Quantcast
Channel: Eurasia Review
Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live

Turkey: Are Electricity Markets On Brink Of Bankruptcy? – OpEd

0
0

The “Regulatory Asset Base” expression was defined and established in 1990 in the United Kingdom to avoid financial difficulties of private companies who were in the energy business. It is now the time that this definition should be implemented into the local environment in Turkey to avoid possible bankruptcies. The Regulatory Asset Base (RAB) usually refers to the measure of the net value of a company’s regulated assets used in price regulation. It is used in calculating important elements of the revenue requirements (the basis for the tariff calculation), depreciation allowance and return on capital.
(Ref. Wikipedia)

An important article was released by The Hurriyet Daily on 8 September titled “Growing Financial Difficulties of Private Companies in Local Energy Business”.

Let us read the first paragraph of that article:

“Companies have paid 21.1 billion USD for the privatization of electricity in Turkey since 2009. However, due to deteriorating economic indicators and extreme value increase in the USD with respect to the Turkish Lira, local companies are in a difficult financial situation in repaying their debts to lenders. Turkish private distribution companies are unable to pay their 7.7 billion USD debt, out of which 7 billion USD belongs to commercial banks. In the case of a collapse in the repayment of their debts to the electricity markets, havoc will occur in the banking sector.” Ref. Hurriyet 8-Sep- 2015
http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/ekonomi/30011693.asp

Electric distribution companies are in default due to the fact that their debts are in USD but their income is in Turkish lira, which has brought them to the point of bankruptcy. They have asked public sources to help them; however, there is a misinterpretation of the situation. There’s no crisis in this regard. There is a mismanagement and miscalculation of the financial sources of the private companies who were exposed to high debts.

These companies have exaggerated the incident when commenting, saying, “Contracts have been made in US dollars, but the collections were in Turkish Lira. The recent exchange rate differences brought financial difficulty.” Well, all contracts referenced were written in the tender documents upfront. There is no change later. The companies should make the calculations correctly to avoid such exposure to risk.

Markets regulate the private companies. Wisdom says that our private investors know best, so why didn’t these investors avoid the increase in prices before the cutthroat exchange rates were in place, and thus stop moving forward in the tender process? What was preventing them? In the past, our electricity market was owned and operated by public institutions. We used to have harsh criticism of public institutions. Contracts were not progressing properly, they were not completed on time, and they were completed incorrectly with progress lacking. Thus, plants could not be run well.

Because power plants, transmission, distribution, and retail all were in public ownership, they belonged to the public, to the nation, to us. They were as if ours in the end. We, Turkish citizens, saw them as our own property, we wanted them and hoped the best for them. Authorities in the public companies were our friends, they agreed with and accepted our criticism; they brought our feelings, writings, and solutions to their in-house meetings, and they tried their best to make the necessary upgrades.

Now the property has been passed to private investors. It is their property. We have no obligations, no responsibility, no care. They may operate or may not operate; they may shut it down if it is not profitable. If they cannot operate it properly and they lose money and go bankrupt and their property will be taken by the lending commercial bank and resold to another competent company. We have no obligation. So why are we entering such conversation? Why does the regulatory agency EMRA enter into the conversation?

If an electricity generation plant or an electricity distribution system cannot be operated efficiently, loses money or goes bankrupt, then the lending bank gets the ownership and can sell it again to another competent operator. There is nothing lost in the market. There is no need to interfere with the ongoing commercial events outside. We should leave the market forces to regulate the markets.

On the other hand, we do not know any news regarding the necessary rehab works that need to be done in the existing privatized power plants. Environmental exemption continues for the existing plants. Plants are operated at full capacity at their highest availability in order to get high cash income without spending much on necessary environmental equipment. Necessary electrostatic dust filter ESP upgrades and flue gas desulphurisation FGD purchases are ignored. There is almost no additional spending other than operation costs, fuel cost and employee salaries. Most of them have inadequate Ash dams.

We have now more than 70K MWe installed on the records but most of the public plants are not in operation. For example, 6 units out of 8 total in Afşin Elbistan are not in operation. Rehab investments are necessary for the privatized power plants, but such investments have not yet been made. Yet the investors are going bankrupt in their operation due to unplanned, inappropriate operation. Most of them are operating with an unqualified and inexperienced engineering capacity. Work barely goes ahead or, most of the time, they cannot go forward at all.

In fact, it was a completely wrong decision to privatize the former state power plants. Old power plants would have been run by the public until the end of their useful lives. Private investors would be required to set up a new plant. Existing natural monopolies cannot be open to competition. Investors may win but society will surely lose.

The Minister of Energy of the past government left his job to a new appointee until the snap elections, which are scheduled for 1 November. We had the opportunity to work with an experienced minister who came from the energy business in the past. Now, we are in transition period. If an investor cannot operate a plant or a distribution system, we should let the market forces regulate the plant and we should not interfere. In the meantime, we should learn more about “regulatory asset base” terminology in order to run the business better in the future.


End The Marijuana ‘Sin Taxes’– OpEd

0
0

Legal marijuana in Colorado has been a boon for freedom, allowing people to make, transfer, and consume marijuana products free from the threat of arrest by state or local police. At the same time, there is an unfortunate side-effect of the liberalization of marijuana laws in the state — the government scooping up great amounts of money via marijuana “sin taxes.”

The high marijuana taxes punish people who purchase marijuana by depriving them of money to save, to give away, or to spend on other goods or services. The sin taxes also are a means of controlling people’s behavior. Facing high taxes, some people will forgo or reduce their purchases of products containing the plant.

Proponents of the sin taxes claim the taxes are justified because using marijuana is a sin that should be discouraged. But, even if it is granted that there is some truth in that claim, a much greater sin is the use of government force via taxation to control people’s nonviolent activities.

There is plenty of marijuana sin tax to roll back in Colorado. Ethan Wolff-Mann calculates in Money magazine that sales and excise taxes increase the price of marijuana by 27.9% in the state.

The gouging of marijuana purchasers is reason enough to oppose the high taxes. In addition, there is the concern that all this tax revenue feeds the government machine that tramples on individual rights, including through enforcing laws against other drugs that are still illegal and even through clamping down on marijuana activities that take place outside the marijuana regulatory system. Recall that New York City cops killed Eric Garner on a Staten Island sidewalk last year in a confrontation predicated on stopping the evasion of one of the highest-in-the-nation cigarette tax rates. Protection of sin tax money streams can be very nasty.

There is indeed much government revenue from marijuana-specific taxes in Colorado. The Marijuana Policy Project places the total for the 12 months ending June 30 at nearly $70 million — 67 percent more than the nearly $42 million in revenue from alcohol-specific taxes during the same period.

How about the government stops taking this money from marijuana purchasers? Let them spend the money on what they choose. Refrain from using the new respect for marijuana freedom as an excuse for imposing oppressive new taxes, manipulating people’s behavior, and funding violations of individual rights.

A one day marijuana tax holiday occurred in Colorado on September 16. The interaction of a state government “accounting error” and state tax law provisions resulted in people in Colorado experiencing that day the freedom of purchasing marijuana free from the compulsion to pay much of the taxes on marijuana. But, freedom is for every day, not just for one day a year. Let’s make every day a holiday from marijuana sin taxes.

This article was published by the RonPaul Institute.

Trevor Noah’s Filthy Debut – OpEd

0
0

Looks like Jon Stewart passed his obscene baton to Trevor Noah. The new host of “The Daily Show” picked up right where Stewart left off, using his first show to comment on the pope’s penis.

The offensive segment begins with a voice-over:

“After being greeted by the president, the vice president and an adoring crowd at Andrews Air Force Base, he [Pope Francis] was whisked away in a tiny Fiat dwarfed by the Secret Service vehicles surrounding him.”

This tees it up for Noah: “That’s a tiny car. Somebody’s compensating. I’m saying the pope has a huge c**k [bleep]. That was a joke. That is a joke. And what a waste.”

The real waste is Noah. Look for him to continue the Stewart legacy by giving a pass to Muslims (out of fear), African Americans and Jews (out of respect), homosexuals and illegal immigrants (out of political correctness)2C and all the others for whom it is taboo to mock in the entertainment industry.

If Noah had any guts, he would break the Stewart mold and choose new targets, but that would mean new writers. Even if he did, he’d still be stuck with those who have a genital fixation—it’s who these people are.

The real joke is that Noah and his fans think he’s creative. How much are they paying this guy?

Contact Steve Albani, Comedy Central Communications:
steve.albani@cc.com

Climate Alarmists Want Us Prosecuted Under RICO – OpEd

0
0

They haven’t employed the thumb screws, rack or auto-da-fe that churches and states once used to interrogate, silence and eliminate heretics and witches. However, global warming alarmists are well practiced in the modern equivalents, to protect their $1.5-trillion Climate Crisis Industry.

They see only what they want to see, and publicize only what they want us to see. They refuse to debate anyone who questions the nature, severity or reality of “manmade climate change dangers” that are the foundation of their demands that we slash fossil fuel use, lower our living standards, and accept global government planning of economies and massive climate “adaptation and reparation” payments.

They collude to hide and manipulate data, and employ computer models that that make the Little Ice Age disappear and global temperatures climb rapidly after 1950. They pressure editors to keep contrarian papers out of scientific journals, and present false claims that 97% of scientists agree that humans are causing dangerous climate change. They take billions from government agencies whose policies and regulations they promote. They blindly ignore the serious adverse effects that their policies have on blue-collar families and the world’s poor. Imbued with religious zeal, now they’re really ramping it up.

Led by Jagadish Shukla and four associates at his George Mason University-based Institute of Global Environment and Society, NCAR researcher Kevin Trenberth and 14 little-known “climate scientists” joined in signing an astounding letter that shows how far they will go to defend their turf and cause.

It asks President Obama, Attorney General Loretta Lynch and Obama science advisor John Holdren to investigate “organizations that have knowingly deceived the American people about the risks of climate change,” under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act.

The letter claims the organizations’ actions “have been extensively documented,” and their “misdeeds” must be “stopped as soon as possible,” so that the world can “restabilize the Earth’s climate, before even more lasting damage is done” to human health, agriculture, biodiversity and the world’s poorest people.

The letter’s ironies, fallacies and falsehoods are almost too numerous to recount.

First, the attack on skeptic scientists was launched from a university named for George Mason, the patriot who wrote the original Virginia version of our Bill of Rights. They include freedom of speech, association, assembly, petitioning our government, and not having livelihoods and other property unreasonably seized. Sadly, it reflects the appalling state of “academic freedom” on too many campuses, which today celebrate every kind of diversity except diversity of opinion.

Second, this action is a blatant effort to (a) coerce, intimidate, slander and silence scientists and organizations that question human-caused climate dangers; (b) forcibly shut down skeptic research, funding, speech and publication; (c) destroy skeptics’ funding, businesses and livelihoods; (d) protect alarmist funding, standing and influence; and (e) bankrupt skeptics, who would have to spend personal fortunes responding to RICO charges and a Justice Department that has limitless resources at its disposal.

Third, the RICO-20 signed their names as members of university faculties and government agencies – suggesting that they represent their organizations and/or these organizations endorse their efforts. If that is the case, it represents another blatant double standard – and a tacit endorsement of the RICO agenda.
Will those institutions now demand that the RICO-20 remove any mention of their affiliations? Will they step forward to vigorously defend academic freedom, constitutional rights, and a scientific method that is severely undermined by this letter and other toxic battles over manmade climate cataclysm claims?

Fourth, RICO is used to prosecute underlying patterns or practices of criminal behavior. This letter may constitute just “acting out.” But whether it represents a pattern of alarmist parties illegally engaging in items (a) through (e) above by calling for criminal prosecution of climate skeptics – or whether opposing the ideological and political campaign for the anti-fossil fuel climate agenda constitutes the required “criminal enterprise” – remains unanswered.

In any event, the “misdeeds” alluded to in the RICO-20 letter are studies, reports and discussions that contradict alarmist allegations and what skeptics charge are exaggerations, fabrications and computer model failures that underlie those claims. This extensive library of challenges to the climate chaos thesis includes peer-reviewed NIPCC Climate Change Reconsidered reports, international climate skeptic conferences, and numerous articles, op-eds, interviews and briefings. They clearly undermine climate chaos theory, but they are protected free speech and reflect honest, replicable science.

This raises the fifth point, that “racketeering” means conducting a “racket.” The term is commonly understood to mean fraudulently offering to solve a problem, because the problem does not actually exist and/or the proffered “solution” would do nothing to solve the problem. Many would say this definition accurately describes the Climate Crisis Industry.

Climate change has been “real” throughout Earth and human history. Driven by powerful natural forces that we do not yet understand and certainly cannot control, it has ranged from gradual to sudden, from beneficial to harmful or even devastating. Contrary to alarmist assertions and computer models, there is still no observational evidence that what we are experiencing today: is different from what our ancestors confronted; is now driven by plant-fertilizing carbon dioxide instead of by the natural forces of yore; or could be prevented or controlled by ending fossil fuel use and dramatically lowering our living standards.

In fact, the notion that we can “restabilize” an unstable and frequently fluctuating planetary climate is ludicrous. So is any claim that carbon-based fuels are superfluous or readily dispensable – or that they are more damaging to human health, agriculture, biodiversity and the world’s poorest people than eliminating those fuels and relying on expensive, land-intensive, unreliable wind, solar and biofuel “substitutes.”

Equally doubtful is any suggestion that the IGES/COLA (Center for Ocean-Land-Atmosphere Studies) can understand or predict Earth’s ongoing climate variations by focusing on carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, and ignoring the solar, cosmic, oceanic and other natural forces that govern climate.

However, IGES/COLA derived 99.6% of its 2014 funding ($3.8 million in taxpayer money) from NASA, NOAA and the National Science Foundation, according to IRS Form 990 and other documents. Under the Obama Administration, those agencies have been almost completely co-opted by the alarmist climate agenda – and would likely terminate funding for any organization that expressed doubts about CO2, reduced its focus on greenhouse gases, or reengineered its climate models to reflect the full panoply of natural forces and thereby better assure accurate monsoon and climate forecasting.

Indeed, the latest Form 990 reveals, Dr. Shukla and his wife received salaries and other compensation totaling $499,145 in 2014 from their tax-exempt research organization. Dr. Shukla worked there only part-time, and his $333,048 compensation package “was presumably on top of his $250,866-per-year [George Mason] academic salary.” That totals $750,000 a year to the RICO-20 leader and his family “from public money for climate work & going after skeptics,” Professor Roger Pielke, Jr. wrote.

The ultimate irony would be an evenhanded investigation that exonerates the skeptic organizations that the RICO-20 want investigated – and results in charges against multiple corporations and organizations (and government agencies?) that engaged in collusion, data manipulation, junk modeling and other deceitful climate research practices that have been highlighted over the years.

The Internal Revenue Service’s targeting of conservative groups could well be what inspired the now fashionable idea of using the Justice Department to prosecute political opponents. The failure of the IRS and DOJ to penalize any of the perpetrators in those cases suggests that prosecution of alarmist fraud or racketeering is highly unlikely under the current administration.

However, the new 2017 administration could take a very different position. At the very least, a new Congress and Executive Branch could derail the climate alarm money train, initiate robust (and long overdue) debate on climate science and models, provide equal funding to skeptics, and end the alarmism. Potential sauce for the gander should make Dr. Shukla and fellow alarmists think twice about their tactic.

This RICO travesty shows how desperate alarmists have become. They are losing the climate science fight. Their models are increasingly contradicted by reality. Their ad hominem attacks will ultimately fail.

They also face major odds in Paris, where they may get a toothless treaty that makes empty promises to redistribute hundreds of billions of dollars from Formerly Rich Countries whose energy use and economic growth are hobbled – but places no binding emission targets on poor countries that will keep developing, burning coal and sending atmospheric carbon dioxide levels ever higher … with no effect on the climate.
­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

A Lay Doctrine For Man’s Survival: Acceptance Of Compromise – OpEd

0
0

Humble Francisco appears to have chosen, from the time he accepted his papal tasks, a narrow path with overgrown thorny brambles; also a major role as arbiter in the West between two ideologies which view very differently both the exercise of power and the distribution of wealth.

These ideologies, as different as night and day, can only reach an armistice, if not final peace, at a critical point either during sunrise… or during sunset. And Jorge Mario Bergoglio, better known post white-smoke at the Vatican as Francisco, Francesco, or Francis, would like to see the world reach that critical point via universal understanding and acceptance of compromise.

These two ideologies could be identified as possessiveness and sharing.

Possessiveness, or the idea to possess or dominate others, via material wealth and/or power, evidenced before our eyes as materialism and consumerism; and sharing, the idea of involvement, participation and, at times, generosity (unselfishness).

Some of my old friends are already saying that finally, after almost half a millennium since the Society of Jesus’ founding, the Jesuits have invaded and taken over the Holy See; “Che” Francis leading the celebratory parade in a little Fiat, not in a Rolls-Royce… in a procession of dispossessed masses marching under the multiple banners of liberation theology, ready to take over from capitalism’s elite both its wealth and its power.

I, however, am not quite ready to share in that assessment.

Francis, I am cautiously convinced, has outgrown that phase of liberation theology of old and replaced it with an approach of inclusiveness and compromise.

Two days before Pope Francis arrived in Washington; I visualized him saying mass in Havana’s Revolution Square, sharing the “Plaza” with another Argentinian – just in spirit reflected in the iconic image of Ernesto “Che” Guevara. A true pragmatist of Latin America’s liberation theology of the 1950’s, Che’s life of armed struggle on behalf of the powerless and impoverished was cut short at 39 years young, at the pinnacle of his fight for the oppressed in Latin America – Bolivia in this case. Five years later (1972), Jorge Bergoglio, put in charge of Argentina’s Jesuits, and barely 36, was struggling with his own authoritarian nature which demanded a strong moral reaction against social injustice, poverty and lack of human rights: the marginalization of the masses.

The Church (Jesuit Order) made a decision to send this young, rebellious priest into exile and, by so doing, whether by design or divine intervention, re-baptized for the world a milder, more humble Jorge Bergoglio, who would later become Archbishop of Buenos Aires, a prince of the Catholic Church… and now its leader by the name of Francis.

Some of us who grew up in either obscurity of religious faith, or who were raised in faith but lost it for whatever reason, may not answer Francis’ request to pray for him, but will gladly join this man of love and humility in best wishes as he tries to impart much added wisdom on transcendental issues of our time, principally defined these days as lack of peace, unjust distribution of income/resources, disregard for climate change, and forced human migration – whether due to war or economic plight.

Sadly, we may tend to demand the unreasonable from this man, a mortal and imperfect sinner by his own account; particularly from those who have a specific agenda to follow. I have been accosted by friends who, believers or non-believers in the tradition of the Catholic Church, do not value any strides in Francis’ reach, whether in substance or even in tone which do not have immediate and dogmatic major change, such as acceptance of abortion; or softer topics, which most of us see as evolving, if slowly, within the Church, such as elevation of women to the priesthood and the end of priests’ celibacy.

Francis’ unique role in the Church as either a revolutionary evolutionist or as an evolutionary revolutionist seems to be invisible to these people… but some of us see hope. We see hope in following the doctrine that for this planet and our human species to continue to exist in harmony and balance, nations and their leaders must follow the path of compromise as never before. And that is the doctrine that Francis would like to add to any non-religious, or religious catechism that we wish to choose, and follow, in our lives.

A visit by Francis has been most timely, and symbolic, to forge a preamble of goodwill between the US and Cuba; and, most importantly, to the gathering of the UN General Assembly conducting critical discussions on Syria, ISIS, refugees and, hopefully, better understanding and compromise affecting China, Cuba, Iran, Russia and the United States through policy positions and, in some cases, meetings of their leaders.

Thank you for your “humildad,” and the softness in your approach, “Che” Francis.

Moderate Islam Is The Solution – OpEd

0
0

By Abdulrahman Al-Rashed

Islam is being associated with the evil we witness around us.

People in areas controlled by the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) — or the Daesh group — are pushed to flee and seek refuge from this evil that has befallen them. Islam has been hijacked by an evil group that speaks in the name of Muslims and dictates its religious interpretations on them.

However, religions came for the good of everyone, and for the sake of expelling evil from people’s lives. Islam came as a mercy to people, and it was the persecuted — slaves, the poor and the vulnerable — who first converted to it after it became well-known for its justice.

Islam has been politicized during the last three decades. The big transformation began with the Islamic revolution in Iran. It expanded after the concept of jihad was introduced in Afghanistan. It expanded further due to the use of religion as a political tool. At this point, extremists emerged and the status of moderates, who were the religious leaders of society, declined.

Even today’s Salafism, which is wrongly characterized as a source of extremism and a cause of our current crisis, has nothing to do with the traditional Salafism that in the past dealt with worship and behavior.

As a result of the struggle in the Islamic arena, hardliners dominated over the moderates, then extremists dominated over the hardliners. We are now in the phase of ultra extremists. The Daesh represents pure evil, which previously appeared at the beginning of Islamic history 14 centuries ago, and Muslims successfully fought it.

However, Muslims today will not win unless they fight extremists’ concept of Islam, which is pushing them to clash with the world and become enemies with Islam’s different sects. The crisis will be prolonged if Muslim leaders do not adopt moderate Islam, which reformulates the life of people and society, and restores the balance that religion created to fight evil. To save Muslims and the world, the solution is moderate Islam — that is a bigger and more important project than fighting Daesh and the cancer of extremism.

Xi-Obama Summit: Bridging The Trust Deficit In US-China Ties? – Analysis

0
0

China and the US face many complex issues; the challenge is not letting one overwhelm the relationship.

By Robert A. Manning*

Xi Jinping’s state visit to the United States took place amid great uncertainty and heightened tensions in US policy toward China.

