Sri Lanka President Maithripala Sirisena said Friday he would open a discourse on enforcing of capital punishment for the convicts of heinous crimes.

Sirisena said though he has powers to take a direct decision in that regard, he expects to inquire about the compliance of everybody in the Parliament as a country respects democracy.

Sirisena stated, as a leader who respects the moral principles he would pay strict attention to the demands of the people to enforce the capital punishment for the convicts of the brutal assassination of Seya Sadewmi and other child rape victims.

The President made these remarks, participating at the ceremony of the second phase of the national program on drug prevention held at the Town Hall Playground in Galle.

Sirisena emphasized that new laws and regulations should be enforced over the rape cases, child abuse, robberies, murders and every heinous crime occurred in the country today.

Sirisena also stated that the government will be fully committed to make the program to build a drug free country successful within next few years, though the drug menace cannot be fully eradicated from the society. He requested the police and all officials not to bow down to any force when they conduct raids and take legal actions against those who engage in such activities. He also stated the government would strengthen the officials who properly activate laws and always protect them and defend their actions.

Sirisena recalled that the new government suspended every license which has been issued bypassing the process of issuing licenses for liquor stores. He added the government’s expectation is to remove excise revenue from the alcohol and tobacco sales from the national budget in the future.

Sirisena said the most severe difficulties he had undergone were when he faced challenge of standing against drugs and taken decisions on drug issue. “Today, as the President, I will do my best to build a drug free country”, he promised.

The second phase of the national program ‘Mathin Nidahas Ratak’ (A Drug Free Country) has been held covering the Galle District was commenced 14th of this month. Its completion ceremony was held today under the patronage of President Maithripala Sirisena.

Positions of Drug Prevention Animator were offered to 150 school children, selected from the schools in Galle District to make the drug prevention program popular.

The President also launched the official website of “Mathin Thora Ratak (A Drug Free Country)”.

Religious leaders including the Maha Sanga, Ministers and Members of parliament, Inspector General of Police, Senior Officers of Security Forces, Principles of the schools in Southern Province, teachers and school children also participated in this ceremony.

By Ashok Alex*

Since taking over office in May 2014 Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s foreign policy engagements have taken him to several countries far across in Asia, Europe and Lain America, but it took nearly an year and a half for the PM to make a visit to one of the countries in the gulf region which is part of India’s extended neighbourhood. Not only does the Gulf shares historical and cultural ties with India but it is also vital to India’s energy security, as well as is the source of bread and butter for more than 6 million Indians working in the region and to their families back home here.

The last visit by an Indian Prime Minister to the GCC nation was that of Manmohan Singh’s visit to Saudi Arabia in 2010, a year just before the Arab Spring got unfolded which further led to significant geostrategic implications in the region.

As far as UAE is concerned though there had been visits by two of India’s former presidents APJ Abdul Kalam and Prathiba Patil in 2003 and 2010, there were no significant political outputs of these. The last PM to visit to UAE was Mrs Indira Gandhi in 1981. Both India and UAE have gone a long way since 1981. India under Mrs. Gandhi then was an ardent supporter of the Palestinian cause and followed a non-aligned path in its pursuit of foreign policy. Today India has not only discarded its non aligned tradition of foreign policy but also pursues robust diplomatic relations with Israel. Similarly UAE which was then on the path of progress as a result of the oil boom had become one of the richest countries in the world and is currently in the process of transforming itself from a rentier economy to a knowledge based one.

When it comes to West Asia, looking at the complexities involved in the region, India had to take a balanced and cautious approach while dealing with Iran and the Arab states on the one hand and Israel on the other. While interests of energy security and expatriate welfare tops India’s relation with the Arab nations, it is the thriving defense and strategic interests that is the hallmark of relations with the Jewish state; the Arab-Persian rivalry has also made India’s engagement in the region jittery to some point. However, the Iran nuclear deal reached between Iran and the P5+1 has given some amount of relief to India and to the gulf monarchies especially to UAE which has long standing territorial disputes with Iran and to Saudi Arabia for its pursuit for regional hegemony. Though India’s political engagement with UAE had been relatively stagnant over the three decades, the economic relations had prospered to the extent that the gulf Arab nation had become India’s third largest trading partner with a trade volume of nearly $60 Billion.

One of the significant milestones of Modi’s visit to UAE has been the upgradation of the normal bilateral ties to the level of strategic partnership and UAE’s support for India’s candidature to the UN Security council. It was not surprising that terrorism became one of the focal points of discussion especially in the new scenario of advent of the ISIS in the region. In the past UAE had been used as a safe haven by some of the anti-India elements based in Pakistan. However, as a result of the close cooperation between the India and UAE, there had been arrests and deportation of several terrorists from Dubai who were most wanted by the former.

In fact, during Modi’s visit UAE has assured that it will adopt India’s proposed comprehensive convention on International terrorism in the United Nations which will be major breakthrough. Being the members of the Indian Ocean Association of Regional Cooperation, the safety and security of the Indian Ocean lays prime importance to both the nations and it is here where the both the countries can cooperate in making the region a zone of peace. On the matters of security aspect there are existing treaties on extradition, legal assistance on civil and criminal matters, maritime cooperation and intelligence exchanges. India has already signed the memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation with UAE way back in 2003.

On the economic front in spite of the falling global crude oil prices the PM was able to garner an investment of about $75 billion especially in infrastructure development, industrial houses based in UAE can further become a part of India’s ‘Make in India Campaign’ especially in the defence manufacturing sector, but the question on how these investments could be implemented in the speedy projects is yet to be seen. In the past many of the foreign investments had faced severe stumbling blocks as a result of political and bureaucratic scuffles.

The smart city project in Kerala is a classic example to this. While the land allotted for the construction of a temple is a good gesture, one significant area that Mr Modi had untouched was the plight of Indian labour workers in UAE, though he visited a residential camp of the labourers and appreciated the community for enhancing India’s pride, there was no official statement relating to any of the problems faced by the mass Indian migrant workers in UAE.

The increasing Emiratisation of the private sector is a source of worry to Indians who constitute nearly 30% of UAE’s workforce. Apart from the traditional trade in hydrocarbons, there has to be new frontiers of cooperation especially in space technology, including joint development and launch of satellites, renewable energy and building of a knowledge economy.

Though Islamic, UAE is a moderate country which is very similar to India’s multicultural society. Not only India has the potential to contribute to UAE’s ‘Vision 2021’, but the two countries can jointly work towards the vision of a 21st century Asia. Though it took more three decades for the two countries to re-engage at the highest political level, the prime minister’s visit did make some significant accomplishments.

*Ashok Alex Luke is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at CMS College, Kottayam (Kerala). He can be reached at ashokalexjnu@gmail.com

Spain’s Ministry for Home Affairs will give 823,500 euros to the Spanish Red Cross in 2016 – twice the amount provided in 2015 – for the development of social and humanitarian care programs at Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals, which will enable this institution to expand the services it provides to the Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals in Valencia, Murcia and Algeciras, as well as those in Madrid and Barcelona.

This measure by the Spanish Ministry for Home Affairs, which will be launched next year, forms part of the initiatives adopted by this ministerial department that also include an agreement signed on Thursday by the Minister for Home Affairs, Jorge Fernández Díaz, and the President of the Spanish Red Cross, Javier Senent, to also provide social and humanitarian assistance at the Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals in Madrid and Barcelona. The financial aid to be provided under the agreement amounts to 400,000 in 2015.

An agreement was signed at the headquarters of the Ministry for Home Affairs that observes the rights of those people admitted to the Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals to receive social and humanitarian assistance, both from the services provided by the centre itself (managed under the Ministry for Home Affairs) and from the public or private, governmental or non-governmental, national or international immigrant protection organizations.

The following actions will be funded with the 400,000 euros being given to the Spanish Red Cross by the government:

• Support for all those admitted, especially language interpretation, relations with family members overseas and the processing of documents
• Liaison between families in Spain and the countries of origin
• Social mediation, fostering dialogue and mutual understanding between those admitted and the authorities to prevent or reduce possible conflicts
• Provision of information on the requirements for requesting international protection, as appropriate
• Acting as a partner on efforts to plan and develop all sorts of activities at the centers

According to the Spanish government, besides demonstrating the commitment from the Ministry for Home Affairs to the people admitted to the Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals, this agreement seeks to provide an urgent, suitable and effective response to the growing needs from the people admitted to these centers.

Of the 400,000 euros being given for 2015, 188,000 euros have been allocated to the Internment Center for Foreign Nationals in Madrid. The same amount has been allocated to the Internment Center for Foreign Nationals in Barcelona and 24,000 euros have been allocated to oversight activities.

An oversight committee will be set up to supervise this agreement on the provision of social and humanitarian assistance at Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals. It will be equally formed by two representatives from each one of the signatories and will meet on a regular basis to review progress, resolve potential difficulties and, in general, propose and agree – as appropriate – any measures capable of ensuring the best possible development of the activities defined in the agreement to meet the corresponding objectives.

The agreement highlights that the admittance of foreign citizens to the Internment Centers for Foreign Nationals, which are not penitentiary in nature, must always take place in an orderly fashion and under judicial control. Their function and purpose is to guarantee the effective nature of both the processing and implementation of expulsion and return measures that may be applied to those admitted, considering the admittance thereof throughout their time at the center as an interim or provisional measure.

By Preety Sahu*

The Law Commission of India submitted its 262nd report on August 31, 2015, ‘The Death Penalty’ in India. The report says, “…the Commission feels that time has come for India to move towards abolition of the death penalty… The Commission accordingly recommends that the death penalty be abolished for all crimes other than terrorism related offences and waging war… Sincerely hopes that the movement towards absolute abolition will be swift and irreversible.”

However, for several key reasons it seems early to think of abolishing death sentencing in the country. Although the Commission has justly pointed out that the abolition of capital punishment should be swift, its remark that time has come for India to abolish death penalty does not seem agreeable. The societal conditions, upbringing, norms etc. in the country are yet to become progressive. The ever-escalating atrocious and scandalous crimes in the Indian society refute the Commission’s belief that “Development in India (Social & Economic Conditions) are vastly different now”. Crimes against women, socially and economically backward sections and children bring both individual and societal injuries that are widespread and do not demonstrate significant social development in India. Also it is objectionable that only terrorism-related offences should be worthy of sentence to death. Murders, not committed in self defence, and rape are as grave as terrorism in nature; because their impact and the harm caused is vast.

The very essence of the justice system is that guilty people must be punished in proportion to the severity of their crime. Justice requires offenders to suffer for their doing, in a way appropriate to their offence. And imposition of appropriate punishment is the manner in which a welfare state should respond to the society’s cry for justice. Abolishing death penalty absolutely may endanger the very essence of justice. Because limiting its paradigms on whatever grounds may raise doubts on its impartial character. The Commission’s argument for prohibiting death penalty because of “judicial developments on the arbitrary and subjective application of the death penalty” can also be nullified on the ground that prohibiting death penalty is not an appropriate step to meet this challenge. Moreover, courts in India are already becoming averse to death penalty. Although a large number of convicts are routinely awarded death penalty, but the cases of actual executions are rare.

There are more profound reasons to support relevance of death penalty for the time being. Providing capital punishment for grave offences provides some kind of deterrence to the society against potential crimes and criminals i.e., by creating fear of death penalty among potential criminals. It is argued that such deterrence does not work. In fact the Law Commission has provided a gist of the same view in its recent report. The report says, “Death Penalty as a Deterrent is a Myth.” However, it is necessary to point out that statistical evidence doesn’t confirm that deterrence works, but it doesn’t show that deterrence doesn’t work either. And there is a reason why such deterrence is not very effective in India. Deterrence is most effective when the punishment happens soon after the crime. To make an analogy; a child learns not to put his or her finger in the fire, because the consequence is instant pain. The more the legal process distances the punishment from the crime – either by time, or certainty – the less effective a deterrent will the punishment be.

In India, the investigation and trial system is so slow that it minimizes the deterrence of death penalty and other punishments. Again, in cases of rape and assassination, providing life sentence instead of capital punishment creates an unwilling situation for the whole society, as the public funds are used in maintenance and protection of the guilty till their natural death; which also adds to the dilemma of the victims, their family and friends, and society as a whole.

Of course capital punishment doesn’t rehabilitate the prisoner and return them to society. Yet in some cases persons condemned to death repent, express remorse, and very often experience profound spiritual rehabilitation before their execution. It may be discarded as an argument in favor of capital punishment, but it demonstrates that death penalty can lead to some form of rehabilitation. Also life imprisonment does not protect society without parole. The offender may no longer be a danger to the public, but the burden of maintaining them, their protection, and preventing them from escaping the cell is perennial. Executions eradicate that danger. It is irrefutable that those who are executed cannot commit further crimes. Again, ‘plea bargaining’ is used in many cases of life sentence for severe offences. It is a process through which a criminal gets a reduced sentence. This may deprive the victim from due justice.

The Supreme Court most notably adopted the ‘rarest of the rare’ guideline in some death penalty related cases. Those crimes that arouse collective shock and social wrath are categorized as ‘rarest of the rare’. This may remove alleged arbitrariness from death penalty. However, the ‘rarest of the rare’ guideline should be more inclusive in its scope. Capital punishment must be due for offences like heinous rapes and assassination, vicious assassination, multiple killings that pose deep indignation to human life. Also, it is important to be considerate about the victim too. In some cases a punishment less than commutation of death may take away the faith of the victim in the judiciary itself. Therefore, at the present juncture, it is inappropriate to risk the abolition of death penalty completely. Of course, sufficient measures should be taken to avoid the loopholes to ensure an appropriate verdict system in the country.

To conclude, if death verdict is to be replaced in the near future, it has to be replaced with a uniformly serious punishment. So there should be no question of prohibiting capital punishment before a compatible alternative is found.

*Preety Sahu is Research Scholar, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. She can be reached at editor@spsindia.in

Kyrgyzstan’s prime minster, Temir Sariyev, says that his country now has more mosques than schools, something that he described as “a dangerous trend” for the future. But while that may be so, other reports suggest may not reflect the real balance of influence between the two.

Sariyev says that in Kyrgyzstan now, there are 2669 mosques and 67 medressahs, compared to 2027 schools and 52 higher educational institutions, a reflection, he says, of the desire of many wealthy people to build mosques in their own honor and of the absence of a desire to build schools (fergananews.com/articles/8693).

Kyrgyzstan officials say that there are too few schools, something that results in overcrowding, too few people willing to teach because of low salaries, and too much uncontrolled internal migration which means that there are often far more children at any one place, such as the capital Bishkek, that officials had planned on.

Most of the country’s schools were built in Soviet times and in the capital even before World War II. Some are in poor repair, and administrators often try to extract money from parents seeking to gain admission for their children nominally to fix up the schools but in fact to pocket because of low salaries.

Teacher salaries are low and often now paid in a timely fashion. The problem is especially critical in public schools where salaries are lower than in private ones and in subject areas like Russian language and the hard sciences where those who have the skills to teach them have other more profitable opportunities.

And these problems, Kygyzstan officials concede, have led to serious overcrowding, The Schools of Bishkek were planned for 74,695 students; but at the start of the last academic year, there were 120,229 enrolled. More have arrived this year, pushing up class size and forcing the schools into two or more shifts.

But the number of schools as compared to the number of mosques may not tell the whole story, despite what officials and some analysts fear. In neighboring Uzbekistan, for example, both government officials and mullahs are on the warpath now against waltzes and showings of “Love Story” in local weddings (islamsng.com/uzb/news/9674).

Both officials and mullahs say such things are inconsistent with national and religious values. However, they just happen to be what young people want, an indication that the power of the internet may be greater than the power of either the public schools or the mosques to determine choices.

Saudi Arabia’s Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Salman has condemned Israel for its blatant attacks on worshippers at Al-Aqsa Mosque.

The king has spoken on phone with US President Barack Obama, Russian President Vladimir Putin, British Prime Minister David Cameron, French President Francois Hollande and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to express his concerns over Israel’s actions.

He called on the UN Security Council to take urgent measures to stop the violations at Al-Aqsa Mosque, protect the Palestine people and holy sites, and ensure Israel grants Palestinians sovereignty, according to the SPA.

He said the attacks violate the sanctity of religions, and contribute to extremism and violence in the world. The Saudi government would hold the Israelis fully responsible for the aggression, the report stated.

Saudi officials warned that Israel’s actions violate the sanctity of the third holiest site in Islam, and are incompatible with the principles of international law.
One official warned that the Zionist regime’s actions would escalate the conflict in the region. He also slammed the Israelis for trying to divide Al-Aqsa.

King Salman had informed Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas that he had been in contact with world leaders regarding the mosque and had asked Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir to take measures to protect Al-Aqsa, according to reports.

The Israeli police entered the compound to disperse protesters this week, in a move that sparked condemnation across the Arab world and concern that the tensions could spiral out of control, according to reports.

