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China’s Labor Costs Slow Mill And Mine Closures – Analysis

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By Michael Lelyveld

China’s government is pushing local authorities to move faster on closing surplus steel mills and coal mines under international pressure as a struggle takes shape over who will pay for the costs.

The government’s top planning agency has issued warnings since July that many provinces are far behind schedule for cutting production capacity in the steel and coal industries this year.

China is the world’s biggest producer of both coal and steel, accounting for about half of global output in both industries.

But its huge excess of production capacity has dragged prices and profits down, triggering international trade penalties, high tariffs and pressure for cuts.

China has responded with pledges to reduce its capacity by up to 500 million tons of coal and 150 million metric tons of steel in “the next few years.”

The planned reductions for this year have been off to a slow start as mines and mills take advantage of short-term price hikes that have been spurred by economic stimulus projects.

The slow pace of cuts was previewed as a major issue for the Group of 20 economic summit in China’s eastern city of Hangzhou over the weekend after U.S. Treasury Secretary Jacob Lew said that President Barack Obama would “press for action on excess capacity, most notably in the steel industry.”

“Excess capacity distorts markets and the environment, harms our workers and runs counter to our efforts to achieve strong, sustainable and balanced growth,” Lew said at the Brookings Institution in Washington last week, according to MarketWatch news.

In the run-up to the summit, China fought to keep overcapacity off the G20 agenda.

“The G20 should focus on core issues in order to restore its leadership and power of execution, instead of discussing unnecessary issues,” said a pre-summit commentary in the official English-language China Daily.

Excess capacity

But President Xi Jinping was unable to silence calls for deeper capacity cutting by China despite warning G20 leaders in his opening speech to “avoid empty talk” and “protectionism.”

Critics of China’s overcapacity succeeded in including the issue in the draft of the G20 communique, but the wording reflected China’s insistence that other nations share responsibility for the problem.

“We recognize that excess capacity in steel and other industries is a global issue which requires collective responses,” the draft said, as cited by Bloomberg News.

The wording was echoed in China’s official summary of the bilateral meeting between Presidents Obama and Xi.

The White House summary said the presidents “discussed China’s role in addressing industrial excess capacity … as part of a global effort.”

The compromise language did little to ease the conflict over the capacity issue, particularly with regard to steel.

“Overcapacity is a global problem but there is a particular Chinese element,” European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker told a press conference in Hangzhou, Reuters reported.

In the G20 final communique, China’s critics won a partial victory with language that cited steel subsidies as a cause of “market distortions” and “global excess capacity.”

The communique also called for formation of a “global forum” to monitor steel excess capacity, a move that China had opposed.

“In terms of excess capacity, this is an issue that we wanted to get on the agenda. We got it on the agenda,”

President Obama said at a post-summit press conference Monday.

“So, we’ve made some progress, not as much as we’d like to see,” he said.

Walking the walk

On Saturday, Xi assured business leaders at the companion B20 summit that China would honor its previous pledges.

“China will use the utmost effort and most concrete measures regarding production overcapacity; it walks the walk,” Xi said, according to the official website china.org.cn.

In an effort to ease international pressure, China’s central government has been trying to speed up its capacity cuts.

The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) initially complained on July 26 that local governments and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) had achieved only 29 percent of the targeted closures in coal production capacity for 2016 by midyear.

Five provinces had made substantial progress toward the national goal of reducing the surplus by 250 million metric tons, but nine others had made none at all, the official Xinhua news agency said.

The warning to the coal industry came one day after a senior official disclosed that steel makers had also met only 29 percent of their annual target of 45 million tons in the first six months.

Feng Fei, vice minister for industry and information technology, took a milder view of the foot-dragging, saying the midyear pace of cuts was “in line with our expectations.”

The cabinet-level State Council apparently disagreed.

On July 27, it issued a statement after a meeting chaired by Premier Li Keqiang, urging “all-out efforts” to meet the targets and threatening the industries with penalties if they did not.

On Aug. 5, the NDRC reported partial but still insufficient progress. Coal companies had made 38 percent of the cuts after seven months while the steel sector had reached 47 percent of its 2016 goal, the agency said.

“Currently, progress clearly lags behind our official schedule,” said NDRC deputy director Lian Weiliang.

Uncooperative coal producers faced “punitive measures including forced shutdowns,” Xinhua reported on Aug. 11.

Lian cited little or no compliance by provincial-level governments in Inner Mongolia, Fujian, Guangxi, Ningxi, Xinjiang, Jiangxi, Sichuan and Yunnan, according to Xinhua.

Stiff resistance

Stiff resistance to downsizing in the steel industry has been bolstered by first-half financial results, thanks to the government’s own economic stimulus policies.

The combined profits of 19 reporting steelmakers climbed to 2.3 billion yuan (U.S. $344 million) at midyear, compared with losses of 1.57 billion yuan (U.S. $235 million) in the year-earlier period, Xinhua said.

Other reports suggest that the costs of laying off an estimated 1.8 million workers in the two industries is at least as big a reason for stalling as short-term profits, despite the central government’s promise of a 100-billion- yuan (U.S. $15-billion) fund for resettlement and other support.

State media reports since February may have left the impression that the funds from the central government would be spent directly on resettling and compensating idled workers.

