jiang realised power of the military early on. The top generals had opposed his talking over the CMC for several years. It was only after some powerful veterans in the army retired that Deng was able to install him as Chairman of the CMC. Even then, Deng had to protect him for some more years in that post till Jiang Zemin could place his trusted officers in important positions. In fact during Jiang’s rule the PLA saw the promotion of the largest number of officers to the generals’ rank.

Jiang also created the powerful Shanghai clique, otherwise known as the Shanghai mafia. In the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) of the Party Central Committee Yu Zhengshen, Liu Yunshan, Zhang Gaoli and Zhang Dejiang are considered to be Jiang’s protégés. But Yu Zhengshen, Wang Qishan and Zhang Dejiang ae also princelings or progeny of senior Long March leaders.

Another powerful protégé of Jiang, Zhou Yongkang, was brought down by Xi in the last two years. Zhou was a member of PBSC, and headed the powerful security apparatus. His writ included the Petroleum faction, who were gradually posted in other influential positions across the country.

Xi began by bringing down Bo Xilai, another princeling and Party Chief of Chongqing municipality. Bo was a protégé of both Jiang and Zhou. He was to be elevated to the PBSC eventually, Bo became too ambitious too early, and reports say he planned to oust Xi Jinping.

But to take action against both Zhou and Bo Xilai, Xi had to take clearance from Jiang.

Xi next moved to cleanse the PLA. First to go was former Vice Chairman of CMC, Xu Caihou, on charges of corruption. Xu, however, died of cancer before he could be sentenced. Lt. Gen. Gu Junshan, former deputy director of the General Logistics Department of the PLA has been sentenced to life imprisonment. A third PLA “Tiger” or senior official to fall was another CMC Vice Chairman Guo Boxiong. There are several others who have been either punished or under investigation.

It was an unwritten understanding that PBSC members would not be targeted. Xi did the unthinkable. His anti-corruption campaign started with the Tigers and “flies” (lower level officials) were targeted subsequently.

Veteran leaders who wanted lifelong tenures were a bane for the People’s Republic of China. After Mao Zedong’s death, when Deng Xiaoping wrested power from the ultra-leftists, he and his colleagues abolished this practice and introduced the age bar system from the president and party general secretary downwards, in 1982.

The next step came after the Tiananmen students’ protest. The Central Advisory Commission (CAC) was abolished. The CAC was a body comprising senior retired cadres, both civil and military. They wielded significant power and influence. Had it not been for the CAC, the crackdown on the students may have been less bloody. The old guards had their entrenched ideas and were very conservative in their outlook. Had the old systems remained, China’s economic liberalization and development would have been doubtful.

At the 19th Congress of the Communist Party in 2017, Xi Jinping is expected to further strengthen himself. Out of the present seven member PBSC only he and Li Keqiang will remain. Li is neither a princeling nor is he from Shanghai clique. He belongs to the Chinese Youth League group of the party. Li has lent his shoulders to Xi’s anti-corruption drive. It is expected that in the next PBSC Xi will place his own people and Li is expected to get a share. But it will be difficult to keep out the Shanghai faction.

Jiang Zemin is not expected to give up without a fight. Corruption is not restricted to Jiang’s Tigers only. There is hardly a senior leader in China who is squeaky clean. There are retired leaders whose children and relatives may not be clean.

Can Xi restrict his anti-corruption drive against Tigers to his political opponents only? Jiang may suffer an ignominious end. Evidence is being collected against him. Xi Jinping is winning the battle but will he be able to win the war? There is a Chinese saying that when a big wave comes it is wise to duck under it. There will be time after that.

*The writer is a New Deli based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

By Bhaskar Roy

Terrorists have no religion. That is the emerging consensus globally so that religious sentiments are not hurt and society is not divided. When murders are committed in the name of religion, it can at best be called deviant religious terrorism or extremism. And these deviants went to establish a global caliphate by establishing minor caliphates in different regions of the world and amalgamate them.

This deviant religious terrorism based on medieval thoughts appears to have engulfed Bangladesh and is seeking to destroy its founding principles laid out by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and his visionary colleagues. From the day East Pakistan broke away from West Pakistan (Pakistan) to establish Bangladesh, efforts were on from both inside and outside the country to destroy it. Two instruments were used- Assassination of leaders, and extreme Islamism. The core principles of the founding a Bangladesh were religious tolerance, fairness, multiculturism, modernity and the unique culture of the people. The current government, led by the Awami League in a coalition with other small but progressive political parties, is trying to uphold and protect the founding ideals which find place in the constitution. But right wing and conservative religious pressure has given way to aberrations.

The immediate challenge of deviant religious extremism lies in the government’s efforts to exorcise the ghosts of the liberation war. The occupying Pakistani army in 1971 along with their Bangladeshi henchmen mostly belonging to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) killed an estimated three million people who supported independence from Pakistan. Around three hundred thousand women were raped. Children, the old and the infirm were not spared. There was a huge demand for accountability. Two war crime Tribunals were set up to try the living leaders of those criminal acts.

A group called the Gonojagoran Mancha (roughly translated as Peoples Awakening Forum) was formed purely on volunteering basis to demand trial (and exemplary punishment) of the anti-liberation “killers”. The volunteers or members comprise mostly of post-liberation generation who saw previous governments rewriting the history of the liberation war and bringing to political power the very same people who opposed liberation, committed atrocities on freedom loving people, and remained faithful to Pakistan, with regressive Islam as their ideas. They were and remain, member of the JEI, who were rehabilitated by President and former army chief Zia-ur-Rehman, in 1977-78 after the assassination of Sk. Mujibur Rahman.

Zia founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), and remained in alliance with the JEI even till date. After Zia’s assassination in 1981 in a coup attempt by a nationalist army officer, Maj. Gen. M. A. Manzoor, his widow Begum Khaleda Zia took over the party, and is a two time prime minister and remains the leader of the BNP, the main opposition party.

Zia-ur-Rehman, a highly decorated freedom fighter who apparently defected from the Pakistani army to fight for freedom, remains a controversial figure. He claimed that he declared independence and not Sk. Mujibur Rahman. But his actions post liberation suggests that he may have been either a Pakistani plant or changed his allegiance to Pakistan subsequently. But that is another story which will come out some day.

Gonojagoron Mancha comprises mainly of secular believers and some atheists. The blogger community who support secularism, minorities, and the down trodden, and are anti- extremist Islam, come mainly from this group.

The latest victim (August 06) of the deviant Islamists is Niladri Chattopadhya who used the pen name Niloy Neel. Four men with machetes barged into his fifth floor flat, confined his wife to a room, hacked Niloy to death, and vanished in broad day light.

He was the fourth blogger to be killed this year. The other bloggers killed and Avijit Roy, Wasiqur Reheman, and Ananta Bijoy Das. All write in the blog is “Mukto Mona” (Free Thinkers) created by Avijit Roy. The other to be assassinated similarly was Ahmed Rajiv Haider, in February 2013. He was a leading figure of Gonojagoron Mancha.

There is a similar signature in all these assassinations. Guns are not used. The machetes hack the neck upward, to imitate beheading. The killers graduated from street killings to entering homes, suggesting their growing boldness.

Ansar-al-Ialam Bangladesh claimed responsibility for killing Niloy Neel in an e-mail to media establishments. The organisation which is of recent vintage, also claimed it was a branch of Al Qaida in South Asia (AQIS). Al Qaida Chief Ayman al Zawahiri announced the formation of AQIS in October 2014.

Ansar-al-Islam Bangladesh (AIB) in a message in May 2015 designated the following seven categories of individuals as their targets: academics, actors, bloggers, doctors, engineers, judges, politicians and writers who insult Prophet Muhammad and “distort” Islam. This list has since been expanded to include atheists and “free thinkers”.

Another new organisation is the Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT) which claims affiliation to Islamic State. Extremist religious groups which have a declared agenda to establish Bangladesh as an Islamic State to be ruled by Sharia law include existing banned organisations like to Jamatul Islam Bangladesh (JMB), Hizb-ut-Tehrir (HUT), Hifazat-e-Islam (HEI) among more than one hundred other splinter groups which espouse the same ideology.

It must be taken into account that HUJI (Bangladesh) was involved in the attempted assassination of Sk. Hasina in 2004. In the grenade attack on an Awami League meeting, Sk. Hasina was injured but twenty two others died. The commander of HUJI, Mufti Hannan, who executed the operation is in custody and is under trial. But the conspiracy is much larger and includes leaders of the BNP. When the trial comes to a conclusion it will shake the whole of Bangladesh. One of the accused is Lutfozaman Babar, then Minister of State of Home Ministry. He too, is in custody and under trial.

Bangladesh’s counter-terrorism agencies like the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) have done commendable work. But in the case of blogger killings very little progress has been noted. According to Bangladesh media, Niloy Neel approached the police to lodge a report that he was under threat. The police declined to register his protest and advised him to leave the country as soon as possible.

The lower level police officials may have declined to register Niloy’s case to avoid additional burden of work. But in all the blogger murder cases lack of progress raises some serious questions. Have some in the police force been influenced by the ideology of these extremists? If that is so, it is most dangerous.

It is well known that during the BNP-JEI government (2001-2006) substantial recruitment in the security apparatus were made from religious extremist groups. This was done in all ranks on the same lines as President Zia-ul-Huq did in Pakistan.

According to reports and talks in knowledgeable sections in Dhaka, the Bangladesh army stands divided among BNP, JEI and the Awami League. In a democracy, the armed forces should remain a political to effectively guard the nation’s borders and in dealing with internal emergency when called upon by the government.

It has to be admitted that religious conservatism is slowly but surely creeping into the armed forces. Lady wives of forces’ offices are increasingly taking to wearing burqas at mess evenings. If this happens in a disciplined institution like the armed forces, then it can be imagined what can happen or what is happening to the more vulnerable organisations and the civil society.

Political rivalry has led to the use of extremist sections for votes. This policy has backfired and religious bigots have only been encouraged.

The JEI is a declared religious political party. Its ultimate goal is to establish Sharia rule in the country. To their credit, the JEI is open about it. But they should abide by the constitution. If they have a different view they should contest democratically, and not by subversive means.