The relationship between the world’s two largest economies and two biggest military powers, arguably the world’s most important, could be at a tipping point. Xi’s visit marked a major juncture in the relationship. Despite positive speeches and glad news of White House fact sheets, there are few signs that Xi is altering his nationalist economic policies biased toward creating “national champions” and using opaque, discriminatory legal and regulatory policies that complicate life for US investors. Nor are there indications that Beijing is rethinking its assertive foreign policies challenging the US posture in East Asia.

Over time, Xi’s success in implementing sweeping market reforms aimed at changing China’s economic model from an investment and export-driven one to an innovative consumer-driven and service-oriented one may be the critical factor in shaping Beijing’s economic and foreign policies in the future.

Many of the assumptions that have guided US policy on China since US President Nixon’s visit in 1972 and still employed by the Obama administration are being called into doubt by US businesses as well as strategic analysts amid rising Chinese nationalism. Concerns over cybersecurity, Chinese techno-nationalism, difficulties for US businesses operating in China as well as China’s assertive posture in the South China Sea pose challenges on US policy toward China.

Despite the concerns, though, agreements on cybersecurity, a Bilateral Investment Treaty and climate change appear to have tamped down US anger and moved the relationship toward a relatively more stable path.

The economic relationship is key, as demonstrated by the remarkable array of top CEOs gathered in Seattle to meet Xi. By all accounts, he was impressive, addressing many US concerns about China’s direction.

Both sides sought to reassure the other. The White House welcomed Xi with a 21-gun salute and red carpet treatment usually reserved for US democratic allies, a recognition Xi has sought for China as a great power. In his speech and meetings in Seattle, Xi emphasized that “opening up is a basic state policy of China” and pledged to implement reforms to give the market a “decisive role” and to “protect the legitimate rights and interests of foreign investors.”

Arguably the most contentious issue facing the two leaders is cybersecurity. The two countries have markedly different views of the internet: The US focus is on access, and China endorses “cyber sovereignty” and its Great Firewall to control access.

Massive cyberespionage of the US Office of Personnel Management, hacking information on 21 million current and former US officials, and the cyber-theft of intellectual property belonging to US firms reached the boiling point such that President Barack Obama was gearing up to issue sanctions against Chinese companies for benefiting from cyber-theft of intellectual property rights.

This threat led to unprecedented closed-door negotiations between top aides to Xi and US officials including US Attorney General Loretta Lynch and FBI Director James Comey. These talks appear to have paved the way for a common ground achieved at the summit.

The agreed formulation is that “neither country’s government will conduct or knowingly support cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property, including trade secrets or other confidential business information, with the intent of providing competitive advantages to companies or commercial sectors.” In addition, Xi and Obama agreed to create a cabinet-level mechanism and a hotline to address concerns. Both pledged to cooperate in creating a global code of conduct for cyberscecurity.

Underscoring lingering skepticism that China would stop doing what it insists it has never done, Obama questioned if words would be followed by actions. Nonetheless, the agreement marks the first time for such a commitment from Beijing and, if implemented, could be a major breakthrough.

Cyber issues are among larger concerns over the economic relationship that totaled $590 billion in two-way trade in 2014 and China’s holding of $1.2 trillion in US Treasury bonds. In pre-summit meetings in Seattle with several dozen leading CEOs, Xi heard complaints about deepening obstacles facing foreign businesses in China, as reflected in comments from US Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzger: “We – and our companies – continue to have serious concerns about an overall lack of legal and regulatory transparency, inconsistent protection of intellectual property, discriminatory cyber and technology policies, and more generally, the lack of a level playing field across a range of sectors.”

Xi and Obama announced progress on the Bilateral Investment Treaty that has the potential to strengthen the key, yet beleaguered economic pillar of the relationship and revive waning US business enthusiasm. Talks had stalled as each side offered “negative lists” of items to be excluded. These lists can wall off industries considered strategic such as energy, aviation, telecommunications or access to state-owned industry procurement. Many were on the initial lists, and these appeared to have been pared back, with both leaders pledging to accelerate efforts on the investment treaty.

There were also agreements on finance and development cooperation, including Beijing commitments to the Bretton Woods system as well as on a range of global issues such as wildlife protection, development, infectious diseases, terrorism and non-proliferation, the cooperative dimension of the relationship.

The showcase global issue is increased US-China climate cooperation. Xi’s announced commitment to a cap-and-trade carbon scheme, similar to that of the European Union, is emblematic of the Sino-US climate partnership, as is China’s cooperation in obtaining the Iran nuclear accord. However, the EU system has been problematic, with mismatches between carbon prices and the allowance of permits, leaving prices too low to provide incentives for industry. Implementing reforms would be tougher in China’s much larger and more complex carbon market.

On key security issues, apart from a modest confidence-building measure of improving air-to-air military communication, there appears little progress on maritime issues in the South China Sea. Xi reiterated Chinese claims to the entire South China Sea, but offered only a vague pledge not to “militarize” some 2000 acres of reclaimed land on disputed islets where China has recently built ports and airstrips. There is little indication that the summit will alter US-China strategic competition in the Asia-Pacific and confrontation over China’s maritime behavior.

Obama has described his foreign policy as “hitting singles and doubles,” not home runs – baseball terminology for moving in spurts rather than with big plays. All told, the summit appears to be a solid single. One problem in assessing Sino-US ties is that the bilateral relationship is so massive and intricate that areas of friction cannot be avoided. The increasingly difficult challenge is to sustain a relationship that is more cooperative than competitive – and not allow one area of disagreement or confrontation overwhelm overall ties, for example, letting tensions over maritime issues lead to reactions, like sanctions, that would undercut more cooperative areas of the relationship.

Implementation of many of the agreements reached at the Xi-Obama meeting can serve as metrics of whether China is moving toward cooperation. If so, China could reduce the trust deficit in Sino-US ties and put the relationship on a trajectory that encourages Obama’s successor in 2017 to also pursue a policy that is more cooperative than competitive.

*The author is a Senior Fellow of the Brent Scowcroft Center for International Security at the Atlantic Council. Follow him on Twitter.

Donald Trump Proves What’s Wrong With Bankruptcy Laws In America – OpEd

0
0

On the opening day of Trump Plaza in Atlantic City in 1984, Donald Trump stood in a dark topcoat on the casino floor celebrating his new investment as the “finest building in the city and possibly the nation.

Thirty years later, the Trump Plaza folded, leaving some 1,000 employees without jobs. Trump, meanwhile, was on Twitter claiming he had “nothing to do with Atlantic City,” and praising himself for his “great timing” in getting out of the investment.

As I show in my new book, “Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few,” people with lots of money can easily avoid the consequences of bad bets and big losses by cashing out at the first sign of trouble. Bankruptcy laws protect them. But workers who move to a place like Atlantic City for a job, invest in a home there, and build their skills have no such protection. Jobs vanish, skills are suddenly irrelevant and home values plummet. They’re stuck with the mess.

Bankruptcy was designed so people could start over. But these days, the only ones starting over are big corporations, wealthy moguls and Wall Street bankers, who have had enough political clout to shape bankruptcy laws (like many other laws) to their needs.

One of the most basic of all economic issues is what to do when someone can’t pay what they owe. The U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8, Clause 4) authorizes Congress to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” and Congress has done so repeatedly.

In the last few decades, these changes have reflected the demands of giant corporations, Wall Street banks, big developers and major credit card companies who wanted to make it harder for average people to declare bankruptcy but easier for themselves to do the same.

The granddaddy of all failures to repay what was owed occurred in September 2008 when Lehman Brothers went into the largest bankruptcy in history, with more than $691 billion of assets and far more in liabilities.

Some commentators (including yours truly) urged then that the rest of Wall Street be forced to grapple with their problems in bankruptcy as well. But Lehman’s bankruptcy so shook the Street that Henry Paulson, Jr., George W. Bush’s outgoing secretary of the treasury, and, before that, head of Goldman Sachs, persuaded Congress to authorize several hundred billion dollars of funding to protect the other big banks from going bankrupt.

Paulson didn’t explicitly state that big banks were too big to fail. They were, rather, too big to be reorganized under bankruptcy—which would, in Paulson’s view, have threatened the entire financial system.

The real burden of Wall Street’s near meltdown fell on homeowners. As home prices plummeted, many found themselves owing more on their mortgages than their homes were worth, and unable to refinance. Yet chapter 13 of the bankruptcy code (whose drafting was largely the work of the financial industry) prevents homeowners from declaring bankruptcy on mortgage loans for their primary residence.

When the financial crisis hit, some members of Congress, led by Illinois Sen. Dick Durbin, tried to amend the code to allow distressed homeowners to use bankruptcy. That would have given them a powerful bargaining chip for preventing the banks and others servicing their loans from foreclosing on their homes. If the creditors and homeowners couldn’t come to an agreement, the homeowner’s case would go to a bankruptcy judge who presumably would reduce the amount to be repaid rather than automatically force people out of their homes.

The bill passed the House, but when in late April 2009 Durbin offered his amendment in the Senate, the financial industry—among the largest donors to both parties—argued it would greatly increase the cost of home loans. (No convincing evidence showed this to be the case.) The bill garnered only 45 Senate votes even though Democrats were in the majority. As a result, distressed homeowners had no bargaining power. Subsequently, more than 5 million lost their homes.

Another group of debtors who can’t use bankruptcy to renegotiate their loans are former students laden with student debt. Student loans are now about 10 percent of all debt in the United States, second only to mortgages and higher than auto loans and credit card debt. But the bankruptcy code doesn’t allow student debts to be worked out under its protection.

If graduates can’t meet their payments, lenders can garnish their paychecks. If still behind on student loan payments by the time they retire, lenders can even garnish their Social Security checks. The only way graduates can reduce their student debt burdens, according to a provision enacted at the behest of the student loan industry, is to prove that repayment would impose an “undue hardship” on them and their dependents. This is a stricter standard than bankruptcy courts apply to gamblers trying to reduce their gambling debts.

Congress and its banking patrons fear that if graduates could declare bankruptcy on their debts, they might never repay them. But a better alternative would be to allow former students to use bankruptcy where the terms of the loans are obviously unreasonable (such as double-digit interest rates), or if the schools they owed money to had very low post-graduation employment rates.

State and federal lawmakers once sought to protect vulnerable borrowers by setting limits on the interest that could be demanded by creditors. But in recent years, under political pressure from big banks like Citigroup, many state legislatures have repealed those limits. It’s not unusual for borrowers who want an advance on an upcoming paycheck to now pay annualized rate of 300 percent or more.

Such legal changes helped swell profits at Citigroup, whose former OneMain Financial unit was one of the leading payday lenders. “There was simply no need to change the law,” Rick Glazier, a North Carolina Democratic legislator who opposed raising interest rate limits there, told the New York Times. “It was one of the most brazen efforts by a special interest group to increase its own profits that I have ever seen.”

It’s not just changes in the bankruptcy code and interest-rate regulations that benefit the wealthy. Real estate developers like Trump have also benefited from a welter of special subsidies and tax breaks squeezed out of pliant local legislators.

Trump has the unique distinction of being the first developer in New York to receive a public subsidy for commercial projects under programs initially reserved for improving slum neighborhoods. Referring to how he managed to win a 40-year tax abatement for rebuilding a crumbling hotel at Grand Central Station—a deal that in the first decade cost taxpayers $60 million—Trump quipped, “Someone said, ‘How come you got 40 years?’ I said, ‘Because I didn’t ask for 50.’”

Trump’s success at getting such deals is better explained by a 1980s study by Newsday, showing Trump had donated more than anyone else to members of the New York City Board of Estimate, which at the time approved all land-use development.

Trump sparred with Jeb Bush in the second GOP debate last Wednesday night over Trump’s alleged lobbying for casino gambling in Florida. “You wanted it and you didn’t get it because I was opposed to casino gambling before, during and after,” Bush charged. “I’m not going to be bought by anybody.” Trump responded: “I promise if I wanted it, I would have gotten it.”

Indeed, Trump is a poster child for how big money buys the laws it wants. “As a businessman and a very substantial donor to very important people, when you give, they do whatever the hell you want them to do,” Trump told the Wall Street Journal. “As a businessman, I need that.”

The prevailing myth that America has a “free market” existing outside and apart from government prevents us from understanding that the very rules by which the market runs—from the federal bankruptcy code to state usury laws to local tax abatements—are made by lawmakers.

And the real issue is whose interests those lawmakers are pursuing. Are they working for the vast majority of Americans, who are getting nowhere economically and whose political voices are barely even heard these days? Or are they beholden to those at the top—CEOs of the biggest corporations and Wall Street banks, hedge-fund and private-equity moguls and billionaires—who now own more of the nation’s wealth than the robber barons of the Gilded Age of the late 19th century, and are using some of that wealth to further rig the rules to their benefit?

We don’t need Donald Trump to give us the answer.

[This article, which appeared in the September 28 edition of Politico Magazine, is drawn from my new book “Saving Capitalism: For the Many, Not the Few.”]


Saudi Prince Nawwaf Bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud Dies At Age 83

0
0

Prince Nawwaf bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, special adviser to King Salman bin Abdulaziz al-Saud, passed away late Tuesday night at the age of 83, Saudi Press Agency reported.

The 22nd son of King Abdulaziz al-Saud, Prince Nawwaf was a senior member of the House of Saud and a close ally of the late King Abdullah.

He previously served a number of positions, including director of intelligence under King Saud in 2001 and, briefly in his early years, chief of the royal court in 1961.

SPA did not confirm the cause of death.

The funeral will take place Wednesday at the Grand Mosque in Mecca, SPA reported.

Original article

The Mighty Hand Of EU In Refugee Crisis – OpEd

0
0

By Priyanka Vaidyanathan*

The European Union (EU) is a unique economic and political partnership of 28 countries between the European nations. The EU was to promote economic relation. Subsequently, the scope expanded which included human rights, equality. One of the core values of the EU is protection of human rights and dignity. It can be perceived that the EU is an institution which upholds the sanctity of human rights.

The EU’s reaction to refugees is witnessed every day, especially those who are displaced from Syria. They are seeking refuge in the EU. And the situation is unruly as they are outnumbered.

Genesis of the crisis

Syrians chose Europe, as it’s viewed as a place of peace and wealth as compared to torture, and despair[1]. A small overview of the situation in Syria would break down the predicament of those who flee.

Syria has a democratically elected regime headed by Bashar al Assad. This regime is being tried to annihilate, as he could not fulfil the political and economical promises made to the civilians. The civil unrest arose and militias were formed. Here marked the mutual initiation of violent actions by the government and the civilians. People were subjected to mass killings, rape, and torture leading to crime against humanity. The government also resorted to the use of chemical weapons. ISIS took advantage of the issue and added fuel to the fire. Syria stood next to ‘hell’.

Assistance of EU

When such was the saddened condition of people, it was then they abandoned their homeland and tried to seek asylum in safer countries. They resorted to entering a European country which seemed safe, and started the dubious journey.

It’s true that the EU is facing a lot of issues by the influx of the refugees and is being criticized for not accepting them freely and providing them a humane treatment. But the situation is overlooked by many and is being misunderstood. It’s well appreciated that among all the nations, EU has let its door open for the refugee. The influx is in such humungous number that the EU is being in a helpless condition to accommodate all of them. It’s obvious that no state would have predicted that such situation would arise in the future so as to keep the refugee camps ready.

Further, EU follows the Dublin convention, 1997. The principle is that asylum is to be a one – step process and that claim can be made in only one EU state. Germany agreed to suspend application of the Dublin Regulation for refugees, who will now be permitted to apply for asylum directly in Germany.[2]

It is agreed that few countries of the EU have resorted to mechanisms to stop the inflow of refugees, like; Hungary has erected a razor-wire fence along its border in an effort to prevent refugees from crossing over land. Austria introduced checks along its internal border to search for refugees being smuggled. Croatia is forcing Hungary to take refugees from their land[3]. This is because they have accepted too many refugees and now are unable to provide them the basic humanitarian aid. It is right on the part of the EU to do so because unless they are in a position to take care of the current refugees, they will not be able to accept a few million more. A state’s duty is not over, once it accepts the refugee in its country. It is obligated to provide humanitarian and aid. Even if they accept and try to accommodate the additional refugee’s, countries would be criticized for not providing decent shelter to those refugees. In any case either they accept or not, would be prone to criticism. Regardless, the EU has stood for refugees.

The gulf countries and their negligence.

Apart from the EU no other state is ready to take in refugees. Primarily, the Gulf countries, which possess incredible resources, also pursuant to the fact that they are dominated by Islamic population, same as the people who are displaced, offered no help in providing asylum. There has been a lot of Islamic unity drive around the Middle East, but are not ready to extend help to such refugees who are of same religion. Countries like UAE and Kuwait defend themselves by saying that they have provided sufficient monetary help to UN[4] to deal with this chaotic condition, but that is not what the situation demands. Refugees are in need of ‘home’ and not money. The poorer countries like Lebanon, Egypt, and Jordan are accepting refugees, whereas, the richer countries like Qatar, UAE, and Kuwait are washing of their hands.

Conclusion

It’s time that all nations put hands together to help refugee to secure a safe home and not heavily burden EU nations. The concept of burden – sharing has to be adopted to deal with the situation in a better way. The concept of burden – sharing is based on the premise that collective action might lead to better and more enduring resolution of crises than unilateral measures by individual nation states[5], this is most viable option for the countries and United Nation has to take an active step in implementing this, rather than criticizing EU for its hypothetical failure.

*Priyanka Vaidyanath is a student of Year Four, at the School of Law, Christ University, Bangalore, India.

Notes:
[1] http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/11845205/Why-do-refugees-and-migrants-come-to-Europe-and-what-must-be-done-to-ease-the-crisis.html
[2] http://www.vox.com/2015/9/5/9265501/refugee-crisis-europe-syria
[3] http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-34303705
[4] http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/08/world/gulf-states-syrian-refugee-crisis/
[5] http://jrs.oxfordjournals.org/content/11/4/396.short

Japan’s New Security Legislation: Need For Domestic Consensus – Analysis

0
0

By K.V. Kesavan*

The passing of the security legislation on September 19 following a great deal of commotion in the Japanese Upper House fulfilled at least partly PM Abe’s long-drawn quest towards making Japan a normal country. He has always believed that Article 9 of the US authored Japanese constitution which put severe restrictions on Japan’s right to collective self-defence and its drive towards reasonable armament should be amended. But as he started his administration following his thumping victory in the Lower House election in December 2012, he soon realised that the path leading to a formal constitutional amendment was fraught with too many political risks. To be sure, Abe was able to significantly improve his political strength in two subsequent elections – the July 2013 Upper House election and the December 2014 Lower House election. Though the LDP-Komeito coalition government has impressive majority strengths in both houses today, it is still falling short of the requisite 2/3 majority in the Upper House needed for passing a constitutional amendment.

Having failed to garner the requisite parliamentary strength, Abe at one time toyed with the idea of lowering the legal bar for constitutional amendment by a simple majority in place of the present complicated method of two thirds majority in both Houses followed by a national referendum on the issue. But seeing a groundswell of public criticism, he quickly dropped the idea and decided instead to reinterpret Article 9 to permit Japan to exercise the right to collective self-defence.

The question relating to Japan’s right to collective self-defence has a long history traceable to 1947 when the US sponsored constitution was promulgated. According to Article 9 of the Constitution, Japan has renounced the use of force as an instrument to settle disputes and in pursuance of this goal, will not maintain air, sea and land forces. In 1981, the Japanese government clarified that while Japan enjoys the right to collective self-defence, it cannot exercise it as it would violate the Constitution. Successive Japanese governments stood by this interpretation despite tremendous pressures they faced from the US which criticised Article 9 as an obstacle to Japan in carrying out its obligations under the bilateral security alliance.

By the time Abe came to power for the second time in 2012, public debate on the issue of the right of collective self-defence assumed greater salience as a result of the increasing activities of the SDF and the worsening security environment of the East Asian region due to North Korea’s nuclear and missile development and the modernisation of China’s maritime and air capabilities. A staunch supporter of the US-Japan alliance, Abe believes that the continued presence of the US in the Asia-Pacific region is essential for maintaining the prevailing strategic balance. He set up a special commission under Shunji Yanai to go into the question of Japan’s right to collective self-defence (CSD). The commission came out with the recommendation that unless the ban on collective self-defence was removed Japan’s security would continue to face serious challenges. The Commission, in particular, considered the issue of how to extend support for defending US naval vessels while intercepting ballistic missiles targeting at US territory and for aiding peace-keeping forces. As the Sino-Japanese relations were getting increasingly tense over the Senkaku issue, a crisis could occur accidentally leading to a violent showdown. As the US is obligated to come to the aid of Japan under Article V of the Security Treaty, assistance to the US could be very crucial if Tokyo enjoyed the right to collective self-defence. Abe believes that the right to CSD could enormously strengthen its commitment to regional security, make proactive contribution to peace and build security networks with other countries like Australia, India, Vietnam and the Philippines.

The present legislation deals basically with two laws, the first one for peace and security that modifies ten existing laws and the second one that defines several new functions for the Self-Defence Force. The second law is called The International Peace Support Law. These laws will enable “seamless responses” to any situations to secure the peaceful life of the Japanese people. Asserting that Japan will continue to be a peace-loving country, the bills would help Japan make proactive contribution to international peace, and enhance deterrence of the bilateral security alliance for the peace and security of the Asia Pacific region.