“Local governments have also been providing support, such as unemployment insurance and payments to the unemployed,” Xinhua said on Aug. 11.

But a report by the London-based Financial Times said the funds are being used “to reward local governments and companies for making good progress on cuts,” citing Lian’s statement on Aug. 19 that 30.7 billion yuan (U.S. $4.6 billion) had already been spent.

The account suggests that the central government is continuing to hold the companies and local authorities responsible for the costs of supporting jobless workers and complying with Beijing’s targets.

Lian also seemed to suggest that the companies could find it cheaper to keep operations open rather than paying the partially-compensated costs of shutting them down.

“During the process of reducing capacity, companies face problems with resettling workers and managing debt. If we are solely relying on the market, then companies might not want to cut back,” he said.

Some provinces have promised “awards” to steel and coal companies that agree to make cuts and compensate workers.

Six state-owned coal producers in Shanxi provinces have already received 1 billion yuan (U.S. $150 million), while steel and coal companies in Henan province have been promised nearly 2.2 billion yuan (U.S. $326 million), Xinhua reported Monday.

Complex forces at work

The situation is a sign of the complex forces at work as the central government tries to persuade the European Union and other trading partners to grant China “market economy status” by December, as provided in World Trade Organization agreements.

The designation would make it harder for the EU to slap anti-dumping duties on Chinese exports like steel, a benefit that may be passed on indirectly to struggling producers.

But even if the government’s targets are met, they may represent only a fraction of China’s overcapacity problem.

The country’s steelmaking capacity may exceed annual production by as much as 400 million tons, while its coal mines could produce up to 2 billion tons more than China consumed last year.

Philip Andrews-Speed, a China energy expert at National University of Singapore, said overcapacity has been a source of conflict between Beijing and local authorities for years.

“Local governments have long resisted central government programs to close capacity, and this applies to coal mines as much as to factories,” Andrews-Speed said.

In the late 1990s, township and village authorities resisted attempts to shut down their mines following the Asian financial crisis as the central government tried to protect larger state-owned producers, he said.

“In all cases, local governments try to keep local businesses and mines going in order to support employment … economic growth and tax revenue,” Andrews-Speed said by email.

But in the case of coal, he also cited differences between closing a mine and a factory, which can be demolished to eliminate production capacity while mining resources remain in the ground.

“It is more difficult to make a coal resource completely inaccessible. As a result, a mine can be closed and then reopened very easily unless the local government actively supports the closure policy,” Andrews-Speed said.

The problem raises the question of how meaningful China’s capacity cuts will be, even if the government’s goals are achieved.

A recent Xinhua report from Inner Mongolia may raise suspicions that some provincial-level governments have been counting declines in production as their contributions to permanent capacity cuts.

Wang Bingjun, head of the regional commission on the economy and information technology, said that 23 illegal mines had been ordered to close and 65 more would be shut by 2020.

“Other mines have been ordered to run at 84 percent of their production capacity, resulting in (a) 10.4-percent reduction in output,” Xinhua said.


Russia, China And Eurasian Integration – Analysis

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By Manoj Joshi*

In the last three years, Russia under Vladmir Putin has surprised us by actions in Crimea and Ukraine, and then, more recently, in Syria. All three have been wildly welcomed in Russia and, in their own way, successful, and have brought observers to wonder whether Russia is now once again a geopolitical player, in Eurasia, if not in the globe. Adding to this has been the growing proximity between Russia and China. Ever since Russia’s estrangement with the West over Ukraine, ties between the two countries have developed in three areas — energy, finance and infrastructure — and now they are reviving in defence.

Putin’s first two Presidential terms were from 2000 to 2008 — seen as political stabilisation and economic growth. The third from 2012 has not quite brought either. Putin began with a three-point plan — prosperity, the rule of law and westward integration. But all three are now in doubt.

The rise in oil prices after 2000 gave Russia a windfall of $1.1 trillion, but today the prices are down three quarters from their peak. According to The Economist, average salaries which were $850 per month in 2014 were just $450 in 2015.

Corruption, western sanctions and low oil price for oil and gas have affected the Russian economy. It has cut Russia off from western capital markets and FDI fell a massive 92 percent in 2015. In 2015, its GDP shrank by four percent.

Many people have praised the management of the Central Bank of Russia which has allowed the rouble to drop in value and channeled dollars to its energy companies and banks to repay debt. Now, with the price stabilising, the CBR reserves are again growing. The rouble’s fall has stoked inflation which in turn has led to real wages falling 10 percent since 2014 (but they are still triple of what they were when Putin took office in 2000).

We should not forget the protests of 2011-2012. Following the elections, when a majority voted against United Russia Party, the Kremlin manipulated the results leading to widespread protests. Putin’s power appeared fragile.

Critics say that it was after the 2011-2012 protests, claiming that the ruling United Russia Party had manipulated the results, that Putin began to stage dramatic foreign policy ventures such as the annexation of Crimea to show the public that Russia was still great. In great measure this was based on a massive $720 billion programme of arms modernisation that the oil windfall had provided.

Russian support for Putin is based on the same principles as the support for the CPC in China — you deliver economic growth and we will back you and not ask too many questions. However, today with the Opposition cowed down, Putin does not need to coerce the voters, they are apathetic and Putin’s support in Russia remains very high.