Is the current refugee crisis gripping the European Union “all America’s fault”? That is how my critique of US foreign policy was characterized in a recent interview on the Fox Business Channel. I do not blame the host for making this claim, but I think it is important to clarify the point.

It has become common to discount any criticism of US foreign policy as “blaming America first.” It is a convenient way of avoiding a real discussion. If aggressive US policy in the Middle East – for example in Iraq – results in the creation of terrorist organizations like al-Qaeda in Iraq, is pointing out the unintended consequences of bad policy blaming America? Is it “blaming America” to point out that blowback – like we saw on 9/11 – can be the result of unwise US foreign policy actions like stationing US troops in Saudi Arabia?

In the Fox interview I pointed out that the current refugee crisis is largely caused by bad US foreign policy actions. The US government decides on regime change for a particular country – in this case, Syria – destabilizes the government, causes social chaos, and destroys the economy, and we are supposed to be surprised that so many people are desperate to leave? Is pointing this out blaming America, or is it blaming that part of the US government that makes such foolish policies?

Accusing those who criticize US foreign policy of “blaming America” is pretty selective, however. Such accusations are never leveled at those who criticize a US pullback. For example, most neocons argue that the current crisis in Iraq is all Obama’s fault for pulling US troops out of the country. Are they “blaming America first” for the mess? No one ever says that. Just like they never explain why the troops were removed from Iraq: the US demanded complete immunity for troops and contractors and the Iraqi government refused.

Iraq was not a stable country when the US withdrew its troops anyway. As soon as the US stopped paying the Sunnis not to attack the Iraqi government, they started attacking the Iraqi government. Why? Because the US attack on Iraq led to a government that was closely allied to Iran and the Sunnis could not live with that! It was not the US withdrawal from Iraq that created the current instability but the invasion. The same is true with US regime change policy toward Syria. How many Syrians were streaming out of Syria before US support for Islamist rebels there made the country unlivable? Is pointing out this consequence of bad US policy also blaming America first?

Last year I was asked by another Fox program whether I was not “blaming America” when I criticized the increasingly confrontational US stand toward Russia. Here’s how I put it then:

I don’t blame America. I am America, you are America. I don’t blame you. I blame bad policy. I blame the interventionists. I blame the neoconservatives who preach this stuff, who believe in it like a religion — that they have to promote American goodness even if you have to bomb and kill people.

In short, I don’t blame America; I blame neocons.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

By John O. Kakonge*

All societies – from the smallest communities to the largest nations – need leaders. Leaders are essential to their societies for a wide variety of reasons, such as: to regulate disputes, to oversee economic and social actions and decisions, and to promote social cohesion. Since the formation of the very first primitive societies formed, the pattern has been for one person to take charge, and usually by dint of force. The problem arises – now just as it did in those early societies – of what to do when a leader dies or becomes incapable of governing. Although for thousands of years this has been recognized as a problem, all societies continue to grapple with the task of political succession and to hunt for ways of ensuring this in a socially acceptable and workable manner.

In contemporary society, succession is of course a political problem and in most organized social units, from countries to the smallest organized communities, the choice of a successor is left to a subset of the respective group, tribe, town or country – namely “the Party” – after which elections of some sort may be held. The process for the selection of the successor may not mean that the best potential leader is chosen, only that the chosen person is best able to influence and affect the selection process.

In Africa and in other developing regions, we have all too often seen that the selected and supposedly “elected” successor does not represent the interests of all people, but may have simply intimidated the inner circle of his party into selecting him (or, much more rarely, her). Generally speaking, in the twenty-first century, it has become accepted that the strongest, most vociferous and most forceful politician cannot simply ascend to leadership by killing his predecessor and any other contenders – and this in turn has diminished the number of so-called “wars of succession”. This shift towards a more enlightened form of succession notwithstanding, Black (2001) argues that in the Islamic world, authority has remained tied over very long periods to outstanding individuals and their resulting dynasties.

Finding a new leader is not the end of the matter, however. Shedding those who are already in office and do not wish to leave, even when constitutionally barred from holding on to their posts, remains a problem, especially in Africa. It is a sad reflection on many African political systems that so many leaders do not want to relinquish their posts and ensure a peaceful handover of power.

In order to understand why peaceful and truly democratic succession has been so elusive in many African countries, it is perhaps useful to explore the reasons underlying the reluctance of African leaders to hand over the reins of office.

THE ‘BIG MAN’ SYNDROME

Many leaders suffer from the ‘Big Man’ syndrome. They are convinced that no other politician could possibly know as much as they do about anything that matters, and they firmly believe that they will always be their country’s best possible ruler. They respect only themselves – although occasionally one of their own children, or just possibly a sibling, may be considered worthy to succeed them. Any country where the succession is a forbidden subject is probably run by such a “big man” (again, women are rarely found in this role). Dissidents are silenced in whatever way is most convenient – threat, exile, imprisonment, or even death.

The nonagenarian President Mugabe of Zimbabwe is a prime example. He differed last year with his vice president and favoured protégée Joyce Mujuru: she was promptly dropped from the Cabinet and then expelled from the ruling party ZANU-PF, because she “was causing division and hostility within the party” (SAPA, 2014). Other examples may be seen in Senegal, where President Wade refused to step down, and Burkina Faso, where former President Campaore sought to set aside the constitutional limit to the number of terms he could serve. The Big Men forget that theirs is not a permanent job.

FEAR OF RETRIBUTION

Kleptomaniac leaders are loath to relinquish power since their successors may prosecute them and members of their families for corruption and malfeasance. The leading contender in this category is probably the late Mobutu Sese Seko, who famously robbed the people of the Congo for years. Another possible contender is Dr. Mahathir Mohamed, former Prime Minister of Malaysia, who managed during his tenure to gather all power into his hands alone (Economist, 1998). He was totally preoccupied with political survival, which led to him sacking his anointed successor, Anwar Ibrahim. A few years later, Dr. Mahathir Mohamed was finally constrained meekly to hand over power to someone he had picked and got endorsed by the ruling party. Other countries which have experienced such kleptocratic rule include Uganda, Rwanda, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Equatorial Guinea, Chad and Cameroon.

INSULAR DECISION MAKING

Presidents almost all have advisors, who can exacerbate the problem of succession by isolating the leaders that they serve, shielding them from differing perspectives and deflecting popular sentiment. Many of these advisors have a vested interest in hanging on to their influential posts, which may represent a source of immense economic power and patronage. Clearly, they may also encourage their benefactor to stay in place for their own personal gain, knowing full well that, if there is a change of power, they will lose their posts and influence. If they have committed crimes, they will be prosecuted and whatever property they have amassed will be at risk of seizure. One example of such an ill-advised leader is former President Wade of Senegal, who refused to step down after two terms of six years until an election proved that the people did not want him. According to former President Obasanjo of Nigeria, who mediated this particular conflict, Wade’s problem was that his advisors wanted him to stay. In many cases, advisers tell the president what he wants to hear – not the truth.

FAILURE TO GROOM LEGITIMATE SUCCESSORS

In many countries, political leaders groom their siblings, close relatives or friends to succeed them, often in the hope that they can thus avoid any drastic retaliation for their actions when in office. This practice has been observed in Togo, Gabon, the DRC and other countries. Not all such favouritism is bad, however, successors to high political office will not come from nowhere and incumbent leaders can play a major role in ensuring that worthy people are ready to assume office when they move on. Thus, President Mandela groomed Thabo Mbeki to take over from him. Michael Saata, president of Zambia, is given credit for developing young Zambian leaders. According to the editor (2013) of the Zambian Times, most important politicians in the country today have passed in one way or the other through the tutorship of Michael Saata. Ironically, despite the criticism that China is not a democratic state, it has a well-articulated system of grooming its political successors. As observed by Wong and Ansfield (2011), the former president of China, Hu Jintao, had begun preparing for his departure from power, passing the baton to his presumed successor, vice-president Xi Jinping. Are there lessons for Africa to learn from China?

Experience shows that an electorate is unlikely to vote for someone whom the incumbent has groomed or who has served as deputy to the leader, if the outgoing president was unpopular. In some cases, the groomed successor may feign loyalty to his patron in order to secure presidential support to win an election. Immediately after the election, however, the president elect may then disassociate himself from his predecessor because he wants to be his own man. This was the case with former President Bingu wa Mutharika of Malawi and his predecessor President Mulusi (BBC News, 2012).

Similarly, candidates may be elected because they associate themselves with a popular president and statesman who enjoyed wide popular support. Thus, in Ghana, a number of presidential candidates, notably former president Jerry Rawlings, associated themselves with the founding president Kwame Nkrumah and won election. In all cases, political parties need to decide on a framework for the identification and selection of a successor well before the outgoing president leaves office.

FINDING A LIFE AFTER POLITICS

Another reason why some presidents are loath to step down is because there is nothing for them to do on Civvy Street. They hang on in office because there seem to be few career options for them after politics. This was the case with such long-serving and superannuated leaders as President Mubarak of Egypt, President Suharto of Indonesia, President Omar Bongo of Gabon and many others. In contrast, a number of retired heads of state and government have shown themselves to be very marketable, working with international organizations like the UN, the EU or the AU, serving as special envoys for specific talks or global issues, and sitting on the boards of private companies. Examples are legion: President Mandela was involved in the peace process for various factions in Burundi and the establishing of different foundations. President Obasanjo has been involved in mediating conflicts all over Africa and has become a widely respected international ambassador. President Mary Robinson of Ireland has had several high-level assignments with the UN, and the former prime minister of UK Tony Blair has been involved in Middle East peace talks and his successor Gordon Brown has served as special envoy of the UN Secretary General on education for girls. Some former leaders are considered to have had more illustrious careers after leaving office, thus, Thabo Mbeki – thought by many to have been a lack-lustre successor to President Mandela- has distinguished himself in his mediation work in numerous African conflicts, including in Burundi, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire, and former US President Jimmy Carter has led his peace and human rights foundation for the last 35 years, arguably with much greater success and distinction than he was able to achieve during his single term as US President.

By and large, retired presidents and prime ministers – if they leave office gracefully and in a constitutional manner – have a great deal to contribute at both national and international levels. The examples cited above should be sufficiently motivating and persuasive to convince those who have not yet retired from office that they will have a role to play upon stepping down democratically from power.

DIFFICULT REAJUSTMENT AS AN ‘ORDINARY’ CITIZEN

Once they have tasted power, most presidents do not want to relinquish power and lose the benefits, perks and adulation which a high political office normally confers. Fighting rush hour traffic after years of sailing through city streets in special motorcades or swooping down in helicopters is not an easy transition. This is especially true for those who have been in power for many years. Some may feel that they will lose respect and miss the red carpet treatment they enjoyed the years they were in office. Ironically, the longer they remain in office and the higher they elevate themselves above their fellow citizens, the more likely this is to happen: we may predict that this is the likely fate that will befall, for instance, the president of Angola, the Castro family in Cuba, and the families of the presidents of Togo, Gabon and other countries. If, however, as incumbent presidents, they treat their citizens with due respect, they should have no cause for concern about their fate after leaving office nor need they unnecessarily prolong their tenure. Thus, around the world, many former presidents are treated with the utmost respect and lead lives of great dignity.

SUMMARY REFLECTIONS

Whatever view we may have of the issue of political succession and how it should be accomplished, the fact remains that the process is highly problematic in so many African countries. At the same time, there is some hope that political parties are increasingly grooming their next generation of leaders. This is the case in Botswana, for example, where one party has dominated the political scene since independence and has been grooming successors. As indicated earlier, politicians who aspire to be elected as presidents want to be their own man (or woman, we should add, although this has not really been the case in Africa), if their former president was not liked by people. Ideally, incumbent presidents should train their successors, following the examples of China, Saudi Arabia, Botswana, Cuba and other countries. This model may even be seen in the New Testament, where Barnabas trained the apostle Paul, who later on served with greater effect than his teacher. As the editor of a Zambian newspaper has remarked, a political party must not only have correct policies but must train and bring up thousands or millions of successors who will carry on its cause. The example of the recent former president of Namibia, who first picked his successor – and that successor was then endorsed by his party SWAPO – is worth noting here. This was also the case in South Africa under President Mandela.

Ironically, unless a succession plan has identified several potential leaders, it risks becoming – as cautioned by the management guru Lesley Uren – a “beautiful fiction”. Experience has shown that if insecure leaders like Paul Biya of Cameroon and Isaias Afwerki of Eritrea, along with many before them, such as Suharto of Indonesia and others, do not encourage succession, their legacy will be revealed by what happens over the months and years after they leave office. Stefan Stern (2014) reminds us that “No matter what wonderful things people will be saying about them today; executives should remember they are mortal.” That is a simple truth which should be borne in mind by every person in politics. To quote the well-known adage: “Graveyards are full of people who once thought they were indispensable”. Great political leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela, business leaders like Jack Welch and the late Steven Jobs and other outstanding figures in civilian life excelled as leaders both through their accomplishments in office and also because they left legacies for others during their own lifetimes by fostering candidates for succession and raising new leaders around themselves.

* Dr. John O. Kakonge is the former Kenyan Ambassador to the UN Office in Geneva, Switzerland. John.o.kakonge@gmail.com

REFERENCES

1. Black, A. (2001) The History of Islamic Thought, Edinburgh University Press, UK
2. BBC News (2012), “Obituary: Bingu wa Mutharika, Malawi’s President”, 7 April 2012. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-17624072 Accessed 17 August 2015.
3. Economist (1998), “Dr. Mahathir’s noxious remedies”. The Economist, 24 September 1998.
4. Editor (2013), “Political successions”. Blogspot.co.ke/2013/03/ political-successions.html
5. Koranteng-pipim, S (2012), “Africa has great leaders”.
6. Eaglesonline.org/Africa-has-great-leaders. Accessed 15 August 2015.
7. SAPA (2014), “Mugabe fires Vice-President Mujuru”. mg.co.za./article/2014-12-10 mugabe-fires-vice-president-mujuru. Accessed 16 August 2015
Stern, S. (2014), “The best bosses groom their successors”, Financial Times, 29 August 2014. http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/83a1c942-5b6a-11e4-a674-00144feab7de.html#axzz3j4mB90t1 Accessed 17 August 2015.
8. Wong, E., and J. Ansfield (2011), “China grooming deft politician as next leaders”, New York Times, 23 January 2011. http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/24/world/asia/24leader.html?_r=0 Accessed 17 August 2015.

Pope Francis prayed for the ongoing negotiations between FARC rebels and the Colombian government happening in Cuba right now saying that “another failure” is not an option.

“Please, we do not have the right to allow ourselves yet another failure on this path of peace and reconciliation,” he said following the Sept. 20 Sunday Angelus in Revolution Square.

Since 1964, more than 200,000 people have been killed in Colombia’s civil war. For the past three years, Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) rebels and the Colombian government have been engaged in peace talks in Cuba, but an outcome has not yet been reached.

“At this time I feel bound to direct my thoughts to the beloved land of Colombia,” he said, “conscious of the crucial importance of the present moment when, with renewed effort and inspired by hope, its sons and daughters are seeking to build a peaceful society.”

Although much innocent blood has been shed in the decades of armed conflict, he hopes that their sacrifice, united with Christ’s, may “sustain all the efforts being made, including those on this beautiful island, to achieve definitive reconciliation.”

“Thus may the long night of pain and violence can, with the support of all Colombians, become an unending day of concord, justice, fraternity and love, in respect for institutions and for national and international law, so that there may be lasting peace,” the Holy Father said.

Turning his attention to the example of the Blessed Mother, the pontiff urged those present to “place all our concerns and hopes before the heart of Christ.”

“We pray to her in a special way for those who have lost hope and find no reasons to keep fighting, and for those who suffer from injustice, abandonment and loneliness,” he said.

Like Mary, we must learn to “keep our hearts awake and attentive to the needs of others” and the “little details of life” so that no one will lack “the joy which Jesus brings us.”

Pope Francis then prayed for all those experiencing difficulty, especially the Cubans whom he called the “sons and daughters” of Mary.

Yukiya Amano, the head of the International Atomic Energy Agency, arrived in Tehran on September 20 and attended a meeting of Iran’s parliamentary commission charged with reviewing the Comprehensive Plan of Joint Action to answer questions.

ISNA reports that Amano agreed to attend the meeting with the commission on the condition that it be held behind closed doors away from the media.

Amano previously appeared before the U.S. Senate’s foreign policy committee to answer questions from U.S. senators regarding the agreement reached between Iran and the 5+1.

Upon arrival in Tehran, Amano also met with President Rohani and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif.

The parliamentary commission is charged with reviewing the nuclear agreement drafted by the Iranian and 5+1 delegations and delivering a report to Iranian Parliament by October 1.

Yukiya Amano will also meet with the IAEA Board of Governors on December 15 to report on past and current issues surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.

The Greek election will not resolve the most important problems facing the country, CEPR co-Director Mark Weisbrot said Sunday.