The new laws will also remove the earlier geographical limitations on the role of the SDF. The 1997 Defence Guidelines confined the activities of the SDF primarily to the area surrounding the Korean Peninsula. Now the SDF can support activities in situations anywhere that will have an important influence on Japan’s peace and security. The SDF will now be able to provide necessary logistic support and search and rescue to armed forces of foreign countries collectively addressing the situations that threaten international peace and security. SDF’s role has also been expanded in areas such as ship inspection operations, provision of supplies to the US Forces Rescue of Japanese nationals abroad.

Previously, the Japanese government considered that “the use of force” under the Constitution was permitted only when an “armed attack” occurred against Japan. But the new legislation recognises that in view of the drastically altered security environment of the region, there are situations when an armed against a foreign country could threaten Japan’s survival. The government now has come to the conclusion that the use of force can be permitted if the following three conditions are fulfilled. a) When an armed attack against Japan or against a friendly country that is in close relationship with Japan occurs and as a result threatens Japan’s survival; b) When there is no other appropriate means available to counter aggression and c) the use of force should be limited to the minimum level possible.

On the use of force, Prime Minister Abe has tried hard to explain that there will not be any change in Japan’s traditional commitment to its peaceful orientations and that Japan will not send its forces to fight battles on foreign soil. Eve some American officials clarified that the main objective of the new legislation is to make the bilateral alliance more efficient and inter operable and not to involve Japan in combat activities abroad. Despite these assurances, there is still a great deal of opposition to the security bills which some of the opposition parties have dubbed as “war legislation”. In an opinion poll conducted by the Mainichi , on September 19-20, about 80% of the respondents complained that the explanation offered by the government on issues like the use of force, involvement of Japan in external combat activities, etc, was “insufficient”. Many people in Japan feel that Abe showed a great deal of hurry to push through the bills. How Abe will address the public scepticism and build a national consensus on the issue will be the next key item on his agenda.

*Prof K.V.Kesavan
is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Iran’s Foreign Policy – Analysis

0
0

By Kenneth Katzman*

This report provides an overview of Iran’s foreign policy, which has been a subject of numerous congressional hearings and of sanctions and other legislation for many years. The report analyzes Iranian foreign policy as a whole and by region. The regional analysis discusses those countries where Iranian policy is of U.S. concern. The report contains some specific information on Iran’s relations with these countries, but refers to other CRS reports for more detail, particularly on the views of individual countries towards Iran.

This report does not examine Iran’s broader policy toward the United States of U.S.-Iran relations in detail, but the present report analyzes Iran’s actions in relations to U.S. interests as a consistent theme. Nor does this report address how a potential Iranian nuclear weapon factors into Iran’s foreign policy.

Iran’s Policy Motivators

Iran’s foreign policy is a product of overlapping, and sometimes contradictory, motivations. In describing the tension between some of these motivations, one expert has said that Iran faces constant decisions about whether it is a “nation or a cause.”1 Iranian leaders appear to constantly weigh the relative imperatives of their government’s revolutionary and religious ideology against the demands of Iran’s interests as a country. Some of the factors that affect Iran’s foreign policy actions are discussed below.

Threat Perception

Iran’s leaders are apparently motivated, at least to some extent, by the perception of threat to their regime and their national interests posed by the United States and its allies.

  • In spite of statements by U.S. officials that the United States does not seek regime change in Iran, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i has repeatedly stated that the United States has never accepted the Islamic revolution and seeks to overturn it through various actions such as support for domestic opposition to the regime, imposition of economic sanctions, and support for armed or other action by Iran’s regional adversaries.2
  • Iran’s leaders assert that the U.S. maintenance of a large military presence in the Persian Gulf region and in other countries around Iran could reflect U.S. intention to attack Iran if Iran pursues policies the United States finds inimical, or could cause military miscalculation that leads to conflict.3
  • Some Iranian official media have asserted that the United States not only supports Sunni Arab regimes and movements that criticize or actively oppose Iran, but that the United States has created or empowered radical Sunni Islamist extremist factions such as the Islamic State organization.4

Ideology

The ideology of Iran’s 1979 Islamic revolution continues to influence Iran’s foreign policy. The revolution overthrew a secular authoritarian leader, the Shah of Iran, who the leaders of the revolution asserted had suppressed Islam and its clergy. It established a clerical regime in which ultimate power is invested in a “Supreme Guide,” or Supreme Leader, who combines political and religious authority.

  • In the early years after the revolution, Iran attempted to “export” its revolution to nearby Muslim states. As of the late 1990s, Iran apparently has abandoned that goal because promoting it succeeded only in producing resistance to Iran in the region.5
  • Iran’s leaders assert that the political and economic structures of the Middle East are heavily weighted against “oppressed” peoples and in favor of the United States and its allies, particularly Israel. Iranian leaders generally include in their definition of the oppressed the Palestinians, who do not have a state of their own, and Shiite Muslims, who are minorities in many countries of the region and are generally underrepresented politically and disadvantaged economically.
  • Iran claims that the region’s politics and economics have been distorted by Western intervention and economic domination, and that this perceived domination must be ended. Iranian officials typically cite the creation of Israel as a manifestation of Western intervention that, according to Iran, deprived the Palestinians of legitimate rights.

National Interests

Iran’s national interests also shape its foreign policy, sometimes intersecting with and complicating Iran’s ideology.

  • Iran’s leaders, stressing Iran’s well-developed civilization and historic independence, claim a right to be recognized as a major power in the region. They often contrast Iran’s history with that of the six Persian Gulf monarchy states (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman) that make up the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), several of which gained independence in the early 1970s. On this point, the leaders of the Islamic Republic of Iran make many of the foreign policy assertions and undertake many of the same actions that were undertaken by the former Shah of Iran and Iranian dynasties prior to that.
  • In some cases, Iran has appeared willing to temper its commitment to aid other Shiites to promote its geopolitical interests. For example, it has supported mostly Christian-inhabited Armenia, rather than Shiite-inhabited Azerbaijan, in part to thwart cross-border Azeri nationalism among Iran’s large Azeri minority. Iran also has generally refrained from backing Islamist movements in the Central Asian countries, reportedly in part to avoid offending Russia, its most important arms and technology supplier and an ally in support of Syrian President Bashar Al Assad.
  • Even though Iranian leaders accuse U.S. allies of contributing to U.S. efforts to structure the Middle East to the advantage of the United States and Israel, Iranian officials have sought to engage with and benefit from transactions with U.S. allies to try to thwart international sanctions.

Factional Interests

Iran’s foreign policy often appears to reflect differing approaches and outlooks among key players and interests groups.

  • By all accounts, Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, has final say over all major foreign policy decisions. Khamene’i is widely considered an ideological hardliner who expresses deep-seated mistrust of U.S. intentions toward Iran. His consistent refrain, and the title of a book widely available in Iran, is “I am a revolutionary, not a diplomat.”6 Leaders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), a military and internal security institution created after the Islamic revolution, consistently express support for Khamene’i and ideology-based foreign policy decisions.
  • Khamene’i has tacitly backed the JCPOA – if only by not openly opposing it – but he has stated on several occasions since it was finalized that neither Iran’s foreign policy nor its commitment to opposing U.S. policy in the region will not change as a result of the JCPOA. The IRGC leadership has criticized the accord but not threatened to undermine it, and has made statements similar to those of Khamene’i with regard to future Iranian foreign policy.
  • Nevertheless, more moderate Iranian leaders and factions, such as President Hassan Rouhani and the still influential former President Ali Akbar Hashemi- Rafsanjani, argue that Iran should not have any “permanent enemies” and that a pragmatic foreign policy could result in easing of international sanctions and increased support for Iran’s views on the Middle East. These views have drawn support from Iran’s youth and intellectuals who argue that Iran should adopt a foreign policy that avoids isolation and achieves greater integration with the international community. In contrast to Khamene’i’s statements, Rouhani said on September 13, 2015 that the JCPOA is “a beginning for creating an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation with various countries.”7
  • Some Iranian figures, including the elected president during 1997-2005 Mohammad Khatemi, are considered reformists. Reformists have tended to focus more on promoting domestic reform than for a dramatically altered foreign policy. However, most of Iran’s leading reformist figures have become sidelined without being able to achieve significant change either domestically or in foreign policy.

Instruments of Iranian Foreign Policy

Iran employs a number of different methods and mechanisms to implement its foreign policy, some of which involve supporting armed factions that engage in international acts of terrorism.

Financial and Military Support to Allied Regimes and Groups

As an instrument of its foreign policy, Iran provides arms, training, and military advisers in support of allied government as well as armed factions. Iran was placed on the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism (“terrorism list”) in January 1984, and two of the governments Iran has supported – Syria and Sudan – are the two countries still on that list. Many of the groups Iran supports are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the United States.

The State Department report on international terrorism for 2014,8 released June 19, 2015, stated that in 2014 Iran “continued its terrorist-related activity, including for Palestinian terrorist groups in Gaza, Lebanese Hezbollah, and various groups in Iraq and throughout the Middle East.”

Iran’s operations in support of its allies—which generally includes arms shipments, provision of advisers, training, and funding—is carried out by the Qods (Jerusalem) Force of the IRGC (IRGC-QF). The IRGC-QF is headed by IRGC Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani, who is said to report directly to Khamene’i.9 Some IRGC-QF advisers have been reported to sometimes engage in direct combat, particularly in the Syrian civil conflict.

The range of armed factions that Iran supports are discussed in the regional sections below.

  • Some Iranian-supported factions are opposition movements, while others are militia forces supporting governments that are allied to Iran. These governments include those of President Bashar Al Asad of Syria and Prime Minister Haydar Al Abbadi of Iraq.
  • Some armed factions that Iran supports have not been named as FTOs and have no record of committing acts of international terrorism. Such groups include the Houthi (“Ansar Allah”) movement in Yemen (composed of Zaidi Shiite Muslims) and some underground Shiite opposition factions in Bahrain.
  • Iran opposes—or declines to actively support—Islamist armed groups that work against Iran’s core interests. For example, Al Qaeda and the Islamic State organization are orthodox Sunni Muslim organizations that Iran apparently perceives as significant threats.10 Over the past few years, Iran has expelled some Al Qaeda activists who sought refuge there after the September 11, 2001, attacks against the United States. Iran is actively working against the Islamic State organization, which opposes Asad of Syria and the Abbadi government in Iraq.
  • Iran does support some Sunni Muslim groups that further Tehran’s interests. Two Sunni Palestinian FTOs, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad – Shiqaqi Faction, have received Iranian support in part because they are antagonists of Israel.

Other Political Action

 

  • Iran’s foreign policy is not limited to militarily supporting allied governments and armed factions. A wide range of observers report that Iran has provided funding to political candidates in neighboring Iraq and Afghanistan in an effort to build political allies in those countries.11
  • Iran has reportedly provided direct payments to leaders of neighboring states in an effort to gain and maintain their support. For example, in 2010 then-President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai publicly acknowledged that his office had accepted direct cash payments from Iran. 12
  • Iran has established some training and education programs that bring young Muslims to study in Iran. One such program, headed by Iranian cleric Mohsen Rabbani, is focused on Latin America, even though the percentage of Muslims there is low.13

 

Diplomacy

At the same time that it funds and trains armed factions in the region, Iran also uses traditional diplomatic tools.

  • Iran has an active Foreign Ministry and maintains embassies in almost all major countries with which it has formal diplomatic relations. Iran’s Supreme Leader Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i rarely travels outside Iran, but Iran’s elected presidents, including the current President Hassan Rouhani travel frequently and not only within Iran’s immediate neighborhood.
  • Iran actively participates in or seeks to join many different international organizations, including those that are dominated by members opposed to Iran’s ideology and/or critical of its domestic human rights practices. For example Iran has sought to join the U.S. and Europe-dominated World Trade Organization (WTO). It has also sought to join such regional organizations as the South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that groups Central Asian states with Russia and China. Iran is an observer in the SCO and SCO officials say that implementation of the JCPOA could pave the way for Iran to obtain full membership in the body.14
  • Iran participates actively in multilateral organizations that tend to support some aspects of Iranian ideology, such as its criticism of great power influence over developing states. From August 2012 until August 2015, Iran held the presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), which has about 120 member states and 17 observer countries. Iran hosted a summit of the movement in August 2012, when it took over the rotating leadership.
  • The JCPOA represented an attempt to ensure that Iran’s nuclear program is purely peaceful, demonstrating evident lack of international trust in Iran’s nuclear intentions. Iran is a party to all major nonproliferation conventions, including the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and insists that it has adhered to all its commitments under these conventions.
  • During 2003-2005, Iran negotiated limits on its nuclear program with three European Union countries—Britain, France and Germany (“EU-3”). In 2006, the negotiating powers expanded to include the United States and the two other Permanent Members of the U.N. Security Council, Russia and China, to form the “P5+1.” The P5+1 and Iran reached an interim nuclear agreement in November 2013 (“Joint Plan of Action,” or JPOA) and a framework of a comprehensive nuclear accord on April 2, 2015. The P5+1 and Iran set a deadline of June 30, 2015, to reach finalize an accord.

Near East Region

The overwhelming focus of Iranian foreign policy is on the Near East region, as demonstrated by Iran’s employment of all the various instruments of its foreign policy, including deployment of the IRGC-Qods Force in several locations in the region. All the various motivations of Iran’s foreign policy appear to be at work in its actions in the region, including its efforts to empower Shiite communities that fuel sectarian responses. Iranian steps to aid Shiites in Sunni-dominated countries often fuel responses by those governments, thus aggravating sectarian tensions.15

The Arab States of the Persian Gulf

Figure 1. Map of Near EastIran has a 1,100-mile coastline on the Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman. The Persian Gulf monarchy states (Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates) have always been a key focus of Iran’s foreign policy. These states, all controlled by Sunni- led governments, cooperate extensively with U.S. policy toward Iran, including by hosting significant numbers of U.S. forces at their military facilities and procuring U.S. military equipment, including missile defense technology. GCC facilities would be critical to any U.S. air operations against Iran in the event of a regional conflict, and GCC hosting of these facilities presumable serves as a deterrent to any direct Iranian aggression against the GCC countries.

At the same time, the GCC states generally do not try to openly antagonize Iran and, although all the GCC states enforce international sanctions against Iran, they also all maintain relatively normal trading relations with Iran.

The following sections analyze the main outlines of Iran’s policy toward each GCC state. Although Saudi Arabia’s positions are often taken to represent those of all GCC states toward Iran, there are some distinct differences within the GCC on Iran policy, as discussed below.

Saudi Arabia16

Iranian leaders assert that Saudi Arabia seeks hegemony for its brand of Sunni Islam and that Saudi Arabia is working with the United States to deny Shiite Muslim governments and factions influence in the region. Conversely, Saudi Arabia has used the claim of an Iranian quest for regional hegemony to justify military intervention in Bahrain in 2011 and in Yemen in 2015. Both countries have tended to exaggerate the influence of the other, leading to actions that have fueled the apparently expanding Sunni-Shiite conflict in the region. Some of the region’s conflicts are described as “proxy wars” between Saudi Arabia and Iran because each tends to back rival sides. The one exception might be Iraq, where both Iran and Saudi Arabia back the Shiite-dominated government, although Iran does so much more directly and substantially.

The Saudis also repeatedly cite past Iran-inspired actions as a reason for distrusting Iran; these actions include encouraging violent demonstrations at some Hajj pilgrimages in Mecca in the 1980s and 1990s, which caused a break in relations from 1987 to 1991. Some Saudis accuse Iran of supporting Shiite protesters and armed groups active in the Kingdom’s restive Shiite-populated Eastern Province. Saudi Arabia asserts that Iran instigated the June 1996 Khobar Towers bombing and accuses it of sheltering the alleged mastermind of the bombing, Ahmad Mughassil, purportedly a leader of Saudi Hezbollah. Mughassil was arrested in Beirut in August 2015, indicating that Iran might have expelled him if it was sheltering him. Saudi and Iranian have had occasional diplomatic discussions about their regional differences since President Rouhani came into office, but any rapprochement has been stalled recently over the Yemen issue, discussed below.

United Arab Emirates (UAE)17

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE tends to take hardline positions on Iran. However, unlike Saudi Arabia, the UAE has a large population of Iranian expatriates in Dubai emirate, historically close business ties to Iran’s large trading companies, and territorial disputes with Iran over the Persian Gulf islands of Abu Musa and the Greater and Lesser Tunb islands. The Tunbs were seized by the Shah of Iran in 1971, and the Islamic Republic took full control of Abu Musa in 1992, appearing to violate a 1971 UAE-Iran agreement to share control of that island. The UAE has sought to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), but Iran has insisted on resolving the issue bilaterally. (ICJ referral requires concurrence from both parties to a dispute.) In the aftermath of the 2013 interim nuclear agreement (JPOA), the two countries held direct discussions on the issue and reportedly made progress. Iran reportedly removed some military equipment from the islands.18 However, no progress has been announced since.

The UAE and Iran maintain relatively normal trade and diplomatic ties, and Iranian-origin residents of Dubai number about 300,000. In accordance with long-standing traditions, many Iranian-owned businesses are located in Dubai emirate (including branch offices of large trading companies based in Tehran and elsewhere in Iran). These relationships have often triggered U.S. concerns about the apparent re-exportation of some U.S. technology to Iran,19 although the UAE has said it has taken extensive steps, in cooperation with the United States, to reduce such leakage.

Qatar20

Qatar appears to occupy a “middle ground” between the anti-Iran animosity of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, and the intensive high-level engagement with Iran exhibited by Oman. Qatar invariably joins GCC consensus statements on Iran, most of which criticize Iran’s regional policies. However, Qatar maintains consistent high level contact with Iran; the speaker of Iran’s Majles (parliament) visited Qatar in March 2015 and the Qatari government allowed him to meet with Hamas leaders who are in exile in Qatar. But, unlike Oman and Kuwait, Qatar has not exchanged leadership level visits with Iran. Despite its contacts with Iran, Qatar also has not hesitated to pursue policies that are opposed to Iran’s interests, for example by providing arms and funds to factions in Syria that are fighting to oust Syrian President Bashar Al Asad.

Unlike the UAE, Qatar does not have any active territorial disputes with Iran. Yet, Qatari officials reportedly remain wary that Iran could try to encroach on the large natural gas field it shares with Iran, fueled by occasional Iranian statements such as one in April 2004 by Iran’s deputy oil minister that Qatar is probably producing more gas than “her right share” from the field. He added that Iran “will not allow” its wealth to be used by others.

Bahrain21

Bahrain is a core member of the hardline camp within the GCC on Iran issues. Bahrain is about 60% Shiite-inhabited, many of whom are of Persian origin, but the government is dominated by the Sunni Muslim Al Khalifa family. In 1981 and again in 1996, Bahrain publicly claimed to have thwarted Iranian attempts to support efforts by Bahraini Shiite dissidents to violently overthrow the ruling Al Khalifa family. Bahrain has consistently accused Iran of supporting radical Shiite factions that are part of a broader and mostly peaceful uprising begun in 2011 by mostly Shiite demonstrators.22 The State Department report on international terrorism for 2013 stated that Iran has attempted to provide arms and other aid to Shiite militants in Bahrain. However, the State Department report for 2014, released June 19, 2015, did not specifically repeat that assertion.23 Some outside observers—including a government-appointed commission of international experts called the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry—have suggested that Iran’s support for the Shiite uprising has been minimal.24 On several earlier occasions, tensions had flared over Iranian attempts to question the legitimacy of a 1970 U.N.-run referendum in which Bahrainis opted for independence rather than for affiliation with Iran.

Kuwait25

Kuwait cooperates with U.S.-GCC efforts to contain Iranian power, but does not demonstrate enthusiasm for GCC military action or proxy warfare against Iran’s regional interests. Kuwait exchanges leadership-level visits with Iran; Kuwait’s Amir Sabah al-Ahmad Al Sabah visited Iran in June 2014, meeting not only with President Hassan Rouhani but also Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i. Kuwait appears to view Iran as a helpful actor in stabilizing Iraq, which occupies a central place in Kuwait’s foreign policy because of the 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Kuwait cooperates extensively with the Shiite-dominated government in Baghdad despite Saudi and other GCC criticism of the government’s marginalizing Sunni Iraqis.

Kuwait is also differentiated from some of the other GCC states its relative confidence in the loyalty of its Shiite population. About 25% of Kuwaitis are Shiite Muslims, but Kuwait’s Shiites are extensively integrated into the political process and Kuwait’s economy, and have never constituted a restive, anti-government minority. Iran was unsuccessfully in supporting Shiite radical groups in Kuwait in the 1980s as a means to try to pressure Kuwait not to support the Iraqi war effort in the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). At the same time, Kuwait has stood firm against alleged Iranian spying or covert action in Kuwait. On numerous occasions, and as recently as August 2015, Kuwait has announced arrests of Kuwaitis alleged to be spying for or working with the IRGC-QF or Iran’s intelligence service.

Oman26

Of the GCC states, the Sultanate of Oman is closest politically to Iran. Omani officials assert that engagement with Iran is a more effective means to moderate Iran’s foreign policy than to threaten it or undertake indirect action against Iran through proxies. Oman also remains grateful for the Shah’s sending of troops to help the Sultan suppress rebellion in the Dhofar region in the 1970s, even though Iran’s regime changed since then.27 Sultan Qaboos made a state visit to Iran in August 2009, even though the visit coincide with large protests against alleged fraud in the reelection of then-President Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Qaboos visited again in August 2013, reportedly to explore concepts for improved U.S.-Iran relations and to facilitate U.S.-Iran talks that led to the JPA and its banks serve as a financial channel for the permitted transfer of hard currency oil sales proceeds to Iran under the JPA.28It subsequently hosted P5+1 – Iran nuclear negotiations that led to the JCPOA. In March 2014, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani visited Oman, the only GCC state he has visited since taking office.