The return of a great power

Putin has garnered a great deal of support because of his actions in Crimea, Ukraine and Syria. For Russia and many Russians, the dream of being a great power is a powerful one. Dealings with China, and the American willingness to collaborate with Russia on Syria seem to signal that Russia is an equal and once again rival of the US. Putin seems to want to take Russia back to the world where the Soviet Union, US and UK decide the fate of the world and many Russians, too yearn for that past. Americans may have their exceptionalism, but so do the Russians.

Putin’s action in intervening in Syria in September 2015 were not aimed at merely shoring up an ally or to resolve a huge humanitarian crisis. It was to signal to the US and EU that it was a global power.

The Russian actions have been carefully caliberated. They are not in the American mode to do nation building. Their moves have been surgical and strategic. The bulk of the fighting in Syria has been done by Assad forces and in Ukraine by pro-Russian elements.

Having secured a nominal ceasefire in February, the Russians declared victory and announced a withdrawal from Syria. In the process, he showed the US to be ineffective and dithering and sidelined Turkey.

Aggrieved nationalism plays well in China, so does it in Russia. The Kremlin portray the annexation of Crimea and bombing of Syria as defensive actions against the US which in their view had staged a coup in Ukraine. Putin’s latest avatar is as the leader of a resurgent nation by which he is able to paper over the fact that his country is going through one of the worst economic crises in recent Russian history.

Yet the Syrian action has got Russia and US working together. After the February accord, the two sides have coordinated action and currently seeking to work out a new agreement to make more durable arrangements for a ceasefire as well as to cooperate to defeat the IS.

Sino-Russian entente

The western embargo of Russia post Crimea and Ukraine has led to Russia turning eastwards towards China. A measure of this is the sharp increase in Russian oil supplies to China. In 2013, the two sides signed the massive $270 billion deal to supply oil over the next 25 years and the following year, another $85 billion pre-paid deal to supply 200,000 bpd of oil. Russia is aiming to supply 1 million barrels per day to China (currently it is around 300,000).

The western embargo of Russia post Crimea and Ukraine has led to Russia turning eastwards towards China.

Rosenft and CNPC have also formed a joint venture for exploration and production in Siberia. This was topped by a $400 billion deal to supply gas from western Siberia to China over 30 years. Once the deliveries began probably in 2018, China would supplant Germany as the primary destination of Russian gas. Of course when the deals were struck, oil prices were above $100 a barrel and now they are $30 to 40 and the Chinese economy has also slowed down significantly, there are question marks about the pricing of the gas as well. This will reduce both the oil and gas flows, but this cannot remove the strategic nature of the relationship emerging.

Another area in which the Russians have turned to China because of the western embargo is in the area of finance. According to the Bank of Russia, Chinese foreign direct investment into Russia increased by a factor of five from 2009 to 2014.

Political relations between the two countries are today excellent. The Sino-Soviet border agreement of 1991 removed the one major irritant that could have stalled the process. The 2001 China-Russia Treaty of Friendship needs to be looked at carefully considering Jiang Zemin signed it with Putin.

It talked about peaceful relations, economic cooperation etc. and Article 16 spoke of cooperation in “economy and trade, military know-how, science and technology, energy resources, transport, nuclear energy, finance, aerospace and aviation, information technology and other areas of common interest.”

But Article 9 of the treaty can also be seen as an implicit defence pact its language is remarkably similar to the one that was their in Article 9 of the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971. It notes, “When a situation arises in which one of the contracting parties deems that peace is being threatened and undermined or its security interests are involved or when it is confronted with the threat of aggression, the contracting parties shall immediately hold contacts and consultations in order to eliminate such threats.”

It is not as if the two countries have common security concerns. Russia’s main aim is to create a security buffer between its heartland and NATO in the West, while China’s main focus is on pushing the US back beyond the first island chain in the Pacific.

Arms sales from Russia to China declined after 2006 because of Moscow’s annoyance at Beijing’s copying of Russian designs. But the Russian problems with the West has compelled them to resume sales. So today, Russia remains the largest external provider of Chinese military equipment. Of course, Beijing has developed a indigenous, high tech defence industry with the abiity to reverse engineer even sophisticated military hardware. But it still needs some cutting edge stuff like the S-400 Triumf missile defence system of which it will be the first customer. There are also reports of China acquiring 24 Su-35 fighters and there is a lot of work on joint projects on dual use technologies, for example, a tie up between Karpesky Labs and the state-owned China Cyber Security company for defence against cyber attacks. In the past two years the ties are going beyond technology transfer.

In May this year, the Russians and Chinese participated in a joint computer exercise in Moscow on ways to jointly counter a ballistic missile attack. Given the need to exchange information in a sensitive area, it speaks of the enhanced trust between the two.

The essential focus of their new cooperation is in ways to counter the US and its allies. China used to copy Russia, now Russians are sourcing components from China. Russia plans to buy Chinese diesel engines which they had originally planned to get from Germany for their coastal patrol vessels. In April they discussed exchanging electronic components used in spacecraft construction with Russian liquid fuel rocket engine technology.