It was, therefore, surprising wen the JEI issued a statement, “severely protesting and condemning the inhuman and brutal murder of blogger Niloy Hossen (sic1) by some miscreants”, and blamed it on the failure of the incumbent government. (The statement was made in a Bangladesh Jamaat-e-Islami, International Relations Team Circular). But it is curious why they called Niloyu Neel “Niloy Hossen”. Niloy, a self-declared atheist was born Hindu. Why try to protect him as a Muslim? The JEI must publicly clarify this.

There is no doubt that religious extremism is emerging as a major threat to the fabric of Bangladesh. It is time the political parties realise that use of religion and religious groups will be disastrous for all. Religion and politics have their own places and should never be mixed.

*The writer is a New Delhi based strategic analyst. He can be reached at e-mail grouchohart@yahoo.com

Egypt’s new counterterrorism law increases authorities’ power to impose heavy sentences, including the death penalty, for crimes under a definition of terrorism that is so broadly worded it could encompass civil disobedience. President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi enacted the law on August 15, 2015.

The new law also gives prosecutors greater power to detain suspects without judicial review and order wide-ranging and potentially indefinite surveillance of terrorist suspects without a court order.

“With this sweeping new decree, Egypt’s president has taken a big step toward enshrining a permanent state of emergency as the law of the land,” said Nadim Houry, deputy Middle East and North Africa director. “The government has equipped itself with even greater powers to continue stamping out its critics and opponents under its vague and ever-expanding war on terrorism.”

The law makes it a crime to publish or promote news about terrorism if it contradicts the Defense Ministry’s official statements and would allow the courts to temporarily ban journalists from practicing their profession for doing so. It also makes anyone judged to have facilitated, incited, or agreed to a vaguely defined terrorist crime – whether in public or in private – liable for the same penalty that they would receive if they had committed that crime, even if the crime does not occur. The law eliminates any time limit for bringing terrorism prosecutions.

Egypt has had no lower house of parliament, which drafts laws, since it was dissolved by court order in 2012. In its absence, al-Sisi has issued at least 175 laws and decrees since taking office in June 2014. The government has repeatedly postponed elections for a new parliament. By law, the new parliament will have only 15 days after its first session to review and amend all legislation passed in its absence before that legislation becomes final.

The government revived its discussion of a draft counterterrorism law – which had been proposed following the 2013 removal of former President Mohamed Morsy by the military – after the assassination of Prosecutor General Hisham Barakat on June 29, 2015, in a Cairo car bombing. In a speech at Barakat’s funeral on June 30, al-Sisi said that “the prompt hand of justice is tied by the laws, and we can’t wait for that,” and pledged to amend Egypt’s laws “to implement the law and justice in the fastest possible time.”

Since Morsy’s overthrow, the government has focused its crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood, Morsy’s former organization, arresting thousands of its members, while courts have sentenced hundreds to death. On the day of Barakat’s funeral, Egypt’s State Information Service blamed the Brotherhood for his killing – which the Brotherhood called “reprehensible” – without presenting any evidence.

Egypt’s cabinet labeled the Brotherhood a terrorist group in December 2013 and April 2014. Cairo’s Court of Urgent Appeals, normally meant to handle temporary civil injunctions, designated the Brotherhood a terrorist group in February 2014, but that ruling remains on appeal and legal analysts have said that the court likely exceeded its jurisdiction. No competent court in Egypt has designated the Brotherhood a terrorist group, though prosecutors have filed thousands of cases accusing Brotherhood members of terrorism or membership in a terrorist group.

“Barakat’s assassination and the ongoing conflict in the Sinai Peninsula show that the Egyptian government faces a serious and deadly insurgency,” Houry said. “But eroding basic rights, curtailing dissent, and using ‘terrorism’ as a cudgel against opponents is no way to win the battle for hearts and minds.”

On August 11, the Greek government and its creditors agreed on a memorandum of understanding (MoU) on a third bailout. The 29-page document, which was leaked to media a day later, is predicated on broad and deep reforms and a timetable. It seeks to restore “fiscal sustainability,” protect “financial stability,” foster “growth, competitiveness and investment” and support “modern state and public administration.”

Pro-austerity advocates consider the MoU ambitious; cynics see it as aspirational. If the deal is ratified by other Eurozone countries, it could ensure up to €86 billion in financing over the next three years.

How did few summer weeks result in a deal that may replace one Greek crisis with another?

To Grexit or Not, That’s the Question

The third bailout is the result of more than six months of turbulent negotiations, which pushed Greece back into recession, left its banks subject to stringent capital controls, while delaying any action to reduce Athens’s huge debt burden until the fall.

As Greece’s primary creditors, the so called troika – the European Commission (EC), the European Central Bank (ECB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – presented their June 25 proposal, which pushed for very harsh austerity policies, Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras resorted to a referendum, which took the creditors by a surprise. Tsipras needed national unity and a better hand for the talks.

In contrast, Brussels made no secret about its support for the Greek opposition. Before the referendum, the Eurogroup’s uncompromising president Jeroen Dijsselboem warned that “If [the Greek] people say they don’t want [the creditors’ reform package], there is not only no basis for a new program, there is also no basis for Greece in the Eurozone.”

In the referendum, some 61% of Greeks voted against the creditors’ proposal, only 39% for it. Greek party leaders signed a joint statement, expressing common goals, including the securing of funding in exchange for reforms and seeking debt relief. It was a triumph for the Syriza-led coalition government that had come to power only in January; after 7 years of contractions.

However, the Eurogroup’s pressure did lead to the replacement of finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, whom Brussels found too “radical,” with Euclid Tsakalotos, Greece’s key negotiator in aid talks with creditors.

But was there any room left for a compromise between Athens and its creditors? Not really. Prime Minister Tsipras demanded a “fair compromise” requesting a 3-year bailout. However, Greece’s creditors remained fixated to the substance of their June 25 proposal. As Athens was working on its reform proposal ahead of a meeting of all 28 EU leaders, an ultimatum came with the EC head Claude Juncker’s warning. “We have a Grexit scenario [the exit of Greece from the Eurozone] prepared in detail.”

If Athens opposed the creditors’ proposal; Greece would be allowed to default. The creditors betted that, after hundreds of billions of euros had been spent on firewalls, a meltdown would harm Greece, but Europe would avoid a contagion. That’s how Sunday July 12 became the “make-or-break” day for Greece’s continued membership in the Eurozone.

After marathon talks, the Eurozone leaders agreed to give Greece up to €86 billion of new bailout loans, but only in return for new round of extreme austerity measures.

The Price of the EU Membership

Ironically, now Greek parliament was compelled to accept the pension overhauls and sales tax increases that Greek voters had just rejected in the referendum. The final rescue program contains measures that far exceed the oversight and external control other Eurozone bailouts, including a €50 billion fund in state-owned assets which will be privatized and non-performing loans (loans not being repaid to banks).

As far as Athens and Greek people were concerned, that was the price for staying in the Eurozone.

What surprised many observers was the insistence of Germany – against France – on punishing austerity terms that have already wrecked Greece and much of Southern Europe, while eroding fiscal stability in Northern Europe and leaving Eastern Europe in a growth limbo. The pro-austerity views, however, can be attributed to debt ownership.

Greek debt is owned by the key Eurozone economies – Germany (27%), France (17%), Italy (15%), Spain (10%) and the Netherlands (5%); as well as the IMF and the ECB together (15%). The burden is particularly hard for small and fiscally conservative euro economies, such as Belgium (€7.5bn), Austria (€5.9bn) and Finland (€3.7bn), which themselves are under increasing economic pressures.

Through much of the process, Chancellor Merkel and her finance minister Wolfgang Schäuble pushed for a de facto Grexit. The subtext was that if the terms of the deal would be very harsh, Greece would reject them and “choose” exit. But the assumption proved flawed.

In Southern Europe, the larger economies – France, Italy and Spain – opted for a more conciliatory stance; they have their own “Greek-like” debt challenges and remain concerned about punishing austerity measures.

The member states of Eastern Europe took the toughest stance toward Greece. They see the terms as far too soft. Since these countries had struggled so hard to join the Eurozone, they regard Brussels as too soft.

Bailing Out Banks, Not People

Before the deal, European equity markets were down, with the depreciation of the euro and widening spreads in the Eurozone periphery. As a result, calls became more vocal in Washington, Beijing and Moscow call for Athens and its creditors to seek a compromise that would allow Greece to remain in the Eurozone.

Following the deal, equity markets enjoyed a mild rally, with the strengthening of the euro and narrowing spreads in the regional periphery. Optimists saw it as the return of economic certainty and market stability.

But the realities are very different. After the global crisis of 2008, Greek per capita income, adjusted to inflation, has plunged by a third. Let’s put that in context. In 2000, the Greek per capita income was still 17% higher than in South Korea and almost twice as high as in Poland. Today, it is less than $26,000, or 40% lower than in South Korea and about the same as in Poland.

Has the fall of Greek living standards helped to resolve its debt challenges? No. Instead, it has made the debt load a lot heavier. Athens returned to markets only after two huge bailouts of €73 billion and €164 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, unemployment continues to hover around 25% and youth unemployment exceeds 50%. Moreover, Greek public debt almost doubled to €323 billion, or 175% of the GDP. Based on current and benign scenarios, this debt could decline to around 130% in the early 2020s – that is about the same as Italy’s current level, which is considered excessive.

Brussels has vowed that each new bailout would be the last one. But as I have argued since spring 2010, each package has been misguided. All have contributed to the Eurozone sovereign debt challenges. And none have really benefited ordinary Greeks. Indeed, almost 90% of the two bailout monies in Greece have been used to rescue major European private banks, especially in Germany and France. Only 11% of the monies have been directed to Greek people.

The question is whether the third bailout package will prove any different.

The Cul-de-sac of Germanic Europe

Will the deal work? Success would require strong and sustained growth. Yet, during the current year, contraction is likely to exceed 3% in Greece and the return to growth is likely to take until 2017. Thereafter real GDP growth of more than 2% is possible but not sufficient for Athens’s creditors.