Omani ties to Iran manifest in several ways. Unlike Saudi Arabia and some other GCC states, Oman reportedly has not materially supported any factions fighting against the Asad regime in Syria. Nor did Oman join the Saudi-led Arab intervention against the rebel Zaidi Shiite Houthi movement in Yemen that began in March 2014. Oman’s relationship with Iran and its membership in the GCC alliance as enabled Oman to undertake the role of mediator in both of those conflicts.

Iranian Policy in Iraq and Syria: Islamic State Crisis29

Iran’s policy has been to support the Shiite-led government in Iraq and the Alawite-led, pro- Iranian government in Syria. That policy has come under strong challenge from the Islamic State organization, which threatens the Iraqi government as well as that of Iran’s close ally President Bashar Al Asad. The United States and Iran have worked in parallel, although separately, to assist the Iraqi government against the Islamic State organization. However, the United States and Iran hold opposing positions on the Asad regime.
Iraq30

In Iraq, the U.S. military ousting of Saddam Hussein in 2003 benefitted Iran strategically by removing a long-time antagonist and producing governments led by Shiite Islamists who have long-standing ties to Iran. Iran was a strong backer of the government of Prime Minister Nuri al- Maliki, a Shiite Islamist who Tehran reportedly viewed as loyal and pliable. Maliki supported most of Iran’s regional goals, for example by allowing Iran to overfly Iraqi airspace to supply the Asad regime.31 The June 2014 offensive led by the Islamic State organization threatened Iraq’s government and at one point brought Islamic State forces to within 50 miles of the Iranian border. Iran responded quickly by supplying the Baghdad government as well as the peshmerga force of the autonomous Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) with IRGC-QF advisers, intelligence drone surveillance, weapons shipments, and other direct military assistance.32

Iranian leaders also acquiesced to U.S. insistence that Iran’s longtime ally Maliki be replaced, and Tehran concurred with his replacement by the more inclusive Abbadi.33 U.S. officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, have said that Iran’s targeting of the Islamic State generally contributes positively to U.S. efforts to assist the Iraqi government.

Still, many aspects of Iranian policy in Iraq reportedly trouble U.S. policymakers. Iran helped establish many of the Shiite militias that fought the United States during 2003-2011. During 2011-2014, the Shiite militia evolved into political organizations, but Iran has helped reactivate and empower some of them to support the Iraq Security Forces (ISF) against the Islamic State. The militias that Iran works most closely with in Iraq include As’aib Ahl Al Haq (League of the Righteous), Kata’ib Hezbollah (Hezbollah Brigades), and the Badr Organization. The Mahdi Army of Moqtada Al Sadr (renamed the Peace Brigades in 2014) was supported extensively by Iran during the 2003-2011 U.S. intervention in Iraq but has sought to distance itself from Iran in the more recent campaigns against the Islamic State. Kata’ib Hezbollah is designated a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) by the United States. The participation of some Shiite militias has increased tensions with some of Iraq’s Sunnis because some of these militia fighters have carried out reprisals against Sunnis after recapturing Sunni-inhabited territory from the Islamic State.

In late 2014, news reports citing Iranian elite figures, reported that Iran had spent more than $1 billion in military aid to Iraq in the approximately six months after the June 2014 Islamic State offensive.34 That figure presumably also includes weapons transferred to the Shiite militias as well as the ISF. CRS has no way to independently confirm any of the estimates on Iranian aid to Iraqi forces.

Syria35

On Syria, the United States has stated that President Bashar Al Asad should eventually leave office as part of a negotiated political solution to the conflict. Iran’s policy has apparently been to try to keep Asad in power because he has been Iran’s closest Arab ally and because Syria is the main transit point for Iranian weapons shipments to Hezbollah. Both Iran and Syria have used Hezbollah as leverage against Israel to try to achieve regional and territorial aims. Iran also asserts that Asad is a bulwark against the takeover of Syria by the Islamic State.

U.S. officials and reports assert that Iran is providing substantial amounts of material support to the Syrian regime, including funds, weapons, IRGC-QF advisors, and recruitment of Hezbollah and other non-Syrian Shiite militia fighters.36 Some experts say the Iranian direct intervention has, at least at times, gone beyond QF personnel to include an unknown number of IRGC ground forces as well.37 In June 2015, the office of the U.N. Special Envoy to Syria Staffan de Mistura stated that the envoy estimates Iran’s aid to Syria, including military and economic aid, to total about $6 billion per year.38 Other estimates vary, and CRS has no way to independently corroborate any particular estimate.

At the same time, some experts assess that Iran might be willing to abandon Asad, as it abandoned Maliki in Iraq, if Iran’s interests in Syria could be secured.39 In December 2012, and again in July 2015, Iran announced proposals for a peaceful transition in Syria that would culminate in free, multiparty elections. However, President Rouhani and other Iranian leaders continued to assert that any political negotiations be preceded by a cessation of hostilities – an assertion that cast doubt on whether Iran is willing to accept Asad’s eventual departure.

Israel: Iran’s Support for Hamas and Hezbollah40

Iran opposes Israel as what it asserts is an illegitimate creation of the West and an oppressor of the Palestinian people and other Arab Muslims. The position of Iran’s current regime differs dramatically from that of the pre-1979 regime of the Shah of Iran. Israel and the Shah’s regime had relatively normal relations, including embassies in each other’s capitals and an extensive network of economic ties.

Supreme Leader Khamene’i has repeatedly called Israel a “cancerous tumor” that should be removed from the region. In a September 2015 speech, Khamene’i stated that Israel will likely not exist in 25 years – the time frame for the last of the specific JCPOA restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program to expire. 41 Iran’s open hostility to Israel—manifested in part by its support for groups that undertake armed action against Israel—fuels assertions by Israeli leaders that a nuclear armed Iran would constitute an “existential threat” to the State of Israel. Iran’s support for armed factions on Israel’s borders could represent an Iranian attempt to acquire leverage over Israel. More broadly, Iran might be attempting to disrupt prosperity, morale, and perceptions of security among Israel’s population in a way that undermines the country’s appeal to those who have options to live elsewhere. The formal position of the Iranian Foreign Ministry is that Iran would not seek to block an Israeli-Palestinian settlement but that the process is too weighted toward Israel to yield a fair result.

Iran’s leaders routinely state that Israel presents a serious threat to Iran and that the international community applies a “double standard” to Iran as compared to Israel’s presumed nuclear arsenal. Iranian diplomats point out in international meetings that, despite apparently being the only Middle Eastern country to possess nuclear weapons and not being a party to the Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty, Israel does not face internationally imposed penalties as a consequence. In identifying Israel as a threat, Iran’s leaders cite Israeli official statements that Israel retains the option to unilaterally strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Iran also asserts that Israel’s purported nuclear arsenal is a main obstacle to achieving support for a weapons-of-mass-destruction (WMD) free zone in the Middle East.

Iran’s material support for militant anti-Israel groups has long concerned U.S. Administrations. For at least a decade, the annual State Department report on international terrorism has repeated its claim that Iran provides funding, weapons, and training to Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad— Shiqaqi Faction (PIJ), the Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (a militant offshoot of the dominant Palestinian faction Fatah), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). All are named as foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs) by the State Department. Iran has long supported Lebanese Hezbollah, which is an FTO and which portrays itself as the vanguard of resistance to Israel. In November 2014, a senior IRGC commander said that Iran had provided Hezbollah and Hamas with training and Fateh-class missiles, which enable the groups to attack targets in Israel.42

Hamas43

The annual State Department report on terrorism has consistently stated that Iran gives Hamas funds, weapons, and training. Hamas seized control of the Gaza Strip in 2007 and now administers that territory. Although it formally ceded authority over Gaza in June 2014 to a consensus Palestinian Authority government, Hamas retains de-facto security control over that territory. Its terrorist attacks using operatives within Israel have significantly diminished in number since 2005, but Hamas continues to occasionally engage in armed action against Israel, using rockets and other weaponry supplied by Iran. Israel and Hamas came into conflict in late 2008-early 2009; in November 2012; and during July and August, 2014.

The Iran-Hamas relationship was forged in the 1990s as part of an apparent attempt to disrupt the Israeli-Palestinian peace process through Hamas’s suicide bombings and other attacks on buses, restaurants, and other civilian targets inside Israel. However, Hamas’s position on the ongoing Syria conflict caused the Iran-Hamas relationship to falter. Largely out of sectarian sympathy with the mostly Sunni protesters and rebels in Syria, Hamas opposed the efforts by Asad, backed by Iran, to defeat the rebellion militarily. The rift apparently contributed to a lessening of Iran’s support to Hamas in its 2014 conflict with Israel as compared to previous Hamas-Israel conflicts in which Iran backed Hamas extensively. Since the latest Hamas-Israel conflict, Iran has apparently sought to rebuild the relationship with Hamas by providing missile technology that Hamas used to construct its own rockets and by helping it rebuild tunnels destroyed in the conflict with Israel.44 Some Hamas leaders have reportedly welcomed rebuilding the group’s relations with Iran, perhaps because of financial difficulties the organization has faced since the military leadership in Egypt began closing smuggling tunnels at the Gaza-Sinai border in 2013. According to some estimates, Iran’s financial support (not including weapons provided) has ranged from about $300 million per year during periods of substantial Iran-Hamas collaboration, to much smaller amounts during periods of tension between the two, such as those discussed above.45 CRS has no way to corroborate the levels of Iranian funding to Hamas.

Hezbollah46

Lebanese Hezbollah, which Iranian leaders assert is an outgrowth of the 1979 Iranian revolution itself, is arguably Iran’s most significant ally in the region. Hezbollah has acted in support of its own as well as Iranian interests on numerous occasions and in many forms, including through acts of terrorism and other armed action. The Iran-Hezbollah relationship began when Lebanese Shiite clerics of the pro-Iranian Lebanese Da’wa (Islamic Call) Party began to organize in 1982 into what later was unveiled in 1985 as Hezbollah. As Hezbollah was forming, the IRGC sent advisory forces to help develop Hezbollah’s military wing, and these IRGC forces subsequently became the core of what is now the IRGC-QF.47

The 2014 U.S. intelligence community worldwide threat assessment stated that Hezbollah “has increased its global terrorist activity in recent years to a level that we have not seen since the 1990s,” but the 2015 worldwide threat assessment, delivered in February 2015, did not repeat that assertion. In part as a consequence of its military strength, Hezbollah now plays a major role in decision-making and leadership selections in Lebanon. The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) rarely acts against Hezbollah’s forces or interests. However, there has been vocal criticism of Hezbollah within and outside Lebanon for its active supports for its other key patron, Asad, against the Sunni-led rebellion in Syria. That involvement, reportedly urged and assisted by Iran, has diluted Hezbollah’s image as a steadfast opponent of Israel by embroiling it in a war against fellow Muslims.

Iran’s political, financial, and military aid to Hezbollah has helped it become a major force in Lebanon’s politics. The 2010 congressionally-mandated Department of Defense report on Iran’s military power asserts Iranian aid levels to Hezbollah are “roughly $100 – $200 million per year.”48 That estimate is consistent with figures cited in past years’ State Department reports on international terrorism. Still, CRS has no way to independently corroborate any such estimates.

Earlier, Hezbollah’s attacks on Israeli forces in southern Lebanon contributed to an Israeli withdrawal in May 2000, and Hezbollah subsequently maintained military forces along the border. Hezbollah fired Iranian-supplied rockets on Israel’s northern towns during a July–August 2006 war with Israel, including at the Israeli city of Haifa (30 miles from the border)49 and in July 2006 hit an Israeli warship with a C-802 sea-skimming missile. Iran bought the C-802 from China in the 1990s and almost certainly was the supplier of the weapon to Hezbollah. Hezbollah was perceived in the Arab world as a victor in the war for holding out against Israel. Since that conflict, Iran has resupplied Hezbollah to the point where it has, according to Israeli sources, as many as 100,000 rockets and missiles, some capable of reaching Tel Aviv from south Lebanon, as well as upgraded artillery, anti-ship, anti-tank, and anti-aircraft capabilities.50

In the context of the conflict in Syria, Israel has carried out occasional air strikes inside Syria against Hezbollah commanders and purported arms shipments via Syria to Hezbollah. In January 2015, Hezbollah attacked an Israeli military convoy near the Lebanon-Israel-Syria tri-border area, killing two Israeli soldiers and making it the deadliest Hezbollah attack on Israeli territory since 2006. However, these incidents have not, to date, escalated into a broader Israel-Hezbollah conflict.

Yemen51

Yemen does not appear to represent a core security interest of Iran, but Iranian leaders appear to perceive Yemen’s instability as an opportunity to acquire additional leverage against Saudi Arabia and the GCC states, several of which border Yemen. Yemen’s elected leaders have long claimed that Iran is trying to take advantage of Yemen’s instability by supporting Shiite rebels in Yemen— a Zaydi Shiite revivalist movement known as the “Houthis”—with arms and other aid. Yemen has been unstable since the 2011 “Arab Spring” uprisings, which included Yemen and which forced longtime President Ali Abdullah Saleh to resign in January 2012. In September 2014, the Houthis and their allies seized key locations in the capital, Sana’a, and took control of major government locations in January 2015, forcing Saleh’s successor, Abd Rabu Mansur Al Hadi, to flee to Aden. The Houthis and their allies subsequently advanced on Aden, prompting Saudi Arabia to assemble a ten-country Arab coalition, with logistical help from the United States, to undertake military action to stop the Houthi advance.52 Saudi officials have explained their military action, which has escalated in mid-2015 to include some ground forces, as an effort to restore the elected government and, as a by-product, to stop Iran from expanding its influence in the region.

There is debate over the extent to which the Houthi advance is a priority of Iranian policy. Iran has not denied aiding the Houthis, but has sought to minimize its involvement in Yemen. A senior Iranian official reportedly told journalists in December 2014 that the Qods Force has a “few hundred” personnel in Yemen training Houthi fighters.53 Iran reportedly has shipped unknown quantities of arms to the Houthis, as has been reported by a panel of U.N. experts assigned to monitor Iran’s compliance with U.N. restrictions on its sales of arms abroad. Nonetheless, Iran’s aid to the Houthis appears less systematic or large-scale than is Iran’s support to the government of Iraq or to Asad of Syria. Observers describe Iran’s influence over the Houthis as limited and assert that the Houthi military action against President Hadi was not instigated by Iran. On April 20, 2015, National Security Council spokesperson Bernadette Meehan told reporters that, “It remains our assessment that Iran does not exert command and control over the Houthis in Yemen,” and an unnamed U.S. intelligence official reportedly said, “It is wrong to think of the Houthis as a proxy force for Iran.”54 No firm estimates of Iranian aid to the Houthis exists, but some Houthi sources estimate Iran has supplied the group with “tens of millions of dollars” total over the past few years.55

Iran might have increased its aid to the Houthis as a counter to the Saudi military campaign, which began in April 2015, against the Houthi advance. Iran appears to be seeking to frustrate Saudi foreign policy.56 The United States augmented its naval presence off the coast of Yemen with an aircraft carrier in mid-April 2015, in part to try to prevent any additional Iranian weapons shipments to Iran. The Iranian ship convoy turned around rather than confront the U.S. Navy, and the U.S. presence appears to have deterred further Iranian efforts to arm the Houthis by ship.

Turkey57

Iran shares a short border with Turkey, but the two have extensive political and economic relations. Turkey is a member of NATO, and Iran has sought to limit Turkey’s cooperation with its NATO partners in any U.S.-backed efforts to emplace even defensive equipment, such as missile defense technology, near Iran’s borders. Iran is a major supplier of both oil and natural gas to Turkey, through a joint pipeline that began operations in the late 1990s and has since been supplemented by an additional line. Iran and Turkey also agreed in 2011 to cooperate to try to halt cross border attacks by Kurdish groups that oppose the governments of Turkey (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK) and of Iran (Free Life Party, PJAK), and which enjoy a measure of safe have in northern Iraq. Turkey has also been supportive of P5+1 – Iran negotiations and the JCPOA, apparently in the expectation that the agreement not only would constrain Iran’s nuclear program but also that the lifting of sanctions on Iran would remove constraints on Iran-Turkey trade.

On the other hand, the two countries have disputes on some regional issues, possibly caused by the sectarian differences between Sunni-inhabited Turkey and Shiite Iran. Turkey has been a key advocate of Syrian President Asad leaving office as part of a possible solution for conflict-torn Syria. Iran, as has been noted, is a key supporter of Asad.

In the 1990s and early 2000s, Iran and Turkey were at odds over the strategic engagement of Turkey’s then leaders with Israel. The Iran – Turkey dissonance on the issue has faded since the Islamist-rooted Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in Turkey about a decade ago. Since then Turkey has realigned its foreign policy somewhat and has been a significant supporter of Hamas, which also enjoys Iran’s support, and other Islamist movements.

South and Central Asia Region

Figure 2. South and Central Asia RegionIran’s relations with countries in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and South Asia vary significantly, from close relations with Afghanistan to animosity with Azerbaijan. Regardless of any differences, most countries in these regions conduct relatively normal trade and diplomacy with Iran. Some countries in these regions, such as Uzbekistan and Pakistan, face significant domestic threats from radical Sunni Islamist extremist movements similar to those that Iran characterizes as a threat to regional stability. Such common interests create an additional basis for Central and South Asian cooperation with Iran.

Most of the countries in Central Asia are relatively stable and are governed by authoritarian leaders, offering Iran little opportunity to exert influence by supporting opposition factions. Still, unrest does flare occasionally, including in mid-2015 in Tajikistan, which has never fully resolved a significant civil war in the years after the breakup of the Soviet Union. Afghanistan, by contrast, is a weak state supported by international forces, and Iran has substantial influence over several major factions and regions of the country. Some countries in the region, particularly India, apparently seek greater integration with the United States and other world powers and have sought to limit or downplay cooperation with Iran and to comply with sanctions against Iran. The following sections cover those countries in the Caucasus and South and Central Asia that have significant economic and political relationships with Iran.

The South Caucasus: Azerbaijan

Azerbaijan is, like Iran, mostly Shiite Muslim-inhabited. However, Azerbaijan is ethnically Turkic and its leadership is secular; moreover, Iran and Azerbaijan have territorial differences over boundaries in the Caspian Sea. Iran also asserts that Azeri nationalist movements might stoke separatism among Iran’s large Azeri Turkic population, which has sometimes been restive. In July 2001, Iranian warships and combat aircraft threatened a BP ship on contract to Azerbaijan out of an area of the Caspian that Iran claims as its territorial waters. The United States called the incident inconsistent with diplomatic processes under way to determine Caspian boundaries,58 among which are negotiations that regional officials say might resolve the issue at a planned 2016 regional summit meeting in Astana, Kazakhstan. Largely as a result of these differences, Iran has generally tilted toward Armenia, which is Christian, in Armenia’s disputes with Azerbaijan. In this context, Azerbaijan has entered into substantial strategic cooperation with the United States, directed not only against Iran but also against Russia. The U.S.-Azerbaijan cooperation has extended to Azerbaijan’s deployments of troops to and facilitation of supply routes to Afghanistan,59 as well as counter-terrorism cooperation.

Azerbaijan has been a key component of U.S. efforts to structure oil and gas routes in the region to bypass Iran. In the 1990s, the United States successfully backed construction of the Baku- Tblisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, intended in part to provide non-Iranian and non-Russian export routes. On the other hand, the United States has apparently accepted Azerbaijan’s assertions that it needs to deal with Iran on some major regional energy projects. Several U.S. sanctions laws have exempted from sanctions long-standing joint natural gas projects that involve some Iranian firms—particularly the Shah Deniz natural gas field and pipeline in the Caspian Sea. The project is run by a consortium in which Iran’s Naftiran Intertrade Company (NICO) holds a passive 10% share. (The other significant partners are BP, Azerbaijan’s national energy firm SOCAR, and Russia’s Lukoil.) 60

Central Asia

Iran has generally sought positive relations with the leaderships of the Central Asian states, even though most of these leaderships are secular. All of the Central Asian states are inhabited in the majority by Sunnis, and several have active Sunni Islamist opposition movements. The Central Asian states have long been wary that Iran might try to promote Islamic movements in Central Asia, but more recently the Central Asian leaders have seen Iran as an ally against the Sunni movements that are active in Central Asia, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).61 That group, which is active in Afghanistan, in mid-2015, declared its loyalty to the Islamic State organization. The Islamic State has recruited fighters from Central Asia to help fill its combat ranks in Iraq and Syria,62 and Central Asian leaders express concern that these fighters could return to their countries of origin to conduct terrorist attacks against the Central Asian governments. Almost all of the Central Asian states share a common language and culture with Turkey; Tajikistan is alone among them in sharing a language with Iran.

Iran and the Central Asian states carry on normal economic relations. In December 2014, a new railway was inaugurated through Iran, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan, providing a link from the Persian Gulf to Central Asia.63
Along with India and Pakistan, Iran has been given observer status in a Central Asian security grouping called the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO—Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan). In April 2008, Iran applied for full membership in the organization. Apparently in an effort to cooperate with international efforts to pressure Iran, in June 2010, the SCO barred admission to Iran on the grounds that it is under U.N. Security Council sanctions.64 However, SCO officials have stated that the finalization of the JCPOA might remove existing obstacles to Iran’s full membership in the body.

Turkmenistan

Turkmenistan and Iran have a land border in Iran’s northeast. Iran’s Supreme Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i, is of Turkic origin; his family has close ties to the Iranian city of Mashhad, capital of Khorasan Province, which borders Turkmenistan. The two countries are also both rich in natural gas reserves. A natural gas pipeline from Iran to Turkey, fed with Turkmenistan’s gas, began operations in 1997, and a second pipeline was completed in 2010. Turkmenistan still exports some natural gas through the Iran-Turkey gas pipeline, even though China has since become Turkmenistan’s largest natural gas customer. Perhaps in an attempt to diversify gas export routes, Niyazov’s successor, President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, signaled in 2007 that Turkmenistan sought to develop a trans-Caspian gas pipeline. That project has not proceeded, to date.