Another area of learning seems to be in hybrid warfare, both China and Russia are using a mix of civilian and paramilitary to push back against the West in Ukraine and in South China Sea.

Central Asia

The rise of China and the relative decline of Russia has implications for the Russian near-abroad in Central Asia. This is China’s area of vulnerability, bordering as they do its restive province of Xinjiang. Whereas for Russia, these are legacy areas from the days of the Soviet Union. For China, this is also an area of opportunity through which it seeks to enhance its Eurasian vision.

In September 2013, Xi Jinping announced the One Belt One Road (OBOR) plan at a speech in Astana. Over the years, China has signed major oil and gas deals and developed pipelines that have had a significant shift in the economic relations of Central Asian countries in relation to China.

Trade between the region and China has grown from $1 billion in 2000 to $50 billion in 2013 and then coming down to about $43 billion. Chinese companies own 25 percent of Kazakh oil production and account for 50 percent of Turkmenistan’s gas exports. China’s Eximbank is the largest single creditor to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan holding 49 and 36 percent of their government debt.

Over the years, Chinese infrastructure construction has negated Russia’s advantage as being the best connected to the Central Asian region. Among the projects are:

The Central Asia-China (Turkmenistan-China) 3666 km long gas pipeline runs from Turkmenistan to China via Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan and was commissioned in 2009. Today this comprises of three pipelines and the fifth pipeline Line D which will go through all five central Asian repubics is under construction.

The 2228 km Kazakhstan-China oil pipeline runs from Atyarau in the Caspian sea to Alashankou in Xinjiang. In future, this will be the main means to tap the huge Kashagan oil field.

Central Asia is also the region through which Beijing’s ambitious goal of developing overland communications links with Europe under the OBOR. Trains are already running to destinations in Hamburg, Madrid and Teheran. The number of containers travelling by train between China and Europe via Kazakhstan has increased 18 times between 2011 and 2014, and doubled in 2015 according to KTZ, the Kazakh state railway company.

The route is attractive to electronics companies such as HP — which has helped to pioneer it — for whom the shorter transit time compared to shipping by sea is worth paying for. The journey from China to Europe takes 14-16 days, compared with a month or more by sea, although the cost of shipping one container is some $9000 compared with $3000 by sea.

Russia has its own Eurasian Economic Union plan, but as of now it appears that China is leading the game. Beijing has been careful not to over-step. It has agreed to coordinate OBOR investments between the AIIB and the World Bank and ADB. In May 2015, bowing to the inevitable, the Russians signed an agreement with China to coordinate the projects.

As for China, it is only beginning its grand One Belt One Road design which could see much greater investments in transportation infrastructure in the Central Asian republics and their closer economic and political integration with China which, in turn, is merely a prelude to a closer Eurasian integration under Beijing’s auspices in the coming half century.

*Manoj Joshi is a Distinguished Fellow at the ORF. He has been a journalist specialising on national and international politics and is a commentator and columnist on these issues. As a reporter, he has written extensively on issues relating to Siachen, Pakistan, China, Sri Lanka and terrorism in Kashmir and Punjab.

Baltic Echoes Of The NATO Warsaw Summit – Analysis

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By Egle Murauskaite*

(FPRI) — In the Baltics, the NATO Warsaw Summit is viewed as a momentous event, marking a shift to a deterrent stance vis-à-vis Russia with the decision to deploy the four multinational battalions to Eastern Europe. This article contributes two new perspectives to the analytical voices discussing the key implications of the Summit. First, it reflects on and contextualizes the narratives and popular perceptions of the Summit in the Baltics that may not be immediately obvious to outside observers. Second, it highlights the views from the Warsaw Summit Experts’ Forum (WSEF) – a high-level Summit sideline event that considered the key agenda items in a less politically charged environment.

The multinational battalions have received disproportionate attention in the Baltic media. The boost to missions in Afghanistan and Iraq and greater consideration for cyber offensive measures were also discussed in passing. Meanwhile, the significance and implications of NATO-EU cooperation has been almost entirely lost on local audiences, and the return of nuclear issues to the table has hardly been mentioned. Perhaps most importantly, the Baltics seem to be missing out on NATO plans to address the underlying socio-economic causes of instability and insecurity that are of immediate concern to the Southern flank, but ultimately are also at the core of the alliance’s future direction.

United We Stand?

Although many are questioning whether four battalions constitute a sufficient deterrent force, their core contribution is to signal alliance unity. For the past several years, public sentiment in many NATO member states has been playing right into the divide-and-conquer theme that epitomizes Russia’s policy towards Eastern Europe. On one side are opinion polls showing Western European reluctance to defend the Baltics in case of an armed incursion. On the other is the historic Baltic refrain that the U.S. is their real security guarantor while contributions from other NATO allies are welcome but almost second-rate. The gradual U.S. shift towards more substantive burden sharing, which includes trading away some of its consistent presence in the Baltics for that of the other allies, is thus unnerving for local observers. However, it ought to provide a strong impetus to revisit these perceptions. While the U.S. continues with statements and gestures of support towards the Baltics through (such as the recent Biden visit to Latvia), it is important to revisit some of these the perceptions surrounding European collective defense and recalibrate the internal balance of the Alliance in line with the shifting geopolitical realities

On the other hand, the strategic intent of signaling Alliance strength through unity risks being undercut by domestic political considerations in Western European NATO members. Thus far, Canada has been the only country to publicly advertise its upcoming presence in the Baltics, detailing the intended force size, accompanying military equipment, and planned deployment dates in early 2017. Meanwhile, Germany and France have historically sought cooperation and closer ties to Russia, and left the Summit with notable unease about the Alliance’s harsher stance. With 2017 an election year in both of these countries, there is already palpable reluctance to hold the force commitment up to public scrutiny, and to downplay it as a capacity-building mission not directed at any particular adversary.