Recently, Greece’s Q2 GDP performance of 0.8% surprised markets. But was it a sign of a turnaround? No, the data can be attributed to less fiscal austerity during the talks, pickup in tourism and measurement errors.

Is higher-than-expected growth possible? In theory, yes, but thriving Greek exports would require stronger global growth prospects, which seem unlikely and higher-than-expected Eurozone growth, which seems debatable. Under the bailout terms, recovery will not be rapid and inflation will not support fiscal consolidation.

Are worse-than-expected scenarios possible? Yes, although – despite their aggressive public rhetoric – both troika and Brussels will act cautiously since exit scenarios could prove very costly and potentially catastrophic.

What else could go wrong? The debt negotiations could deteriorate, which would impair nascent business and consumer confidence in Greece. Also, Athens might be unable to pay on wages and pensions, which would worsen devastating social crises in Greece and increase economic uncertainty and market volatility in the Eurozone.

The reform measures of the proposed deal will require further pension reforms, tax reforms to boost revenue and major reduction of military spending. In the coming months, other measures will include an overhaul of the welfare system, agricultural reforms, privatization of electricity transmission and governance reforms of the Greek administration. These changes will not occur without substantial resistance.

Despite popular support, Tsipras is likely to lose a Syriza faction – the so-called Left Platform that calls for Greece to leave the euro – and key members of its right-wing coalition partner Anel. The third bailout can be passed only with the majority of the Syriza-led coalition, and its opposition; the conservative New Democracy, social-democratic PASOK and centrist Potami.

If Tsipras can keep his majority, despite Syriza dissenters, and pass the reforms (and if Merkel can do the same in Germany, despite the rebels of the conservative/social-democratic coalition), Greece will have access to funds. However, as Syriza will hold its extraordinary congress, divisions may well pave way to an early fall election.

Nor will risks disappear from the region. The European project itself seems to have shifted. In the past, Brussels offered regional integration with sovereign flexibility. Guided by the Merkel-Schäuble stance, it is now providing tighter integration but at the expense of national flexibility. This approach reflects German interests, but not those of the Eurozone as a whole.

As a result, it tends to generate highly asymmetric outcomes among countries within the region. For instance, as unemployment rates have soared across the Eurozone, they have fallen in Germany. Other economic data indicate similar discrepancies, as former Fed chair Ben Bernanke and other critics have stressed.

These patterns imply serious medium-term challenges for the Eurozone and will foster division, certainly not solidarity, among the member states.

In the short-term, this approach may work because the alternatives – Grexit, Eurozone fragmentation, increasing volatility – are perceived as prohibitive. In the medium-term it is not likely to survive, politically or economically.

A Pyrrhic Victory

Ever since the onset of the Eurozone debt crisis in spring 2010, those political interests – nationalist movements, Euroskeptics, anti-eurozone parties, extremist fringes – that have historically promoted greater national role within (or without) the European project have been gaining in national and pan-European elections. Over time Germany may either have to accept greater flexibility within greater integration or the Eurozone project will fragment or dissolve.

Assuming that, in the short-term, Brussels will continue to insist on stringent austerity, growth will remain subdued and unemployment high in southern Europe, while fiscally conservative North will no longer be immune to erosion. With such fiscal policies, Eurozone is not economically sustainable.

As the ECB will continue to inject new rounds of quantitative easing (QE), a semblance of stability can be maintained in the near-term. However, the exchange rate illustrates more substantial shifts behind the façade. Between 2008 and 2015 – after rate cuts and rounds of QE, the euro against the U.S. dollar has fallen from a high of $1.60 to $1.12 today. Current policies are likely to drive the exchange rate to parity, or beyond.

The third bailout is likely to result in lingering growth, further decline of living standards, continued unemployment, and diminished future prospects in Greece. Nor will it foster economic certainty or market stability in the Eurozone.

It is a Pyrrhic victory for Brussels. As Greece’s creditors won a battle, they may have lost the war.

This article appeared at European Financial Review and is reprinted with permission.

US Republican presidential candidate Mike Huckabee, 59, said Wednesday during a 48-hour fundraising visit to Israel that he did not consider the West Bank to be occupied by that nation.

According to Huckabee, the West Bank is part of Israel. “I don’t see it as occupied,” Huckabee told journalists at a press conference, “That makes it appear as if someone is illegally taking land. I don’t see it that way.”

“In America, we have about a 400-year relationship to Manhattan. It would be as if I came and said we need to end our occupation of Manhattan. I’m pretty sure most Americans would find that laughable,” various media reports cited Huckabee, ex-governor state of Arkansas, as saying at a press conference held at Jerusalem’s Waldorf-Astoria Hotel.

With regard to the two-state solution, various media outlets reported Huckabee as dismissing that option, saying “the notion of two governments working the same piece of land is unrealistic and unworkable.”

On Tuesday, Huckabee attended a fundraiser for his presidential bid at Shiloh, an illegal Jewish settlement in the occupied Palestinian territory that was sponsored by Simon Falic, an American-Jewish supporter of Republican candidates and right-wing Israeli politicians. The Falic family was the largest contributor to the recent election campaign of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, according to a Bloomberg report.

According to AFP, Huckabee said he had no qualms about holding the fundraiser at Shiloh in the West Bank, which Israel seized in the 1967 Six-Day War.

More specifically, Bloomberg reported Huckabee as saying he “wasn’t in the least hesitant” to go to Shiloh, describing it as “a place of great connection to the history of the Jewish people.”

By Robert Berke

Recently, I recently wrote that a remarkable turnaround was taking place in the US President Barack Obama’s fortunes. It’s an impressive display of rising from the depths of falling popularity last fall, and it is starting to be felt in many areas, with major impacts on the future of energy.

At his lowest point, the US President was widely regarded as a lame duck, shedding influence and power, and on a down-hill slide.

This was followed by a number of embarrassments, with one of the worst coming from Russia, when it chose to provide sanctuary to Edward Snowden who revealed that the U.S. was hacking the strategic communications of its closest allies.

More damaging, the revelation came at the worst possible time for the U.S., seriously discrediting its campaign to enlist allies against alleged Russian and Chinese hackers.

This was followed by another embarrassment where the U.S. utterly failed to prevent U.S. allies from joining the Chinese-sponsored Asian infrastructure bank. It seemed that the doomsayers were proving correct about America’s decline and fall.

Since then, Obama has been on a roll, with victories in Congressional trade agreements and at the Supreme Court with decisions that removed legal and constitutional challenges to the President’s health program, and gay marriage.

Following hot upon these achievements were the successful negotiations with Cuba and Iran, that went far beyond expectation, climaxing with the signing of the historic Iran nuclear agreement.

Even more surprising was the President’s ability to marginalize the powerful lobbies and opponents of these agreements, including hard-liners in the U.S., Iran, Israel, and the Gulf Kingdoms.

Not Your Father’s Sanctions

In the past, the effectiveness of sanctions was often questioned because of the difficulty of tracking compliance. The result was that targeted countries easily hid and continued banned activities. The sanctions golden rule: if you can’t track them, you can’t enforce them.

But current sanctions are nothing like they were in the past. The difference is that technology has lifted surveillance to unprecedented levels. What with spy satellites, drones, and sophisticated listening devices, the U.S. now has the capacity to pierce nearly every form of communication and transaction. That is the secret weapon which enables the west to impose iron bound constraints that can level just about any economy.

Whether the participants in the recent negotiations will comply with the terms of their agreements, only the future can tell. But there’s little question that none would have come to the table without the sanctions.

Recall also that only first stage sanctions had been imposed on Cuba, Iran, and Russia, with each nation clearly warned that far worse lay in store if targeted activities continued.

The message was hardly lost on the ever pragmatic President Putin, who despite brave words of resistance, suddenly saw that it was to his country’s benefit to cooperate with the U.S. and its allies, particularly in the Iranian nuclear negotiations, and the ongoing war in Syria and Iraq.

Nor was the message lost on China either, who also suddenly found it in their interest to stop island building in the South China Sea, and began negotiations with its neighbors over territorial claims, as urged by the U.S. and its allies in the region. China ‘acting poor’ when Russia recently came calling for financial help also smacked of western influence.

Contrary to their rhetoric, Iran and Russia were deeply chastened by sanctions, even more so by the oil price collapse, and have agreed to major concessions. It’s no accident that both countries are also becoming ever more important in the world’s anti-terrorism campaign, an effort clearly being coordinated with the U.S.

OPEC Support

Playing into Obama’s hand was a different sort of victory taking place during the same period. That was the Saudis leading OPEC to defend their traditional market share by flooding the oil markets.

The ensuing trade war against competitors has caused every other major oil producing country and oil companies to cut future development plans. Importantly, the oil glut reinforced the damaging effects of sanctions on targeted countries.

Some conspiracy theorists have claimed that the U.S. Administration conspired with the Saudi King to create an oil glut by over-producing, directly aimed at crashing the Russian economy, where energy accounts for nearly 50 percent of its budget.

U.S. Investment Bank, Morgan Stanley recently reported that the Saudi’s were over-producing by some 1.5 million barrels per day in a market with a surplus of around 800,000 barrels per day.

The Bank added that the oil markets’ fall could be worse and last longer than the one created 1986, in which Saudi Arabia grew tired of shouldering the burden of production cuts and decided to flood the market in an effort to pursue market share.

With Iran expected to return to markets, thereby adding to the glut, the bank also stated that these current moves made the risk in oil markets “historically unanalyzable,” a red alert to the investment community.

Oil Glut Ricochet

The Saudis enthusiastically took up the opportunity to lower global energy prices, ostensibly claiming they were not aiming to kill off rivals in Russia or the U.S., but merely that they were not the highest cost producer.

There were also other unexpected reversals. It has been widely reported that the Gulf Kingdoms are outraged over the U.S. drawing closer to Iran, as well as the U.S. distancing itself from the wars in the Middle East. Evidence for this view can be found in the Saudis’ multi-billion dollar deals with the Russia, which fly in the face of U.S./EU sanctions.