With almost a third of the votes counted, it appeared that Syriza was the clear winner with a projected total of 35.5 percent of votes, even though the party’s leader, Alexis Tsipras, had reversed course earlier this year and agreed to implement austerity measures in return for a 86 billion euro ($97 billion) bailout package. Center-right New Democracy was second with about 28 percent, and New Democracy leader Vangelis Meimarakis quickly conceded to Syriza and Tsipras.

“Financial terrorism by the European authorities has succeeded, for now,” Weisbrot said. “With a gun to their head, most voters were convinced that there was no choice but to accept continuing depression, for this year and 2016. But there are in fact better choices than the major parties were offering, and there will likely be a number of battles ahead against the implementation of further austerity.”

The IMF has projected that Greek GDP will shrink by a further 2.5 percent this year, and European officials have forecast recession for 2016 as well. Greece has lost more than a quarter of its output since 2008, and unemployment remains at 24.6 percent.

Weisbrot noted that there was a record low turnout, so Syriza’s percent of eligible voters was probably around 20 percent. Still, he said, it was impressive that the party was able to remain in power after the European authorities had taken such extreme measures, including direct sabotage of the economy, in order to discredit them and drive them from power. These included the ECB’s denial of credit necessary to the financial system, forcing a shutdown of the banking system that guaranteed continued depression.

“It is not surprising that, within the framework of surrendering to the European authorities, that voters would choose Syriza, which had at least made an attempt to save the economy from their destruction,” said Weisbrot.

“No country ever has to accept a prolonged depression and mass unemployment of this magnitude,” Weisbrot said. “This was a lesson learned during the Great Depression 80 years ago, and the European authorities are trying to make people unlearn it.”

By Ron Redmond

UNHCR staff on Sunday were caring for survivors of two separate weekend incidents involving boats carrying refugees and migrants between Turkey and Greece that left some 40 people dead or missing.

Early Sunday, a dinghy reportedly carrying up to 48 people sank off the coast of Lesvos in the pre-dawn hours. By mid-afternoon, some 20 survivors had been reported, with one person confirmed dead and up to 27 others still missing.

The exact circumstances of Sunday’s incident remain unclear, but some survivors told UNHCR that their boat had collided with a ferry in the pre-dawn darkness at 4:30 a.m. as they were approaching the Lesvos coast in the vicinity of the Mitiliny airport.

Early Sunday afternoon, searchers rescued a young Syrian man who came ashore wrapped in a silver foil insulating blanket and shivering from hypothermia. He told UNHCR he had been adrift for several hours and feared most others on the inflatable raft had perished.

In the earlier incident overnight Friday, an 8-year-old girl drowned and between 10 and 12 other people were reported missing when their small wooden boat capsized off Lesvos after running out of fuel. That vessel was carrying some two-dozen people.

Both incidents were reported by the Greek Coast Guard, which mounted search and rescue operations around the eastern Aegean island some 6 kms off the coast of Turkey.

UNHCR and its partners in Greece are providing ongoing support for the survivors and families of the casualties, including medical and psychological care, accommodation, legal assistance, food and water. Many of them, particularly those who have lost family members, including children, are severely traumatized.

The narrow waterway between Turkey and the Greek islands has become a main entry-point for refugees to Europe over the past few months. More than 318,000 refugees have undertaken the perilous voyage to Greece this year, with the largest surge – 192,000 — arriving since August.

“Compared to figures earlier in the summer, it’s almost doubled,” said Djamal Zamoum, UNHCR’s senior emergency officer on Lesvos. “Yesterday we saw 6,000 in just one day.”

In all, Europe has seen more than 442,400 arrivals by sea so far this year – 82 percent of them from the world’s top 10 refugee-producing countries, led by Syrians. Nearly 3,000 people have died or gone missing trying to cross the Mediterranean this year.

With a socialist background, Bihar in India generally opts for secular parties to govern the state. The Bihar legislature assembly has 243 seats and assembly elections will be held in five-phases in October-November 2015 as the tenure of the current Legislative Assembly of Bihar expires on November 29, 2015. It is going to be a three-cornered poll.

The JD(U) and RJD have announced to fight the election jointly under Nitish Kumar’s leadership under the Janata Parivar group (a group of six parties- Samajwadi Party, Janata Dal (United), Rashtriya Janata Dal, Janata Dal (Secular), Indian National Lok Dal and Samajwadi Janata Party (Rashtriya)), which is joined by the Indian National Congress and the Nationalist Congress Party. On the other hand, Bharatiya Janata Party led NDA front is fighting election alongside the Lok Janshakti Party , the Rashtriya Lok Samata Party and Hindustani Awam Morcha. All Left parties have come together under the one banner of the Left Front to provide an alternative platform other than BJP-led NDA and Janata Parivar. Communist Party of India, Communist Party of India (Marxist) and Communist Party of India (Marxist–Leninist) have some presence in the state.

The Aam Aadmi Party which rules the Delhi state and JVM-P have announced that they will not contest in Bihar Elections, but will campaign against the NDA. Sharad Yadav of JDU has welcomed Aam Aadmi Party’s step to campaign against NDA.

Bihar, where, according to Indian ancient history, Lord Gautama Buddha was born, derivates from the Buddha “vihar” associated with his meditation. Buddha propagated happiness and peace through freedom. Unfortunately, a communal party likes BJP that does not seek peace anywhere in India and thrives on communal discord, wants to rule Bihar.

Both the alliances- BJP led NDA alliance and Nitish Kumar-led alliance are trying social engineering. On June 7, 2015, Lalu Prasad Yadav announced RJD alliance with JD(U) for the elections. On June 11, 2015, Jitan Ram Manjhi announced his party Hindustani Awam Morcha alliance with BJP for the elections. In April 2015, Bihar chief Minister Nitish Kumar announced decision to include few more castes including Teli caste in list of Extremely Backward Class in Bihar In July 2015, Nitish Kumar announced 50 percent quota for OBC, EBC and SC/STs in all government contracts up to Rs 15 lakh. In May 2015, Nitish Kumar Government increased Dearness Allowance (DA) by six to 11 percent for state government employees and pensioners. In September 2015, Nitish Kumar government gave its nod to two major moves — the creation of a dedicated fund for fencing of temples in Bihar and the inclusion of two of Extremely Backward Castes (EBCs) — Nishad (Mallah) and Nonia, in the SC/ST category. The state government also decided to provide grants-in-aid to 609 more madrassas across Bihar from the list of 2,459 registered by Bihar State Madrassa Education Board

It is certainly a falsified conclusion that many right-wing analysts on Bihar elections have synthesized to state that Bihar is poised for an NDA win. In fact, for all practical purposes, the Indian ruling party BJP has indirectly accepted its defeat in the ensuing assembly poll in Bihar notwithstanding PM Modi’s usual developmental assurances.

None in the Congress party thinks it has even remote chance of returning to power on its own in the foreseeable future. It is quite likely that the era of Indian National Congress is finally over. Anna Hazare and Modi dismantled it while the latter capitalized the end game. Only Congress skeletons are now on display. Its game with the fate of Muslims by using the RSS-BJP against them did not help it in any way. Now not only Muslims, but also Christians, Sikhs and even Hindus do not trust the soft Hindutva Congress party with hidden Hindutva agenda.

This situation has clearly left advantage for the incumbent JDU government of veteran Nitish Kumar, whose popularity has never suffered any set back, stronger even before the poll day. Clearly governance and development outcomes have an increasingly important role in shaping voter decisions even in a society as stratified as Bihar. The coming weeks will only consolidate this likely outcome.

As late as March 2014, survey after survey showed that Bihar Chief Minister Nitish Kumar enjoyed considerable popularity in the state. Many still considered him as the best CM the state had had in a long time. It was around the same time that the chorus of “Modi as PM and Nitish as CM” had begun to be heard all too frequently across the state. The chorus reached the CM’s ears also, forcing a change in his campaign strategy. This also means Nitish could be the next PM if politics changes to that much.

BJP is targeting the Dalit caste votes. As per, 2011 Census of India, Scheduled Castes (SC) constitute 16% of Bihar’s 104 million population. The census identified 21 of 23 Dalit sub-castes as Mahadalits OBC/EBC 51% and most of them are with RJD and JDU. In August 2015, Cobra post exposed many BJP leaders especially like JP president Murli Manohar Joshi MP and C. P. Thakur alongside former PM Chandra Shekhar associated with Ranvir Sena(upper-caste landlord militia) in Bihar Dalit massacres.

The fortune of the Janata Parivar under Nitish, however, will depend a great deal on how Mahadalits and extreme backward classes vote in the coming assembly elections. These are the two groups which had got special attention from him as part of his social engineering plan. They are also the ones who switched over to the Bharatiya Janata Party in large number in the Lok Sabha elections. Will a seemingly more confident Nitish manage to win them back?

It was perhaps for the first time that following parliamentary electoral debacle Nitish Kumar seemed to have lost confidence in what he had stood for. Even after ousting Manjhi and retaking his position as CM, Nitish has continued to look less certain about his policies. Many of his dream projects are languishing for want of funds and attention. The law-and-order situation, which he had vowed to clean up and partially succeeded in doing, has deteriorated. Given this background, his recent assertion that his party was ready to face the electorate all alone can only be seen as a belated attempt to regain lost ground. Nudged by the Congress, Lalu eventually had to fall in line and grudgingly declare Nitish as the chief ministerial candidate of the Janata Parivar. The Janata Parivar offered Nitish a partial victory in the by-elections that followed the Lok Sabha elections, was seen as an endorsement of this new strategy.

The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) negotiators outdid themselves in the matter of seat-allocation to NDA allies in Bihar, especially to Jitan Ram Manjhi’s HAM. A political anecdote, dating back to 1995, will explain why the BJP should be seen as having pulled off a political coup of sorts by getting Manjhi to agree to 20 seats.

With the benefit of hindsight, it can be said that Mulayam’s political prognosis proved accurate. Mayawati not only emerged as a powerful Dalit icon but also graduated into a powerful regional leader. Not only did Mayawati chew and spit the BJP first and then the Congress, she effectively pushed both the national parties to the political margins in the country’s largest state (where the BJP stayed till 2014 and Congress continues to stay). She used the Congress and BJP as crutches and cannibalized their political space. This was the precise political pitfall that the BJP was trying to avoid in Bihar. By propping Manjhi or conceding more ground to him than was absolutely necessary, it was determined not repeat the mistakes of Uttar Pradesh in Bihar.

Thanks to Nitish Kumar’s relentless courting of the Mahadalits in his first term and his sudden propping up of dalit Manjhi as Chief Minister in 2014, Manjhi has already assumed a stature that was not his till recently. Manjhi’s rebellion against Nitish and his subsequent dalliance with the BJP came as a critical accretion of votes for the BJP. Unlike Mayawati, Manjhi did not have organisational backing or mentoring of an outstanding leader like Kanshi Ram. Yet he wore the persecuted Mahadalit hat very well. In a way, he even outgrew Ram Vilas Paswan, who claims to be the only true reprehensive of all dalits and who till now claimed to be the sole Dalit face in the mainstream politics of the state. Any more propping up with a disproportionately large number for seats would have made Manjhi a bigger hero among Dalits.

In Bihar, the Hindutva forces used to have a limited social footprint confined to the upper castes. Lately the BJP has made inroads into OBCs and extremely backward castes (EBCs) by aligning with pro-Mandal forces. The party’s acceptability in the scheduled caste was negligible.

The delay in seat agreements was because of this difficult balancing act and the BJP may have been let off lightly by Manjhi when he accepted only 20 seats but with an additional five of his men getting BJP tickets. Manjhi has been effectively circumscribed to the role of a small factional leader whose amenability would always be easy.

Meanwhile, Bihar Congress President Ashok Choudhary received a communication that Chief Minister Nitish Kumar, like RJD supremo Lalu Prasad, is occupied with seat allotment and selection of candidates and hence would not be able to it make to Rahul Gandhi’s Ramnagar program. Lalu Prasad and Nitish Kumar have expressed inability to come. Nitish Kumar will not be present at the rally of Congress Vice President Rahul Gandhi in West Champaran district Ramnagar on Sept 19 as he would be busy with ticket distribution. RJD President Lalu Prasad has already announced that he would not be able to go to Ramnagar and instead he would send his son Tejaswi Yadav.

Ramnagar, 40 km from district headquarter Bettiah, is dominated by Schedule castes and Tharu tribes. It borders Nepal and is about 15-20 km from Bhitarwah from where Mahatma Gandhi had launched his satyagraha in 1917. Ramnagar (reserved seat) is presently represented by Bhagirathi Devi of BJP. JD (U) General Secretary KC Tyagi said as Kumar would be involved in ticket distribution, he has to stay in the state capital and will not be able to make it to Rahul Gandhi’s program at Ramnagar on the occasion of birth anniversary of Dalit icon BR Ambedkar.

Of course, there are no hints so far to say that people of Bihar do not trust CM Nitish Kumar or his alliance and as such it appears the JDU government would be back to rule Bihar. However, how many seats out of total 243 his party would get in the state remains to be seen.

The Bihar poll is likely to speed up opposition unity in the country. Whether the Left parties and Congress could join the Janata parivar would also be decided by the outcome of the poll. If BJP fails here, obviously, it would have to revise its Ghar- wapsi program to convert Muslims and Christians into Hindutva fold. Already RSS is facing a serious problem while converting Christians and others into their fold because the new converts would have be placed in a Hindu caste. Everyone obviously wants to be a high caste convert in order to enjoy social and political status.

I am not the only one who thinks the Federal Reserve should have raised its target federal funds rate at its September 17 meeting, as they suggested they would do months ago, although opinion was mixed on whether the Fed would raise the rate, and whether it should.

The Fed is holding the federal funds rate near zero, which is holding all interest rates down. The argument is that the economy is still showing weakness so the low rate is needed to shore up a sagging economy.

First, let’s look at the facts. The Fed has been holding interest rates down since 2008, and the federal funds rate has been near zero (below 0.2%) since 2009.

Now, let’s look at the Fed’s argument. They have been holding interest rates down for well over half a decade now to stimulate the economy, and it hasn’t worked. So, they are going to keep trying that same policy that has not worked in the past.

There is an inverse relationship between interest rates and asset prices (and, therefore, an argument that the Fed’s low interest rate policy leads to asset price bubbles), but let’s see how financial markets viewed the Fed’s move. Assuming that stock market movements are a response to the Fed’s announcement, the S&P 500 and DJIA both fell on September 17 after the Fed’s announcement, and continued their downward slides the next day.

Interest rates affect asset prices, but so does the longer term economic outlook, and the indication in financial markets is that the negative effect on the long-term outlook outweighs the positive effect of lower interest rates. That is consistent with the lack of effective stimulus we’ve seen for more than half a decade now.

If a policy isn’t working, maybe it is time to consider a different policy.

This article appeared at The Beacon and is reprinted with permission.

As the high-ranking economic and political delegations from the European and Asian countries flock to Tehran one after the other to negotiate the resumption of their trade ties with Iran following the landmark conclusion of the nuclear talks between Iran and the six world powers earlier on July 14, the United States is the only nation that hasn’t yet taken a final decision on the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and implementing it.

The UN Security Council issued the resolution 2231 on July 20, endorsing the terms of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, indicating that after a period of 10 years, Iran’s nuclear program would be treated as a normal and regular case within the safeguards framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency, and taken off the Security Council’s agenda as an urgent concern for the world peace and security. Upon the receipt of a positive report from the IAEA that Iran has complied with its commitments, such as reducing the number of its spinning centrifuges, reconstructing the Arak heavy-water reactor and diluting its stockpile of highly enriched uranium, etc., the Security Council will terminate the sanctions placed on Iran through six resolutions passed between 2006 and 2015.

Now, the U.S. Congress is hotly debating the nuclear agreement, and while almost all the Republican House representatives and Senators have decried it as a bad deal that needs to be blocked, it seems like the Democratic Senators have secured enough votes to prevent the opposition from stopping the implementation of the JCPOA. Even the U.S. President Barack Obama has said that he would definitely use his veto power if needed in order to make sure that the nuclear deal with Iran would safely pass through the Congress floor and come into force.

A former U.S. politician tells Iran Review that he is convinced the two houses of the Congress will eventually vote in approval of the Iran deal and even the next U.S. President will honor the agreement, whether a Republican is heading to the Oval Office or a Democrat.

The former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Lawrence Korb believes if Iran abides by its part of the agreement, the U.S. government won’t violate it, and after a period of 5 years, everybody will totally forget what the commotion has been all about.

Commenting on the implicit war threats made by the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter against Iran following the conclusion of the nuclear talks, Lawrence Korb noted that he was mostly trying to appeal to a domestic audience and convincing those people who claimed that President Obama emerged weak by signing the agreement with Iran.