Finally, there is the outstanding need for building greater inter-operability – recognized but not much discussed at the Summit. In each of the Baltic states, the multinational battalion seems to be composed of nation-clusters with substantial prior experience of jointly serving in out of area missions. However, political considerations aside, this might be a missed opportunity for the armed forces to get familiar with the operational practices of allies they have not worked with closely before but would have to call on in a crisis. Prolonged collective presence in day-to-day operations can build institutional memory beyond what joint exercises can offer.

Make Defense Great Again?

Most Western experts speaking at the WSEF agreed that the battalions are an important first step on a long road ahead, while prominent Latvian and Estonian representatives claimed to be entirely satisfied with the outcome already, a sentiment subsequently echoed by Lithuanian officials. Herein lies another challenge – that of cultivating the Baltic perception of security as a continuous and all-encompassing process, rather than a task to outsource or a box to check.

Since joining NATO in 2004, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia (to a lesser degree) seemed only too happy to delegate strategic security and defense decisions to Western partners, consistently reducing defense spending in favor of investments in social security and education. For example, after regaining independence through peaceful resistance in 1990, the first Lithuanian parliament considered armed defense forces unnecessary, and military matters have not been particularly popular or prestigious since. The World Bank data shows Lithuania spending 1.36% of GDP on defense in 2001, but continuously cutting that share for over a decade. It was not until 2013 that the numbers started to climb (from 0.76%), reaching 1.14% in 2015. Similarly, in 2006 Latvian defense spending peaked at 1.72% GDP in 2006, after which point it declined until 2012 (0.91%). It was then gradually raised to 1.06% in 2015.

Maintaining this new momentum for host nation support, and engaging Baltic societies as a whole (not just the defense and security professionals) will be key to the successful implementation of this allied deterrent move. For instance, with less than two months to go before Lithuania’s parliamentary election, only a couple of the major political parties have included national security or defense elements in their program. Despite the regional geopolitical situation, socio-economic matters remain at the forefront of the election campaign. As part of the host nation support efforts, finding pragmatic solutions to potential challenges associated with a significant increase of military presence on the ground will be just as important as investing in local security culture and demonstrating the direct relevance and impact of defense matters to both private citizens and businesses.

Indeed, a theme permeating most of the Experts’ Forum discussions was the need to engage the civil societies of NATO member states and increase their support and understanding of in alliance policies. Strengthening commitments to and investments in collective territorial defense is becoming an increasingly tough pitch in societies shaken by violent extremism and weary of immigration challenges. Nuclear member states and allies hosting U.S. nuclear weapons on their soil are challenged to tie the potential use of this particular type of deterrent to the values and priorities of modern day societies. Continued commitment of elite Baltic troops to NATO’s out of area missions might also be more a reflection of social disengagement from defense matters and consequent lack of opposition, rather than a sign of resounding support for this distribution of national resources.

Security Through Development?

One of the most significant Summit outcomes was the NATO-EU Cooperation Agreement, prompting further discussions about NATO’s role in addressing the underlying causes of long-term instability and insecurity. Experts emphasized the direct links between the growing popularity of radical and violent movements, and issues like systemic income inequality, corruption and cronyism in politics, limited women’s participation, and bleak economic prospects and lack of opportunities for the next generation. These problems are particularly severe in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region that is currently experiencing exponential demographic growth. Experts deemed it important to get ahead of the curve when it comes to violent extremism and address these challenges, rather than be forced to grapple with their consequences in the coming years. Curiously, even senior Russian experts speaking at the Forum underscored heightened Russian sensitivities to trade and economic tensions, and admitted to watching EU policies with greater concern than NATO’s military posturing.

In this context NATO-EU cooperation will be of particular significance, with each partner looking to bring its core competences to the table and jointly tackle these challenges. Among the initial efforts to alleviate these socio-economic challenges, NATO has already volunteered its competences to boost police capacity building efforts in the Middle East, and offered the use of Mediterranean fleet to help ensure safe transit for the refugees. Yet, it remains unclear, how the emphasis on socio-economic issues is compatible with NATO’s consistent requirement for its member states to increase their defense spending – which would almost inevitably detract from government assistance on poverty relief, education, and similar domains.

The Power of Information or Conversation?

Developments on the intelligence and information sharing fronts were another important part of NATO discussions, though their significance is not immediately obvious. The decision to increase the aerial reconnaissance presence in the MENA region was viewed as perhaps the most significant NATO contribution to fighting ISIS. Nevertheless, sharing and processing the intelligence already at hand remains challenging for the alliance members. Moreover, the quest for reliable human intelligence remains particularly acute in NATO’s Eastern flank, as well as in partner states further east and south. With active ongoing disinformation campaigns conducted by Russian and pro-Russian elements in Eastern Europe, in a time of crisis, inability to swiftly establish the facts on the ground could be devastating. Years of experience in countering Soviet propaganda have made the Baltic states considerably more resistant to these tactics. However, the downside of that is the local propensity to accept or to dismiss certain narratives as obvious or as obviously wrong, and to fail to appreciate the significance of establishing the credibility of their own narrative with external partners.