Another potential project favored by Turkmenistan and the United States would likely reduce interest in pipelines that transit Iran. President Berdymukhamedov has revived Niyazov’s 1996 proposal to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan to Pakistan and India (termed the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India, or “TAPI” pipeline). Some preliminary memoranda of understanding among the leaders of the nations involved have been signed. U.S. officials have expressed strong support for the project as “a very positive step forward and sort of a key example of what we’re seeking with our New Silk Road Initiative, which aims at regional integration to lift all boats and create prosperity across the region.”65 However, doubts remain that the pipeline will actually be constructed.

Tajikistan

Iran and Tajikistan share a common Persian language, as well as literary and cultural ties. Despite the similar ethnicity, the two do not share a border and the population of Tajikistan is mostly Sunni, not Shiite. In March 2013, President Imamali Rakhmonov warned that since Tajikistan had become independent, the country and the world have experienced increased dangers from “arms races, international terrorism, political extremism, fundamentalism, separatism, drug trafficking, transnational organized crime, [and] the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” These are threats that Iranian leaders claim to share. Rakhmonov also stated that close ties with neighboring and regional states were a priority, to be based on “friendship, good-neighborliness, [and] non- interference in each other’s internal affairs,” and to involve the peaceful settlement of disputes, such as over border, water, and energy issues.66 He stated that relations with Iran would be expanded. Tajikistan is largely dependent on its energy rich neighbors and has not announced any significant energy-related projects with Iran.

Some Sunni Islamist extremist groups that pose a threat to Tajikistan are allied with Sunni extremist groups, such as Al Qaeda, that Iranian leaders have publicly identified as threats to Iran and to the broader Islamic world.

Tajikistan’s leaders appear particularly concerned about Islamist movements in part because the Islamist-led United Tajik Opposition posed a serious threat to the newly independent government in the early 1990s, and a settlement of the insurgency in the late 1990s did not fully resolve government-opposition tensions. The Tajikistan government has detained members of Jundallah (Warriors of Allah)—a Pakistan-based Islamic extremist group that has conducted bombings and attacks against Iranian security personnel and mosques in Sunni areas of eastern Iran. In part because the group attacked some civilian targets in Iran, in November 2010, the State Department named the group an FTO—an action praised by Iran. In July 2013, Tajik police detained alleged operatives of the IMU, which is active in Uzbekistan and which also operates in Afghanistan.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan, apparently among the most stable of the Central Asian states, has appeared eager for an Iran nuclear deal that would lift sanctions on Iran. In early 2013, Kazakhstan hosted a round of the P5+1-Iran negotiations. In September 2014, Kazakhstan’s President Nursultan Nazarbayev held talks with President Rouhani. In his welcoming speech, Nazarbayev appeared to link progress in Iran-Kazakhstan relations to a comprehensive agreement with the international community on Iran’s nuclear program, saying: “Kazakhstan views Iran as an important partner in the world and a good neighbor in the Caspian region. We are confident that you will achieve successful solution on the biggest challenge in Iran—the nuclear program. It will influence the development of the Iranian economy and our relations.”67 The bilateral meeting reportedly included a broad agenda, including oil and gas, agriculture, and infrastructure issues.

The JCPOA potentially opens Iran to additional opportunities to cooperate with Kazakhstan on energy projects. Kazakhstan is an important power in Central Asia by virtue of its geographic location, large territory, ample natural resources, and economic growth. Kazakhstan possesses 30 billion barrels of proven oil reserves (about 2% of world reserves) and 45.7 trillion cubic feet of proven gas reserves (less than 1% of world reserves). There are five major onshore oil fields— Tengiz, Karachaganak, Aktobe, Mangistau, and Uzen—which account for about half of the proven reserves. Two major offshore oil fields in Kazakhstan’s sector of the Caspian Sea— Kashagan and Kurmangazy—are estimated to contain at least 14 billion barrels of recoverable reserves. Iran and Kazakhstan do not have any joint energy ventures in the Caspian or elsewhere, but in the aftermath of the JCPOA, the two countries reportedly agreed in principle to resume Caspian oil swap arrangements that were discontinued in 2011.68

Uzbekistan

Uzbekistan and Iran do not share a common border, or significant language or cultural links. Since its independence in 1991, Uzbekistan, which has the largest military of the Central Asian states, has tended to see Iran as a potential regional rival and as a supporter of Islamist movements in the region. Over the past two years, Uzbekistan and Iran have moved somewhat closer together over shared stated concerns about Sunni Islamist extremist movements such as the Islamic State and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has declared allegiance to the Islamic State. The IMU, which has a reported presence in northern Afghanistan, has not claimed responsibility for any terrorist attacks in Iran and appears focused primarily on activities against the governments of Afghanistan and Uzbekistan.

Uzbekistan’s intense focus on the IMU began in February 1999 when, according to various reports, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area killed more than 20 people. Uzbekistan’s President Islam Karimov had been expected to attend a high-level meeting in that area when the bombings took place, and the act was widely viewed as an effort to decapitate the Uzbek government. The government alleged that an exiled opposition figure led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s Taliban and IMU co-leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namangani. The Taliban were, at that time, in power in Afghanistan and granting safe haven to Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda leaders. In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as an FTO, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism in pursuit of its main goal of toppling the government in Uzbekistan, including taking foreign hostages.69 During U.S.-led major combat operations in Afghanistan during 2001-2003, IMU forces assisted the Taliban and Al Qaeda, and IMU co-head Namangani was probably killed at that time.70

Uzbekistan has substantial natural gas resources but the two countries do not have joint energy- related ventures. Most of Uzbekistan’s natural gas production is for domestic consumption.

South Asia

The countries in South Asia face an even greater degree of threat from Sunni Islamic extremist groups than do the countries of Central Asia, and on that basis share significant common interests with Iran. The governments in South Asia are elected governments and thus tend to be more constrained by domestic laws and customs in their efforts to defeat extremist groups than are the Central Asian states. Iran apparently also has looked to some countries in South Asia as potential allies to help parry U.S. and European economic pressure. This section focuses on several countries in South Asia that have substantial interaction with Iran.

Afghanistan

In Afghanistan, Iran is apparently pursuing a multi-track strategy by helping develop Afghanistan economically, engaging the central government, and supporting pro-Iranian groups and anti-U.S. militants. A long-term Iranian goal appears to be to restore some of its traditional sway in eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan, where “Dari”-speaking (Dari is akin to Persian) supporters of the “Northern Alliance” grouping of non-Pashtun Afghan minorities predominate. Iran has also sought to use its influence in Afghanistan to try to blunt the effects of international sanctions against Iran.71 The two countries are said to be cooperating effectively in their shared struggle against narcotics trafficking from Afghanistan into Iran; Iranian border forces take consistent heavy losses in operations to try to prevent this trafficking.

Iran has sought influence in Afghanistan in part by supporting the Afghan government. President Hamid Karzai was replaced in September 2014 by Ashraf Ghani: both are Sunni Muslims and ethnic Pashtuns. In October 2010, Karzai admitted that Iran was providing cash payments (about $2 million per year) to his government, through his chief of staff.72 Iran’s close ally, Dr. Abdullah Abdullah, a Persian-speaking Afghan who is partly of Tajik origin, is “Chief Executive Officer” of the Afghan government under a power-sharing arrangement that resolved a dispute over the most recent election. It is not known whether these payments have continued since Ghani and Abdullah took office in September 2014.

Reflecting apparent concern about the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan, Iran reportedly tried to derail the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) that Ghani’s government signed on September 30, 2014. The BSA allows the United States to maintain troops in Afghanistan after 2014 but prohibits the United States from using Afghanistan as a base from which to launch military action against other countries. The two countries appear to have overcome differences over the BSA; President Ghani visited Tehran during April 19-20, 2015, and held discussions with Iranian leaders that reportedly focused on ways the two governments could cooperate against the Islamic State organization, which has developed affiliates inside Afghanistan.73

Even though it engages the Afghan government, Tehran has in the recent past sought leverage against U.S. forces in Afghanistan that are supporting that government. Past State Department reports on international terrorism have accused Iran of providing materiel support, including 107mm rockets, to select Taliban and other militants in Afghanistan, and of training Taliban fighters in small unit tactics, small arms use, explosives, and indirect weapons fire.74 The State Department terrorism reports also assert that Iran has supplied militants in Qandahar, which is a Pashtun-inhabited province in southern Afghanistan and which would indicate that Iran is not limiting its assistance to militants near its borders. The support Iran provides to Afghan insurgents gives Iran potential leverage in any Taliban-government political settlement in Afghanistan. In July 2012, Iran reportedly allowed the Taliban to open an office in Zahedan, in eastern Iran.75

Pakistan76

Relations between Iran and Pakistan have fluctuated over the past several decades. Pakistan supported Iran in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War, and Iran and Pakistan engaged in substantial military cooperation in the early 1990s. It has been widely reported that the founder of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, A.Q. Khan, sold nuclear technology and designs to Iran.77

However, several factors divide the two countries. During the 1990s, Pakistan supported the Taliban in Afghanistan, whereas Iran supported the Persian-speaking and Shiite Muslim minorities there. The Taliban allegedly committed atrocities against Shiite Afghans (Hazara tribes) while seizing control of Persian-speaking areas of western and northern Afghanistan. Taliban fighters killed nine Iranian diplomats at Iran’s consulate in Mazar-e-Sharif in August 1998, prompting Iran to mobilize ground forces to the Afghan border. Afghan Taliban factions have a measure of safe-haven in Pakistan, and Iran reportedly is concerned that Pakistan might still harbor the ambition of returning the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.78 In addition, two Iranian Sunni Muslim militant opposition groups – Jundullah (named by the United States as an FTO, as discussed above) and Jaysh al-Adl – operate from western Pakistan. These groups have conducted a number of attacks on Iranian regime targets.

An additional factor distancing Iran and Pakistan is that Pakistan has always had strategic relations with Iran’s strategic adversary, Saudi Arabia. In March 2015, Saudi Arabia requested Pakistan’s participation in a Saudi-led coalition to try to turn back the advance in Yemen by the Iranian-backed Houthis (see above). Pakistan’s government is abiding by an April 2015 vote of its parliament not to enter the conflict, on the grounds that Pakistan could become embroiled in conflict far from its borders. The decisions has complicated Pakistan’s relations with the GCC states but was applauded by Iran.79 Experts also have long speculated that if Saudi Arabia sought to counter Iran’s nuclear program with one of its own, the prime source of technology for the Saudi program would be Pakistan.

Despite these differences, Iran and Pakistan conduct low-level military cooperation, including joint naval exercises in April 2014. The two nations’ bilateral agenda has increasingly focused on completing a major gas pipeline project that would link the two countries. Pakistan asserts that the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline could help alleviate Pakistan’s energy shortages, while the project would provide Iran an additional customer for its large natural gas reserves. Then-president of Iran Ahmadinejad and Pakistan’s then-President Asif Ali Zardari formally inaugurated the project in March 2013. Iran has completed the line on its side of the border, but Pakistan has had persistent trouble financing the project on its side of the border. That roadblock might have been cleared by an agreement by China, reported on April 9, 2015, to build the pipeline at a cost of about $2 billion.80 Prior to the JCPOA, the United States opposed the project as providing a benefit to Iran’s energy sector and U.S. officials stated that the project could be subject to U.S. sanctions under the Iran Sanctions Act.81 However, the applicable provisions of the Iran Sanctions Act are to be waived as a consequence of the JCPOA, removing perhaps the last key obstacle to the project’s completion. As originally conceived, the line would continue on to India, but India has withdrawn from the project.

India82

India and Iran have overlapping histories, civilizations, and interests, aligning on numerous issues; for example, both countries have strongly supported minority factions based in the north and west of Afghanistan. India also is home to tens of millions of Shiite Muslims. As U.S. and international sanctions on Iran increased in 2010-2012, India sought to preserve its long-standing ties with Iran while still cooperating with U.S. and international sanctions on Iran. In 2010, India’s central bank ceased using a Tehran-based regional body, the Asian Clearing Union, to handle transactions with Iran. In January 2012, Iran agreed to accept India’s local currency, the rupee, to settle nearly half of its sales to India; that rupee account funds the sale to Iran of Indian wheat, pharmaceuticals, rice, sugar, soybeans, auto parts, and other products. Over the past three years, India has cut its purchases of Iranian oil at some cost to its own development, and has received from the U.S. Administration the authorized exemptions from U.S. sanctions for doing so. By mid-2013, Iran was only supplying about 6% of India’s oil imports (down from over 16% in 2008)—reflecting significant investment to retrofit refineries that were handling Iranian crude. India’s private sector has come to view Iran as a “controversial market”—a term used by many international firms to describe markets that entail reputational and financial risks. As a result, investment in Iran by Indian firms, including in Iran’s energy sector, has been largely dormant over the past four years. However, Indian investment in Iran, as well as oil purchases from Iran, are expecting to rise sharply once sanctions are lifted or suspended under the JCPOA.

Some projects India has pursued in Iran involve not only economic issues but national strategy. India has long sought to develop Iran’s Chabahar port, which would give India direct access to Afghanistan and Central Asia without relying on transit routes through Pakistan. India had hesitated to move forward on that project because of U.S. opposition to projects that benefit Iran. After the JPA, India announced it would proceed with the project, but there has been little actual construction done at the port to date.83 The JCPOA, once fully implemented, will likely cause the Chabahar project to move forward significantly.

As noted above, in 2009, India dissociated itself from the Iran-Pakistan gas pipeline project. India publicly based its withdrawal on concerns about the security of the pipeline, the location at which the gas would be transferred to India, pricing of the gas, and transit tariffs. However, the long- standing distrust and enmity between India and Pakistan likely played a significant role in the Indian pullout. These issues will not be addressed by the JCPOA, making India’s return to that project still unlikely. During economic talks in July 2010, Iranian and Indian officials reportedly raised the issue of constructing a subsea natural gas pipeline, which would bypass Pakistani territory.84 However, an undersea pipeline would be much more expensive.

During the late 1990s, U.S. officials expressed concern about India-Iran military-to-military ties. The relationship included visits to India by Iranian naval personnel, although India said these exchanges involved junior personnel and focused mainly on promoting interpersonal relations and not on India’s provision to Iran of military expertise. The military relationship between the countries has withered in recent years.

Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka was a buyer of small amounts of Iranian oil until 2012, when U.S. sanctions were imposed on countries that fail to reduce purchases of Iranian oil. Shortly thereafter, Sri Lanka ended its oil purchases from Iran and in June 2012, the country received an exemption from U.S. sanctions. The JCPOA will likely cause Sri Lanka to resume oil purchases from Iran.

Russia

Iran appears to attach significant weight to its relations with Russia, which is a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and the member of the P5+1 that was the most accepting of some of Iran’s positions in the JCPOA talks. Strategically, Iran and Russia are aligned in Syria – the two countries are the main international backers of the Asad regime.

Russia has been Iran’s main supplier of conventional weaponry and a significant supplier of missile-related technology. Russia built and still supplies fuel for Iran’s only operating civilian nuclear power reactor at Bushehr, a project from which Russia earns significant revenues. Russia and Iran reportedly are negotiating for Russia to build at least two additional nuclear power plants in Iran.

Despite its commercial and military involvement with Iran, Russia has abided by all U.N. sanctions, even to the point of initially cancelling a contract to sell Iran the advanced S-300 air defense system after Resolution 1929 banning arms exports to Iran was adopted—even though the resolution did not specifically ban the sale of the S-300. After the April 2, 2015, framework nuclear accord was announced, Russia lifted its ban on the S-300 sale. By all accounts, the system has not been delivered to date, but Russia might be waiting until after “Implementation Day” of the JCPOA (the point where Iran is deemed compliant with initial nuclear tasks and most sanctions are lifted) to go ahead with the shipment. Some reports suggest that in 2015 a Russian defense firm might also have offered to sell Iran the advanced Antey-2500 air defense system.85 In January 2015, Iran and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding on defense cooperation, including military drills.86

Other issues similarly align Iran and Russia. Since 2014, Iran and Russia have apparently both seen themselves as targets of Western sanctions (over the Ukraine issue, in the case of Russia). Iran and Russia have also separately accused the United States and Saudi Arabia of colluding to lower world oil prices in order to pressure Iran and Russia economically. In August 2014, Russia and Iran reportedly agreed to a broad trade and energy deal which might include an exchange of Iranian oil (500,000 barrels per day) for Russian goods87—a deal that presumably would go into effect if sanctions on Iran were lifted. Russia is an oil exporter, but Iranian oil that Russia might buy under this arrangement would presumably free up additional Russian oil for export. Iran and Russia reaffirmed this accord in April 2015.

Some argue that Iran has largely refrained from supporting Islamist movements in Central Asia not only because they are Sunni movements but also to avoid antagonizing Russia. Russia has faced attacks inside Russia by Sunni Islamist extremist movements and Russia appears to view Iran as a de-facto ally in combating such movements. These common interests might explain why Iran and Russia are each assisting the Asad regime against the armed insurgency led by Sunni Islamist groups.

Europe

U.S. and European approaches on Iran have converged since 2002, when Iran was found to be developing a uranium enrichment capability. Previously, European countries had appeared somewhat less concerned than the United States about Iranian policies and were reluctant to sanction Iran. After the passage of Resolution 1929 in June 2010, European Union (EU) sanctions on Iran became nearly as extensive as those of the United States.88 In 2012, the EU banned imports of Iranian crude oil and natural gas. Still, the EU countries generally conducted trade relations in civilian goods that are not the subject of any sanctions. The EU is a party to the JPA and the JCPOA, and, in concert with the agreement, the EU is lifting nearly all economic sanctions on Iran in connection. Several high-level European delegations have visited Iran since JCPOA was finalized, most of which included business executives seeking to resume business relationships mostly severed since 2010. France opened a formal trade office in Tehran in September 2015.

Iran also always maintained full diplomatic relations with all the EU countries, with the exception of occasional interruptions caused by Iranian assassinations of Iranian dissidents in Europe or attacks by Iranian militants on EU country diplomatic property in Iran. There are daily scheduled flights from several European countries to Iran, and many Iranian students attend European universities. Iran did not break relations with the EU or with any EU countries when, in July 2013, the EU designated the military wing of Lebanese Hezbollah as a terrorist organization, an action that followed the attack on Israeli tourists in Bulgaria in 2012 (see table above). After the JCPOA was finalized, British Foreign Secretary Phillip Hammond visited Iran and reopened Britain’s embassy there – closed since the 2011 attack on it by pro-government protesters.

During the 1990s, U.S. and European policies toward Iran were in sharp contrast. The United States had no formal dialogue with Iran; however, EU countries maintained a policy of “critical dialogue” and refused to join the 1995 U.S. trade and investment ban on Iran. The EU-Iran dialogue was suspended in April 1997 in response to the German terrorism trial (“Mykonos trial”) that found high-level Iranian involvement in killing Iranian dissidents in Germany, but it resumed in May 1998 during Mohammad Khatemi’s presidency of Iran. In the 1990s, European and Japanese creditors bucked U.S. objections and rescheduled about $16 billion in Iranian debt bilaterally, in spite of Paris Club rules that call for multilateral rescheduling. During 2002-2005, there were active negotiations between the European Union and Iran on a “Trade and Cooperation Agreement” (TCA) that would have lowered the tariffs or increased quotas for Iranian exports to the EU countries.89 Negotiations were discontinued in late 2005 after Iran abrogated an agreement with several EU countries to suspend uranium enrichment. Also, although the U.S. Administration ceased blocking Iran from applying for World Trade Organization (WTO) membership in May 2005, there has thus far been insufficient international support to grant Iran WTO membership.

East Asia

East Asia includes three large buyers of Iranian crude oil and one country, North Korea, that is widely accused of supplying Iran with WMD-related technology. The countries in Asia have sometimes joined multilateral peacekeeping operations in the Middle East but have not directly intervened militarily or politically in the region in the way the United States and its European allies have. Countries in Asia have rarely been a target of official Iranian criticism.

China90

China, a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and one of the P5+1 countries that negotiated the JCPOA, is Iran’s largest oil customer. China has also been a supplier of advanced conventional arms to Iran, including cruise missile-armed fast patrol boats that the IRGC Navy operates in the Persian Gulf. There have been reports that, particularly prior to 2010, some Chinese firms had supplied ballistic missile guidance and other WMD-related technology to Iran.91 During U.N. Security Council deliberations on sanctioning Iran for its nuclear program during 2006-2013, China tended to argue for less stringent sanctions and for more deference to Iran’s positions than did the United States, France, Britain, and Germany.

China’s compliance with U.S. sanctions has been pivotal to U.S. efforts to reduce Iran’s revenue from oil sales. China has cut its buys of Iranian oil from about 550,000 bpd at the end of 2011 to about 400,000 bpd by mid-2013. Because China is the largest buyer of Iranian oil, cuts by China have had a large impact in reducing Iran’s oil sales. Several Chinese energy firms have invested in Iran’s energy sector, but some of these projects have been given to Iranian or other country firms or show little evidence of actual development work. These investments are discussed in detail in CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions.