Lawrence Korb is a senior fellow at the Center for American Progress. He was formerly a director of national security studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. He got his Ph.D. at the State University of New York Albany. From 1981 to 1985, he was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs, Installations and Logistics under Secretary Caspar Weinberger in President Ronald Reagan’s administration.

Prof. Korb shared his viewpoints with Iran Review in an exclusive interview conducted a couple of weeks ago, discussing the comprehensive agreement on Iran’s nuclear program, the future of Iran-U.S. relations and the regional crises affecting the Middle East.

Q: Along with the campaign for the next year’s presidential elections, the most heated debate in the U.S. these days revolves around the endorsement of the nuclear deal by the Congress and whether or not the Congress will allow the JCPOA to be implemented. And there’s a great deal of pressure on the Congress by the corporate groups and lobbies to kill this agreement. Do you think that the Congress will eventually yield to the pressures and block the deal? And in that case, will President Obama be able to sustain his veto?

A: I think Obama will sustain his veto. In fact, they’ve set up a process that he leads the way the Congress is handling this. They have a 60-day limit because, if you know anything about our Congress and Senate, people can filibuster and stretch things out. The other is that the president can veto whatever they do and then both houses need to override the veto, which is through getting two third. That’s unusual I think with a treaty – because it would need a two third majority of the two houses to override President’s veto. And given the fact that you have a lot of people in the Congress, particularly Republicans who don’t want to see President Obama succeed in anything, as what happened with Cuba for example, they basically would have made it impossible. So, it’s set up in a way that everybody can win; the president is going to get the deal; members of Congress will approve or vote against it – but the real thing is that the deal will go forward.

Q: Alright; so, what’s your assessment of the climate of the two Houses of the Congress these days? Do you think that the Senate and the House and the majority of the Congressmen in both houses are reluctant to give a green light to the deal or do the majority of the Congressmen have a willingness to finally endorse the deal and let it be implemented? What’s your assessment of how the Congressmen would react to the deal? Of course a number of them are still indecisive; they do not know whether to vote in favor of the deal or to reject it. What will come out at the end?

A: I think what will come out is that the Congress will have to vote by September 17; they had sixty days and the deal was on July 17 [sic]. I think they will turn it down. I don’t think you’re going to get a majority it needs to have because we should remember that the Congress in both Houses is controlled by the opposition parties and they don’t want to give Obama or the Democrats any victory particularly as we get close to an election. But then what will happen, as I mentioned before, is that the president will veto it and the Congress will not be able to get two third in both Houses to override the veto. So, the deal will go through.

Q: There is some uncertainty regarding what the next U.S. president will be doing to the nuclear agreement. Well, some of Republican hopefuls in the presidential race have indicated that they will not continue honoring the terms of the JCPOA if elected as president. This is while Ms. Hillary Clinton, for instance, has stated that she would surely implement and honor this agreement if elected. Do you think that the next president, if he is going to be a Republican, will refuse to implement or continue putting into force the terms of the deal that has been negotiated and concluded after almost two years of intensive talks between Iran and the United States and its partners?

A: Well, if a Democrat wins, there will be no question. And I think even a Republican will not fail to implement the deal, because basically we had this before.We had other executive agreements with adversaries; for example the Helsinki Accord that President Ford implemented and recognized Soviet Russian control over Eastern Europe in return for allowing more openness in those countries. Lots of people were unhappy about it; the Congress didn’t need a vote on the agreement and basically all of Ford’s predecessors such as President Carter, President Reagan and President Bush Sr. all implemented it. So, I think it’s one thing in the campaign but when you get in the office, you recognize that you have all of these obligations and it will create chaos because if a Republican were to get in and want to not implement it, the sanctions would have already been dropped by the UN, by the United States and all the other P5+1 countries. So, no, I don’t think so. I think there is a lot of talk in the campaigns but whoever gets elected, the deal is going to go through.

Q: Perfect. What’s being discussed these days in the U.S. public sphere is the importance of the “snap-back” mechanism for the immediate re-imposition of sanctions against Iran in case that it “cheats” and violates the nuclear deal; however, there’s no talk about a possible U.S. violation of the deal, including an unprompted reinstatement of the sanctions which it has committed will be terminated or pressuring the European companies to stop their trade with Iran. So, is the U.S. government completely confident that it won’t violate the deal at any rate and abide by all of its commitments?

A: Well, if Iran carries out its obligations under the agreement, no “snap-back” will go in. The “snap-back” provision is if Iran should violate the agreement by building another secret facility for enriching uranium or developing more centrifuges, then this is very important that the United States would be able to reinstate sanctions according to the agreement which says that nobody can deal with it in the United Nations and I think that’s important because that gives people the assurance that if Iran, should for whatever reason decided to violate it, it wouldn’t have Russia or China’s veto against bringing the UN sanctions back. So, if Iran doesn’t violate the treaty, there is going to be no snap-back and I think it’s important to keep in mind that, the Soviet Union, even at the height of the Cold War always kept the treaties with determination. One exception seems to be North Korea, but Iran is not North Korea.

Q: So, what if the U.S. government at one point violates its commitments and, for example, tries to put pressure on the Asian and European companies and firms that are returning to Iran’s market, imposes the sanctions including secondary sanctions and effectually puts back those sanctions that are terminated by the virtue of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and the recent UN Security Council resolution 2231? Do you think that there is no chance or there is no possibility that the U.S. will at point or for one reason violate its commitments?

A: Well, the U.S. won’t violate its commitments, if Iran keeps its obligations, which you know better than I – but I happen to think that they will, basically no! There would be no violation by the U.S. In fact, if you take a look at it, after the sanctions are dropped and Iran lives up within its commitments, you’re going to see a great economic development not just in Iran but throughout the rest of the world. I mean, when you look at Iran’s oil and natural gas, it’s is the largest in the world. It’ll be good for American consumers to have access to more oil and gas on the market. So, no! I think they’re not going to want to put them back. And I don’t know if you heard President Obama when he gave his speech at the American University to defend the deal where he pointed out that our leverage for example, with the Chinese for whatever reason, given how much dollars they have, it’s not that great. So, no; I don’t think so. If Iran implements the treaty in five years now, nobody is going to be even thinking about it because it’s an interesting thing in our system. And I’ve seen this when I was in the government and then in the military. People can vote against something and if it turns out to be bad, they can say “see, I told you!” but if it turns out well, nobody will care how it evolved. So a lot of people evolve because they can’t lose politically if they do.

Q: Many of the experts and fellows at the center where you are based, i.e. the Center for American Progress, consider Iran to be a dangerous role-player in the Middle East that threatens the U.S. interests across the world. With such skepticism against Iran, is it really possible to foresee a possible rapprochement between Iran and the United States in the future, as overcoming this mistrust is a pre-requisite for the improvement of the ties? Are Tehran and Washington fated to remain enemies forever or are they going to overcome these cynicism and finally cooperate with each other?

A: Well, I happen to think that they will. A couple of things: look at China and the problems we had. When I was a young man and I was in Vietnam, the Chinese were furnishing equipment to the fighters in the north to shoot at us. So, everything was like that, and we had a real war with the Chinese. But we’re going to get along with them fine now; obviously we have some tensions basically because, you know, they’re trying to get their proper role in the world. And I know, and you probably know better than me that we worked with Iran after the attacks of 9/11. Iran helped the United Sates, gave us information about the Taliban and Al-Qaeda, it gave us intelligence; and at the Bonn Conference in December 2001, my understanding from people who were there like Brahimi is that the Iranians persuaded the Northern Alliance to support Karzai, who is a Pashtu, and so I think we can get along. I think that nobody is going to win in Syria. So we’re going to have to do something there. We both do not want to see ISIS expand its influence particularly in Iraq. So, I do think that there are ways that we can cooperate. I have to tell you something from my own experience. From a dinner I went to; I was working in New York at the Council on Foreign Relations and shortly after 9/11, then Ambassador Zarif invited several of us in the Council over to have dinner with us. He told us that they would be willing to help us in Afghanistan, and after all, Iran had a candle-light vigil after the attacks of 9/11.

Q: Great. So, you believe that it’s eventually possible that Iran and the United States can put aside the hostilities of the past four decades and rebuild their relations. So, how is it possible to move to that point, to make some confidence and overcome the acrimonies accumulated throughout these tumultuous years?

A: I think basically if Iran lives up to the deal and stop supporting groups like Hezbollah, it will happen. You don’t remember but I happen to when I was in government, Hezbollah killed 240 marines in 1983 and again that’s something we have to deal with. So, I think a lot will depend upon whether Iran is willing to work and I think Syria is going to be a big challenge. If they stop supporting Assad and we could come to some sort of agreement there, I believe we can normalize relationships as we did this with China and we did with Russia, though there are tensions again, but we worked together with the Russians during the talks with Iran. We concluded the nuclear agreement with them. So, I do think there is a chance that will be good for both countries. I think if the sanctions are relaxed, people in Iran will begin to develop and have economic opportunities. Then they’re going to want to focus on rebuilding a great country rather than causing problems around the region.

Q: And of course you have the successful experience of the restoration of diplomatic relations with Cuba, which has just taken place recently and you have opened your embassies in the respective countries.

A: Right! And I think this is important. It’s not possible that we always agree on everything.The big questions I think are really keys in terms of dealing with ISIS in that part of the world which is destabilizing the whole region. We have the big question of groups branded as terrorist groups like Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. If we can come to some sort of accommodation where Iran does not aid these groups, then we can come up with some sort of agreement that we can both support. I think that’s really the key, basically, because the United States and President Obama have said that we don’t want any war in Middle East; that’s not what we’re looking for.

Q: Right! I have a question again on the nuclear agreement and its terms. You wrote in Politico Magazine that no official who cares of the sovereignty of their nation, whether in Iran or anywhere in the world, would permit “anytime, anywhere” access to their nuclear, military and security facilities and making such excessive demands will simply result in a new “debacle” in the Middle East; however, there are still some Congressmen and lobbyists and of course leaders in Israel and Saudi Arabia who believe that such permissions should be granted. Do you find these demands reasonable and practical, and do you think that they really serve the goal of nuclear non-proliferation to provide anytime, anywhere access to any military site that is considered as a country’s secrets and part of its sovereignty?

A: Unfortunately, somebody from the White House, I think, it is one of the national security people, did utter that phrase and the Secretary of Energy used it as part of another phrase that’s taken out of context. So, that’s why I think people are coming back to that. That should not have been said before we had the agreement but it’s not just me. I don’t know if you saw the letter from the 29 scientists?!

Q: Yeah , I saw it.

A: And, you know, one of the people on the list used to work with me for some time. He developed the hydrogen bomb; so, he certainly knows what he is talking about with inspections. I think these statements probably shouldn’t have been made but basically you want to take a look as I would like the President who said that we still have a very, very intrusive inspection system. I like that. And I think a lot of people would like anywhere, anytime [inspections for] sure, but that’s impractical; no nation would have agreed to do that. I was quite surprised when I heard that that seems to be on the table!

Q: And also you hear statements being made by senior U.S. officials, including the Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, who said a few days after the conclusion of the nuclear talks that the deal does not take the option of military strike against off the table. Do you think that such statements can be helpful and conducive to peace, especially now that the two sides have come to a comprehensive agreement and diplomacy has prevailed over the specter of a new war campaign in the region?

A: I think what Ashton Carter is saying is what happens with any nation. In the other case, you know that military is the last resort, but I think if you listened to what President Obama was saying – he said if you don’t have this agreement, you really could have a war, and nobody wants that. And I think it’s important to keep in mind this important thing, that a lot of times when people make statements like that, they’re talking to their audience at home because there is a perception, I think –  it’s wrong among some people, that when Obama agreed to the deal, he doesn’t want to use military force! So, I think the Secretary of Defense came to say “no, no! We would if we have to” and that sent the signal which you want. It’s like statements I hear from Iranian politician when they’re talking to their audiences at home. And I think you need to understand that that’s all part of political dynamics. I mean, when I worked with President Reagan, he called the Soviet Union the evil empire; then he negotiated with them! So, I think you need to understand they’retrying to show people that, look! Obama is not weak and if this deal should collapse, and then the Iranians for whatever reason should decide not to do it, we would obviously be able and willing to use military force if it makes sense.

Q: Yeah, but you know that Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif has said, Iran will not tear apart the agreement that it has been working on for more than two years. He made it clear that Iran will not violate the terms of an accord on which it has spent hundreds of hours of intense negotiations and a great deal of political capital. So, it’s still conceivable that Iran is ready to implement its part of the deal faithfully, and the onus is on the shoulders of the international community to mutually respond to Iran’s goodwill gesture by lifting the sanction and enabling the resumption of normal trade.

A: Well, sure! I should say again that I have every confidence that Iran will implement the deal and two years from now people will be wondering what was all the commotion about, because Iran will be implementing the deal, the sanctions will be lifted, the lives of people in Iran will be better, the Middle East will be more stable. But again why is there is a lot of mistrust? Because of problems we had! I mean, many people in our country still haven’t gotten over the American hostages within the embassy; and people keep dragging that up. And so that’s unfortunate. Many people in this country don’t realize we worked with the British to put the Shah back in power. So, in my view the deal will be approved, we’ll start seeing Iran take the steps that it is supposed to. And as President Obama mentioned, for the last 21 months, they kept this deal that a lot of people didn’t think they would.

Q: Yeah, exactly! So, on another issue of mutual concern for Iran and the U.S., the volatile Middle East is grappling with tensions resulting from the atrocities of terrorist groups such as ISIS, the civil war in Syria, the Saudi intervention in Yemen, the crisis in Bahrain, the political instability in Iraq and Afghanistan, etc. What would be the best solutions for handling these problems and bringing peace and security back to the region? Do you think that the idea of Iran-U.S. cooperation would be a pragmatic way out of the crises that we are now dealing with?

A: I think so. I think we can begin with Syria. If Iran, which has influence over Assad as do the Russians, comes to some sort of negotiated solution – because nobody can win there. I think that’s important because when you have ISIS, you’ve got Al-Nusra, you’ve got two branches of the Kurds, you’ve got Assad, and so there’s no winner and you have to come up with some sort of negotiated solution to that situation. I think if we do that, then I think we can move on to deal with these other problems. You know better than I that how much support has been given to the Houthis, but if we could come to let the government go back there and develop an inclusive society, I think that certainly would help. But I think what happens, at least as I see, you have a lot of countries, particularly Sunni countries who think Iran, which is Shiite, wants to dominate the whole region. I don’t think that’s true but there is that perception and so that’s the way a lot of those countries react.

A: I just want to include a concluding question. I’m a proponent of Iran- U.S. detente. I have conducted several interviews with American politicians and diplomats who are willing to work for this end and the realization of along-term reconciliation between our two countries. Personally, what do you think should be done in order for these hostilities of the past four decades to be settled? When we talk to Iranian people, they say that the USS Vincennes cruiser shot down an Iranian passenger aircraft over the Persian Gulf on July 3, 1988 and killed 290 people aboard, played a central role in 1953 coup against the democratic government of Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh, etc. And when we talk to the Americans, they say that you took our diplomats hostage for 444 days. We talk to the both sides and there are grievances. What should be done in order for the two countries to consign these dark memories to oblivion and move toward a new beginning, so that the whole international community could benefit from this partnership?

A: Well, I think there are models for that. We can look at the relation with Vietnam; 59,000 Americans died in that war, as did several million Vietnamese. We have normalized the relations. As I mentioned with China, we fought the Chinese in the Korean War and they provided aid to Vietnam in the war against us. I think if this agreement is kept by both sides, then I think we will be able to start moving in the direction that we did with previous people that we had disagreements with. And I think it’s important for the leaders on both sides to tell their people that each of us have legitimate complaints, and you pointed them out. I mean, Americans – I worry sometimes because we don’t see they know much history. And if you tell them about what we did with Mosaddegh or shooting down that plane accidently– they mistook it for a combatant – people are not aware of that. They do remember the marines in Beirut and the seizure of the hostages, but it requires the leaders to say, ok, we both make mistakes and we got to move on. And as I said, we have Americans that now go back to Vietnam – they had fought in that war. You know, my son was in the Foreign Service when he went on vacation in Vietnam – that’s all where I was in when I was young!

Q: Interesting!

A: And so, I think someday I’d like to come to visit Iran and just have normal relations. I can remember going to China when I was working for President Reagan in 1984 to help them modernize their military logistic system. This is a country that aided Vietnam and we fought them in Korea. So, yes! I think it’s possible and I do think if we could come to some sort of accommodation, the world will be so much better because the Middle East is in such turmoil now and it’s not just Iran that’s causing it. What’s going to happen to Iraq? You don’t have one country, but three countries there. What’s going to happen in Syria? What’s goingto happen to the Arab Spring? So, we if could get together, I think we can begin to deal with a lot of those problems.