The clincher in the Russian-Saudi entente may just have occurred with the sudden ISIS terrorist attacks in Saudi Arabia.

The Saudis are all too aware of the threat that ISIS presents, the monster that some claim they created, and are now badly in need of military assistance, especially with the U.S. declining full scale military engagement in the region.

The Glut’s Toll

The result of the ensuing glut is a fast declining industry that is now willingly accepting new production cutbacks, while oil producing countries like Russia, Canada and Australia, are edging dangerously close to recession, with their currencies hitting six year lows.

As reported by CNBC, global job losses in the oil industry have reached over 141,200, with severe ripple effects across supporting industries. The U.S. is by no means immune to the downtrend, where current lay-offs in the energy field are approaching 71,000, and expected to climb.

U.S. Strategy for the Middle East

If, as it seems, Obama is back on top as a world leader, it’s important to understand his overall strategy and the likelihood of success.

The consensus amongst energy mavens is that if the Iran nuclear deal eventually leads to a withdrawal of sanctions, the results will be increased Iranian supplies, forcing prices lower by some $10 per barrel, according to World Bank estimates.

But Iran’s nuclear deal is about much more than the price per gallon. What the U.S. and its allies are trying to accomplish is no less than the reversal of political hostilities that have marginalized Iran for over thirty years and fueled hostility across the region.

As the President recently stated, the nuclear agreement is also meant to restore Iran as a regional leader in the Mid-East and turn a hostile relationship into at least a neutral one. That could go a long way in changing the political structure of the Middle East, while reducing the West’s dependency on its traditional allies in the region.

That’s not to say that the U.S. and Iran are destined to become close allies, but to recognize that they have important shared interests in combatting radical Islam that could lead to far greater cooperation.

There are some who claim that despite denials, the U.S. and Iran are already cooperating in the West’s battle against ISIS in Iraq and Syria. If so, that could go far in supporting Obama’s goal to pivot from the Middle East and towards Asia.

As stated here, another overriding U.S. goal is to prevent Iran’s drift eastward into a commercial and military alliance with Russia and China, as a partner in the recently formed Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Eurasian Economic Union, and Silk Road project. Instead, the U.S. wants Iran positioned as a competitor to Russia for EU and Asian energy markets, and as a bulwark against Russian and Chinese expansion.

The problem for the administration is that hard-liners at home and abroad, having failed to kill the deal, are continuing their efforts to stop any broader entente emerging between the Iran, its neighbors, and the world.

Here, the road is likely to be far less smooth for Obama. Unlike the nuclear deal that was undertaken under the banner of a UN resolution, any further U.S. political deals with Iran would be subject to congressional approval, something few experts view as forthcoming.

What with these formidable barriers to entente, a continuing drift eastward by Iran towards a closer commercial and military relationship with Russia and China remains a strong possibility.

But I think that the nearly two years of nuclear negotiations with Iran, if it accomplished nothing else, restored Iran to the position of a recognized regional power.

Iran is also unlikely to forget that both China and Russia voted in the UN to support sanctions against Iran. Nor is the fact likely to be ignored that Russia also declined to breach sanctions to deliver a previously contracted system of advanced missile defense systems to its erstwhile ally. Russia’s sudden close relationship with the Saudis is also not likely to sit well in Tehran.

For Iran, an over-riding goal in the deal was the repeal of sanctions, enabling the country to regain its former status as OPEC’s third largest producer. With that goal more realistic in light of a successful conclusion of the recent negotiations, Iran is unlikely to adopt policies to antagonize its newfound partners.

Instead of becoming captive to either Russia or China, Iran is far more likely to promote itself as an anti-terror partner with both west and east, while building investment markets with both sides of the ‘great game’ for its own benefit.

At the same time, Iran is leading the movement to form a united front against terrorism, partnering with the U.S., the Gulf Kingdoms, Turkey, Russia, and Syria.

Conclusion

In a region often beset by conflicts, with hardliners at home and abroad working against it, the odds are high against the success of the American strategy and the Iran deal.

Israel’s Prime Minister Netanyahu has turned the deal into a partisan issue in the midst of a presidential election campaign, in which it will undoubtedly play a major part.

Leading U.S. Democrat Congressmen have gone rogue against their administration, voicing opposition to the deal. Advocates on both sides are now raising the specter of war as the sure results of their opponents’ plans. Can pictures of mushroom clouds be far behind?

Arrayed against the deal opponents are the powerful interests of the international business community, now impatiently chomping at the bit to get into Iran’s virtually untapped market.

Nearly every major western country has recently sent trade missions to Iran in anticipation of sanctions being lifted. Representatives included major international oil companies, banks, and manufacturers. Their enormous influence and immense wealth will weigh heavily in resolving the issue.

A surprising announcement came that may hint at trending opinions in Europe: Yesterday Switzerland became the first country in the world to lift sanctions on Iran, in support of the nuclear deal.

For the President’s supporters, the deal holds real promise for the creation of a partnership of former adversaries united against terror.

If it proves successful, the world may finally have cause to breathe a sigh of relief, but as nearly everyone involved agrees, the outcome is still far from certain.

Source: http://oilprice.com/Energy/Energy-General/Whats-Really-At-Stake-With-The-Iran-Nuclear-Deal.html

By Barbara G. Baker

Five weeks after Fr. Antoine Boutros and his driver were kidnapped on their way to Sunday mass in southern Syria’s Suweida province on July 12, the Catholic parish priest has been released.

Disclosure of the 50-year-old priest’s release on Aug. 15 came from the Melkite Greek Catholic Patriarch of Antioch, Gregory III Laham, who gave no further details.

According to the Rome-based Zenit News Agency, the identity of Fr. Boutros’ kidnappers remains unknown, along with the fate of his driver. A rash of abductions occurred during July in the Suweida region, which is under the control of the Syrian army, but plagued by local brigands and a number of Islamist jihadi factions. Islamic State sources had not claimed responsibility for Fr. Boutros’ kidnapping.

Still unconfirmed are the fates of Italian Jesuit Fr. Paolo Dall’Oglio and Syrian Catholic Fr. Jacques Mourad, abducted July 2013 and May 2015, respectively. Nor has credible evidence surfaced regarding Archbishop Boulos Yazigi and Youhanna Ibrahim of Aleppo, kidnapped more than two years ago.

Released after 6 months

Just four days before Fr. Boutros’s release, Islamic State (IS) militants released 22 elderly Assyrian Christian hostages, all abducted nearly six months ago from their villages along the Khabur River in northeastern Syria.

The captives, 14 of them women, were sent on a bus to a highway outside Hassaka city, according to an announcement Aug. 11 by Afram Yacoub, chairman of the Assyrian Federation of Sweden.

“Negotiations between Assyrian leaders and Sunni leaders who have pledged allegiance to ISIL have been taking place, and following an agreement they were released. No ransom was paid to ISIL through any negotiations,” Yakoub stressed.

“We believe they released them because of health issues and because they are old,” Yakoub told the New York Times. Archimandrite Emanuel Youkhanna of the Assyrian Church of the East agreed, confirming by telephone to World Watch Monitor that the church’s bishopric in Hassaka city had not paid ransoms to the jihadists to secure the elderly Christians’ release.

But the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights claimed that a ransom had been paid. The dispute prompted speculation that funds might have gone to the tribal negotiators, rather than to the Islamic State itself.

Another activist group, the Assyrian Observatory for Human Rights, credited the release to “the tireless efforts and negotiations by the Assyrian Church of the East in the city of Hassaka.”

According to the Assyrian International News Agency, to date 48 of the 253 Khabur hostages initially captured in the IS attacks in February have now been released.

The location and condition of the remaining 205 Christians still believed to be held by IS are not confirmed, although negotiations are ongoing.

Yacoub noted that the recently released prisoners had not been physically harmed. “ISIL separated the men from the women and children, and crammed them all into very small rooms. They were fed disgusting and inedible food,” he said. “During their captivity, ISIL tried to convince them to convert to Islam.”

From Sweden, an Assyrian relative of three of the newly released hostages described the difficult conditions they had suffered as “slaves of ISIS” during their captivity.

“They have not been able to take care of their hygiene and they are full of lice,” Sabah Elijah told Lanstidningen newspaper, as reported by the Assyrian International News Agency. “They have not received food every day either, but perhaps only every other day. Those released will not disclose everything, because they have relatives who are still in the hands of ISIS. They said they have gone through hell.”

“My relatives now live with an aunt,” she said. “But what happens next? What will they live on? They had everything before ISIS came. Now they have nothing.”

Mass hostage-taking in Homs province

To the dismay of Syrian church leaders, during the first week of August Islamic State militants took hostage at least 100 more Christian families, while capturing Qaryatan city in western Syria’s Homs province.

Back in June, many Christians and other religious minorities had taken refuge in Qaryatain and the nearby Christian villages of Hawwarin and Sadad, after IS made large-scale military advances against towns and villages in northern Aleppo province.

So while IS extremists were routing the Syrian army out of Qaryatain, church sources said an estimated 1,500 Assyrian Christian families managed to flee ahead of them into nearby Christian villages and on toward Homs, 65 miles away.

Initial figures released by the Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) on August 7 indicated that at least 230 people had been taken captive in Qaryatain, among them dozens of Christians. Some had taken refuge in the city’s Mar Elian Monastery, where Fr. Jacques Mourad had been abducted by masked gunmen in May.

According to a Syrian priest contacted by the New York Times, “some [of the captives] had been taken away by the Islamic State, while others had been forced to remain in their homes.”

Without explaining the source, The Guardian published a photograph on Aug. 7 of a handwritten “wanted list,” purportedly naming some of the captured Christians tracked down by IS as “suspects” in Qaryatain.

Syriac Orthodox Bishop Selwanos Boutros Alnemeh told Al-Alam News Network from Homs that the IS fighters “accused the Christian families of backing the regime.” Located between Damascus and ancient Palmyra, the world heritage site captured by IS in May, Qaryatain is a key vantage point for the Islamic State’s eventual attempts to take over Damascus. Today (Aug 19) came reports that the 82-year-old archaeologist protecting Palmyra had been beheaded on Tuesday by ISIS.