In conclusion, the human face of NATO – challenges, needs, and fledgling versions of future strategic concepts – was at the forefront of the Summit agenda. However, the most pressing concerns and preferred solutions for individual member states are colored not only by current domestic realities, but also by the historic tradition of security discourse. Struggling to appreciate the underlying differences in its perspectives, national experiences, and narratives, leads to the development of NATO agreements to which each member state then applies a different meaning. This tendency ultimately undercuts NATO as a whole, especially if what the domestic audience was told they were promised fails to materialize. Only by doing their utmost to listen carefully without presumption or wishful thinking, and by working through the differences as they arise, can the allies stand prepared to address the challenges of the future.

The views and assessments expressed here are solely those of the author, and do not necessarily represent either the official position or bear the endorsement of the University of Maryland.

About the author:
*Egle Murauskaite
is a Nonresident Fellow with the ICONS Project at the University of Maryland. Her research is focused on international security issues and unconventional threats, particularly those related to CBRN weapons and materials. Presently based in Lithuania, she also covers a broad spectrum of regional security issues, including assessing NATO’s security assurances in the changing geopolitical context. Her analyses have been published in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Arms Control Today, the Middle East Journal, Peace and Conflict Studies Journal, and Lithuanian Annual Strategic Review. Ms. Murauskaite has also developed courses, workshops, and other training curricula (online and in person) for professionals and academics, exploring different aspects of CBRN-related threats.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI

Tenth Of World’s Wilderness Lost Since 1990s

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Catastrophic declines in wilderness areas around the world over the last 20 years, are reported by researchers reporting in the journal Current Biology. They demonstrate alarming losses comprising a tenth of global wilderness since the 1990s – an area twice the size of Alaska and half the size of the Amazon. The Amazon and Central Africa have been hardest hit.

The findings underscore an immediate need for international policies to recognize the value of wilderness areas and to address the unprecedented threats they face, the researchers say.

“Globally important wilderness areas–despite being strongholds for endangered biodiversity, for buffering and regulating local climates, and for supporting many of the world’s most politically and economically marginalized communities–are completely ignored in environmental policy,” said Dr James Watson of the University of Queensland in Australia and the Wildlife Conservation Society in New York.

“Without any policies to protect these areas, they are falling victim to widespread development. We probably have one to two decades to turn this around. International policy mechanisms must recognize the actions needed to maintain wilderness areas before it is too late. We probably have one to two decades to turn this around.”

Watson said much policy attention has been paid to the loss of species, but comparatively little was known about larger-scale losses of entire ecosystems, especially wilderness areas which tend to be relatively understudied. To fill that gap, the researchers mapped wilderness areas around the globe, with “wilderness” being defined as biologically and ecologically intact landscapes free of any significant human disturbance. The researchers then compared their current map of wilderness to one produced by the same methods in the early 1990s.

This comparison showed that a total of 30.1 million km2 (around 20 percent of the world’s land area) now remains as wilderness, with the majority being located in North America, North Asia, North Africa, and the Australian continent. However, comparisons between the two maps show that an estimated 3.3 million km2 (almost 10 percent) of wilderness area has been lost in the intervening years. Those losses have occurred primarily in South America, which has experienced a 30 percent decline in wilderness, and Africa, which has experienced a 14 percent loss.

“The amount of wilderness loss in just two decades is staggering,” said Dr Oscar Venter of the University of Northern British Colombia. “We need to recognize that wilderness areas, which we’ve foolishly considered to be de-facto protected due to their remoteness, is actually being dramatically lost around the world. Without proactive global interventions we could lose the last jewels in nature’s crown. You cannot restore wilderness, once it is gone, and the ecological process that underpin these ecosystems are gone, and it never comes back to the state it was. The only option is to proactively protect what is left”.

Watson said that the United Nations and others have ignored globally significant wilderness areas in key multilateral environmental agreements and this must change.

“If we don’t act soon, there will only be tiny remnants of wilderness around the planet, and this is a disaster for conservation, for climate change, and for some of the most vulnerable human communities on the planet,” Watson said. “We have a duty to act for our children and their children.”

Chinese Medicine Kills Cancer Cells

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Researchers at the University of Adelaide have shown how a complex mix of plant compounds derived from ancient clinical practice in China – a Traditional Chinese Medicine – works to kill cancer cells.

Compound kushen injection (CKI) is approved for use in China to treat various cancer tumours, usually as an adjunct to western chemotherapy – but how it works has not been known.

This study, published in the journal Oncotarget, is one of the first to characterise the molecular action of a Traditional Chinese Medicine rather than breaking it down to its constituent parts.

“Most Traditional Chinese Medicine are based on hundreds or thousands of years of experience with their use in China,” said study leader, Professor David Adelson, Director of the Zhendong Australia – China Centre for the Molecular Basis of Traditional Chinese Medicine.