By Su-Ann Oh*

Myanmar will hold its general election on 8 November, and for the first time in decades, there will be real competition between political parties and candidates in a general election. Given the popularity of Aung San Suu Kyi and her party – the National League for Democracy (NLD) – we may be about to witness a pivotal moment in the political history of the country. This, however, is overshadowed by concerns over how the military will react if the NLD secures electoral success.
Fully aware of the complexities of politics in Myanmar, this article provides background information about the process and the players by addressing six questions:

1. Which seats are being contested?
2. Who is in the running?
3. What role do the ethnic parties play?
4. Who will be president?
5. Will the elections be free and fair?
6. Will the results be upheld or will the military step in?

WHICH SEATS ARE BEING CONTESTED?

In all, 1,142 people will be elected to the Assembly of the Union (Pyidaungsu Hluttaw) and to the regional assemblies. The Assembly of the Union – the national-level bicameral legislature of Myanmar – is made up of a 440-seat lower house (House of Representatives, Pyithu Hluttaw) and a 224-seat upper house (House of Nationalities, Amyotha Hluttaw).

As Figure 1 shows, 25 per cent of the seats in the Assembly are reserved for members appointed by the Myanmar Armed Forces (Tatmadaw), as enshrined in the 2008 Constitution. In all, 330 seats in the lower house and 168 seats in the upper house will be contested. The constituencies for this year’s general election will be the same as those in 2010.

At present, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) – the ruling party – holds altogether 336 seats in the upper and lower houses. These were won in the general election in 2010 which had been boycotted by the main opposition party, the National League of Democracy (NLD). The NLD has 41 members of parliament who were elected during the by- elections in 2012 (see Figures 2 and 3).

In the lower house, the government, consisting of the USDP and the military holds 322 seats, while the other political parties hold 109 seats. The political parties in the ‘other’ category include the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, the National Democratic Force, the All Mon Region Democracy Party, the Pa-O National Organization, the Chin National Party, the Chin Progressive Party, Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party and the Wa Democratic Party. Shwe Mann, a former general and member of the USDP, was the elected Speaker of the lower house for the first two years. His post was later given to Khin Aung Myint, a former general.

In the ‘other’ category, a host of parties holds a small number of seats each and they include the All Mon Region Democracy Party, the Chin Progressive Party, the National Democratic Force, the Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, the Phalon-Sawaw Democratic Party, the Chin National Party among others. Khin Aung Myint, senior official of the Myanmar military government and a Major General, was elected Speaker of the upper house and Chairman of the Assembly of the Union.

Regional elections will take place as well in each of the 14 major administrative regions and states. Myanmar is divided into 21 administrative subdivisions (by state, region, union territory, self-administered zone, self-administered division).

However, members will be elected for the 14 administrative areas consisting of seven regions and seven states (see map in Figure 4), each with their own Assembly (Region Hluttaw or State Hluttaw); once elected, they will also be involved in the Leading Body in self-administered zones and divisions. The regions – Ayeyarwady, Bago, Magway, Mandalay, Sagaing, Tanintharyi and Yangon – are predominantly ethnically Bamar. The states – Chin, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Rakhine and Shan – on the other hand, have higher proportions of minority ethnic populations. The difference in ethnic composition has important implications on the election as ethnicity is highly political, politicized and part of the political infrastructure of the country.

During the elections, 644 seats will be contested in these regional parliaments. The Shan State and Yangon Region have the largest Hluttaws at 143 and 123 seats respectively, while the Kayah State and Kayin State Hluttaws are the smallest at 20 and 23 respectively (see Table 1). In addition, 29 constituencies for regional or state parliaments for national races will also be contested.

Currently, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) holds the majority of the seats in all State and Region Hluttaws except in Rakhine State where the Rakhine Nationalities Development Party dominates. As Table 1 shows, there is a wide variety of political parties in these assemblies, including a host of ethnic-based ones.

WHO IS IN THE RUNNING?

In all, 90 parties3 have submitted more than 5,8004 candidates and more than 3005 have registered as independent candidates. The USDP, NLD and the NUP (National Union Party) have the highest number of candidates.6 However, the main battle will be fought between the USDP and the NLD.
The USDP registered as a political party in June 2010 and is the successor of the Union Solidarity and Development Association. The latter was formed by the military junta in 1993 as a way of mobilizing the masses to support the military, and “to perpetuate its influence in the society and carry out its policies.”7

In what appears to be a purge of the ranks, Shwe Mann has since been removed as head of the USDP. It is speculated that this has been done to pave the way for Thein Sein’s second term as president, to curb Shwe Mann’s efforts to reduce the military’s influence in parliament and the perception that he has been working in alliance with Aung San Suu Kyi.

The USDP has nominated more than 1,000 candidates nationwide. Among these are 45 senior officers who have retired from the military.8 Although the USDP is generally considered by international commentators to be unpopular, its candidates may win in many rural areas as they are seen to be able to meet local needs.9 It appears that the recent floods are another opportunity for the USDP and the NLD to further their political goals.10 The way in which the government handles the floods will, to some extent, determine how people will vote in these areas.11

It is generally believed that the NLD will do well in the elections, particularly in the Bamar- dominated constituencies. The party and its iconic leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, have long been viewed as stalwart and devoted proponents of democracy, having suffered persecution, imprisonment and personal loss for their cause.

The NLD was formed under the leadership of Aung San Suu Kyi in the aftermath of the 8888 Uprising, a series of protests against the military regime in 1988. In 1990, the NLD won 392 of the 492 available seats. However, it was unable to persuade the ruling military junta to transfer power over to it.12

The NLD is participating in the general elections after having boycotted them in 2010 during which the USDP won 70 per cent of the seats. However, in the by-elections of 2012, the NLD won 43 of the 45 seats on offer. It is widely believed that the geographic spread of seats suited the NLD because they were mainly in ethnic Bamar areas.

The NLD has fielded more than 1,000 candidates; but its choices have been challenged by its own members and those who were not selected. It has been argued that in rejecting all but one of the members of the ’88 Generation’ group – activists who took part in the 8888 Uprising – the NLD is “dissociating itself from the more radical elements” of its party.13 Nevertheless, this is but the first of a series of minor conflicts that are expected to occur and its impact on the NLD’s chances of success is as yet unknown.

The battle for votes will be determined by geography and ethnicity. In the seven central and southern regions where the Bamar dominate, it is expected that the NLD will dominate the polls. However, to obtain an overall majority, the NLD will need to win a substantial number of seats in the minority ethnic states as well. In these regions, strong competition will come from smaller local ethnic groups.

WHAT ROLE DO THE ETHNIC PARTIES PLAY?

The ethnic parties – all of which claim federalism and ethnic needs as priorities – can be classified into three main groups: those linked to the USDP, those connected to the NLD and those linked to neither. Most of the ethnic parties that contested in the 2010 election are from the first category – Rakhine State National United Party, Kayin State Democracy and Development Party, and the All Mon Region Democracy Party for instance. Although these were allied to the USDP during the 2010 election, they have since distanced themselves from a pro-USDP agenda.

Those parties allied with the NLD – Zomi Congress for Democracy, Shan Nationalities League for Democracy, Chin League for Democracy Party, Mon National Party, for example – seek to increase their influence through this association and strengthen their opposition to the USDP.

The ethnic parties in the third group were founded to represent their ethnic electorate, to promote equality and to support their ethnic identity. They include smaller parties whose aim is to limit their being discriminated by larger ethnic groups.14

The ethnic parties have formed several coalitions,15 two of which will be contesting in the elections: the Nationalities Brotherhood Federation (NBF) and the United Nationalities Alliance (UNA). Broadly, the NBF consists of the ethnic parties that successfully contested the 2010 election. The UNA, in contrast, was formed after the 1990 election and is “considered one of the most influential and experienced political alliances operating in the country”.16

The main strategic concern in the ethnic states is the competition with the NLD and the splitting of the ethnic vote. The NLD has not responded to a proposal from the UNA to not contest seats where UNA representatives will stand. 17 It appears that there will be an all-out fight for the ethnic vote. If the ethnic parties win a majority in the seven ethnic states, this could lead to a fragmentation of the local assemblies. Like Singapore and the UK, Myanmar uses the first- past-the-post (constituency-based) system in the general election. This means that the person with the most votes in a constituency is declared the winner and that in constituencies where three or more parties are running, it is difficult to foresee the outcome in many, if not most, instances.

WHO WILL BE PRESIDENT?

Although President Thein Sein has decided not to run in the general election, he has left the possibility of a second presidential term open. A recent amendment to the Constitution has made it possible for unelected representatives to become president. His fellow USDP member, Shwe Mann, has long expressed his desire to be president. It would seem, however, that his chances have diminished since his removal as head of the USDP.

At present Aung San Suu Kyi is not eligible to become president because Article 59F of the 2008 Constitution disqualifies anyone with “legitimate children” owing “allegiance to a foreign power”, i.e. with nationality of another country (Myanmar does not recognize dual citizenship) from doing so. However, if the NLD secures electoral success, pressure may be brought to bear on the military to alter this clause.18 As the selection of a president is likely to occur in the first quarter of 2016, there will be enough time for the NLD to campaign to remove Article 59F. Nevertheless, Aung San Suu Kyi would still need to garner the most votes during the selection in the Assembly, a veritable challenge given the different groups in the Assembly of the Union. As a quarter of the seats is occupied by the army, an anti-NLD coalition only needs a third of the elected seats to control who becomes president.

The selection process, which will involve much lobbying and voting, consists of three steps. First, the members of the Assembly of the Union divide into three groups: the elected representatives of the lower house, the elected representatives of the upper house, and the unelected army representatives. Each group puts forward a candidate and the three candidates are voted for in a joint session by all the elected and unelected representatives of both houses. The winner becomes president and the two losers become vice-presidents.

There has been speculation that a deal was made between Aung San Suu Kyi and Shwe Mann which might have involved the NLD backing Shwe Mann to be president, in return for him pushing through constitutional amendments to make Aung San Suu Kyi eligible to be president. Given that Shwe Mann has been sidelined in the USDP, the possibility of this plan succeeding is low.

Two names have since been tipped as possible NLD presidential candidates but it seems unlikely that they will run. Tin Oo, a former Commander-in-Chief of the Burmese army and a founding member of the NLD has announced that he is not interested.19 Win Htein, a former military officer, appears to be suffering from ill health.20

Finally, there are rumours that current Commander-in-Chief Min Aung Hlaing may be considering throwing his hat into the Presidency ring.

WILL THE ELECTIONS BE FREE AND FAIR?

There appears to be a strong drive to ensure that the elections are free and fair. The Union Election Commission (UEC) has collaborated with local civil society organizations to draft a code of conduct and to educate voters, and is willing to receive international observers during the elections. However, whether things will turn out that way may boil down to technicalities rather than will. One of the main obstacles that the UEC is facing is the capacity to produce accurate voter rolls. It has been in the process of computerizing more than 32 million21 voter names for the first time. This is a major undertaking and the electoral roll has been found to be riddled with inaccuracies. It is now issuing new identity cards, separate from existing National Registration Cards, that will guarantee the right to vote and will be useful in enhancing the accuracy of the voter list for future elections.22

WILL THE RESULTS BE UPHELD OR WILL THE MILITARY STEP IN?

Given Myanmar’s record, observers are leery of predicting what will happen after the results are announced. In an interview with the BBC, Myanmar’s Commander-in-chief Min Aung Hlaing asserted that the military would maintain a political presence until a peace agreement is reached with all the ethnic armed groups and that it would respect the results of the forthcoming general election.23 This pronouncement is believable as the military has a guaranteed 25 per cent block in the parliament, which it believes ‘safeguards’ the nation. Nevertheless, what the military will do if the NLD wins the majority of parliamentary seats remains to be seen.

CONCLUSION

The players are in place and the battle lines have been drawn. On 5 September, campaigning began in earnest: flags will be flown, gauntlets will be thrown down and marches will be stolen. One thing is for certain: we have many lively discussions and speculations of campaign strategies and poll results to look forward to in the coming months.

About the author:
* Su-Ann Oh is Visiting Fellow at ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute. She would like to thank ISEAS Perspective editors and reviewers for their help in editing and improving the draft of this paper.

Source:
This article was published by ISEAS as ISEAS Perspective 2015, Number 51 (PDF).

Notes:
1 USDP – Union Solidarity and Development Party, NLD – National League for Democracy, NUP – National Unity Party, AMRDP – All Mon Region Democracy Party, RNDP – Rakhine Nationalities Development Party, CPP – Chin Progressive Party, CNP – Chin National Party, SNDP – Shan Nationalities Democratic Party, UDPKS – Unity and Democracy Party of Kachin State, KNP – Kayan National Party, NDPD – National Democratic Party for Development, KSDDP – Karen State Democracy and Development Party, PNO – Pa-O National Organization, TNP – Taaung (Palaung) National Party, INDP – Independent, WDP – Wa Democratic Party, ENDP – Ethnic National Development Party, LNDP – Lahu National Democratic Party, DPM – Democratic Party (Myanmar), NDF – National Democratic Force, 88GSY – The 88 Generation Student Youths
2 Nixon, Hamish, Joelene, Cindy, Kyi Pyar Chit Saw, Thet Aung Lynn and Arnold, Matthew. State and Region Governments in Myanmar. Location unspecified: Myanmar Development Resource Institute (MDRI) Centre for Economic and Social Development (CESD) and The Asia Foundation, 2013.
3 Union Election Commission website. http://uecmyanmar.org/index.php/voters (accessed 24 August 2015).
4 The Global New Light of Myanmar. “UEC announces preliminary candidate lists”. 20 August 2015. http://globalnewlightofmyanmar.com/uec-announces-preliminary-candidate- lists/?utm_source=Daily+News+on+the+Southeast+Asian+Region+21+August+2015&utm_campaign=Info+Al ert+20150821&utm_medium=email (accessed 24 August 2015).
5 ibid.
6 ibid.
7 David Steinberg. “The Union Solidarity And Development Association: Mobilization and Orthodoxy in Myanmar”. Burma Debate. Jan/Feb 1997: 11.
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs12/BD1997-V04-N01.pdf (accessed 24 August 2015).
8 “45 Senior Military Officers Retire to Contest Nov. 8 Poll”. The Irrawaddy. 11 August 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/45-senior-military-officers-retire-to-contest-nov-8-poll.html (accessed 14 August 2015).
9 Reuters. “Unpopular but defiant, Myanmar ruling party unfazed about poll prospects”. 25 May 2015. http://uk.reuters.com/article/2015/05/25/uk-myanmar-politics-usdp-idUKKBN0OA1GI20150525 (accessed 14 August 2015).
10 RJ Vogt . “In Magwe, flood relief gets political for NLD”. Myanmar Times. 13 August 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/15966-in-magwe-flood-relief-gets-political-for-nld.html (accessed 14 August 2015).
11 Nicholas Farrelly. “Myanmar and the politics of disaster”.
New Mandala. 12 August 2015. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/08/12/myanmar-and-the- politics-of-disaster/ (accessed 14 August 2015).
12 Derek Tonkin. “The 1990 Elections in Myanmar: Broken Promises or a Failure of Communication?” Contemporary Southeast Asia: A Journal of International and Strategic Affairs. Vol. 29 (1): 2007, pp. 33-54.
13 Timothy Simonson. “The taming of the NLD… by the NLD”. New Mandala. 12 August 2015. http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/2015/08/12/the-taming-of-the-nld-by-the-nld/ (accessed on 14 August 2015).
14 See Marie Lall, Nwe Nwe San, Theint Theint Myat and Yin Nyein Aye. Myanmar’s Ethnic Parties and the 2015 Elections. Location unspecified: International Management Group, 2015. http://www.networkmyanmar.org/images/stories/PDF19/Lall-MEP.pdf (accessed 24 August 2015).
15 Ibid. See page 25, footnote 18 for the list of alliances and their corresponding members.
16 Paul Keenan. “Ethnic Political Alliances”. Briefing Paper No.18. Burma Centre for Ethnic Studies Peace and Reconciliation, 2013.
http://www.burmalibrary.org/docs16/BCES-BP-18-Ethnic_Political_Alliances-en.pdf (accessed on 24 August 2015).
17 Ei Ei Toe Lwin. NLD snubs prominent politicians, activists – and ethnic alliance offer. Myanmar Times. 3 August 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/15792-nld-snubs-prominent-politicians- activists-and-ethnic-alliance-offer.html (accessed on 24 August 2015).
18 Andrew McLeod. “Viewpoint: Aung San Suu Kyi still in running for Myanmar presidency”. BBC News. 10 July 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33476250 (accessed 2 August 2015).
19 The Irrawaddy. “NLD Patron Tin Oo: ‘I Have Never Wanted to be President’”. 16 July 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/interview/nld-patron-tin-oo-i-have-never-wanted-to-be-president.html (accessed on 10 August 2015).
20 Tun Tun. “NLD Says It Intends to Field a Presidential Candidate”. The Irrawaddy. 13 July 2015. http://www.irrawaddy.org/burma/nld-says-it-intends-to-field-a-presidential-candidate.html (accessed on 10 August 2015).
21 Nyein Ko and Htet Shine. “Myanmar expatriates among 32 million eligible voters”. Myanmar Eleven. 23 July 2015. http://www.nationmultimedia.com/breakingnews/Myanmar-expatriates-among-32-million-eligible-vote- 30265069.html (accessed 12 August 2015).
22 Lun Min Mang. “Voters to get identity cards”. Myanmar Times. 6 August 2015. http://www.mmtimes.com/index.php/national-news/15849-voters-to-get-identity-cards.html (accessed 12 August 2015).
23 Jonah Fisher. “Myanmar’s strongman gives rare BBC interview”. BBC News. 20 July 2015. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-33587800 (accessed 12 August 2015).