In an interview with Vatican Radio, Chaldean Bishop of Aleppo Antoine Audo called the Qaryatain kidnappings an IS strategy to show their power and military dominance and “spread terror everywhere.” IS wants to destroy Syria’s Christian communities, Bp. Audo said, so the militants were trying to “push the Christians to emigrate.”

Recent social media releases

In a development described as “strange” by cautious church officials, a recent Youtube video and several photographs posted online have displayed Assyrian men and women believed to be among the IS hostages captured from Hassaka’s Khabur villages in late February.

Three pictures of individual women show them holding up a sign with their names written in Arabic and the date listed below: July 27, 2015. Assyrian sources confirmed that the two legible names, Susan Elias and Hannaa Assaf Youseef, are common names found in the Assyrian community, but could not confirm the exact identity of the women. The name of the third woman, who was pictured with three small chidren, was illegible.

A Youtube video which appeared online Aug. 14 features eight Assyrian men who begin by saying, “I am Christian,” and then each recited in Arabic his name, date of birth and home village. All were confirmed by Assyrian sources to be from Tel Jazira or Tel Shamiram, where IS took some 160 hostages. The last of the eight men read a written appeal: “We are here with our families, and we call on human rights organizations for help.”

In contrast to previous IS propaganda releases, neither the men’s video nor the three photographs were distributed by IS media channels. Nor did the releases include any ransom demand.

“No ISIS fighter appears in the video, but the last man clearly says ‘we call on the international community to secure our release.’ But he does not say anything about ransom,” noted Assyrian Federation of Sweden spokesman Yakoub.

“The church is very cautious about these recently released photos and video,” Fr. Youkhana from the Assyrian Church of the East told World Watch Monitor. “The men for sure we know are from the Khabur villages. But this is very strange, coming this way from ISIS.”

The Islamic State currently controls more than 50 percent of Syrian territory, with the August capture of Qaryatain marking the jihadists’ largest advance since overtaking Palmyra in May.

By Samuel Tadros*

“A coup inside the Muslim Brotherhood” screamed the headline of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood-sympathetic Masr Al Arabia website on May 28, 2015.¹ In a few minutes the Brotherhood’s world was turned upside down as members and supporters struggled to cope with the news. With no leadership to comfort the anguished, members turned to social media to search for news and guidance. Denial was the true believers’ first reaction, but soon their worst fears were born out by Mahmoud Hussein, the secretary general of the Muslim Brotherhood, who took to his Facebook page to confirm that Mahmoud Ezzat had taken over the group.²

The fact that the powerful secretary general of the Brotherhood could not post his statement on any of the Brotherhood’s media outlets clearly indicated that something was amiss. With the struggle now in the open, it was only hours before the other side responded. Mohamed Montaser, the alias of the official Brotherhood spokesperson, published his own statement, only this time on the Brotherhood’s official website: “We affirm that the group’s institutions, which was elected by its base last February, manages its affairs and that only the official spokesman of the group and its official outlets represent the group and its opinion.”³ His written statement was followed by an audio appearance on al-Jazeera, where he declared, “if you see the Muslim Brotherhood deviating from the revolutionary path do not follow us and do not follow the Muslim Brotherhood.”⁴ What had been simmering for months burst into the open: no longer was the Brotherhood’s struggle limited to the regime, but it now included an internal dimension. The Brotherhood’s house was divided.

For those not following the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood closely over the past two years, and to those accustomed to a tight-knight Brotherhood that allows no open dissent, the sight of such open infighting must have seemed astonishing. After all, the Brotherhood, which has long prided itself for being a strong Gama’a, had maintained an organizational structure that extended from the Usra (family) unit to the six levels of membership. In fact, this carefully maintained structure had allowed it to survive decades of repression and dominate post-revolutionary Egyptian elections. Though the mighty had fallen from power, surely two years were not enough to bring down what had taken eighty-five years to build.

In reality, the Brotherhood’s collapse is hardly surprising. In order to understand the current turmoil and dividing lines, as well as the Brotherhood’s potential future, one need not go far into the Brotherhood’s past. Instead, we only need to follow the Brotherhood’s footsteps on its downhill path from Mohamed Morsi’s presidential palace on the night of July 3, 2013, first to the trenches in Cairo’s Rab’a square, past its demonstrations inside Egypt, past its satellite channels and outreach outside, and into the abyss.

The Coup is Reeling

Until his last hours as president, Mohamed Morsi was confident the military would never move against him. After all, he had personally selected the army commander and done everything he could to placate the army in the new constitution. Even after the military issued its 48 hours ultimatum, the Brotherhood twitter account was assuring supporters on July 1, 2013: “Opposition would like to interpret military statement as a coup against president, it’s not. Military is patriotic institution.”⁵ As June 30 was approaching, and in preparation of opposition demonstrations, the Brotherhood had gathered its supporters into two squares, al-Nahda and Rab’a, in greater Cairo. Confident of its command of the masses, expecting a low turnout of opposition demonstrators, and imagining a repetition of what had transpired six months earlier when Morsi issued his controversial decree immunizing his orders from judicial oversight, the Brotherhood had prepared the sit-ins just in case the opposition attempted to attack the presidential palace. Otherwise, the Brotherhood had no plans should its supporters be confronted by tanks instead of demonstrators.

But if Morsi could do little but scream “Et tu Brute,” the Brotherhood was not about to follow with “then fall, Caesar.” As arrests were being carried out by the military, the Brotherhood’s world suddenly shrunk to Nahda and Rab’a squares as it scrambled to plan ahead. During the previous year the Brotherhood had gone out of its way to ally itself with other Islamists. By and large, its efforts had paid off. The 2012 constitutional battle and the Syria rally were a precursor of what was to come. Now, in Nahda and Rab’a, Islamists of all stripes rallied to the Brotherhood’s cause. In camp tents, Brotherhood members, Gama’a Islamiya, Cairo’s Activist Salafists, and Revolutionary Salafists mingled. Differences between various currents of Islamists seemed not to matter. The month was Ramadan and the camp was the closest thing to an Islamist utopia.

The mixing of Islamists had an effect on the speeches. Speakers, in English, portrayed the struggle as one of democracy against a coup while others, in Arabic, cast the struggle in the language of jihad. This was not merely the Brotherhood’s famous two discourses in two languages, but the result of genuine confusion and disorientation. Two attempts to widen the camp were met by military force, but beyond that the Brotherhood did not move. For forty-one days following President Morsi’s removal, the believers awaited their salvation. As some proclaimed sightings of the Archangel Gabriel, rumors, especially happy ones, spread faster than lightning: the commander of the second army is against the coup and will move soon and there are major defections from the army. There was no end to the rumor mill. One slogan captured the hope of the protestors—the coup is reeling. The devout waited.

Take off your shoes when entering Rab’a for its ground is soaked with the blood of Martyrs

Salvation was not meant to be. Instead, for those waiting, darkness covered the face of the earth on August 14, 2013. Security forces attacked the Rab’a camp, turning the scene into the bloodiest massacre of Egyptians by the state since Mohamed Ali’s massacre of Mamluks in 1811. The real numbers may never be known, but close to a thousand likely died in Rab’a. The Brotherhood would speak of a larger human toll: numbers are for historians, emotions for the living.

For the Brotherhood’s supporters abroad, Rab’a became a four finger symbol, popularized by Turkey’s president, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, but for those who lived through the event, Rab’a became something else. A video of the first Islamist demonstration that managed to break the security barricades and reach Rab’a on October 5 shows men falling to the ground and weeping and kneeling while others dance hysterically.⁶ If the Shi’a look to Karbala, the Brotherhood have Rab’a, a moment in which time stops and the world stops turning. Rab’a became a place of mourning, but also a place of rebirth. Those who shared the square and the blood with Brotherhood supporters were brothers, those who did not traitors. In the tents and in the blood, Rab’a became a melting pot, where ideas flowed freely and bonds were created. Given the Brotherhood’s lack of a deep ideological foundation, it is no surprise that ideas flowed only in one direction: from Salafists to Brotherhood.

“Our peacefulness is stronger than bullets”

Those words were uttered by the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme guide, Mohamed Badei, in Rab’a. Still disoriented by the coup and the subsequent raid on Rab’a, what remained of the Brotherhood’s leadership soon turned the slogan into a strategy. The January 25, 2011 Revolution would be replicated, they assumed, as large scale protests across the country would force the military regime to its knees. The how was never clear, though. Was it international pressure that would force the removal of the new president, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, a split in the military, or would it be the collapse of the security forces? These were questions for which the Brotherhood had no answers.

Ultimately, a slogan cannot replace a strategy. In reality of course, the January 25 Revolution was neither peaceful nor could it have succeeded had it not been for the weakness of the Mubarak regime. Moreover, Sisi is anything but Mubarak. The massive protests soon began to draw fewer numbers as the crackdown intensified. Most of the population hardly noticed the protests as they resumed their lives unperturbed by the ongoing confrontation. The Brotherhood’s social isolation was growing. The regime’s propaganda certainly helped, but the Brotherhood had doomed itself through its discourse during its own short rule. Ali al-Haggar’s song, “We are a peoples and you are a peoples,” captured the growing feelings at the time on both sides.⁷

For a moment universities seemed to hold the most promise for the Brotherhood. A generation had opened its eyes to the world of post-revolutionary Egypt, where politics was synonymous with street fighting. But the moment was brief: restless youth were met with deadly force as the regime pacified the campuses. Things might have been a bit different had the Brotherhood been able to transcend the Islamist and non-Islamist divide, but memories of the Brotherhood’s rule were still fresh. The believers were still committed, but the rest of the country had soured on the Brotherhood. Facing the regime juggernaut, the Brotherhood could count only on Islamists to stand by its side.

Developing a strategy to bring down the regime would have been a monumental task in normal circumstances, but the times were anything but normal. Tens of thousands of Brothers were imprisoned, but the real crisis was its leadership structure. For decades the Brotherhood had prided itself on its leadership structure and ability to absorb and continue after each crackdown by the Mubarak regime. This time, however, was different. The crackdown was not limited to a few leaders that could be replaced; it took out entire levels of the Brotherhood organization. Those not in prison were on the run, moving from house to house as the regime searched them out. The immediate task, therefore, was not to replace arrested leaders, but to assist those still free in their attempts to escape. Many low ranking members were able to leave through Cairo airport, but for leaders the path would have to run through Libya or Sudan.