A U.S. sanction requiring that Iran be paid in local currency accounts, which went into effect February 6, 2013, caused Iran to increase importation of clothing and household appliances from China in order to avoid drawing on any hard currency accounts. Even before that sanction was imposed, China had begun to settle much of its trade balance with Iran with goods rather than hard currency, in part because doing so is highly favorable to China. Press reports indicated that Iran’s automotive sector obtains a significant proportion of its parts from China, and two Chinese companies, Geelran, affiliated with China-based Geely and Chery, produce cars in Iran. These exports were reduced substantially during 2013 because of U.S. sanctions, but recovered significantly as a consequence of the JPA, which eased sanctions on Iran’s automotive sector.

Japan and South Korea

Iran’s primary interest in Japan and South Korea has been to maintain commercial relations and evade U.S. sanctions – neither Japan nor South Korea have been heavily involved in security and strategic issues in the Middle East. However, both countries are close allies and large trading partners of the United States and their firms have been unwilling to risk their positions in the U.S. market by violating any U.S. sanctions. Since 2010, Japan and South Korea have imposed trade, banking, and energy sanctions on Iran that are similar to those imposed by the EU. Iran has tried to use the oil import dependency of the two countries as leverage; however both countries have cut imports of Iranian oil sharply since 2011. In 2010, Japan withdrew from an investment in a large Iranian oil field, Azadegan, in cooperation with U.S. efforts to discourage foreign investment in Iran’s energy sector.

The U.S. sanction requiring oil buyers to pay Iran in local accounts has not affected Japan and South Korea’s trading patterns with Iran significantly. South Korea has always generally paid Iran’s Central Bank through local currency accounts at its Industrial Bank of Korea and Woori Bank, and it exports to Iran mainly iron, steel, consumer electronics, and appliances. Japan exports to Iran significant amounts of chemical and rubber products, as well as consumer electronics. These exports have continued. The two countries together hold a substantial portion of the approximately $115 billion in Iran’s foreign exchange reserves that are held abroad. Both countries have comprised a large portion of the $700 million per month in direct hard currency payments to Iran for oil, as provided for by the JPA.

North Korea

Iran and North Korea have generally been allies, in part because their separate nuclear programs pose perceived threats to stability in their respective regions and both have been considered “outcasts” or “pariah states.” Both have been subjected to wide-ranging international sanctions. Even though the economic benefits to Iran of a relationship with North Korea are minimal, the relationship offers Iran some strategic gains. North Korea is one of the few countries with which Iran has formal military-to-military relations, and the two countries have cooperated on a wide range of military and WMD-related ventures, particularly the development of ballistic missile technology. In the past, Iran reportedly funded and assisted in the re-transfer of missile and possibly nuclear technology from North Korea to Syria.92

North Korea did not at any time announce a public commitment to comply with international sanctions against Iran, but its economy is too small to significantly help Iran. According to some observers, a portion of China’s purchases of oil from Iran and other suppliers is re-exported to North Korea, but Iran is paid with Chinese goods rather than any hard currency or major products from North Korea. Press reports in April 2013 said that Iran might supply oil directly to North Korea, but it has not been reported that any such arrangement was finalized. As Iran’s oil imports increase after international sanctions are removed in conjunction with the JCPOA, it is likely that additional quantities of Iranian oil might reach North Korea, either via China or through direct purchasing by North Korea.

Latin America93

Figure 3. Latin AmericaSome U.S. officials and some in Congress have expressed concern about Iran’s relations with certain countries and leaders in Latin America that share Iran’s distrust of the United States. Some experts and U.S. officials have asserted that Iran, primarily through its ally, Hezbollah, has sought to position IRGC-QF and other agents in Latin America to potentially carry out terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in the region or even in the United States itself.94 Some U.S. officials have also asserted that Iran and Hezbollah’s activities in Latin America include money laundering and trafficking in drugs and counterfeit goods.95 In contrast to his predecessor, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, however, President Rouhani has expressed minimal interest in further expanding ties in Latin America. During the Ahmadinejad presidency, Iran reportedly expanded its relations with all of those countries, as well as in Mexico, but few of the economic agreements reached were implemented, by all accounts.

In the 112th Congress, the “Countering Iran in the Western Hemisphere Act,” requiring the Administration to develop within 180 days of enactment a strategy to counter Iran’s influence in Latin America, passed both chambers and was signed on December 28, 2012 (H.R. 3783, P.L. 112-220). The required Administration report was provided to Congress in June 2013; the unclassified portion asserted that “Iranian influence in Latin America and the Caribbean is waning” in part because of U.S. efforts to cause Latin American countries to assess the costs and benefits of closer relations with Iran.96

Observers have directed particular attention to Iran’s relationship with Venezuela (an OPEC member, as is Iran) and Argentina. U.S. counterterrorism officials also have stated that the tri- border area of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay is a “nexus” of arms, narcotics and human trafficking, counterfeiting, and other potential funding sources for terrorist organizations, including Hezbollah.

Venezuela97

During Ahmadinejad’s presidency, Iran had particularly close relations with Venezuela and its president, Hugo Chavez, who died in office in March 2013. Neither Rouhani nor Chavez’s successor, Nicolas Maduro, have expressed the enthusiasm for the relationship that Chavez and Ahmadinejad did. However, even during the presidencies of Chavez and Ahmadinejad, the United States did not necessarily perceive a threat from the Iran-Venezuela relationship. In July 2012, President Obama stated that Iran-Venezuela ties have not had “a serious national security impact on the United States.”98

Only a few of the economic agreements between Iran and Venezuela during the Ahmadinejad and Chavez presidencies were implemented. A direct air link was established but then suspended in 2010 for lack of sufficient customer interest. It was reportedly restarted by President Maduro in January 2015 in order to try to promote tourism between the two countries.99 A deal for Petroleos de Venezuela to supply Iran with gasoline was signed in September 2009, apparently in a joint effort to circumvent U.S. sanctions on sales of gasoline to Iran, and Petroleos was therefore sanctioned under the Iran Sanctions Act in May 2011.100

Argentina101

Argentina is the one country in Latin America in which there is substantial evidence that Iran and Hezbollah have carried out acts of terrorism, in this case against Israeli and Jewish targets.

The two major attacks in Buenos Aires—the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy and the 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center (Argentine-Israeli Mutual Association, AMIA)—still affect the Argentine political system. Based on indictments and the copious investigative information that has been revealed, there is a broad consensus that these attacks were carried out by Hezbollah operatives, assisted by Iranian diplomats and their access to diplomatic privileges. Many in Argentina’s Jewish community opposed a January 2013 Iran-Argentina memorandum of understanding to investigate the 1994 bombing by forming a “truth commission,” rather than to aggressively prosecute the Iranians involved. Opponents of that agreement assert that it undermined Argentina’s efforts to prosecute the Iranians involved. In May 2013, the Argentine prosecutor in the AMIA bombing case, Alberto Nisman, issued a 500-page report alleging that Iran has been working for decades in Latin America, setting up intelligence stations in the region by utilizing embassies, cultural organizations, and even mosques as a source of recruitment. In January 2015, Nisman was found dead of a gunshot wound, prompting turmoil in Argentina amid reports that he was to request indictment of Argentina’s president for allegedly conspiring with Iran to bury the AMIA bombing issue.

The Buenos Aires attacks took place more than 20 years ago and there have not been any recent public indications that Iran and/or Hezbollah are planning attacks in Argentina. However, in February 2015, Uruguay stated that an Iranian diplomat posted there had left the country before Uruguay issued a formal complaint that the diplomat had tested the security measures of Israel’s embassy in the capital, Montevideo.102

Africa

Figure 4. SudanWith few exceptions, Sub-Saharan Africa has not generally been a focus of Iranian foreign policy—perhaps because of the relatively small size of most African economies and the limited influence of African countries on multilateral efforts to limit Iran’s nuclear program or contain its strategic capabilities. Former President Ahmadinejad tried to build ties to some African leaders, but most African countries apparently did not want to risk their economic and political relationships with the United States by broadening their relations with Iran. Few of the announced joint venture agreements between Iran and African countries were implemented. Rouhani has made few statements on relations with countries in Africa and has not made the continent a priority. Still, the increase in activity by Islamic State and Al Qaeda- affiliated Sunni extremist movements could cause Iran to increase its focus on politics and security issues in Africa.

Iran is positioned to intervene more actively in Africa if it chooses to do so. The IRGC-QF has established a presence in some countries in Africa (including Nigeria, Senegal, and Kenya), possibly to secure arms-supply routes for pro-Iranian movements in the Middle East. Iran might also be seeking ways to retaliate against the United States or its allies if military action is taken against Iran’s nuclear facilities. In May 2013, a court in Kenya found two Iranian men guilty of planning to carry out bombings in Kenya, apparently against Israeli targets. In September 2014, Kenya detained two Iranian men on suspicion of intent to carry out a terrorist attack there.

The only country in Africa in which Iran has appeared to invest substantial strategic resources and attention is Sudan.

Sudan

Iran’s closest relationship in sub-Saharan Africa has been with the government of Sudan, which, like Iran, is identified by the United States as a state sponsor of terrorism. Iran’s relations with Sudan provided Iran with leverage against Egypt, a U.S. ally that has a peace treaty with Israel, and a channel to supply weapons to Hamas and other pro-Iranian groups in the Gaza Strip.103 The relationship began in the 1990s when Islamist leaders in Sudan, who came to power in 1989, welcomed international Islamist movements to train and organize there. Iran began supplying Sudan with weapons it used on its various fronts, such as the one with South Sudan, and the QF reportedly has armed and trained Sudanese forces, including the Popular Defense Force militia.104 Some observers say Iranian pilots have assisted Sudan’s air force, and Iran’s naval forces have periodically visited Port Sudan.

For Iran, the key to the relationship with Sudan has been its role in transshipping Iranian weapons to Hamas. Israel has repeatedly accused Iran of shipping weapons bound for Gaza through Sudan and,105 in October 2012, Israel bombed a weapons factory in Khartoum, purportedly a source of Iranian weapons supplies for Hamas. In March 2014, Israel intercepted an Iranian shipment of rockets that were headed to Port Sudan.106

However, Sudan is inhabited by Sunni Arabs and has always been considered by experts as susceptible to overtures from Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries to distance itself from Iran. Apparent Saudi pressure on Sudan, coupled with apparent Saudi offers of generous economic assistance and investment, have caused an evident rift in the Iran-Sudan relationship. In September 2014, the Sudan government closed all Iranian cultural centers in Sudan and expelled the cultural attaché and other Iranian diplomats. Sudan’s press speculated that the Sudanese government perceived that Iran was using its facilities and personnel in Sudan to promote Shiite Islam.107 In March 2015, Sudan joined the Saudi-led Arab coalition against the Houthis in Yemen, appearing to confirm that Sudan has significantly downgraded its strategic relations with Iran. Sudan reportedly is considering sending up to 600 ground troops to fight in Yemen alongside Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other members of the Saudi-led Arab coalition.

Prospects and Alternative Scenarios

There are a number of factors that could cause alterations in Iran’s foreign policy. Iran’s Supreme Leader has said on several occasions since the JCPOA was finalized that the agreement will not cause change in Iran’s foreign policy or lead to a broader rapprochement with the United States. President Rouhani, in contrast, has stated that the JCPOA is “a beginning for creating an atmosphere of friendship and co-operation with various countries.”

Some experts and officials, including Israel’s Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, argue that the broad sanctions relief provided by the JCPOA will provide Iran more financial and other resources with which to fund and arm regional factions who are acting against U.S. and allied interests. Other experts argue that Iran might seek to demonstrate that a nuclear agreement has not caused Iran to abandon its ideology and that Iran might try to increase its influence in the region.108 Some also maintain that a nuclear deal could provide Iran with greater legitimacy and a degree of influence on U.S. policy that Iran has not had since the 1979 Islamic revolution.109 Those who support these arguments assert that Iran’s foreign policy would become even more challenging for the United States and its allies than it is without a nuclear agreement. As examples:

  • Sanctions relief could enable Iran to acquire, licitly or illicitly, technology to enhance the accuracy of rockets and short-range missiles it has supplied to Hezbollah and Hamas.
  • Sanctions relief – coupled with the lifting within five years of the U.N. ban on arms sales to Iran – could enable Iran to modernize its armed forces. Iran could potentially strengthen to the point where it has increased ability to move ground forces across waterways such as the Strait of Hormuz—and thereby further intimidate the GCC states.
  • Iran could decide to increase its assistance to hardline opposition factions in Bahrain, who have thus far made little headway in challenging the government’s control of the country.110
  • Iran might be able to use extra funds to recruit additional Shiite fighters from around the Muslim world to fight on behalf of Asad. Such efforts might assist Asad against rebels that are backed by the United States and its allies, as well as against the Islamic State forces in Syria.
  • Iran’s reintegration into the international community could enable Iran to expand its relationships with countries in Latin America or Africa that have thus far been hesitant to broaden their relations with Iran.

A counterargument is that a nuclear agreement would give Iran incentive to avoid actions that could provoke calls among U.S. allies for the re-imposition or addition of international sanctions.111 President Obama has argued that Iran has a strong national interest in avoiding re- imposition of sanctions or of U.S. military action as a potential consequence of pursuing “expansionist ambitions.”112 A nuclear agreement also could strengthen Iranian moderates who seek to improve Iran’s international reputation.113 An agreement may lead to increased U.S.- Iranian cooperation on regional issues. U.S. officials argue that domestic political and economic pressures might also somewhat limit or even largely constrain Iranian leaders from directing expected financial benefits of a nuclear deal toward foreign policy efforts that are adverse to U.S. and allied interests. Some examples of possible Iranian foreign policy shifts that might flow from the JCPOA, most of which would benefit U.S. and allied interests include:

  • Iran and the United States might cooperate directly against Islamic State forces in Iraq, and Iran might reduce its support for Asad of Syria and support a political solution that explicitly includes his departure from office.
  • Iran might curtail its delivery of rockets and short-range missiles to Hezbollah and Hamas, although Iran is unlikely under any circumstances to reduce its political support for Hezbollah.
  • Saudi Arabia and Iran might potentially agree to a political solution in Yemen.
  • Iran and Saudi Arabia might also decide to cooperate within OPEC to try to lift
    world oil prices.
  • Iran and the UAE might resolve their territorial dispute over Abu Musa and the two Tunbs islands in the Persian Gulf.
  • Iran might obtain admission to the WTO.
  • A lifting of U.S. sanctions could cause Iran, Azerbaijan, and international energy firms to expand joint projects to develop the energy fields in the Caspian Sea. U.S.-Azerbaijan strategic cooperation might diminish as their shared perception of the Iran threat recedes.
  • Easing of sanctions could enable planned separate gas pipeline linkages between Iran and Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman to proceed.
  • The planned Iran-Pakistan natural gas pipeline might proceed to completion with the threat of U.S. sanctions on firms involved in the project removed. India likely would intensify its efforts to develop Iran’s Chahbahar port as U.S. opposition to the project diminishes. Both India and Pakistan might expand their separate military cooperation with Iran.

There are factors beyond the JCPOA that could cause Iran’s foreign policy to shift. An uprising in Iran or other event that changes the regime could precipitate policy changes that either favor or are adverse to U.S. interests. The unexpected departure from the scene of the Supreme Leader could change Iran’s foreign policy sharply, depending on the views of his successor(s). Other factors that could force a shift could include the expansion or institutionalization of a Saudi-led coalition of Arab Sunni states that might succeed in defeating movements and governments backed by Iran.

This article has been slightly edited from the original

About the author:
*Kenneth Katzman,
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