By Subrata Kumar Mitra*

Comments in the press on the cancelled trip of Mr Sartaj Aziz, Special Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Pakistan, to Delhi to meet his Indian counterpart vary between a ‘missed opportunity’, a ‘farce’ and a plaidoyer for a new beginning.2 The cautious optimism that marked the three weeks that intervened between the Ufa initiative and the trip that failed to materialise gives ground to believe that serious analysts had seen some probability of progress of India-Pakistan dialogue in this initiative. However, a critical analysis of the discourse that surrounded the cancelled trip of Mr Sartaz Aziz reveals the structural hurdles that underpin any meaningful dialogue between India and Pakistan as things stand.

I argue in this essay that the failure of the Ufa initiative to follow its course is an alert call for deeper analysis and strategising – a warning that India and Pakistan can ignore only at enormous and avoidable costs.3 However, while there is a general admission of the need for India and Pakistan to break out of the ‘stalemate’4 in which they find themselves, there is no radically new thinking on how this can be done. In suggesting a move towards ‘principled negotiations’,5 this article points towards some concrete steps that might contribute to the breaking of the stalemated, low-level-equilibrium- trap in which the two hostile neighbours find themselves at this moment.

The Ufa ‘Agreement’ and its Aftermath

The meeting of Mr Aziz with Mr Ajit Doval, National Security Advisors (NSAs) was agreed to at Ufa, Russia, on 10 July 2015 where India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Pakistan’s Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, had agreed to the following five points on the side-lines of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation summit. As reported in the press, five points were agreed to.6

1. A meeting in New Delhi between the two NSAs to discuss all issues connected to terrorism.
2. Early meetings of DG BSF and DG Pakistani Rangers followed by the DGMOs.
3. Decision for the release of fishermen in each other’s custody, along with their boats, within a period of 15 days.
4. Mechanisms for facilitating religious tourism.
5. Both sides agreed to discuss ways and means to expedite the Mumbai case
   trial, including additional information like providing voice samples.

Following the meeting in Ufa, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif came in for vigorous criticism at home on account of the first and the fifth points where he was seen to have conceded too much to India by having failed to include Kashmir among the issues to be discussed.7 The events that unfolded leading the acrimonious cancellation of the visit could have been easily anticipated. The fact that events unfolded differently from the predicted direction shows the limited utility of the thinking that currently dominates the Indian position in terms of its capacity to initiate and sustain a serious dialogue with Pakistan. For India and Mr Modi, the event has acquired a serious significance. Rather than merely a tactical failure, this is the second major setback for Mr Modi’s larger foreign policy framework regarding Pakistan, following the first one marked by India’s cancellation of the Foreign Secretaries’ meeting between India and Pakistan. As long night on Sunday (23 August, 2015) unfolded, Pakistan managed to focus global attention, once again on the Kashmir conflict and not terrorism – precisely what India wanted to avoid.

During the three ominous weeks that Pakistan took to set a date for the visit of Mr Sartaz Aziz, the interpretations of the Ufa initiative and expectations arising out of them grew in radically divergent directions in India and Pakistan. Though the two PMs agreed to the NSAs meeting, there were some public disagreements about the agendas of the meeting almost immediately after the surprise announcement at Ufa. However, the speed with which the divergent interpretations of what was exactly agreed to surfaced, reveals the chasm that separates the positions of the two countries. India insists that the agreement was made to discuss terrorism; Pakistan does not see it that way and wishes to broaden the discussion and bring in the Kashmir issue. As the Indian side saw it, the intent behind Mr Sartaz Aziz’s insistence on meeting the Hurriyat,8 though it was presented only as a symbolic meeting in a large get-together at the Pakistan High Commission in Delhi, was to broaden the agreed agenda and bring the Kashmir question back in again.

Had the meeting taken place, this would have been the first formal high-level meeting between the two countries after the cancellation of the two foreign secretaries meeting in 2014. There are striking parallels between the two failures – the two foreign secretaries in 2014 and the two NSAs now. In each case India has tried to focus on the specific issue of cross-border terrorism in a bilateral setting whereas Pakistan has sought to broaden the issue and give the ‘dialogue’ a tripartite character by including Kashmir and the Hurriyat, against which India has vigorously protested. The Indian case for focussing only on terrorism and wanting a quick resolution of the connected issues (case of perpetrators of Mumbai attack, Dawood Ibrahim, Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi, training camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir in which terrorists are launched into India) follow from the basic premise of Kashmir’s accession to India as final and binding, and assumptions that underpin the Indian position.

Contrasting Position of India and Pakistan on Kashmir

In order to understand the divergent interpretations of the follow-up to the Ufa initiative, we have to look at India and Pakistan separately. In India, one needs to go back to the election campaigns of Mr Modi, who promised to ‘erase the menace of terrorism’ without necessarily committing himself to any particular solution to the Kashmir conflict. Indian thinking is based is based on a framework that has the following six assumptions:

1. The integration of Jammu and Kashmir with the Indian Union is legal and final. As such, the parts of Jammu and Kashmir that are under the occupation of Pakistan and China are illegal. This also includes the parts of Jammu and Kashmir ceded to China by the Pakistan-China agreement of 1963. (See map, below).
2. The legitimacy of this position is supported by an all-party resolution of the Indian Parliament in 1994. (See box 1, below).
3. The fact that regular, fair and free elections have taken place in Kashmir subsumes the need for a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir.
4. A plebiscite could have taken place only on the condition that Pakistan first vacated the occupied territories (Azad Kashmir) which has not happened. Besides, in the hypothetical event of a plebiscite, the only choice would be between Kashmir joining either India or Pakistan. In other words, the independence of Kashmir could not be an option.
5. Strong law and order management could produce a stable border and give a permanent character to the Line of Control that marks the position of ceasefire in the original 1947-48 war between the two neighbours which is still under the observation of the representatives of the United Nations. (See Figure 2 ).
6. Muslim-majority Kashmir’s integration with India is an important argument of India’s character as a secular state which does not consider religion to be the basis of state formation.

In response to increasing terrorist violence and Pakistan’s attempt to highlight the Kashmir dispute internationally, both Houses of the Indian Parliament unanimously passed a resolution on 22 February 1994 on Jammu and Kashmir. (See Box 1, below). This landmark resolution of the Parliament put on record the assertion that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an “integral part of India” and that Pakistan must vacate parts of the State under its occupation. A close reading of the resolution helps unpack all the assumptions of India that underpin the Indian position.

Box 1: Parliament Resolution on Jammu and Kashmir

“This House note with deep concern Pakistan’s role in imparting training to the terrorists in camps located in Pakistan and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, the supply of weapons and funds, assistance in infiltration of trained militants, including foreign mercenaries into Jammu and Kashmir with the avowed purpose of creating disorder, disharmony and subversion:

• reiterates that the militants trained in Pakistan are indulging in murder, loot and other heinous crimes against the people, taking them hostage and creating an atmosphere of terror;
• Condemns strongly the continued support and encouragement Pakistan is extending to subversive and terrorist activities in the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir;
• Calls upon Pakistan to stop forthwith its support to terrorism, which is in violation of the Simla Agreement and the internationally accepted norms of inter-State conduct and is the root cause of tension between the two countries reiterates that the Indian political and democratic structures and the Constitution provide for firm guarantees for the promotion and protection of human rights of all its citizens;
• Regard Pakistan’s anti-India campaign of calumny and falsehood as unacceptable and deplorable.
• Notes with deep concern the highly provocative statements emanating from Pakistan urges Pakistan to refrain from making statements which vitiate the atmosphere and incite public opinion;

Expresses regret and concern at the pitiable conditions and violations of human rights and denial of democratic freedoms of the people in those areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which are under the illegal occupation of Pakistan; On behalf of the People of India, firmly declares that:

(a) The State of Jammu & Kashmir has been, is and shall be an integral part of India and any attempts to separate it from the rest of the country will be resisted by all necessary means;
(b) India has the will and capacity to firmly counter all designs against its unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity;
and demands that –
(c) Pakistan must vacate the areas of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, which they have occupied through aggression; and resolves that –
(d) All attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of India will be met resolutely.”
The Resolution was unanimously adopted. Mr. Speaker: The Resolution is unanimously passed.

February 22, 1994
http://www.kashmir-information.com/LegalDocs/ParliamentRes.html.

The assumptions that underpin the Pakistani position contest some of the assumptions of India and add some additional ones for extra effect:

1. India’s claim of the eternal union of Kashmir with the Indian republic is legally unfounded (no copy of the original Instrument of Accession is available); (King Hari Singh was coerced by the Indian government to sign the Instrument of Accession.
2. The legitimacy of the integration of Kashmir is questioned by the mass uprising (parallel to the Ittifada in Palestine), and a plebiscite will confirm it.
3. World opinion supports the Pakistani position on Kashmir
4. Pakistan has the solid support of China in terms of its Kashmir position.
5. Opinion of Islamic countries supports the integration of Muslim majority
   Kashmir with Pakistan, carved out of British India as a homeland for Muslims
   of South Asia.
6. Continuous pressure on India through the mobilisation of opinion in global
   fora, lobbying Washington, cross-border terrorism, overt and covert links with Muslim organisations in India will one day either destabilise India or will make the cost of keeping Kashmir in India too high for the Indian state.

The two sets of assumptions specified above constitute the two hard, contrasting positions whose hiatus scuttles specific initiatives like Ufa, and, left intact, might contribute to the cancellation of the planned visit Prime Minister Modi to Pakistan in 2016.

The coming of Mr Modi to the centre stage of Indian politics as Prime Minister has added an extra élan to the Indian position as the core of India’s Pakistan policy. Under him, Indian border forces and the military have been given more of a free hand in taking actions against terrorists’ activities and ceasefire violations from Pakistan. The BJP, Mr Modi’s party which, for the first time in the past thirty years has emerged as the single majority party in the Lok Sabha, is the junior partner of the People’s Democratic Party (PDP), in the coalition government of Kashmir. Any association of the Hurriyat which has chosen to stay out of electoral democracy in a talk that might involve the future of Kashmir would fundamentally question the legitimacy of the Kashmir polls, besides being unacceptable to the full spectrum of India’s political establishment, the bureaucracy and the army. (See box 1, again).

For Pakistan, that every opportunity at a dialogue with India is used to broaden the issue and bring Kashmir in, is equally understandable. As the Pakistani argument goes, Kashmir conflict is a continuation of the unresolved issue of the partition of India. As already mentioned above, Pakistan trenchantly contests the instrument of accession through which the then King of Kashmir Maharaja Hari Singh agreed to join Jammu & Kashmir with India. Pakistan has long advocated a plebiscite to decide the issue of Kashmir accession as commanded by the UN Security Council Resolution 47 (Resolution of 21 April 1948). In the light of this constellation of factors, the planned meeting of Mr Aziz with the Hurriyat leaders was seen in Delhi merely as the customary Pakistani strategy to keep the pot boiling, and to internationalise the issue.

Implications of the Low-Level-Equilibrium-Trap in Kashmir for India and Pakistan

An analysis of trends in violent incidents in Kashmir will give an insight into the military and political prognosis of India and Pakistan. Thanks to vast improvements in the deployment of the army, paramilitary and police forces and better coordination of civil and military intelligence, violence in Kashmir has declined quite radically. (See Figure 2, again) The downward sloping curves create an impression of a firm, linear decrease in violence that the Indian army believes will eventually see the problem disappear on its own. Such an assumption, which becomes a contributory cause to escalation for reasons underpinning the Pakistani position, is dangerous and could close the window of opportunity for a legitimate and enduring solution to the conflict in Kashmir. Let us note that while the curves all point downwards after the peak year of 2001, rather than falling to zero, they have become asymptotic. (See figure 2, again)

In terms of logistics and strategy, Indian army reads this data as a success of law and order management, border fencing and the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act which gives special powers of search and arrest to the army. However, while the rate of casualties has definitely come down, the quest for a stable, democratic regime in Kashmir, based on law and order and free of military presence like most parts of India (with the exception of the North-East), is far from over. The combination of a sullen population and the ability of cross-border terrorists to stage spectacular attacks show that despite radical reduction in casualties the conflict in Kashmir has reached a stalemate. Politics in Kashmir stays locked into a ‘low-level-equilibrium-trap’ where India cannot quite manage to ‘win’ decisively. Forces opposed to the continuation of Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union include cross-border terrorist organisations as well as those drawing support from within India, with links to rogue elements of the Pakistani army, and sections of the Hurriyat who want independence of Kashmir. They do not constitute a cohesive group, which would be able to mobilise itself as a united front, make a decisive strike and break the deadlock.

The conventional approach leads to a suboptimal outcome for both India and Pakistan

In order to see the dynamics that underpins the deadlock in India-Pakistan consider the following simulation, presented in the form of a two-person zero-sum game (Figure 3). Each of the two parties to this ‘game’, in this case, India and Pakistan, has a choice of being peace-like (opening-up for trade, cutting down on militarisation) or war-like (closing down trade and investing in enhancing military strength). The payoffs to each are presented in the cells, where the first figure represents the expected gain of the player on the left (in this case India) and the second number corresponds to the expected game of the player named on the top (in this case, Pakistan).

For the sake of simplicity, we have adopted metric scales for the pay-offs.10 Thus, when India opts for peace and Pakistan reciprocates, India can expect to gain 8 points (and India can anticipate Pakistan also to cash the ‘peace dividend’). When both opt for war, the gains get reduced, to 4 for India (and for Pakistan as well).11 However, in the event India opts for peace and Pakistan chooses the war option, it can deal a fatal blow, to sever Kashmir from India (which is what Pakistan had indeed attempted in 1965 and later, in 1999 Kargil war). In this case, Pakistan can expect 10 points as against India’s 0. The symmetric opposite would be the case if Pakistan opted for peace and India went for the war option. The Indo-Pak war of 1971 where India could capitalise on Pakistan’s logistical difficulties and split the country would illustrate the determination of Pakistan not to let off guard – an argument which helps understand the determination of Pakistan to stay ahead of India with regard to nuclear weapons – regardless of the cost.

In a two-person game, each player chooses his options unilaterally, based on the calculation of the likely minimum payoff from each tactic. So, seen through the eyes of India the peace option carries the potential of a payoff of 0, whereas the war option could yield either 10 or t4, and in any case, a minimum of 4. Given a choice between 0 and 4, a rational player could be expected to choose 4, i.e. the war option. The same logic holds for Pakistan too. So, the likely outcome of this game would be the simultaneous choice of war-war, yielding the suboptimal gain of 4 whereas 8 could have been possible. In the language of game theory this is a strong and stable outcome, known as Nash equilibrium. To see why that might be the case, imagine India being tempted by the peace dividend and opting for peace. If Pakistan is sure that Indians would lower their guard, one can expect them to go for the war option and deal the fatal blow. (Those familiar with the rapidity with which the Pakistani army mobilised troops on Kargil heights following Vajpayee’s ‘bus diplomacy’ would understand the logic of the game.

The Indian position on Pakistan corresponds to the lesson that we learn from the above example. India counts on the continuation of the military status quo though it is suboptimal, and hopes that the functioning of a regional government, and directly elected local panchayats, schools, colleges and hospitals would produce a semblance of normalcy which the world would eventually recognise as permanent. That calculation itself reinforces the desire on the opposite side to keep the pressure on, looking for loopholes where to strike and mobilise world opinion against the attempts of a powerful neighbour using its superior force to coerce the weaker party to accept what it considers illegitimate.

The two-person zero-sum game depicted above also resembles US-USSR relations at the height of the Cold War. For two rational players – here rationality is understood as the ability to maximise expected gain – a “mutually hurting stalemate” can eventually lead to cooperation in the form of a “mutually satisfying agreement” in which “divergent positions are combined into a single outcome”.12 One can thus understand why couples caught in bitter protracted divorce cases sometimes opt for an out-of- court settlement; why in the trench warfare of the First World War the enemies – the Anglo-French army on one side and the Germans on the other – could implicitly collude;13 and how the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) could take place despite the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union.