As time passed, and as members made their way to Qatar and Turkey while others absorbed the shock of the coup and Rab’a, internal pressures began to mount. The spirit of rallying around the leadership was replaced with questions. How will the regime be brought down? Many could still not abandon the parallel, often conspiratorial world in which they lived.⁸ But for a growing number of Brothers, tangible questions pertaining to the future could not be postponed. In December 2013, the regime had declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization, ending any illusions that some still harbored of a possible reconciliation. The United Kingdom opened an inquiry into the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities; making matters worse, Qatar asked some Brotherhood leaders to leave the country in September 2014 due to pressure from the U.A.E. and Saudi Arabia. While Qatar would continue backing the group, the screws were tightening on the Brotherhood.

In June 2014, the Islamic State took over Iraq’s second largest city, Mosul, sending shockwaves around the world. For the first time an Islamist group had managed to achieve what all others had failed to do: control and govern sizeable territory, and not in some remote outpost called Afghanistan, or in a backward long forgotten land called Somalia, but in the heart of the Arab Muslim world. The impact was immediate. Success is always the best recruitment tool. Before Mosul, jihadism may have been an appealing theological concept, but for the first time it had achieved success. For the first time it was possible to think of an Islamic State, which could not have picked a better moment to ideologically challenge the Brotherhood. Demoralized, facing regime decapitation of their leaders and organization, Brotherhood members began to wonder.

The Muslim Youth Uprising

The first step on the road to violence was taken early. Every protest was met by force from the security forces; demonstrating was fast becoming a dangerous activity. Soon, protesters started demanding protection. As men faced arrest, women became disproportionally represented in the protests and sending them out became an act of madness. The leadership relented and protest protection units were formed.⁹ If the regime used civilian thugs to attack Brotherhood marches, they would be met by units armed with rocks and Molotov cocktails. The units would alert protesters to the presence of police. Who could possibly disagree with self-defense?

Events on the ground, however, moved faster than the leadership. The mixing of Islamists that had begun in Rab’a was beginning to show results. The Brotherhood had always been first and foremost an organization. Its founder, Hassan al-Banna, had left few works that could fill the ideological void and since the passing of its leading member, Sayed Qutb, the group had not produced an intellectual. As a result, the Brotherhood placed great emphasis on discipline and organizational cohesion, forcing any independent minds outside of its ranks. In order to broaden the tent, Banna had intentionally left many key theological and political questions unanswered.

None of his successors had the intellectual ability to fill the void even if they had wanted to do so. In normal circumstances, Brotherhood cohesion was maintained through the family structure and leadership command, but neither was functioning due to the crackdown. What began as the sharing of tents in Rab’a soon morphed into a mixing of ideas. Some would abandon the Brotherhood altogether and join jihadist groups, but these were few in numbers. The greatest impact on young Brotherhood members would come from Revolutionary Salafism.

Rifa’i Sorour had been an early member of the first Egyptian jihadi cell in 1966.¹⁰ Influenced by the street protests that took place following the defeat of 1967, he broke with jihadis to argue that working with the masses was the most suitable methodology.¹¹ He later refused the nomination to become the leader of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and instead devoted his life to creating a theoretical framework for the jihadi movement following the assassination of Anwar Sadat.¹² His life work, spanning three decades of active writing, successfully merged Salafist tenets, jihadi discourse, and revolutionary methodology. Sorour soon acquired a devoted following. Among his students were Khaled Harbi and Hossam Abu al-Bukhari, both of whom would emerge as key Islamic activists during the revolution. The revolutionary moment had given his ideas a movement in the form of the large following that gathered around Hazem Salah Abu Ismail’s presidential bid. Now, at the Brotherhood’s moment of crisis, with tens of thousands of its members lost and shopping for a new idea, his theories found a large audience.

It was not a coincidence that Matariyah district in Cairo remained the only Cairo neighborhood where Islamist protests continued and where clashes with police were a weekly phenomenon. Sorour’s residence had been in Matariyah for decades; it is where his followers exerted the most influence on Brotherhood members. Each week, following Friday prayers, a number of protestors were killed in violent confrontations. Dividing lines were being eroded by the shared struggle and bloodshed.

In November 2014, the Salafi Front, a small hardcore Salafi group founded in the aftermath of the revolution by Salafis frustrated with their leaders, called for a day of protests that it dubbed the Muslim Youth Uprising. The protests would be unabashedly Islamist, motivated by pure Islamist slogans that called for upholding Egypt’s Islamic identity against secularism. Before long, the call was echoed across social media by young Islamists, Brotherhood and non-Brotherhood alike. The Brotherhood leadership was cornered. Should they come out against an Islamist demonstration, and on what grounds? On the other hand, the demonstration risked undoing all of the Brotherhood’s efforts at labeling anti-coup activities as non-Islamist in nature. The Brotherhood vacillated until it finally came out against Islamizing the protests. Its statement declared that protesters were only to “raise the flag of Egypt and the usual revolutionary slogans.”¹³ The uprising failed to gather steam and the day passed with clashes limited to the usual areas, but the Brotherhood’s respite was brief. One week earlier, protesters in Matariyah had chanted for ISIS as one of them raised the black flag.¹⁴ The lid was about to blow.

Putting the House in Order

For a hierarchal organization that puts great emphasis on structure, the prospect of operating without leadership is a nightmare. As occupied as the remaining Brotherhood leadership was with finding a strategy to defeat the regime, the sustainability of the struggle and the very existence of the Brotherhood depended on their ability to replace those arrested with new leaders. Both for those who managed to escape and those still on the run inside Egypt, the task of putting the Brotherhood house in order could not be delayed.

In February 2014, the Egyptian Brotherhood held major elections in order to replace those arrested on the local and national levels. How the group managed to conduct these elections in such circumstances remains a mystery and testifies to its resilience. Unable to gather voters in one location, the elections were likely conducted by passing the vote from one person to the next. In the event, Mohamed Badei remained supreme guide despite languishing in jail, though effective control of the group passed to Mohamed Taha Wahdan.¹⁵ The fifty-four year old Wahdan, an agriculture professor, was previously responsible for the important Upbringing Division inside the group and had been elected in January 2012 to the Guidance Council. Other elected leaders include Guidance Council member Mohamed Kamal, parliamentarian Hussein Ibrahim, October 6 city Brotherhood leader Aly Batikh, and the Giza Brotherhood leader, Saad Eliwa (elected to the Guidance Council in January 2013). What was the fate of the previous Guidance Council members who remained outside of prison, such as Secretary General Mahmoud Hussein, Deputy Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ezzat, Deputy Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ghozlan, and Brotherhood religious authority Abdel Rahman al-Barr? No clear answer was provided. In December 2014, rumors began circulating that Mahmoud Hussein had been removed or sidelined as secretary general. The reason given was his statement against the Muslim Youth Uprising.¹⁶

Following the coup, the Brotherhood formed the National Alliance Supporting Legitimacy as an umbrella group for parties opposed to the new regime. In addition to the Brotherhood, the alliance included al-Wasat Party, the Salafi al-Watan Party, Gama’a Islamiya’s Building and Development Party, the Salafi Fadila and Asala parties, and other smaller groups. As months passed, the alliance began to crumble with most parties leaving it. In need of a new umbrella and eager to shed the Islamist label by positioning anti-coup activities as pan-Egyptian (Islamist and non-Islamists alike), the Brotherhood in August 2014 initiated the Egyptian Revolutionary Council.¹⁷ The council included a few non-Islamist faces that would be beneficial for the Brotherhood’s image in the West. Similarly, in December 2014, the Brotherhood gathered those parliamentarians who had managed to escape to Turkey and announced the reestablishment of the Egyptian parliament in exile.¹⁸ Neither move had much of an impact on developments in Egypt nor did many take either seriously, though the Egyptian Revolutionary Council proved useful to the Brotherhood in its attempts to secure meetings in Washington in January 2015. Putting pressure on the regime abroad remains a top Brotherhood priority.

Simultaneously, the Brotherhood devoted considerable energy to building a media infrastructure capable of carrying its message both to Egyptians and the West. Realizing that it cannot be totally dependent on al-Jazeera, despite the continued support the channel has shown them, Egyptian Islamists began forming satellite channels from Turkey. In 2013, Mekameleen TV (“We Continue”) began broadcasting.¹⁹ It was followed in December 2013 by Rab’a TV²⁰ and in April 2014 by al-Sharq TV (“The East”).²¹ While all of these channels are pro-Brotherhood, the group desired a TV channel completely under its own control. Thus, in August 2014 it launched Misr Alaan TV (“Egypt Now”).²²

These satellite channels target Egyptian audiences. Therefore, the Brotherhood focused on building an English language media arm, one that would not appear to be controlled by it directly. The task was carried by the London office. In July 2009, Brotherhood affiliates established Middle East Monitor to focus mainly on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.²³ Following the coup, the website shifted to focusing on Egypt, thereby providing Western readers the Brotherhood’s point of view. To supplement the message, Brotherhood affiliates launched Middle East Eye in February 2014.²⁴

With thousands of its members leaving Egypt, the Brotherhood was also in desperate need of organizing its expatriates. Initially, the Brotherhood focused on providing them housing and jobs. As conditions stabilized abroad, the focus shifted to creating the necessary structures to organize all international efforts. In January 2015, elections were held for Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood members no longer living in Egypt.²⁵ The new body, called the Administrative Office for Egyptians Abroad, comprised three members from Turkey, two from Qatar, one from Malaysia, and one from Sudan, thereby representing the countries to where members had escaped and settled down.¹ In April 2015, the office headed by Ahmed Abdel Rahman, formerly the secretary general in Faiyum governorate of the Freedom and Justice Party, was announced to the world.²⁷ In his first interview on al-Jazeera on April 22, Abdel Rahman declared that the new office would be solely responsible for managing the current crisis facing the Brotherhood in Egypt.²⁸ Lastly, in January 2015, the Brotherhood announced that it now had only one designated official spokesman, Mohamed Montaser. The name was an alias,²⁹ with an insider suggesting that in reality several people had access to the Montaser social media accounts.