Notes:
1 Foreign Policy Association. “A Candid Discussion with Karim Sadjadpour.” May 6, 2013. http://foreignpolicyblogs.com/2013/05/06/a-candid-discussion-with-karim-sadjadpour/.
2 Khamene’i: “U.S. Would Overthrow Iranian Government If It Could—Media.” Reuters, February 8, 2014.
3 Erik Slavin. “Iran Emphasizes Nuclear Reconciliation, Criticizes U.S. Military Posture in Persian Gulf.” Stars and Stripes, March 5, 2014. http://www.stripes.com/news/iran-emphasizes-nuclear-reconciliation-criticizes-us-military-posture-in-persian-gulf-1.271204.
4 Ramin Mostaghim. “Iranians Rally to Support Iraq; Some Blame U.S. for Sunni Insurgency. Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2014. http://www.latimes.com/world/middleeast/la-fg-iran-volunteers-militants-iraq-20140624-story.html.
5 Soner Cagaptay, James F. Jeffrey, and Mehdi Khalaji. “Iran Won’t Give Up on Its Revolution.” New York Times, op- ed. April 26, 2015.
6 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/world/middleeast/iran-us-nuclear-talks.html?_r=0.
7 Thomas Edrbrink. “Post-Deal Iran Reappraising ‘Great Satan’” New York Times, September 18, 2015.
8 The text of the section on Iran can be found at: http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/index.htm.
9 http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2013/09/30/130930fa_fact_filkins?printable=true&currentPage=all.
10 http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/iranians-are-terrified-irans-isis-nightmare-10856.
11 See, for example. http://www.newsweek.com/what-are-iranians-doing-iraq-303107. Also reported in author conversations with U.S. and Iraq and Afghan officials, 2009-2015.
12 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2010/oct/26/iran-cash-payments-to-afghanistan.
13 http://www.crethiplethi.com/subversion-and-exporting-the-islamic-revolution-in-latin-america/islamic-countries/ iran-islamic-countries/2012/.
14 http://www.globalresearch.ca/geopolitical-shift-iran-to-become-full-member-of-the-shanghai-cooperation- organization-sco/5465355
15 Statement for the Record. U.S. Director for National Intelligence James Clapper. Senate Armed Services Committee, February 2015, p. 14.
16 For detailed information on Saudi Arabia’s policy toward Iran, see CRS Report RL33533, Saudi Arabia: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
17 For detailed information on Iran-UAE relations, see CRS Report RS21852, The United Arab Emirates (UAE): Issues for U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
18 http://archive.defensenews.com/article/20140115/DEFREG04/301150034/Source-UAE-Iran-Reach-Accord- Disputed-Hormuz-Islands.
19 http://www.nytimes.com/2008/04/02/washington/02UAE.html?pagewanted=print.
20 For detailed information on Iran-Qatar relations, see CRS Report RL31718, Qatar: Background and U.S. Relations, by Christopher M. Blanchard.
21 For detailed information on Iran-Bahrain relations, see CRS Report 95-1013, Bahrain: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
22 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2014/01/bahrain-accuses-iran-training-rebels- 201413144049814960.html.
23 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/index.htm.
24 http://middleeastvoices.voanews.com/2011/11/bici-report-iran-not-linked-to-bahrain-protests/.
25 For detailed information on Iran-Kuwait relations, see CRS Report RS21513, Kuwait: Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
26 For detailed information on Iran-Oman relations, see CRS Report RS21534, Oman: Reform, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
27 As reported in author conversations in Oman and with Omani officials, 1988-2015.
28 Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs Julia Frifeld. Letter to Senator Bob Corker, Chairman Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. June 17, 2015. Enclosure to letter: Department of State. Determination and Certification pursuant to the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2012. Undated.
29 For information, see CRS Report R43612, The “Islamic State” Crisis and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard et al.
30 For more information, see CRS Report RS21968, Iraq: Politics and Governance, by Kenneth Katzman and Carla E. Humud.
31 Michael Gordon, “Iran Supplying Syrian Military Via Iraqi Airspace,” New York Times, September 5, 2012.
32 “Iran News Agency Reports Death of Iranian Pilot in Iraq.” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. July 5, 2014.
33 Babak Dehghanpisheh. “Iran Dramatically Shifts Iraq Policy to Confront Islamic State.” Reuters, September 2, 2014.
34 Missy Ryan and Loveday Morris. “The U.S. and Iran Are Aligned in Iraq Against the Islamic State – For Now.” Washington Post, December 27, 2014.
35 For more information on the conflicts in Syria, see CRS Report RL33487, Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response, coordinated by Christopher M. Blanchard.
36 Details and analysis on the full spectrum of Iranian assistance to Asad is provided by the Institute for the Study of War. “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” by Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. May 2013.
37 Will Fulton, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer, “Iranian Strategy in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, May 2013.
38 Eli Lake. “Iran Spends Billions to Prop Up Asad,” Bloomberg View, June 9, 2015.
39 As reported in author conversations with European and U.S. experts on Iran and Syria in Washington, DC, 2014-2015.
40 For more information, see CRS Report R42816, Lebanon: Background and U.S. Policy, by Christopher M. Blanchard; CRS Report R41514, Hamas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Jim Zanotti; and CRS Report RL33476, Israel: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
41 http://www.cnn.com/2015/09/10/middleeast/iran-khamenei-israel-will-not-exist-25-years/
42 “Iranian General: Palestinians Have Longer-Range Missiles.” The Times of Israel, November 12, 2014.
43 For more information, see CRS Report RL34074, The Palestinians: Background and U.S. Relations, by Jim Zanotti.
44 Stuart Winer. “Iran Boasts of Rocket Aid to Palestinians, Hezbollah.” The Times of Israel, February 3, 2015; and, http://www.wsj.com/articles/iran-rekindles-relations-with-hamas-1429658562.
45 Robert Tait, “Iran Cuts Hamas Funding Over Syria.” Telegraph, May 31, 2013.
46 CRS Report R41446, Hezbollah: Background and Issues for Congress, by Casey L. Addis and Christopher M. Blanchard.
47 Kenneth Katzman. “The Warriors of Islam: Iran’s Revolutionary Guard.” Westview Press, 1993.
48 Department of Defense. Annual Unclassified Report on Military Power of Iran. April 2010.
49 “Israel’s Peres Says Iran Arming Hizbollah,” Reuters, February 4, 2002.
50 IAF Chief: Israel Will Destroy Hezbollah Bases in Lebanon, Even Ones in Residential Areas.” Reuters/Jerusalem Post, January 29, 2015.
51 For more information, see CRS Report R43960, Yemen: Civil War and Regional Intervention, by Jeremy M. Sharp.
52 Ali al-Mujahed and Hugh Naylor. “Yemen Rebels Defy Saudi-led Attacks.” Washington Post, March 28, 2015.
53 “Iranian Support Seen Crucial for Yemen’s Houthis.” Reuters, December 15, 2014.
54 Ali Watkins, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed, “Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen Takeover,” Huffington Post, April 20, 2015.
55 Jay Solomon, Dion Nissenbaum, and As Fitch, “In Strategic Shift, U.S. Draws Closer to Yemeni Rebels.” Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2015.
56 Michael Shear and Matthew Rosenberg. “Warning Iran, U.S. Sends Two More Ships to Yemen.” New York Times, April 21, 2015.
57 For analysis on Turkey’s foreign policy and U.S. relations, see: CRS Report R44000, Turkey: Background and U.S. Relations in Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
58 http://usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/archives/2001/july/0725a.html.
59 http://foreignpolicynews.org/2014/04/10/azerbaijans-strategic-relations-united-states/.
60 For more information, see: CRS Report RS20871, Iran Sanctions, by Kenneth Katzman.
61 Sebastien Peyrouse. “Iran’s Growing Role in Central Asia? Geopolitical, Economic, and Political Profit and Loss Account. Al Jazeera Center for Studies. April 6, 2014. http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/dossiers/2014/04/ 2014416940377354.html.
62 Stratfor. “Re-Examining the Threat of Central Asian Militancy” January 21, 2015. http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/ re-examining-threat-central-asian-militancy#axzz3PTRMU0el.
63 http://www.railwaygazette.com/news/news/asia/single-view/view/iran-turkmenistan-kazakhstan-rail-link- inaugurated.html.
64 Substantially more detail on Iran’s activities in Afghanistan is contained in CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman.
65 U.S. Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, May 23, 2012.
66 Center for Effective Dispute Resolution (CEDR), March 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-54015758.
67 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13930618000811.
68 http://en.mehrnews.com/news/109439/Kazakhstan-to-resume-oil-swap-with-Iran
69 http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2001/html/10252.htm#imu.
70 U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.
71 Matthew Rosenberg and Annie Lowry, “Iranian Currency Traders Find a Haven in Afghanistan,” New York Times, August 18, 2012.
72 Dexter Filkins. “Iran Is Said to Give Top Karzai Aide Cash by the Bagful.” New York Times, October 23, 2010.
73 “Afghanistan, Iran to Work together Against “Macabre” IS Threat.” RFE/RL, April 22, 2015.
74 State Department. Country Reports on International Terrorism: 2011. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/ 195547.htm.
75 Maria Abi-Habib, “Tehran Builds On Outreach to Taliban,” Wall Street Journal, August 1, 2012.
76 For detail on Pakistan’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R41832, Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, by K. Alan Kronstadt.
77 John Lancaster and Kamran Khan, “Pakistanis Say Nuclear Scientists Aided Iran,” Washington Post, January 24,
2004.
78 Author conversations with experts in Washington, DC, who consult with Iranian government officials. 2013-15.
79 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2015/04/10/6dc494fc-df62-11e4-a500-1c5bb1d8ff6a_story.html.
80 http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/international/world-news/china-to-build-pakistan-iran-gas-pipeline- pakistan-government/articleshow/46867932.cms.
81 http://www.thenational.ae/business/energy/big-powers-block-iran-pakistan-gas-pipeline-plans.
82 For detail on India’s foreign policy and relations with the United States, see CRS Report R42823, India-U.S. Security Relations: Current Engagement, by K. Alan Kronstadt and Sonia Pinto.
83 Author conversations with Indian diplomats in Washington, DC, March 2015.
84 http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/world/iran-backs-deepsea-gas-pipeline-to-india/article5466999.ece.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 “Iran, Russia Negotiating Big Oil-for-Goods Deal.” Reuters, January 10, 2014.
88 For information on EU sanctions in place on Iran, see http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/iran/eu_iran/ restrictive_measures/index_en.htm.
89 During the active period of talks, which began in December 2002, there were working groups focused not only on the TCA terms and proliferation issues but also on Iran’s human rights record, Iran’s efforts to derail the Middle East peace process, Iranian-sponsored terrorism, counter-narcotics, refugees, migration issues, and the Iranian opposition PMOI.
90 CRS In Focus IF10029, China, U.S. Leadership, and Geopolitical Challenges in Asia, by Susan V. Lawrence.
91 CRS Report RL31555, China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues, by Shirley A. Kan.
92 http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303763804579183231117914364.
93 For more information on the issues discussed in this section, see CRS Report RS21049, Latin America: Terrorism Issues, by Mark P. Sullivan and June S. Beittel.
94 Ilan Berman. “Iran Courts Latin America.” Middle East Quarterly, Summer 2012. http://www.meforum.org/3297/ iran-latin-america.
95 Posture Statement of General John F. Kelly, Commander, U.S. Southern Command, before the 114th Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, March 12, 2015.
96 Department of State, “Annex A: Unclassified Summary of Policy Recommendations,” June 2013.
97 For more information, see CRS Report R43239, Venezuela: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan.
98 Comments by President Barack Obama on “CNN: The Situation Room,” July 11, 2012.
99 http://panampost.com/sabrina-martin/2015/04/06/iran-takes-venezuelan-money-passes-on-deliveries/.
100 http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/24/us-iran-usa-sanctions-idUSTRE74N47R20110524.
101 For more information, see CRS Report R43816, Argentina: Background and U.S. Relations, by Mark P. Sullivan and Rebecca M. Nelson.
102 “Questions Swirl Over Incident Involving Iranian Diplomat in Uruguay.” LatinNews Daily, February 9, 2015.
103 Michael Lipin. “Sudan’s Iran Alliance Under Scrutiny.” VOANews, October 31, 2012. http://www.voanews.com/ content/article/1536472.html.
104 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Security-Watch/terrorism-security/2012/1025/Did-Israel-just-blow-up-an-Iranian- weapons-factory-in-Sudan.
105 “Were the Israelis Behind the ‘Mystery’ Air Strike in Sudan?” Time, April 6, 2011; “Car Blast in E. Sudan, Khartoum Points to Israel,” Reuters, May 22, 2012; “Rockets and Meetings,” Africa Confidential, May 25, 2012.Weapons Documented in South Kordofan,” Small Arms Survey, April 2012.
106 http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Israel-Navy-intercepts-Gaza-bound-Iranian-rocket-ship-near-Port-Sudan-344369. 107 Sudan Expels Iranian Diplomats and Closes Cultural Centers. The Guardian, September 2, 2014.
108 Kenneth Pollack. “Iran’s Regional Policy After a Nuclear Deal” Brookings Institution, March 2, 2015. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/03/02-iran-after-a-nuclear-deal-pollack.
109 “Public Saudi Welcome for Iran Nuclear Deal Masks Private Unease.” Reuters, April 3, 2015.
110 Ibid.
111 “David Kirkpatrick. “Saudis Make Own Moves as U.S. and Iran Talk.” New York Times, March 31, 2015.
112 “President Obama Interview with Jeffrey Goldberg,” The Atlantic, May 21, 2015.
113 See the President’s own comments on this matter in, “Transcript: President Obama’s Full NPR Interview On Iran Nuclear Deal,” National Public Radio, April 7, 2015.

Curbing Violence In Nigeria: Revisiting The Niger Delta – Analysis

0
0

Violence in the Niger Delta may soon increase unless the Nigerian government acts quickly and decisively to address long-simmering grievances.

With the costly Presidential Amnesty Program for ex-insurgents due to end in a few months, there are increasingly bitter complaints in the region that chronic poverty and catastrophic oil pollution, which fuelled the earlier rebellion, remain largely unaddressed.

Since Goodluck Jonathan, the first president from the Delta, lost re-election in March, some activists have resumed agitation for greater resource control and self-determination, and a number of ex-militant leaders are threatening to resume fighting (“return to the creeks”).

While the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East is the paramount security challenge, President Muhammadu Buhari rightly identifies the Delta as a priority. He needs to act firmly but carefully to wind down the amnesty program gradually, revamp development and environmental programs, facilitate passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) and improve security and rule of law across the region.

The Technical Committee on the Niger Delta, a special body mandated in 2008 to advance solutions to the region’s multiple problems, proposed the amnesty program, whose implementation since 2009, coupled with concessions to former militant leaders, brought a semblance of peace and enabled oil production to regain pre-insurgency levels. However, the government has largely failed to carry out other recommendations that addressed the insurgency’s root causes, including inadequate infrastructure, environmental pollution, local demands for a bigger share of oil revenues, widespread poverty and youth unemployment.

Two agencies established to drive development, the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) and the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA), have floundered. Two others mandated to restore the oil-polluted environment (particularly in Ogoni Land) and curb or manage hundreds of oil spills yearly, the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) and the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA), have been largely ineffective.

The PIB, intended to improve oil and gas industry governance and possibly also create special funds for communities in petroleum-producing areas, has been stuck in the National Assembly (federal parliament) since 2009. In sum, seven years after the technical committee’s report, the conditions that sparked the insurgency could easily trigger a new phase of violent conflict.

The outcome of the presidential election has also heightened tensions. While most people in the region acknowledge that Jonathan lost, some former militant leaders and groups accept Buhari only conditionally. For instance, the Niger Delta People’s Salvation Front (NDPSF), the civil successor to the militant Niger Delta People’s Volunteer Force (NDPVF), claims Jonathan’s ouster was the product of a conspiracy by northerners and the Yoruba from the South West against the Delta peoples and the South East. Apparently influenced by that view, some groups are resuming old demands, hardly heard during the Jonathan presidency, for regional autonomy or “self-determination”.

Local tensions generated by the polls also pose risks, particularly in Rivers state, where Governor Nyesom Wike (of ex-President Jonathan’s People’s Democratic Party, PDP) and ex-Governor Rotimi Amaechi (of President Buhari’s All Progressives Congress, APC) are bitter foes. With many guns in unauthorised hands, politically motivated assassinations and kidnappings for ransom, already common, could increase.

Policy and institutional changes are necessary but, if not prepared and implemented inclusively and transparently, could themselves trigger conflict. Buhari has declared that the amnesty program, which costs over $500 million per year, is due to end in December. He has terminated petroleum pipeline protection contracts that Jonathan awarded to companies owned by ex-militant leaders and the Yoruba ethnic militia, O’odua People’s Congress (OPC), and may streamline the Delta’s inefficient development-intervention agencies. He may also withdraw the PIB from parliament for revision. Some of this is desirable, even inevitable, but a number of former militant leaders and other entrenched interests threaten resistance and a possible return to violence. A perception that the government’s actions are reversing the Delta’s gains could aggravate local grievances and precipitate armed violence.

At its peak in 2009, the insurgency in the Niger Delta was claiming an estimated 1,000 lives a year, had cut Nigeria’s oil output by over 50 per cent and was costing the government close to four billion naira (nearly $19 million) per day in counter-insurgency operations. A resurgence of violence and increased oil-related crime in the Delta could seriously undermine national security and economic stability, which is already weighed down by the Boko Haram insurgency and dwindling oil revenues.

RECOMMENDATIONS

To prevent a relapse to conflict and to build durable peace in the Niger Delta

To President Muhammadu Buhari:

1.  Visit the Delta at the earliest opportunity to underscore commitment to the region and lay out a comprehensive plan for its security and development.

To the federal government of Nigeria:

2.  Wind down the amnesty program gradually, while ensuring that ex-militants already registered complete promised training, but also demand greater transparency and accountability in the program’s management.

3.  Align ex-militant training with available employment opportunities.

4.  Streamline regional development responsibilities, particularly by winding down the Ministry of Niger Delta Affairs (MNDA) and reforming the Niger Delta Development Commission (NDDC) to make it a more accountable and effective agency and thereafter ensuring it is well-resourced.

5.  Take urgent steps to stop environmental degradation by:

a) reviving the Hydrocarbon Pollution Restoration Project (HYPREP) as a statutory entity, independent from the petroleum ministry, and directing it to commence clean-up arrangements and operations in Ogoni Land and other adversely affected areas quickly;

b) strengthening the ability of the National Oil Spills Detection and Response Agency (NOSDRA) to respond to oil spills rapidly and effectively; and

c) discouraging the environmentally damaging proliferation of artisanal refineries by improving the availability of properly-refined petroleum products and creating long-proposed modular refineries across the region.

6.  Strengthen security and rule of law, including by encouraging partnerships between security agencies and local communities in place of the pipeline protection contracts awarded to ex-militant leaders and ethnic militia groups.

7.  Work closely with the National Assembly to ensure speedy passage of the long-stalled Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB) this legislative year, on the basis of compromise between Delta interests and those of other areas.

8.  Prosecute those responsible for electoral violence and fraud, but also encourage communal and inter-party reconciliation, especially in Rivers state.

To the international community, particularly the European Union and the U.S. and UK governments:

9.  Sustain and where possible increase support of existing programs, including those of civil society organisations, for conflict prevention, peace building, good governance, rule of law and development in the Niger Delta.

10.  Offer technical, logistical and other capacity-building assistance to agencies promoting development, safeguarding and restoring the environment and curbing corruption, particularly the NDDC, HYPREP, NOSDRA and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).

11.  Strengthen collaboration with the government and other international partners in fighting oil theft, including by tracking proceeds of illicit enterprises.

To major oil companies, including Shell and ENI (NAOC):

12.  Intensify efforts to curb pollution by upgrading or replacing aging infrastructure more regularly, installing more sensors for early detection of pipeline breaches, and giving greater support to NOSDRA and grassroots campaigns against artisanal refineries.

13.  Intensify efforts to create jobs for local youth by increasingly outsourcing marginal jobs to local companies and utilising local materials and expertise in compliance with the Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry Content Development Act.

14.  Honour financial obligations more conscientiously, particularly to the NDDC, Nigeria Content Development Fund and Ogoni Environmental Restoration Fund.

15.  Contribute more actively to fighting oil theft, particularly by instituting better metering at production points and more transparent oil-loading arrangements.

Read the full report here (PDF).

International Day Of Older Persons: Turning Grey Into Gold – OpEd

0
0

Just a few decades ago, the population of the Asia-Pacific region was dominated by the young. Now, as birth rates have dropped and life expectancies improved, the population is aging. Twelve per cent of our people in the region are already over the age of 60. By 2050, this figure will rise to one-quarter of the whole population. Never before have countries aged as rapidly. It took France 115 years and Sweden 85 years to become aged societies, but for Viet Nam and Thailand, it will take only 20-22 years. The region risks getting old before it gets rich. So how do we address this crisis of a rapidly aging population in our region?

It is clear that the demographic window of opportunity for the region, which opened with a surge in the working-age population, is closing. Take China for example: 67 per cent of its population is of working age today – but this has started to change. Forty years from now, this will have shrunk to only half, with almost one third of the entire Chinese population older than 65.

Does this mean that our region will inevitably lose its economic dynamism? Not necessarily – if we prepare properly, and act now. The International Day of Older Persons, celebrated on 1 October every year, provides us with a good opportunity to reflect on how best to prepare for these new challenges and opportunities.

There is still ample scope to increase labour force participation, even as working-age populations decline. In many countries across the region, large proportions of the population, especially women, remain excluded from labour markets. For example in the Republic of Korea, only 56 per cent of women of working age participate in the labour force, and in South Asia, less than a third do. Going forward, countries will have to adopt more active policies to encourage and enable women’s labour force participation. Countries with an increasingly aged population might also consider policies attracting orderly and reliable international migration as an additional option to address key potential labour shortages.

Another key element which must be addressed to sustain economic growth is to increase productivity. When countries age, their economic structure should move from labour-intensive industries to more technology-oriented ones. This entails improving the quality of education and promoting technological upgrades and their wide-spread adoption.

We also need a new system of intergenerational solidarity. In the traditional system, older persons were looked after by their children. But these traditional systems are breaking up as a result of increasing industrialization, increased women’s labour force participation and rural to urban migration. However, we can turn these changes into another opportunity. We can turn population ageing into a second demographic dividend, with financially-secure, healthy older persons, empowered to focus their decades of accumulated experience, wisdom and wealth to stimulate new economic growth. The specific needs of older persons can also spur innovation and demand for new products, as well as creating job opportunities in care industries. This will only work however, if we act now to ensure that older persons are provided with the means and opportunities to contribute to society. Currently, only about 26 per cent of working-age people in the region contribute to pension schemes. We need to further develop pension systems to increase savings and to sustain domestic demand. We also need to introduce principles of solidarity into pension systems, and especially address the needs of women.

Population ageing plans must be at the centre of development, not an afterthought, and the time to act is now. Comprehensive policies, developed and implemented in collaboration with older persons, are urgently needed.

With the right preparation, we can benefit from a golden generation of healthy, wealthy and active older persons. In 2002, the United Nations brought countries together in Madrid to agree on a global way forward: to treat older persons as actors of development; to ensure their health and wellbeing; and to create enabling and supportive environments for them. In the new sustainable development agenda, adopted last week, older persons have a role to play in almost each of the new goals. The United Nations stands ready to support countries to put these plans into action, and to secure future societies for all ages in Asia and the Pacific.

*The author is an Under-Secretary-General of the United Nations and Executive Secretary of the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). She is also the UN’s Sherpa for the G20 and previously served as Governor of the Central Bank of Pakistan and Vice President of the MENA Region of the World Bank.

Did Austria Try to Cover Up Exculpatory Evidence Against Stephan Templ? – OpEd

0
0

As part of our efforts to defend Stephan Templ from the unjust and arbitrary persecution by the Austrian authorities, we have been reviewing all the published decisions (recommendations) published on the website of the National Fund of the Republic of Austria for Victims of National Socialism, the institution responsible for adjudicating property looted by the Nazi regime back to their original owners.

By law, the National Fund is under an obligation to publish all recommendations online. In June this year their website was revamped, and relaunched with all the same data … except for just one missing decision.

Mr. Templ, the investigative journalist that he is, was able to track down the paper copy of this one single missing decision. Interestingly, it contained a very important case precedence. In the penultimate paragraph of decision WA1/2007, the following is written:

In this regard, it should be merely be mentioned that a criminally (or otherwise) sanctioned obligation of an heir to reveal in probate proceedings the existence of other heirs does not exist. Only a wrong statement during a formal questioning in the matter, as for instance in the recording of the death could have relevance.

This evidence is hugely important for the Stephan Templ case and directly underlines why he is innocent. The decision taken in case WA1/2007, which was conveniently removed from the Fund’s website for a time, shows that one does not have an obligation to state the existence of other heirs – which is exactly contrary to what was said in Stephan’s case.

What is interesting is that National Fund had released a FAQ on this case on the 4 June 2014, while Stephan’s final court decision was pending (i.e. which is not very fair, in our view) where they stated that one had to name other heirs if they knew of them. Further, in testimony before the first verdict, Claire Fritsch, the legal adviser to the Arbitration Panel (of the National Fund) also answered positively to the question that one had to name other heirs.

So, the National Fund has publicly declared something which this decision now suggests was wrong and a representative of the Fund testified making the same claim – and her testimony was said by the judge to be reliable and credible so it likely had an effect on the verdict.

We denounced this cover up by the Austrian authorities during a September 22 press conference. The next day, Sept 23, one of our lawyers took a screenshot just to make sure. Then guess what happens on September 24? The National Fund quietly puts decision WA1/2007 back up online without comment!

There are no words for this sort of unsavoury conduct by the Austrian authorities, who appear to be doing everything in their power to throw this innocent man in jail because of who he is and what he has said.


‘New Normal’ Productivity Spells Uncertainty For Global Economy

0
0

A failure to embrace long-term structural reforms that boost productivity and free up entrepreneurial talent is harming the global economy’s ability to improve living standards, solve persistently high unemployment and generate adequate resilience for future economic downturns, according to The Global Competitiveness Report 2015-2016, which is released Tuesday.

The report is an annual assessment of the factors driving productivity and prosperity in 140 countries. This year’s edition found a correlation between highly competitive countries and those that have either withstood the global economic crisis or made a swift recovery from it. The failure, particularly by emerging markets, to improve competitiveness since the recession suggests future shocks to the global economy could have deep and protracted consequences.

The report’s Global Competitiveness Index (GCI) also finds a close link between competitiveness and an economy’s ability to nurture, attract, leverage and support talent. The top-ranking countries all fare well in this regard. But in many countries, too few people have access to high-quality education and training, and labour markets are not flexible enough.

First place in the GCI rankings, for the seventh consecutive year, goes to Switzerland. Its strong performance in all 12 pillars of the index explains its remarkable resilience throughout the crisis and subsequent shocks. Singapore remains in 2nd place and the United States 3rd. Germany improves by one place to 4th and the Netherlands returns to the 5th place it held three years ago. Japan (6th) and Hong Kong SAR (7th) follow, both stable. Finland falls to 8th place – its lowest position ever – followed by Sweden (9th). The United Kingdom rounds up the top 10 of the most competitive economies in the world.

In Europe, Spain, Italy, Portugal and France have made significant strides in bolstering competitiveness. Thanks to reform packages aimed at improving the functioning of markets, Spain (33rd) and Italy (43rd) climb two and six places respectively. Similar improvements in the product and labour market in France (22nd) and Portugal (38th) are outweighed by a weakening performance in other areas. Greece stays in 81st place this year, based on data collected prior to the bailout in June. Access to finance remains a common threat to all economies and is the region’s greatest impediment to unlocking investment.