However, such is not the case with India and Pakistan. To understand why this is not the case, one has to put the two countries in context. Thus, one can see that the two- person game is actually a part of a three-person game, for China is part of this triangular relationship. The presence of China would cause the low-level-equilibrium- trap to dissolve into a series of unstable outcomes, constantly egging India and Pakistan into a spiral of bitter rivalry and arms race.

To see this consider the situation depicted in figure 4 (below). In the first sequence, India and Pakistan have worked out a ratio of arms (eg 3:1), a form of balance of power, whereby Pakistan has a proportionate counter-threat to the Indian threat. However, India might argue that India also needs to balance against China and therefore would need k units of force to supplement its stock pile. (Sequence 2) At this point, Pakistan can argue that it would need to have one-third of everything India has (“where is the guarantee that India would not turn the supplementary force against Pakistan in order to deal the fatal blow?” Pakistan might argue). So, in Sequence 3 one has a situation where Pakistan’s security need is satisfied, but this might make India insecure and act as an incentive for another round of arms acquisition by the country. This would start the kind of arms race between the two that somewhat resembles the situation obtaining today.

The way out of this dangerous spiral where intense political violence lurks just under the surface of a deceptive peace, lies in the realm of ‘principled negotiation’ (Fisher et al 1991). The need for taking stock of Kashmir is particularly urgent in the present context because the reduction of militancy compared to the recent past can lead to complacency14 and the very window of opportunity that has opened up with the reduction of militancy might shut, if a major effort for an enduring solution is not taken as a matter of priority.

The ‘Principled Negotiation’ Model for a Durable Conflict Regulation

Since a stable and effective negotiated agreement among adversaries is a crucial component of the model, it is important to analyse the components of what is known as ‘principled’ negotiation. It is a method developed by Fisher, Ury and Patton (1981, subsequently published in 1991, 2011) which offers some norms of negotiation that are designed to facilitate the parties to a conflict to reach an amicable accord. According to them the four basic points (people, interests, options, the criteria of acceptability of the solution to the stakeholders) define a straightforward method of negotiating that they claim can be used under any circumstances. ‘Principled’ negotiation requires the separation of people from issues; focusing on interests and not on positions; inventing new options for mutual gain and insisting on objective criteria in choosing options. The main hypothesis that follows from these assumptions is that negotiations that follow these four points have a greater chance of reaching a successful and lasting outcome than those which do not take these into account. Moreover, principled negotiators know their ‘best alternative to a negotiated agreement’ (BATNA). The model suggests that an enduring deal can be struck when both (all) parties see the agreement as in their interest (in terms of the costs and benefits relative to the next best outcome).

Getting to ‘Principled Negotiation’ Without ‘Giving In’

I have shown elsewhere that left to themselves India and Pakistan will not converge to a stable equilibrium in terms of peaceful relations on the lines of post-war France and Germany or the United States and the USSR on the lines of the SALT15 talks that finally ended the Cold War.16 Nor is the cost of the low-level-equilibrium trap likely to lead the adversaries towards negotiation the way a ‘mutually hurting stalemate’17 does for those whose interests are hurt; (border populations, for example) are not the ones who have the voice, and those who have the power to decide are way beyond the firing line!

Kashmir conflict is caught in a ‘low level equilibrium trap’ –a state of no-war, no- peace – where heavy (but unsustainable) military presence confronts a state of low militancy. The parties to the conflict build their strategies on the assumption that any sign of weakening by the Indian state can trigger renewed bouts of violence. The consequence is a stalemate where the messy status quo prevails faute de mieux because solutions which look neat on paper have no takers and little chance of being implemented in reality.

Why has India resolutely refused to accept the singularity of the Kashmir conflict as compared to other sub-national movements of India? The enduring character of the Kashmir conflict, the oldest of its kind in India, and perhaps, one of the most durable in the world, is puzzling in view of India’s relative success with ethno-national movements that have staked their claims to an exclusive homeland, and have found a niche within the Indian federation. An analysis of the parameters of the Kashmir conflict shows why the conventional Indian model of coping, based on the negotiated accommodation of sub-national movements through a strategic combination of force, power-sharing and federalization has only been partially successful in Kashmir and, offers some radical steps towards a solution that might be more acceptable to all the stakeholders.

The conventional ‘Indian’ model has not been as successful in integrating Kashmir within the democratic political system of India. This is not because of the essential difference of Kashmir from the rest of India but because of some additional parameters that affect the functioning of the conventional model. The fragmentation of the rebels and the exogenous factors are among the additional considerations that have reduced the efficacy of the ‘Indian model’ in terms of coping with sub- nationalism.

Beyond the Conventional Indian Strategy: Why a New Approach to Negotiating Kashmir is called for

Since India’s Kashmir strategy envisages the conflict as a sub-national movement which typically combines force and participation, it is important to discuss the components of the Indian model. As India perceives it, most ethno-nationalist movements attract media attention when they first appear with their customary fury, mass insurgency and military action, but eventually they find an institutional solution within the Indian political system. And though continued political unrest in Kashmir continues to challenge this thesis, the case of Punjab in the 1990s and Tamil Nadu in the 1960s, both of which, after a spate of political turbulence, have settled down to normal parliamentary politics, illustrate this mode of successful conflict resolution in India.

The typical sub-national movement (Figure 5) begins with a few advocates, fired up with the zeal of a separate state and willing to risk all. Their high intensity is juxtaposed with the paucity of their numbers. However, when the issue of a separate state acquires a firm empirical anchor in social, political and economic cleavages, the number of adherents grows and average intensity comes down. (Time t2) If the trend continues, a point comes when the movement acquires a mass character and enters elections. Once successful, the leaders of the movement form the government of a new political unit which corresponds to the territorial base of the imagined community.18

The deceptive similarity of Kashmir to other ethno-national movements19 has caused India’s strategic analysts to approach the region with the same tool kit of a combination of force and persuasion but within the framework of the Indian Constitution. In Kashmir, the multiplicity of actors, their overlapping, exclusive and entangled agendas, as well as different BATNAs, necessitate a multi-dimensional, multi-level model of solution that is radically different from what convention dictates. The Indian model does not pay sufficient heed to the singularity of Kashmir which, in terms of cross-border entanglements, resembles the separatist movements in the North East. In the light of the analytical issues that Kashmir gives rise to, one needs to reconsider the main premises of the model, expand its domain by including new variables, and reconsider previous evidence, leading to a reformulation of the conventional model (See figure 6).20

The political field in Kashmir is structured along two different dimensions that correspond, respectively, to the transactional politics within parliamentary and democratic institutions, and to a radical, separatist dimension. Part of the political community perceives its stake as firmly anchored in transactional politics of elections, lobbying, patronage, office and professional careers. There is another section, which is numerically smaller but whose intensity continues to be high. They are sustained by both local support and extra-territorial flow of money, personnel, ideological tools, weapons and training. There is considerable fragmentation within each of the two segments; as such, for the Indian state, there is no leading contender among the separatists with whom to negotiate.

Broadening the agenda and turning rebels and adversaries into stakeholders and partners through the ‘Composite Dialogue’

Any enduring solution to the Kashmir conflict must meet two necessary conditions. First, it must ensure a method whereby rebels and adversaries can become stakeholders; secondly, the solution must have the backing of the primary stake- holders, namely India, Pakistan and China, whose security interests should be part of the negotiation.

As the strongest military and political presence in Jammu and Kashmir, India is best placed to initiate the process of multi-level negotiation.21 This can be initiated by a joint agreement of India, Pakistan and China to transform the reality on the ground to a legal fact. The transformation of the de facto lines of control to de jure frontiers22 will send a strong signal to political forces active within the three parts of Jammu and Kashmir, respectively under the control of India, Pakistan and China to think of the best solution they can come up with for their own governance. Here again, India is well-placed to continue what India does best, i.e., to continue the consolidation of democratic participation (regular panchayat elections in Kashmir are a case in point); and encourage the democratically-elected government in Kashmir to integrate the Kashmiri market with the thriving Indian market properly by removing the restrictions on immovable property ownership by non-Kashmiris.23 Instead of being withdrawn, the army should be redeployed to protect the frontiers; policing should be done by Kashmiri police. Special travel documents should be provided to residents of Jammu and Kashmir for cross-border travel. Finally, India, Pakistan and China should work towards a CBM to set up a joint front against terrorism.24

The steps outlined above form part of the method of principled negotiation, suitably adapted to a multi-level context. They can be used to simulate the multi-level negotiation one can imagine taking place between, for example, India and Pakistan currently on water, terrorism, Kashmir, drugs and trade. Thus, despite massive military presence on both sides of the border in Kashmir, efforts are being made through the ‘composite dialogue’25 to move towards ‘principled’ negotiations based on interests (for example negotiations on economic issues such as water sharing and quadrupling of trade volume) and innovative solutions (border-crossing is made easier by means of bus service from Srinagar to Lahore) as well as separation of people from problems (for both India and Pakistan terrorism represents a mutual problem, a problem that the countries try to tackle together). The sooner the actors, empowered as stakeholders, realise the true nature of what is at stake and make credible bids, the easier it would be to reach enduring solutions to conflicts that appear intractable. This would require the Indian public to be ready to engage in a ‘land for peace’ deal – not the easiest thing to do in a democracy as one knows only too well from the comparable case of Israel and the ‘occupied territories’ in the enduring Middle-East conflict. The recent initiative to solve the issue of enclaves along the India- Bangladesh frontier shows that the combination of political will and effective leadership can solve long-standing issues that were once considered insurmountable.

India should have learnt by now that the stance of injured innocence did not do much good to Jawaharlal Nehru when India went to the UN to complain against Pakistani aggression and was lumbered with the order to hold a plebiscite, on territory it claimed as its own. Similarly, today, the Indian argument that Kashmir should continue to be part of India because of its legal union with India through an Instrument of Accession (legitimacy rather than legality is the new mantra of our globalised world) has few takers. Nor does the ‘secularist’ angle – ‘Kashmir should not leave India merely because it has a Muslim majority’, help acquire Western sympathy because all western liberal democracies are based essentially on a core religious identity. How can one expect these Western states not to accede to the argument that Muslim-majority Kashmir should belong logically and naturally to Islamic Pakistan?

The case for Pakistan to make the necessary concession in favour of a multi-level negotiation comes from the fact that the ‘all or nothing’ approach to Kashmir has become an impediment to trade, development, civilian rule and democracy, and in any event, forcing such a solution on India appears unrealistic in the near-future. This form of realism marked the Musharraf plan which could contribute important elements to the package of ideas to move towards ‘principled’ negotiation.26

Current developments point in the direction of a cautious optimism with regard to a solution to the Kashmir problem that might be acceptable to India, Pakistan and the majority of the people of Kashmir. Public opinion in India continues to be in favour of a negotiated solution to the Kashmir problem. The initiative taken by the Hindu- nationalist BJP at the head of the NDA coalition under the leadership of Vajpayee to negotiate with Pakistan set an important precedent. It has been followed by the successor, the Congress-led UPA. A negotiated outcome to the Kashmir problem has emerged as a viable alternative to military action27 for the government of Pakistan, continuously in search of domestic legitimacy and international acceptability. The acquisition of nuclear weapons and missiles has helped Pakistan overcome the handicap of her relatively smaller arsenal of conventional weapons against India, and this transformation of conventional asymmetry into nuclear parity has facilitated a serious engagement in the ‘composite dialogue’. Finally, Pakistan’s nuclear threat has given further salience to the Kashmir problem by drawing the attention of a world keen to avoid regional nuclear conflict.

The time may be ripe for the steps we have indicated above. The threat to internal security has emerged as a major source of challenge to public policy making in India. A corollary to this is the entanglement of Indo-Pakistan rivalry with internal security, and its potential for nuclear war, which remains a source of great anxiety. These security concerns affect the flow of capital, investment, and trade. The leaders of both India and Pakistan have shown great concern for the opportunity cost of terrorism for the growth of trade, communication and development, and opened multiple channels of diplomatic negotiation. There is far greater realisation today that Kashmir, deeply evocative of the memory of India’s partition, is indicative of the incomplete character of national and territorial integration of both India and Pakistan. The rational politics of coping with sub-nationalism, which combines force with persuasion and accommodation, enriched by multi-level ‘principled’ negotiation, based on the multiple identities of actors and guided by interlocutor’s recommendations can help re-design space that was once considered rigid and immutable.

Is ‘Principled Negotiation’ Realistic?

The method of ‘principled negotiation’ advocated in this article marks several points of departure from the parameters that underpin conventional thinking about India- Pakistan dialogue. First, it requires India (and Pakistan) to look beyond the Simla Agreement that requires all issues between India and Pakistan to be sorted out bilaterally. Our approach requires China to be brought in as a third party with a stake in Kashmir. Secondly, it requires Indian thinking to take cognisance of the singularity of the Kashmir conflict and take cognisance of its regional dimensions. Thirdly, Pakistan has to take on board the fact that it is a multi-level negotiation where India might involve all opinions within Jammu and Kashmir at a lower level (as India already attempted in the Interlocutors initiative) while Pakistan can take into confidence its own stakeholders such as the army and the rulers of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir. But at the highest level, the negotiation should be confined to the three main stake-holders: India, Pakistan and China.

The revival of the stalled dialogue is squarely in the hands of the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan. Where, one might ask, is the incentive for Mr Modi and Mr Sharif to take the risk? To answer this question, one has to understand that in game-theoretic terms, far from being a zero-sum game, it is a non-zero sum game between these two elected leaders. Both have major challengers at home; both need to show a major prize to regain their credibility. Some progress on anti-terrorism and the Mumbai trials will do this for Mr Modi; bringing Mr Modi to Pakistan in 2016 for the SAARC summit and a good trade- and aid-package between the two countries will do this for Mr Sharif. But, is such a radical initiative realistic in the current atmosphere of distrust and powerful outpouring of venomous rhetoric on both sides? One has to only hark back to the halcyon days of Atal Behari Vajpayee when the situation was just as desperate but still, a major breakthrough could be made. Turning a problem into an opportunity is what leadership is about.

Conclusion

The fiery rhetoric and the blame-game in the respective news conferences of Mr Sartaz Aziz and Mrs Sushma Swaraj have a sense of déjà vu about them. This stalemate represents a huge opportunity cost for the corporate sectors and civil society in both states just as the Chinese crisis has created an opportunity for South Asia’s entrepreneurs and the Greek crisis keeps European business focussed on their domestic problems, this could have been the time for the subcontinent to enter the global arena in an effective way. An equally missed opportunity is for the political and the military leaders of the two countries to join forces and intelligence information in order to subdue the various branches of terrorist networks linked to global terrorism. A third missed opportunity is Indo-Pakistan trade. Ironically, just as the NSA dialogue drama was unfolding, a report in Indian Express showcased vigorous trading in Pakistani textile by a private entrepreneur in Chandigarh with Indian customers happily purchasing large stocks of Pakistani deem superior to their Indian rivals.28

One of the most protracted, violent and contentious conflicts in the world, Kashmir has attracted much attention and scholarship29 with regard to a possible solution. However, in the absence of a consensus among the conflicting parties to work jointly towards a mutually acceptable outcome, I have argued in this essay, no serious or sustainable dialogue is possible.30

The way forward to break through this dangerous and costly stalemate is for India to rethink its strategy of how to engage Pakistan. First, India should bring in China as a negotiation partner to encourage Pakistan to focus squarely on eliminating terrorist training camps in Pakistan. Harking back to the Simla Agreement (1972), signed at the nadir of Pakistan’s fortunes, has the same effect as the Versailles Treaty (1919) had on Germany, egging noxious nationalism towards a ‘just war’ to retrieve lost national honour. Second, India should try to glean some useful elements from the composite dialogue of 1999 which packaged the issues into eight baskets. Third, the Musharraf Plan, which fell along with its author when the political climate in Pakistan changed, has some useful elements that could be put together to produce a coherent Indian strategy. This could become the basis of a ‘principled’ negotiation which focuses on issues and not positions and looks for win-win solutions.

That Kashmir currently has an elected coalition government of a regional Kashmiri party Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) as a junior partner should give India a window of opportunity in order to showcase the strength of Indian democracy. In a public opinion survey31 where I asked the question “do you consider yourself a citizen of India”, a majority of Kashmiris had pronounced themselves as citizens of India. Except the border districts where the army is in active operation and the ritualised bandhs and hartals, life in Kashmir most of the time is as normal as elsewhere in India. However, Kashmir has not been able to take advantage of the general boom in Indian economy because of the legal prohibition against land ownership by non-Kashmiris. The cost of the Kashmir conflict in this sense is largely borne by Kashmiris themselves in terms of missed trade and industry.

The energetic trips of Mr Narendra Modi to foreign lands – his achievements on this score alone outstrips any of his predecessors – will come to naught with regard to the Kashmir issue if India does not develop a coherent strategy to engage all the stakeholders. These include the Pakistani military, elected government, civil society, businesses in Pakistan; United States and China; and in India itself the BJP and the Congress party, the PMO, foreign ministry, defence ministry, home ministry, the elected government of Kashmir and the Hurriyat. This might seem as too large and disparate a constituency and in consequence it might seem impossible to generate consensus from within this constituency in support of a coherent strategy, but in the end that is what leadership is about. The longer India waits to get there, the costlier it would be to find an acceptable solution.