“There is often plenty of evidence that these medicines have a therapeutic benefit, but there isn’t the understanding of how or why.”

“If we broke down and tested the components of many Traditional Chinese Medicines, we would find that individual compounds don’t have much activity on their own. It’s the combination of compounds which can be effective, and potentially means few side-effects as well.”

“This is one of the first studies to show the molecular mode of action of a complex mixture of plant-based compounds – in this case extracts from the roots of two medicinal herbs, Kushen and Baituling – by applying what’s known as a systems biology approach. This is a way of analysing complex biological systems that attempts to take into account all measurable aspects of the system rather than focussing on a single variable.”

The Zhendong Australia China Centre for Molecular Traditional Chinese Medicine was established at the University of Adelaide in 2012 in a collaboration with the China-based Shanxi College of Traditional Chinese Medicine and Zhendong Pharmaceutical Company.

The Centre was established with a donation by the Zhendong Pharmaceutical Company, with the aim of understanding how Traditional Chinese Medicine works, and the long-term aim of possible integration into western medicine.

The researchers used high-throughput next generation sequencing technologies to identify genes and biological pathways targeted by CKI when applied to breast cancer cells grown in the laboratory.

“We showed that the patterns of gene expression triggered by CKI affect the same pathways as western chemotherapy but by acting on different genes in the same pathways,” said Professor Adelson.

“These genes regulate the cell cycle of division and death, and it seems that CKI alters the way the cell cycle is regulated to push cancer cells down the cell death pathway, therefore killing the cells.”

Professor Adelson said this technique could be used to analyse the molecular mechanisms of other Traditional Chinese Medicines, potentially opening their way for use in western medicine.

Unprecedented Atmospheric Behavior Disrupts One Of Earth’s Most Regular Climate Cycles

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The normal flow of air high up in the atmosphere over the equator, known as the quasi-biennial oscillation, was seen to break down earlier this year. These stratospheric winds are found high above the tropics, their direction and strength changes in a regular two- to three-year cycle which provides forecasters with an indication of the weather to expect in Northern Europe. Westerly winds are known to increase the chance of warm and wet conditions, while easterlies bring drier and colder weather.

Scientists from NCAS at the University of Oxford and the Met Office were part of an international team that observed the unusual behaviour in February, noticing a reversal of the expected pattern in the winds. This same team then identified the reason why.

The quasi-biennial oscillation is a regular feature of the climate system. On average, these equatorial eastward and westward winds alternate every 28 to 29 months, making them very predictable in the long term. The team’s findings published in Science this week, show that this unexpected change in wind direction was caused by atmospheric waves in the Northern Hemisphere.

Dr Scott Osprey, an NCAS scientist at the University of Oxford, said, “The recent disruption in the quasi-biennial oscillation was not predicted, not even one month ahead. If we can get to the bottom of why the normal pattern was affected in this way, we could develop more confidence in our future seasonal forecasts.”

Prof Adam Scaife, Head of Long-range Forecasting at the Met Office and Honorary Visiting Professor at the University of Exeter, said: “This unexpected disruption to the climate system switches the cycling of the quasi-biennial oscillation forever. And this is important as it is one of the factors that will influence the coming winter.”

A return to more typical behaviour within the next year is forecast, though scientists believe that the quasi-biennial oscillation could become more susceptible to similar disruptions as the climate warms.

Later this month international research groups will meet in Oxford to discuss the origins and implications of this event.

Let’s Bring Presheva Out Of The Isolation-Separation Triangle – OpEd

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The official meeting between Edi Rama and Aleksandar Vučić, the prime ministers of Albania and Serbia will take place in the next few days. This is a proactive continuation of a dialogue that begun three years ago within the framework of European Integration process embraced by the two countries. Such a bilateral dialogue has been encouraged by the European Union and aspires to empower the regional cooperation at the neighborly, bilateral and multilateral levels.

There is no doubt that a political and diplomatic dialogue is positive among the Balkan nations and governments, especially between Albania and Serbia, whose peoples have had violent confrontations and lack of political-bilateral discussion for over a century.

Moreover, the truth is that until now the political – diplomatic dialogue between Tirana and Belgrade has been more of a ceremonial, following the protocol tradition and routine official public statements, it has not be constructive let alone productive in order to see clear short-term results.
Of course ceremonial visits and meetings, as well as the mutual statements have a positive impact towards bringing the parties together; they also provide an improvement of the political climate and mutual trust among the two nations.

It is understood that without the afore-mentioned steps it would be impossible to move forward into concrete projects, from the bilateral education initiatives all the way to regional infrastructure projects.

On the political and diplomatic dialogue between Tirana and Belgrade that is expected to happen in the next few days, it is imperative for both sides to unravel the principal topics that so far have been avoided and have not acquired a privileged ranking in the existing bilateral agenda.

One of these issues is the current analysis of the valley – region of Presheva as well as the immediate implementation of a series of actions destined to improve the living conditions of Albanians on this part of Serbia.

The Albanian community in the region of Presheva has remained completely out of any government agenda and is isolated within the Serbia-Kosovo-Macedonia triangle. In this political – diplomatic process of Albania and Serbia, the Albanian Government must raise the voice in support of Presheva and its people while polishing off the neglect-isolationist attitude from this important bilateral issue.