Many questions remained unanswered. Many potential conflicts were looming on the horizon. What roles did the previous Guidance Council members now have in the Brotherhood? Was Mahmoud Hussein still the secretary general of the group? And what exactly was the role of the new office abroad? Up to that point, and in similar historical crises that the Brotherhood had faced in various countries, members residing abroad were overseen by the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, currently run by its secretary general, Ibrahim Mounir. Based in London, the seventy-eight year old Mounir had left Egypt and managed the Brotherhood in Europe for decades. What role would he have now? The seeds were planted for conflict.

All that is below bullets is peacefulness

As important as it was for the Brotherhood to put its house in order, the group could not ignore developments in Egypt and the growing pressure from its youth for a strategy to defeat the regime. In the absence of a strategy, Brotherhood members were growing restless. Their leadership had led them into a dark tunnel with no end in sight. The regime’s crackdown had certainly contributed to growing radicalization, but the problem went beyond that. The comradeship young Brothers shared with other Islamists during the previous year was beginning to bear fruit. Keen on portraying the struggle as one between Islam and the regime, the Brotherhood had courted Salafis and pushed them forward on its media platforms. Could a young Brother be blamed if he took the words of sheikhs like Mohamed Abdel Maksoud seriously if the group was hosting him on its channels? Could a young brother ignore the ranting of Revolutionary Salafist Mahmoud Fathy if the Brotherhood included him in its Anti-Coup Alliance?

The revolutionary upheaval that Egypt had undergone for the past few years had removed old constraints. Throughout the previous years, revolutionary forces had employed violence when it suited them, from torturing so-called “thugs” in Tahrir square to attacking police stations. Molotov cocktails had become the typical accessory for a day of protesting. While the Brotherhood had rejected violence against the regime in the past, its nonviolence was an act of expediency, as Ibrahim al-Hodeiby argues.³⁰ When circumstances necessitated the use of violence, as in the case of the Itihadiya clashes during Morsi’s rule, the Brotherhood did not shy away from it.

The coup and the Rab’a massacre answered the question for many. As one Brotherhood member proclaimed: “We don’t need law; we need revolutionary courts. We don’t need diplomacy; we need clarity.”³¹ The sentiment was not limited to young members. Fifty-six year old Amr Darrag, often described in the Western press as a Brotherhood moderate, declared that “the main lesson I learned is that gradual change would no longer work.”³² If Morsi was to be faulted, it was not because he and the Brotherhood ruled in a non-inclusive manner and alienated everyone else, but because he was not revolutionary enough and had not crushed the state institutions that had overthrown him. In his first media appearance, the new head of the Brotherhood’s office abroad apologized to the Egyptian people for adopting a reformist route.³³

As time passed, the pressure mounted. The protection units formed to protect Brotherhood demonstrators soon engaged in non-defensive acts. Why limit oneself to hurling a Molotov cocktail at officers who are disrupting a march when one can just throw it at a police station instead? It was the same police that was being targeted after all. And if the police were a permissible target, surely attacking infrastructure could be easier to rationalize given that it did not involve attacking individuals. Low-scale violent attacks became more frequent. A police station here, a police car there, it could all be theoretically justified. Egypt’s electricity grid became a favorite target with small bombs destroying electricity towers. Groups sprung up out of thin air: “Popular Resistance,” “Anonymous,” and “Revolutionary Punishment.”³⁴

Whether early attacks were planned or spontaneous remains an open question, but there is little doubt that as the pace of attacks accelerated and grew in sophistication, the Brotherhood’s new leadership signaled a green light. In his analysis of the Brotherhood’s strategy, Abdelrahman Ayyash writes, “the Muslim Brotherhood leadership appears wary of losing ground to its youth wing by outright opposing the use of violence.”³⁵ Given the regime pressure, the Brotherhood leadership reasoned that a complete rejection of such tactics would result in either a major split within the group or in the loss of a significant portion of its membership.³⁶ In the internal elections, many youth were elevated into leadership positions as a means of alleviating pressure from the leadership. In all cases, they were the ones leading the action on the ground. The regime crackdown had necessitated a decentralization of local operations, and communications between leadership and members were constrained. The leadership could do little besides push these members into leadership positions.³⁷

Besides, the leadership could have it both ways. Officially, the Brotherhood would not claim violent acts and maintain its pledge to nonviolence; in reality, the special units would bleed the regime to death. The new slogan, “All that is below bullets is peacefulness,” replaced the old slogan, “Our peacefulness is stronger than bullets.” After all, as a Brotherhood member lamented, “our peacefulness is not stronger than bullets.”³⁸ Allowing the special units to conduct these attacks would hurt the regime without committing the whole group to the path of violence. ³⁹ The calculation would prove mistaken as violence spiraled out of control.

It is at this critical moment that Shahid Bolsen would emerge on the Egyptian scene. As ideologues go, he was certainly odd. An American convert to Islam, he had been imprisoned in the U.A.E. for murdering a German citizen after luring him with the promise of sex with his maid. Following his October 2013 release, he made his way to Turkey. Through his friendship with U.A.E. Umma Party leader Hassan al-Dokki he was introduced to Fadila Party leader Mahmoud Fathy. Sharing a flat together, the two men clicked. Fadila had always adopted a heavier social justice component than other Islamist parties, and Bolsen’s odd mixture of Islamism and anti-capitalism and anti-globalization fell on welcome ears. Through Fathy, Bolsen would be introduced to other Egyptian Islamists; and through social media, his discourse would find a new audience. Bolsen’s rants proved appealing. Instead of attacking police stations, he instructed new groups to attack multinationals, KFCs, banks, and mobile operating companies. In Bolsen’s vision, the response to the coup should be “a campaign of targeted system disruption against multinational corporations that will slash profits and increase the cost of doing business, thus forcing them to withdraw their support to Sisi.”⁴⁰ If Bolsen was insane, the times were certainly equally insane for the Brotherhood.

The Genie’s out of the bottle

On May 19, 2015, Abdel Rahman al-Barr published two articles after months of complete silence. The first followed the expected lines: Morsi is the legitimate president, retribution is necessary, the coup leaders will be put on trial, the army has to withdraw from politics, and the police force needs to be reformed. The regime, he continued, was the one who wanted violence and was in fact behind the terrorist attacks which it planned in order to blame the revolutionaries.⁴¹ The article was a prelude for his second piece, in which he argued that the regime wanted to drag revolutionaries to violence in order to convince its international sponsors that it is fighting terrorism. Barr argued that this would allow the regime to legitimize its own violence and maintain loyalty amongst the troops. The Brotherhood had warned that some who suffer from the regime’s injustices would fail to understand the need for non-violence. This is precisely what the regime wants and revolutionaries should be aware of the violence trap.⁴²

If anyone doubted that there was a message being sent, those doubts were put to rest three days later when Deputy Supreme Guide Mahmoud Ghozlan similarly published an article following months of silence. Ghozlan went straight to the point: the Brotherhood is for peacefulness and rejects violence. It is for collective work, Shura, and rejects tyranny and individualism, as well as takfir. We will not abandon nonviolence, he proclaimed, and killing is strictly forbidden.⁴³ A message was clearly being sent, but the article’s comment section filled with disgruntled Brothers cursing its contents. Two days later, two articles were published in the same venue in response. Nonviolence cannot be adopted in the face of violence, these authors argued. That would not be peacefulness, but servility, humiliation and an abandonment of the path of jihad. No religion would accept that. Adopting such pacifism would make the Brotherhood no different than the Nour Party, which supported the coup. The coup had demonstrated that peaceful democratic change was a trick and change cannot take place through demonstrations or denunciations of the coup. Rights are not given but taken by force and jihad, a force that terrorizes the enemies of God. Ask Algerian Islamists, Morsi, Yemen’s Islamists, and Hamas if democracy worked for them, these writers argued. One author summarized the argument by stating that when he gave his allegiance to the Muslim Brotherhood he gave it to its slogan, “jihad is our way.”⁴⁴

The Muslim Brotherhood coup was announced four days later, with reports of seven members of the pre-coup Guidance Council meeting inside Egypt, including two deputy supreme guides, Mahmoud Ezzat and Mahmoud Ghozlan, as well as the group’s mufti, Abdel Rahman al-Barr. The very fact that Ezzat was inside Egypt shocked members and observers alike. He had disappeared completely as the coup took place and most observers assumed that he was in Gaza. Other decisions quickly followed. Besides Mahmoud Hussein referring to himself as the secretary general of the Brotherhood, it was announced that the office abroad would fall under the command of the International Organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴⁵ Framing all that was a clear message that the Brotherhood’s usurpers lacked legitimacy and had diverted from the right path.

If the old guard expected the new leadership to toe the line, they were in for a huge surprise. This was not your father’s Muslim Brotherhood where members would salute and obey. Social media was abuzz with curses as Brotherhood members tweeted under the hashtag, “We will not turn backwards.” Mohamed Montaser has echoed these sentiments. Adopting the revolutionary path was a strategic decision and there would be no turning back.⁴⁶ The unbreakable Muslim Brotherhood was about to be broken.

What had driven Ezzat and his colleagues to make their move knowing that even their meeting would pose a security risk? (That risk was made real a few days later when security forces finally apprehended Ghozlan and Barr). In the immediate aftermath of the crisis, some attributed the dispute to an alleged secret visit by Mahmoud Hussein and Ibrahim Mounir to Iran.⁴⁷ Hussein quickly denied the rumor.⁴⁸ In reality no visit to Iran was necessary; the storm had been gathering for months.