The sooner the actors, empowered as stakeholders, realise the true nature of what is at stake and make credible bids, the easier it would be to reach enduring solutions to conflicts that appear intractable. This would require the Indian public to be ready to engage in a ‘land for peace’ deal – not the easiest thing to do in a democracy as one knows only too well from the comparable case of Israel and the occupied territories in the enduring Middle-East conflict.

The three wars 1947-48, 1965 and 1999 and countless cross-border incursions as well as the action on the western front in India’s Bangladesh liberation war in 1971 have shown that Pakistan cannot afford to completely let go off Kashmir; and India cannot quite manage to solve the Kashmir issue by force. India has refused plebiscite on the ground that Kashmiris through regular elections have expressed their willingness to be part of the Indian Union. Just as India, when it comes to Indo-Pakistan dialogue, seeks to push Kashmir unto the back burner, Pakistan tries to bring Kashmir back in again. Thus, it seems the aborted trip of Mr Sartaj Aziz is being interpreted by some commentators as a “victory” for Pakistan because the circumstances which led to its termination are being seen as Indian obduracy and an effort to dictate terms to Pakistan about what could be talked about and what had to be excluded. Be that as it may, this kind of short-term triumphalism can only harden attitudes in India and lower the chances of a negotiated outcome even further. The time has come for the Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan to take the initiative back from war-mongers. Forceful and quiet diplomacy rather than the gladiators of the talk-show and newspaper columns should be the order of the day.

About the author:
* 1. Professor Subrata Kumar Mitra is Director and Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at isasmskr@nus.edu.sg. The author, not ISAS, is responsible for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper. The paper is based on a talk he delivered at the Researchers’ meeting, ISAS, on 3 September 2015. He is grateful to the participants and the anonymous referees for their valuable comments.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Working Paper Number 209 (PDF)

Notes:
2 Delhi has hinted that the latest fiasco may not necessarily mean a prolonged break in the dialogue. As the External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj put it, there are no full-stops in Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan. C. Raja Mohan, “Not with you, nor without you”, Aug 25, 2015. http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/not-with-you-nor-without-you.
3 In his excellent and balanced article, former Pakistani diplomat Hussain Haqqani points out some of the costs of the present stalemate to Pakistan and India. See Hussain Haqqani, “Pakistani Hate, Indian Disdain”. Foreign Policy http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/08/28/pakistanihateindiandisdain/.
4 “If the balance of power changed in India’s favor in 1971 the nuclearisation of Pakistan by the late 1980s ended Delhi’s presumed advantage. Since then, we have a stalemate. Pakistan has shown the capacity to destabilize Kashmir and foment terror across India. But it has not been able to change the territorial status quo in Kashmir. Delhi, on the other hand, has not been able to find an effective answer to Rawalpindi’s proxy war. Nor has India been able to compel Pakistan to normalize bilateral relations through the expansion of economic cooperation and settlement around the status quo in Kashmir. Neither side knows how to break this stalemate.” (Emphasis added). Raja Mohan, op. cit.
5 This method, called ‘principled negotiation’ or ‘negotiation on the merits’, can be boiled down to four basic points. These four points define a straightforward method of negotiation that can be used under almost any circumstance. Each point deals with a basic element of negotiation, and suggests what you should do about it. 1. People: Separate the people from the problem. 2. Interests: Focus on interests, not positions. 3. Options: Generate a variety of possibilities before deciding what to do. 4. Criteria: Insist that the result be based on some objective standard.’ See Roger Fisher, Bruce Patton and William Ury, Getting to yes: negotiating agreement without giving in (New York, 2011), For a detailed review of the literature on ‘principled negotiation’ and an application of the model to the Kashmir conflict, see Subrata Mitra and Radu Carciumaru, “Beyond the ‘Low-Level equilibrium Trap’: Getting to a ‘Principled Negotiation’ of the Kashmir Conflict” in the Irish Studies in International Affairs, Vol. 26 (2015), 1–24.
6 See The Hindu, July 11, 2015, and ‘Blame Nawaz’, in The Dawn, August 23, 2015. http://www.dawn.com/news/1202209/blame-nawaz.
7 Ibid.
8 The All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) is an alliance of 26 political, social and religious organisations formed on 9 March 1993 as a political front to raise the cause of Kashmiri separatism. This alliance has historically been viewed positively by Pakistan as it contests the claim of the Indian government over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Wikipedia, visited on 7/9/2015
9 South Asia Terrorism Portal, accessed on September 22, 2013, available at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm
10 See Subrata Mitra, “War and Peace in South Asia: A revisionist view of India-Pakistan relations” Contemporary South Asia, Vol 10, Issue 3, 2001, pp.361-379, for a general version of this game where the numbers are presented in the form of ordinal scores.
11 India being the larger country with a bigger economic base, one can argue that the cost of war is higher to Pakistan on a per capita basis. However, that does not change the logic of the main argument, leading towards a suboptimal outcome for both.
12 William Zartman, and Jeffrey Z. Rubin eds. Power and Negotiation (International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2000), p. 12
13 According to Axelrod, four conditions – namely, knowledge, proximity, reciprocity and recursiveness – could produce the unofficial ‘Christmas truce’ between the two sides. Axelrod, Robert, The Evolution of Cooperation (Revised ed.) (New York: Perseus Books Group, 2006).
14 Partha S. Ghosh suggests, “probably just like the Cold War came to an end without giving any prior notice, the problem of Kashmir too could well be solved one day to the surprise of all Kashmiris, Indians and Pakistanis”. See, Partha S. Ghosh, “Kashmir Revisited: Factoring Governance, Terrorism and Pakistan, as Usual”, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, vol. 54, 2010, p.13.
15 The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks(SALT) were two rounds of bilateral conferences and corresponding international treaties involving the United States and the Soviet Union on the issue of arms control.
16 See Subrata K Mitra, “War and peace in South Asia: A revisionist view of India-Pakistan relations”, Contemporary South Asia, Vol 10, Issue 3, 2001, pp.361-379, in which this has been demonstrated in terms of a two-person, zero-sum game that leads to a prisoner’s dilemma situation.
17 I. William Zartman, Ripe for Resolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)
18 See, Subrata Mitra, “The Rational Politics of Cultural Nationalism: Subnational Movements of South Asia in Comparative Perspective”, British Journal of Political Science, Vol. 25, Issue 1, January 1995, pp. 57-77.
19 See Subrata K Mitra and A. Lewis (eds.), Subnational Movements in South Asia (Boulder/Colorado: Westview, 1996), for detailed analysis of cases from India and its neighbours.
20 See Subrata Mitra, “Sub-National movements, Cultural Flow, the Modern State and the Malleability of Political Space: From Rational Choice to Transcultural Perspective and Back Again” in Transcultural Studies 2 (2012) E-journal, Excellence Cluster, Heidelberg, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.11588/ts.2012.2.9155.
21 The conflict cannot be perceived by either India or Pakistan, as a zero-sum territorial dispute anymore.
22 The transformation of the de facto frontiers to de jure can be a result of the negotiation and not an assumption to begin with. I am grateful to Mr Javed Burki for this comment.
23 Article 370 of the Indian Constitution protects the separate status of Kashmir. Findings from a survey of the Kashmiri population show that 53% of the electorate of Kashmir Valley and 80% in Jammu think of themselves as citizens of India. This shows the popular base in Kashmir for an Indian-style secular democracy. See Subrata K Mitra, “Citizenship in India: Some Preliminary Results of a National Survey”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No.9, February 2010.
24 The freeing up of the Indian army from the Kashmir imbroglio may not be in the best interest of the Chinese but then, there is the possibility of reciprocity in terms of a swap of the disputed territory in the western border with that of the contested claims in the East.
25 See Sajad Padder, “The Composite Dialogue between India and Pakistan: Structure, Process and Agency”, Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics, no. 65, Feb 2012. Padder explains the strength of this visionary agreement in terms of dividing the contents of India-Pakistan relations into eight baskets of issues namely, “Peace and Security including confidence building measures(CBMs); Jammu and Kashmir (J&K); Siachen; Wullar Barrage/Tulbul Navigation Project; Sir Creek; Economic and Commercial Cooperation; Terrorism and Drug Trafficking; and, Promotion of Friendly Exchanges in various fields”.
26 See Javed Naqvi, “Musharraf’s four stage Kashmir peace plan: we can make borders irrelevant: India”, in Dawn, Dec 6, 2006
27 In view of recent border skirmishes, Sartaj Aziz – Pakistan’s Advisor on National Security and Foreign Affairs – stated that Directors General of Military Operations (DGMOs) of Pakistan and India “should meet immediately and discuss ways and means to stop the current spate of firing along the working boundary…” (See “Kashmir gun battle leaves several dead” August 24, 2014, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2014/08/kashmir-gun-battle-leaves-several-dead- 201482411568738820.html). Moreover, Pakistan and India, in view of the withdrawal of NATO forces from Afghanistan, would greatly profit by joining forces to fight the terrorists that are likely to become more active in destabilising not only the Frontier Regions of Pakistan, but other parts of the region as well, including and particularly Kashmir.
28 Nirupama Subramanian, “Unbothered by NSA talks, they pick up the threads at an India- Pakistan fair”, The Indian Express, August 23, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india- others/unbothered-by-nsa-talks-at-an-india-pakistan-fair-they-pick-up-the-threads/.
29 One of the best known list of possible solutions is from Sumit Ganguly. See Sumit Ganguly, The crisis in Kashmir: portents of war, hopes of peace (Washington, DC, 1997), pp. 131–50.
30 The latest in the series of specific measure is the recent agreement among journalists and newspaper owners in both parts of Kashmir to share information. However, in the absence of the support of the key stakeholders, such initiatives have little chance of making real progress. See Islamabad, September 7, 2015 Updated: September 7, 2015 02:28 IST Newspapers in Kashmir, PoK to share content. Reported in The Hindu 7/9/2015
31 See Subrata Mitra, “Citizenship in India: Some Preliminary Results of a National Survey”, Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLV, No.9, February 27, 2010, pp. 46-53.

By Terri Moon Cronk

Gains made by Syrian Kurd fighters against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant have also lent support to Iraq’s fight against the extremist group by disrupting ISIL’s freedom of movement between the two countries, a U.S. Central Command spokesman said.

Speaking to reporters at the Pentagon via teleconference, Air Force Lt. Col. Patrick Ryder emphasized U.S. and coalition forces are also supporting and enabling Syrian Kurd opposition fighters in its train-and-equip program.

For nearly a year, other indigenous forces, such as Syrian Kurd fighters, have had support as they fought to save the town of Kobani, Syria, from ISIL, he said. “And the number of forces have continued to grow,” he added.

Since the start of the fight against ISIL, Syrian Kurds have achieved “significant effects” in the Northeast part of Syria, he said.

“[Syrian Kurds] pushed ISIL back and in the process, regained more than 17,000 square kilometers of territory — more than 6,500 square miles — previously held by the enemy,” Ryder noted.

“They’ve also retaken critical border crossing points between Syria and Turkey, including Kobani [and] Tal Abyad, and going forward, this should help abate the flow of foreign fighters into Syria,” he said.

With Syrian Kurds disrupting ISIL’s movement in Iraq and Syria, Ryder said the Kurds’ gains should over time help to further stabilize and improve security inside Iraq.

“So, we want to see these anti-ISIL forces operating in Syria continue to be successful,” he said.

In a fight as complex as fighting ISIL forces in Iraq and Syria, Ryder said “it should be expected” the United States can and will employ every available asset to disrupt and degrade the enemy.

“Going forward, we will continue to pursue opportunities as they present themselves across what is a very complex and dynamic battlefield,” he said.

By Murat Ulgul*

In his two-day visit to the United Kingdom, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu faced what are now considered ordinary protests against him as 300 protestors in Whitehall demanded that the British authorities arrest him over his government’s policies against the Palestinians.[1]Yet, these kinds of protests never change the fact that during their meetings with foreign leaders, Israeli leaders focus on what they perceive to be existential threats to their nation rather than the criticisms that are being slung against them.

Although in his meeting with the British Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that he is ready to negotiate with the Palestinian Authority (PA) without any conditions, the main topic Netanyahu preferred to talk about was the Iranian threat. “The Middle East is disintegrating under the twin forces of militant Islam: The militant Sunnis led by ISIS and the militant Shiites led by Iran,” Netanyahu warned and asked for the cooperation of his British counterpart against these threats.[2]

Netanyahu’s equating Israel’s existential threat – Iran – with an evil force – ISIS – is not unfamiliar. Fourteen years ago when the Al Qaeda crashed hijacked planes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, it was the Israeli rightand its leader Ariel Sharon who developed the “Arafat is bin Laden” formula in order to avoid talking with the PA. “[Palestinian attacks] against Israeli citizens are no different from bin-Laden’s terrorism against American citizens,” Sharon cried while reminding the international community that Arafat was the one who “legitimized the hijacking of planes” several decades ago.[3] Even though, unlike radical terrorists, Arafat was a rational actor and even told bin Laden not to hide behind the Palestinian cause,[4] the Israeli right managed to delegitimize the PA and Arafat, which paved the way for Operation Defensive Shield in 2002.

The result of this policy was the growing power of Hamas in Gaza while the PA started to lose its influence over the Palestinians year by year. Since 2007, the PA has had no control in Gaza, while in the West Bank it is not as popular as before. Therefore, the PA Netanyahu tries to talk to today is not as influential as Arafat’s PA fifteen years ago. If Netanyahu is honestly seeking a solution for the Palestinian question, he needs to talk to Hamas as well. Yet, he pursues a confrontational approach in Gaza, which makes the Palestinians there more radical. As the recent International Crisis Group report shows, since Operation Protective Edge oflast year, Salafi-jihadi groups in Gaza are “growing and emboldened” because the Palestinians there live under  the “worst [conditions] since Israel conquered the territory in 1967.”[5] Ten years ago, Israel confronted the PA, and as a result Hamas was empowered. Today Netanyahu confronts Hamas, and as a result radical Islamists are empowered. There are always worse enemies.

It seems that the Israeli leaders take no lesson from the past as they demonize Iran at the expense of regional order and stability. Today the main evil in the international community is ISIS and Netanyahu uses every chance he gets to equate the Iranian regime with the radicals. Yet, unlike ISIS, and similar to the PA, Iran is a rational actor. As Peter Beinart argues in his opposition to the equation of Nazi Germany and Iran – yet another analogy Israeli leaders like to make to demonize their enemies – Iranian officials do not have ISIS’s and Nazi Hitler’s maniacal bloodlust and they often act based on interests rather than ideology.[6]

Indeed, this understanding is what is behind Obama’s intention to make a nuclear deal with Iran. If Iran integrates into the international community and has something to lose, the American administration believes, its officials will act more rationally. Moreover, if dialogue becomes efficient, Iran can become a strong ally against the ISIS threat. But, if a confrontational position is adopted, as Netanyahu prefers, Iranian officials will have no choice other than pursuing their interests by force. In this scenario it is more likely that we will see an increase in sectarian conflict and more disorder and instability in the region.

All Netanyahu has to do is to look at the recent past of Israel’s Palestinian policy. In this region, confrontational policies only lead to the emergence of more radical actors. The Israeli government does not see Hamas as a negotiating partner but it is a fact that Hamas is more rational than some radicals. Now ISIS seems to top the radicalism scale in the region. Yet, among the Shiites more radical actors may emerge if Iran is not brought into the international community or, worse, if its regime collapses suddenly as a result of military action.

*The author recently earned his doctoral degree from the University of Delaware. His research interests are ethnic conflict, civil-military relations, U.S. foreign policy as well as Turkish and Israeli politics.

[1] James Cusick, “Protests Set to Continue as David Cameron Meets Benjamin Netanyahu for Talks,” The Independent, 9 September 2015 (accessed 10 September 2015).
[2]Cynthia Blank, “Netanyahu Ready to Enter Negotiations with PA ‘Immediately’,” ArutzSheva, 9 September 2015 (acccessed 10 September 2015).
[3] Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “PM Sharon Addresses the Knesset’s Special Solidarity Session,” 16 September 2001 (accessed 15 August 2014).
[4] Ian Fisher, “Arafat Disavows bin Laden, Saying ‘He Never Helped Us’,” New York Times, 16 December 2002 (accessed 10 September 2015).
[5] International Crisis Group, “No Exit? Gaza & Israel Between Wars,” Middle East Report No. 162, 26 August 2015 (Accessed 29 August 2015).
[6] Peter Beinart, “Iran Isn’t Nazi Germany,” The Atlantic, 6 August 2015 (accessed 7 August 2015).