Among the larger emerging markets, the trend is for the most part one of decline or stagnation. However, there are bright spots: India ends five years of decline with a spectacular 16-place jump to 55th. South Africa re-enters the top 50, progressing seven places to 49th. Elsewhere, macroeconomic instability and loss of trust in public institutions drag down Turkey (51st), as well as Brazil (75th), which posts one of the largest falls. China, holding steady at 28, remains by far the most competitive of this group of economies. However, its lack of progress moving up the ranking shows the challenges it faces in transitioning its economy.

Among emerging and developing Asian economies, the competitiveness trends are mostly positive, despite the many challenges and profound intra-regional disparities. While China and most of the South-East Asian countries performing well, the South Asian countries and Mongolia (104th) continue to lag behind. The five largest members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – Malaysia (18th, up two), Thailand (32nd, down one), Indonesia (37th, down three), the Philippines (47th, up five) and Vietnam (56th, up 12) – all rank in the top half of the overall GCI rankings.

The end of the commodity super cycle has strongly affected Latin America and the Caribbean, and is already having repercussions on growth in the region. Greater resilience against future economic shocks will require further reform and investment in infrastructure, skills and innovation. Chile (35th) continues to lead the regional rankings and is closely followed by Panama (50th) and Costa Rica (52nd). Two large economies in the region, Colombia and Mexico, improve to 61th and 57th, respectively.

It’s a mixed picture in the Middle East and North Africa. Qatar (14th) leads the region, ahead of the United Arab Emirates (17th), although it remains more at risk than its neighbour to continued low energy prices, as its economy is less diversified. These strong performances contrast starkly with countries in North Africa, where the highest placed country is Morocco (72nd), and the Levant, which is led by Jordan (64th). With geopolitical conflict and terrorism threatening to take an even bigger toll, countries in the region must focus on reforming the business environment and strengthening the private sector.

Sub-Saharan Africa continues to grow close to 5%, but competitiveness and productivity remain low. This is something countries in the region will have to work on, especially as they face volatile commodity prices, closer scrutiny from international investors and population growth. Mauritius remains the region’s most competitive economy (46th), closely followed by South Africa (49th) and Rwanda (58th). Côte d’Ivoire (91st) and Ethiopia (109th) excel as this year’s largest improvers in the region overall.

“The fourth industrial revolution is facilitating the rise of completely new industries and economic models and the rapid decline of others. To remain competitive in this new economic landscape will require greater emphasis than ever before on key drivers of productivity, such as talent and innovation,” said Klaus Schwab, Founder and Executive Chairman of the World Economic Forum.

“The new normal of slow productivity growth poses a grave threat to the global economy and seriously impacts the world’s ability to tackle key challenges such as unemployment and income inequality. The best way to address this is for leaders to prioritize reform and investment in areas such as innovation and labour markets; this will free up entrepreneurial talent and allow human capital to flourish,” said Xavier Sala-i-Martin, Professor of Economics at Columbia University.

FIFA To Rescue Of Troubled Saudi King Salman – Analysis

0
0

Palestine is a headache Saudi King Salman doesn’t need as he confronts rare demands from members of his ruling family that he and his son be removed from power, growing unease about a seven-month old devastating military campaign in Yemen that has caused devastation and mounting civilian casualties, widespread criticism of the kingdom’s handling of the Haj in the wake of a deadly stampede, and concern about the financial and economic management of the kingdom against the backdrop of dropping oil prices.

Palestine emerged as a problem that threatened to escalate already high emotions in the kingdom with Saudi Arabia’s national soccer team scheduled to play a 2018 World Cup qualifier against Palestine in the Faisal al-Husseini International Stadium in Al-Ram, a town on the outskirts of Jerusalem. Travelling to Al-Ram would have meant that the Saudi squad would pass through Israeli security, passport and customs controls when it entered the West Bank from Jordan.

Doing so would have without doubt fuelled criticism of Mr. Salman’s nine-month old reign; infuriated a deeply conservative, anti-Israeli clergy as well as public opinion that sees the Jewish state as an enemy; and raised further questions about his management that has produced few tangible successes, exposed the kingdom to increased international criticism, and positioned his young, untested son whom many have nicknamed “Reckless” as a powerful defence and economic policy overlord as well as the king’s potential successor.

A Saudi soccer team crossing the King Hussein Bridge from Jordan to the West Bank would have been one step to many despite greater Saudi willingness to acknowledge that Israel and the kingdom despite having no diplomatic relations share common interests, particularly with regard to the rise of Iran with international sanctions likely to be lifted as a result of the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. The agreement with Iran has further cemented concern about the reliability of the United States as the kingdom’s foremost ally.

The Saudi reluctance to allow its national soccer team to cross an Israeli-controlled border was further complicated by the fact that the United Arab Emirates had no such qualms to allow its team earlier this month to play a World Cup qualifier in Al-Ram, the first such match on Palestinian territory involving a squad from a country with which Israel has no diplomatic relations. The Saudi hesitancy further threatened to undermine Palestinian efforts to use soccer as a way to raise Palestine’s status internationally and project itself as an independent state.

World soccer body FIFA, a long-standing pillar of autocratic rule in the Middle East and North Africa, had no misgivings about resolving Mr. Salman’s dilemma. In a letter to the Saudi and Palestinian soccer associations dated September 28, FIFA ordered the Saudi-Palestinian match because of “force majeure” to be moved from Al Ram to a neutral venue.

FIFA offered no explanation of what force majeure Saudi Arabia was facing that the UAE did not confront in allowing its soccer team to play in Palestine. In doing so, it appeared to be attempting to spare King Salman, already fighting battles on multiple fronts, a further potentially explosive headache. The FIFA decision was one more marker of the global soccer body’s mockery of its assertion that politics and sports are unrelated. That mockery is evident with just a glimpse of the issues Mr. Salman is dealing with.

In an unprecedented move, a senior Saudi prince, a grandson of Saudi Arabia’s founder, Abdulaziz Ibn Saud, this month, called in two letters that have gone viral on the Web for the replacement of Mr. Salman, and his son, deputy crown prince, defence minister and chairman of the Council for Economic and Development Affairs, Prince Mohammed Bin Salman Al Saud.

“The king is not in a stable condition and in reality the son of the king [Mohammed bin Salman] is ruling the kingdom. So four or possibly five of my uncles will meet soon to discuss the letters. They are making a plan with a lot of nephews and that will open the door. A lot of the second generation is very anxious. The public are also pushing this very hard, all kinds of people, tribal leaders. They say you have to do this or the country will go to disaster,” the prince who has not been named publicly told The Guardian.

The threat to Messrs. Salman and Mohammed was heightened by the king’s refusal to hold anyone accountable for this month’s stampede during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca in which more than 700 people were killed. Angry Saudis have asserted on social media that the incident was the result of rampant corruption in the kingdom.

Saudi Arabia’s ruling Al Saud family derive their legitimacy from being the custodians of Islam’s two most holy cities, Mecca and Medina. A Saudi soccer squad playing on the edge of Jerusalem at a time of Israeli-Palestinian clashes around the Al Aqsa mosque, Islam’s third most holy site, would have further put that legitimacy in doubt.

Saudis, including many of those in regions bordering Yemen who have tribal and family ties to the war-torn country, are increasingly disgusted at the pictures of the Middle East’s wealthiest country armed to the teeth with sophisticated weaponry reducing the Arab world’s poorest nation to a heap of ruins in a military campaign that has made progress in retaking southern Yemen from Houthi rebels but shows no sign of securing outright victory and producing a viable, unifying Yemeni government. Saudis also criticize what they see as a lack of a military or exit strategy.

“This is a war against the Yemeni nation and against Yemen becoming independent. It has no legitimate political foundation and it is not what the people want. Ninety per cent of people in Saudi Arabia don’t want this to happen, exactly the opposite of what the media shows,” said Sgt Maj Dakheel bin Naser Al Qahtani, a former head of air force operations at King Abdulaziz airbase, Dhahran, who defected from the Saudi armed forces last year.

With oil trading below $50 a barrel, Saudi Arabia is being forced to borrow and according to the Financial Times has withdrawn some $70 billion from overseas investments. Saudi Arabia’s stock market index has dropped 30 percent in the last year. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicted Saudi Arabia would next year have a budget deficit of at least $107 billion.

Saudi Arabia’s budget is based on a $90 a barrel oil price. The kingdom is believed to need a $110 a barrel price to balance its budget given the costs of the wars in Yemen, Syria and against the Islamic State, the jihadist group that controls a swath of Syria and Iraq.

Pictures of Saudi soccer players subjecting themselves to Israeli controls potentially could have been the cinder that put the House of Saud on fire where it not for the willingness of Sepp Blatter’s FIFA fire brigade to come to Mr. Salman’s rescue on what can only be opportunistic political grounds.

FIFA letter regarding Saudi Arabia - Palestine match.
FIFA letter regarding Saudi Arabia – Palestine match.

Germany Shames US With Its Policies Toward Refugees, China And Russia – OpEd

0
0

Maher Zain, a 1981-born singer who was just eight when his Lebanese family was admitted by Sweden, is the latest showcase that Muslim immigrants can make contributions to world peace rather than causing troubles to their receiving countries. With millions of fans in Europe, England, Malaysia, Indonesia, Palestine, Pakistan and China, Zain’s anti-war songs [Note 1] are no less heart-touching than Pakistan-born Canadian singer Irfan Makki’s “You and I”. Yet, Germany is the only state in the West camp welcoming Muslim refugees when all its peers hesitate. Berlin’s once again deviation means something important to International Relations.

While Chancellor Angela Merkel is preparing Germany to admit as many as 800,000 refugees by the end of 2015 (for example, allocating 20% of the refugees to its most populous state North Rhine-Westphalia [Note 2]), Secretary of State John Kerry “said the current cap of 70,000 migrants annually will be increased to 85,000 next fiscal year and 100,000 in 2017” [Note 3]. Britain, the United States’ closest ally, will only accept “up to 20,000 Syrian refugees by 2020 on the same day Germany said it plans to spend US$6.7 billion to deal with an influx of thousands of migrants from the Middle East and North Africa” [Note 4]. It is of course correct to say that Germany would benefit economically from large influx of laborers. This move would nonetheless generate various and even incalculable risks to not just domestic politics but also local administration. Despite being named skeptically (or sarcastically) as “Mother Angela” that her decision “has divided Europe”, Chancellor Merkel has shown her resolute to welcome the refugees in mass volume [Note 5].

After its firm opposition to Iraq War and absence from the direct intervention into the Arab Spring events, Berlin’s un-cruel attitude towards Russia over Ukraine and its friendly policy towards China are indications that Germany has been somehow behaving consistently in a very different manner from the mainstream West.

Throughout the Ukraine crisis, Germany appears more tolerant of Russia’s aggressive influence over it. With better understanding of the historical background of the “Russian Idea”, Berlin seems to prefer staying aside to let the Russians and Ukrainians solve their ethnical knots — “The claim to the legacy of Rus’ (the ancient core from which the Russian state developed) became so important for Russian identity that … Vladimir-Suzdal and later Muscovy were the true dynastic and cultural successors of Kievan Rus’. This is why the possession of Ukraine, the heart of the lands of Rus’, became a vital ingredient in legitimizing the Russian identity … it was claimed that the inhabitants of present-day Ukraine were Russians” [Note 6].

From a realist geo-political perspective, Kremlin’s invasive behavior in Ukraine and annexation of Crimea presents threats to the NATO. Alternatively, viewing the conflicts inside Ukraine as of an ethnical nature, there could be no worry of further intrusion into the heart of Europe. The Merkel Administration tactically refrained from taking harsh measures against Russia, thus lowering the chance of unnecessary escalation to military confrontation between NATO and Russia. Furthermore, should there be an opportunity for a negotiated secession as the ultimate solution to the standoff, the non-hegemonic Germany would play a leading role to have it realized without bloodshed.

None of the contemporary German government leaders including the incumbent Merkel (2005-present), Gerhard Schroder (1998-2005) and Helmut Kohl (1982-98) were as enthusiastic about China as Jacques Chirac (French President 1995-2007 who launched a colorful Year of China 2004 in France and had the Eiffel Tower bathed in scarlet red lights for the first time in history to honor China [Note 7]). Behind the plain German-Chinese relation, however, Berlin rarely has a spat with Beijing, except acting on behalf of EU over trade matters. Former Chancellor Schroder had even tried to persuade the Parliament to lift the arms embargo against China in 2004 [Note 8].

When France and Italy are in the main selling fashion goods to Chinese consumers, Germany’s high-performance producer goods ranging from cranes to gas turbines have been shipped to China without political questioning. Mid-sized German manufacturers (mittelstand) are also open to Chinese acquisitions without political barriers (examples are M-Tec, a dry mortar producer, and Putzmeister, a concrete machinery firm). On global matters, Berlin has been consistently supporting China’s engagement with the European Union as well as mediating roles in the Middle East and Sudan. Among the 57 founding member states of the China-founded Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank, Germany’s 4.57% share ranks the 4th highest, only below China (30.34%), India (8.52%) and Russia (6.66%). Above all, there is no sign whatsoever that Merkel is interested in joining any effort to ‘contain China’ [Note 9]. Quite on the contrary, Berlin welcomes China’s rise and participation into global affairs through either the United Nations or certain supranational organizations.

If there is a philosophical theme behind a foreign policy and it is Pragmatism in Beijing, Pan-Slavism in Moscow, Utilitarianism in London, then what is resisting hard to Washington’s Liberal Universalism is Berlin’s strong inclination towards Internationalism. In no doubt, nor any reservation, do the post-WWII Germans share with the American creeds — liberty, equality, rule of law, democracy and Christian ethics, but the Germans also have a long tradition of criticizing Liberalism at least since Hegel. Harsh critiques of the bellicose American way are common amongst the indigenous theorists, be they the Frankfurt School, the informal Ritter School or the students of Carl Schmitt (1888-1985).

With a higher moral status after accepting a huge number of refugees, Germany will have a stronger base to choose its role and position to play in world politics. Its metamorphosis would eventually become another solid footing for an ‘International Society’ [Note 10] to operate in the 21st century.

This article, originally titled as “Germany is another West on Refugees, Russia and China”, was first published by Foreign Policy In Focus on Sep 28, 2015.
http://fpif.org/germany-shames-u-s-with-its-policies-toward-refugees-china-and-russia/

[Note 1]
Wikipedia, Maher Zain.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maher_Zain
Song “Hold My Hand” 2009:
“Why don’t we share the same love? Your neighbor, my neighbor, we’re neighbors.”

Wikipedia, Irfan Makki.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Irfan_Makki
Song “You and I” 2011:
“Let’s get rid of hatred and see each other as we really are.”

[Note 2]
DW, “North Rhine-Westphalia is home to one-fifth of Germany’s refugees”, Sep 21, 2015.
http://www.dw.com/en/north-rhine-westphalia-is-home-to-one-fifth-of-germanys-refugees/a-18727863

[Note 3]
CNN, “Kerry: U.S. to accept more Syrian refugees”, Sep 20, 2015.
http://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/20/politics/syrian-refugees-john-kerry/index.html

[Note 4]
UPI, “Britain to accept 20,000 Syrian refugees; Germany slots $6.7B for migrants”, sept 7, 2015.
http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2015/09/07/Britain-to-accept-20000-Syrian-refugees-Germany-slots-67B-for-migrants/4291441622596/

[Note 5]
Spiegel Online International, “Mother Angela: Merkel’s Refugee Policy Divides Europe”, Sep 21, 2015.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/refugee-policy-of-chancellor-merkel-divides-europe-a-1053603.html

[Note 6]
See pages 13-14 in Katlijin Malfliet and Francisca Scharpe (eds) (2003), “The Concept of Russia: Patterns for Political Development in the Russian Federation”, Leuven University Press: Leuven, Belgium.
The paper was issued by Chair Interbrew – Baillet Latour “European Union-Russia”, a joint project created in 2000 between Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Universite Catholique de Louvain.
http://soc.kuleuven.be/web/staticpage/11/74/eng/498

[Note 7]
China online, “Eiffel Tower Illuminated in Red to Honor China”, Jan 25, 2004.
http://www.china.org.cn/english/2004/Jan/85465.htm

[Note 8]
DW, “German Parliament rejects Arms Sales to China”, Oct 29, 2004.
http://www.dw.com/en/german-parliament-rejects-arms-sales-to-china/a-1380190

[Note 9]
Foreign Policy In Focus, “How did U.S. go from ‘Constructive Engagement” to Containing China?”, Apr 29, 2015.
http://fpif.org/how-did-u-s-go-from-constructive-engagement-to-containing-china/

[Note 10]
See more details from Kai Alderson and Andrew Hurrell (eds.) (2000), “Hedley Bull on International Society”, Macmillan Press: London.

Saudi Arabia Says Iran ‘Key Reason For War In Yemen’

0
0

By Mohamed Al-Sulami

Saud Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir has accused Iran of fomenting regional strife by supporting terrorist groups.

Responding to Iranian President Hassan Rohani’s address at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, the Saudi minister said the Iranian president should be the last person to discuss democracy in Syria.

“If it was not for Iran, there would not be the destruction and killing we see today in Syria,” the minister said in an interview with Al-Arabiya TV.

He said that Iran supports Bashar Assad by sending thousands of militants into the country and fueling sectarianism between Sunnis and Shiites.

Responding to Rohani’s comment that Iran was willing to contribute to a political solution in Yemen, Al-Jubeir said Iran was one of the main reasons behind the war in Yemen.

He said Iran was smuggling weapons to the Houthis in violation of UN Resolution 2216. “Their last attempt was on Saturday when an Iranian ship loaded with weapons was intercepted,” he was quoted as saying.

Referring to Rohani’s comments on the Mina stampede, Al-Jubeir said: “We have previously said that it is unacceptable to use such human tragedy politically, which happened while people were performing a religious ritual.”

He added:“The Iranians should be the last to speak about the Haj and pilgrims because they have caused chaos multiple times in the past. Their protests in the 80s resulted in a number of deaths,” he said.

Meanwhile, Brig. Gen. Ahmed Asiri, spokesman of the coalition forces, has rejected reports that the Saudi-led soldiers were responsible for an attack on a wedding party in Yemen on Sunday that claimed the lives of 27 people.

Maj. Gen Mansour Al-Turki, spokesman of the Interior Ministry, said that Ali bin Fahad Abu Mahasin, one of the members of the Mujahideen Management Branch in Jazan, had been killed during shelling from the Yemeni side of the border on Monday.

He also denied reports that Houthi militants had captured a soldier, Talal Hazazi, on the Saudi-Yemeni border.

He said the soldier had evaded capture for 14 days.

Giants Of Asia In Silicon Valley – Analysis

0
0

By Manoj Joshi*

Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping have just made back to back visits to the United States. In keeping with the times, both began their tours from that Mecca of our age -Silicon Valley. Thereafter their paths diverged because Xi was on his first state visit to Washington DC, whereas Modi, on the annual pilgrimage the Indian PM makes on the occasion of the UN General Assembly, had a brief meeting with Obama in New York City.

Both were competing with yet another international star for the attention of the American media-Pope Francis. But for both Xi and Modi, the real target was not the US but the audience back home.

The reason is that the other thing that unites the two Asian giants is that both are visiting the US at a time when they have important political preoccupations back home. It is not just the Bihar election that demands Modi’s attention in India, it is the failure of his government to take concrete steps to make India a more business-friendly destination. True, the Indian economy is one of the few in the world that is growing and that FDI to India has gone up in the past year. But it is also a fact that a slew of measures to make high economic growth sustainable remain to be taken. The government has abandoned plans to pass a bill to ease land acquisition, a Goods and Service Tax (GST) is yet to be implemented, statutes to end retrospective taxation and ease labour laws is yet to reach Parliament.

As for Xi, the recent stock market crash and the bungled response of the government has taken away some sheen from China’s economic growth story. Meanwhile he is finding it difficult to push the reform of state owned enterprises (SOE), the key to rebalancing the Chinese economy. A proposal to reform the SOEs was unveiled on the eve of the Xi visit but they have proved to be a damp squib. A proposal for drastic reforms of the Chinese military was expected to be unveiled on September 10, but that, too, has not happened.

The economic troubles could well lead to the Communist party leadership taking recourse to nationalist displays, as manifested by the huge military parade to celebrate the 70th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II. This was clearly intended to burnish Xi’s aura. In the US, Xi signed an important agreement with the US committing both sides not to undertake cyber espionage. In the context of the forthcoming Paris Conference on Climate Change, President Obama gained an important commitment from Xi on China’s commitment to take drastic measures to limit emissions.

This said, actually even host America is in a somewhat distracted state. President Obama is lame duck and the 2016 Presidential election campaign has more or less begun. The state of American politics is parlous, with outliers like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders leading the Republican and Democratic fields respectively. The anti-establishment mood is so strong in the country that it has led to the resignation of US House Speaker John Boehner who was fed up by the actions of the hardliners in his party who are infuriated over their inability to push their anti-Obama agenda.

In all fairness, it is early days for Modi. He has just about finished the first year of government and all said and done, India’s economy still remains on the growth track. The Prime Minister remains personally popular and his party is expected to win the Bihar state assembly elections scheduled for next month. In contrast the Opposition remains divided and uncertain and its biggest party, the Congress, remains directionless.

But even so, there is need for Modi to understand that grand-standing in the Silicon Valley and supping with American CEOs will not bring India American investment. That will only happen when things happen on the ground and India moves up in the list of ease of doing business. That, in turn, is a task that cannot be achieved by Modi and his PMO alone, he needs to galvanise his government and its ministers who as of now are a bunch of faceless men and women who even the average newspaper reading person will not be able to mostly recognise.

All said, the Modi government needs to move from its penchant for event management and exhortation, to delivering on what brought them to power in the first place – the promise of a economic transformation of the country.

*The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi

Courtesy: www.mid-day.com

Viewing all 73339 articles
Browse latest View live




Latest Images