At the heart of the struggle were two issues: organization and strategy. On the organizational front, the old guard contended that no new elections for the Guidance Council had taken place. Instead, facing the regime crackdown, what remained of the Guidance Council had added six new figures to a crisis management committee but not to its membership. These crisis managers then overstepped their roles and crossed the line.⁴⁹

But if that was the case, why had they been silent since February 2014 when the elections were held? Moreover, Ibrahim Mounir had himself touted these elections in one September 2014 interview.⁵⁰ In truth, the organizational problem for the old guard was not the election in Egypt, but the one that took place abroad and resulted in the creation of the Administrative Office for Egyptians Abroad. The clash between Ibrahim Mounir and the new body had spun the old guard into action. Mahmoud Hussein had similarly been marginalized by the new office, which in April had attempted to wrestle control of the Brotherhood’s financial portfolio from him.⁵¹

But the organizational struggle was the less important factor in pushing the old guard to go public. It was developments in Egypt pertaining to the strategy to confront the regime that drove these men to break their silence.

One day prior to the coup announcement, a statement titled Nidaa al-Kinana (Egypt Call) signed by 159 religious scholars from across the Muslim world was released.⁵² Signatories included a who’s who of international Brotherhood religious scholars, as well as Egyptian Salafis who had sided with the Brotherhood since the coup. These included Cairo Activist Salafi Sheikh Mohamed Abdel Maksoud, Salafi Call’s former leader Sa’id Abdel ‘Azeem, and Sorouri Atiya ‘Adlan. The statement opened by declaring its intent to explain the religious position to the Egyptian regime. The ruling regime in Egypt was declared criminal and murderous, as it had committed sins and breached forbidden things. It was the religious duty of the whole Muslim Umma to resist the regime. The religious verdict extended not only to the rulers, but to judges, officers, soldiers, select religious leaders, the media, and politicians. All of them were deemed murderers and the religious edict on murderers (death) was applied to them. To call it a declaration of war is an understatement. Brotherhood spokesman Mohamed Montaser endorsed it, calling it “one of the main bases determining the correctness of the Brotherhood’s path.”⁵³ The website hosting the statement invited anyone agreeing with it to add their endorsement. To date, over 626,400 people have done so.

The old guard’s attempt to regain control was not simply an act driven by a paternal sense of ownership and belief that they alone knew the Brotherhood line, as some have argued. ⁵⁴ Instead, it was driven by a real fear that violence on the ground was growing out of control and risked dragging the whole group into the abyss. Celebrating six months of attacks, the Revolutionary Punishment movement boasted of killing or wounding 157 and 452 security personal, respectively, while destroying 162 cars and 53 buildings of “Camp David’s military.”⁵⁵

While younger members look to Syria with admiration, the old guard remains afraid of the Syria of the 1980s. At the time, the Brotherhood had taken up arms against the Assad regime; the result was its complete annihilation across the country.⁵⁶ The old guard had learned that a clash with the state was a losing proposition with profound ramifications for the whole organization. Keeping the group intact until circumstances in Egypt change remains a top priority.⁵⁷

At the heart of the Brotherhood crisis sit two competing visions. Neither side can claim a coherent strategy. The old guard believes that the Egyptian regime should be given a chance to implode on its own. In this view, a combination of economic decline, security failure, and growing discontent will lead either to self-destruction, an internal coup, or Western intervention by pressuring for reconciliation.⁵⁸ To maintain momentum, demonstrations need to continue even if they do not produce immediate results. Simultaneously, the Brotherhood needs to keep the pressure on the West by warning that the fate of Iraq and Syria awaits Egypt if they don’t move. By maintaining a semblance of non-violence, the Brotherhood can continue to claim that it is the moderate alternative to the Islamic State. It is betting on time and changing regional dynamics, especially a rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia under King Salman.⁵⁹ It is this perspective that informed Yusuf Nada when he penned an open letter to Egyptian officers warning them that Egypt is on the road to failed state status, like Iraq, Syria, Libya and Yemen. Nada called on the army to revolt in return for the Brotherhood abandoning Morsi’s legitimacy.⁶⁰

On the opposite side, the new leadership, and behind it the Brotherhood’s rank and file, believes that only by bleeding the regime can it be brought to its knees. If the old guard warned of repeating the crisis of 1954 when Nasser crushed the group, it is precisely their leadership and actions that led the Brotherhood to a situation today that is worse than 1954.⁶¹ A regional deal is precisely what they fear as it would mean that all their sacrifices would have been in vain and their tormentors would not be punished. Their war with the regime is no longer about Morsi and the coup; in fact, Sisi’s removal would solve nothing for them. Instead, the struggle is an ideological one between Islam and apostasy, between right and wrong, between them and the “Army of Camp David” and its “Zionist masters.” Such a struggle stems from a worldview that allows no compromise.

Conclusion

In the days following the Brotherhood implosion, the Egyptian regime not only arrested Ghozlan and Barr from the old guard, but also managed to arrest Saad Eleiwa from the new leadership on June 18. This followed the arrest of the new effective Supreme Guide Wahdan on May 27. With leaders from both sides taken out of the scene, the media war went silent. But behind the scenes the infighting continued. The fight raged between Brother and Brother, between father and son; “the clash of ideas was splitting the Brotherhood into two.”⁶²

The Brotherhood may still hope to have it both ways. Before the clash, the Brotherhood’s statement endorsing jihad in Arabic on January 27 was removed from its website; and the group issued a statement three days later, in English, denouncing violence.⁶³ On May 17, Mohamed Montaser called for a revolution to cut heads. Following his statement committing to the revolutionary path on May 28, he seemed to backtrack on June 25 by calling on the Brotherhood youth to be careful not to slip into a cycle of violence.⁶⁴ His shift was in response to the horror of the Revolutionary Punishment’s assassination of a civilian which it accused of cooperating with the regime,⁶⁵ and a realization that such acts would tie the Brotherhood to violence and end any prospect of the Brotherhood regaining public support. The shift was short-lived, however. Following the regime’s liquidation of nine Brotherhood leaders on July 1, Montaser released a statement that declared “the Muslim Brotherhood affirms that the assassination of its leaders is a turning point that has ramifications and by which the criminal, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, founded a new phase in which there cannot be control on the anger of the oppressed segments that will not accept to die in their homes and between their families.”⁶⁶

Can any of the competing leadership camps stop the cycle of violence and maintain the group’s cohesion? What will become of the Muslim Brotherhood? Will the old guard win or will the youth take over the group? Can balance be maintained or will the Brotherhood finally breakup? One thing is certain: the current balancing act is impossible to sustain over the long run. On July 2, one Brotherhood leader, Ashraf Abdel Gaffar, was adamant that the Brotherhood did not endorse complete peacefulness and that peacefulness was not absolute. Instead, it allowed for tactical operations such as bombing power stations.⁶⁷ The next day he doubled down, arguing that peacefulness as adopted by the Brotherhood comes in degrees that includes anything but murder and that blocking roads or burning police cars was acceptable. After all, the army, he argued, was working for Israel.⁶⁸ The radicalization of the Brotherhood rank and file is now beyond the ability of any leadership to control. As Abdelrahman Ayyash argues, the Salafist-Jihadist discourse has insinuated itself among Brotherhood members.⁶⁹ Following the Brotherhood’s open clash, its nemesis, Salafi Call leader Abdel Monem al-Shahat, lamented the slow rise of violence and takfiri discourse within the group. Young members were now being led by satellite channels and takfiri sheikhs who appeared on their screens. These included Salama Abdl Qawy and Wagdi Ghonim.⁷⁰

In the aftermath of the Brotherhood clash, a former member wrote an article that created a stir. Mohamed Abbas had left the group and joined the Egyptian Current, hailed by the Western press as one of the moderate Brotherhood youth groups. In his article, he called for a fourth founding of the Muslim Brotherhood, noting that the group had seen three previous foundings at the hands of Hassan al-Banna, Sayed Qutb, and Omar al-Tilmisani. This time the founding would not take place at the hands of an exceptional leader as the base was now driving and leading the group together with Islamists from outside the Brotherhood. Tilmisani’s methodology of operating within the system and competing in elections was finished. The Brotherhood now realizes it has been deceived with concepts like democracy, inclusiveness, and serving people. These concepts have been replaced with “jihad is our way,” struggle over control and not simply ruling, and politics as a way to implement Sharia instead of serving the people. He ended on a dramatic note. One day a man will come and ask the fourth founding leaders to step aside in order to declare the fifth founding: the Islamic Caliphate.⁷¹

Sooner or later one side will win or the group will disintegrate. On one side, the old guard enjoys historical prestige and remains in control of the Brotherhood’s finances as well as its international arm. On the other side are the radicalized members paying the heaviest price in blood. These men are no longer committed to operating within the concept of the nation state. Their legitimacy stems from their sacrifices and they alone are in control of the Brotherhood Street. They also dominate the media.⁷² The Brotherhood pyramid is today inverted with the base dragging the leadership forward. The struggle is no longer as it was portrayed before the revolution between Qutbists and Reformers.⁷³ The Qutbists of old are the current doves.

This is not the first time the Brotherhood has faced a leadership struggle. From Shabab Mohamed’s fight with Banna over his willingness to operate within a system governed by man-made laws in 1940, Ahmed al-Sokary’s fight with Banna over leadership in 1947, and the special apparatus and its challenge to Hassan al-Hodeiby in the 1950’s, to the Sayed Qutb prison challenge in 1965, the Wasat Party split in 1995, and Abdel Monem Aboul Fetouh in 2011, the Brotherhood had had its share of internal crisis.⁷⁴ Despite these splits, the optimists argue, the group has survived. In truth, the Brotherhood did not survive Nasser’s crackdown. Had the Islamist revival not been taking place on university campuses when the Brotherhood’s leaders emerged from twenty years of imprisonment in the 1970s, it is doubtful the Brotherhood would exist today.

The future has not been written yet, but one thing is certain. As journalist Abdel Rahman Youssef put it, “The question is not whether the Muslim Brotherhood will change, but how it will change and what is the extent of that change.”⁷⁵

About the author:
*Samuel Tadros is a Senior Fellow at the Hudson Institute.

Source:
This article was published by the Hudson Institute as part of Current Trends in Islamist Ideology

Notes:
¹ “A coup inside the Muslim Brotherhood,” Masr Al Arabia, May 28, 2015. ↝