In the upcoming meeting between Edi Rama and Aleksandar Vučić it is imperative to unravel the fundamental aspects that are problematic to Albanians in the region of Presheva: the matters pertaining to human, ethnic rights and the overall development of economic and education-social projects among Albanians in this part of Serbia.

In the first aspect, Serbia must refrain from using the discriminatory politics that is against human freedom and liberties that benefit Albanian communities. The freedom, human rights and community rights must be analyzed and respected under the European Charter of Human Rights.

On the other hand community rights, including the material, symbolic and cultural-education traditions are in front of many challenges that must become the main focus of discussions at the highest levels in the midst of Tirana and Belgrade.

In this context Tirana’s Government must promote the same rights of Serbian minorities in Kosovo for the Albanian community in the region of Presheva, based on a fully fledged reciprocity framework.
In regards to the second aspect, economic and social development, it is time for dialogue by the Governments of Tirana, Prishtina and Belgrade, they must contribute tangible results. The three parties must pursue a united strategy of coordination, cooperation in order to co-finance these programs for the Albanian communities in Presheva, Bujanovc and Medvegje.

Today’s economic and social situation in Presheva is utterly hopeless and disastrous. There is a complete lack of investments from the national and local governments including the business sector. Foreign investments are fully absent. Presheva’s industry is destroyed. Agriculture and livestock grazing enterprises are at the most primitive levels.

As a result there are huge social problems. Unemployment is approximately 80 percent, making it the highest in Europe. School system is in chaos due to the absence of Albanian language text books. Health Care service barely exists. Remittances sent from the local family members working abroad are the only source of economic improvement and income to secure minimum basic living expenses.

The governments of Albania and Kosovo must include the issues of Albanians in Presheva on every meeting agenda with their Serbian and E.U. counterparts.

Moreover Tirana’s government should request to the Government of Belgrade to immediately include
Presheva in every national and regional development project that entail economic, infrastructure and social progress.

It is a tripartite task between Albania-Serbia-Kosovo to include the region of Presheva in the European Union Agenda and make sure that this part of Serbia is neither abandoned nor isolated.

These measures must be tangible for all nations of Western Balkans. But in the case of Presheva region these challenges must be addressed above all by the Serbian government due to its commitment to respect and fulfill the requirements of Chapters 23-24 that are part of the framework for Belgrade’s membership negotiations with the European Union.

How US Is Complicit In Human Rights Abuses In Honduras – Analysis

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By Jessica Farber*

In an opinion piece that appeared in the New York Times on August 11, titled “How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth got Safer,” Sonia Nazario paints a misguided picture of Honduras as a country that was once ravaged with violence, but has since been bravely rescued and is now stable thanks to aid from the United States.[i] On the one hand, the author highlights an important point: some violence-prevention programs funded by the United States in Honduras are indeed working, and their focus on human capital and social justice is a welcome departure from the “iron-fisted” security measures that have characterized U.S. aid in the past. What the author neglects to mention, however, is that an enormous portion of the same aid package is also funneled to a government that, in conjunction with a corrupt military and police force, is carrying out massive human rights violations against its citizens. Given the increasing number of activists killed with impunity under the rightwing government, whose power the United States helped to consolidate following the 2009 coup against democratically elected President Manuel Zelaya, continued funding to Honduras deserves additional scrutiny.

A Contradictory Approach

As Nazario rightfully acknowledges, the withdrawal of all funding to Honduras could be harmful because it would interrupt successful violence-prevention initiatives at the local level. The pilot programs she describes, in which the U.S. Agency for International Development (U.S.A.I.D.) partners with community leaders to implement programs that engage and counsel gang members and other vulnerable youth, are both novel and exemplary. With such programs, the United States finally seems to acknowledge that simply intensifying security measures to kill off gang members does nothing but fuel the fire. Nazario admirably emphasizes the need to address the long-term structural factors behind gang violence and advocates for the implementation of more of these types of programs throughout Central America. Furthermore, in “a striking rebuke against the rising isolationists in American politics,” Nazario highlights the positive impact that U.S. spending can have for both Americans —in terms of stemming the flow of migrants— as well as for marginalized populations in the developing world.[ii] The Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA), a longtime proponent of grassroots and social justice programs, applauds Nazario for her intentions in this respect.[iii]

While Nazario is not wrong to shed light on the specific U.S. initiatives that are succeeding in violence prevention, it is far too soon to claim that the United States has single-handedly created a dramatically safer Honduras. On the contrary, such a position ignores the complex roots of the violence in Honduras, and leads one to question whether the author is not trying to obfuscate U.S. complicity in the violence. As Nazario mentions in her article, crime and violence are major issues plaguing Honduran society, but she erroneously attributes most of this violence to gangs, narco-trafficking and other forms of organized crime that the Honduran government needs help in dealing with. To genuinely contribute to the overall sustainable development of Honduras, it is essential for the United States to acknowledge that much of the gang and drug-related violence, as well as the scores of uninvestigated murders of activists, are politically motivated and are carried out at the urging of elements of the military and the police. The article effectively distracts readers from the government’s abysmal human rights record and its own role in perpetuating violence in a country where 98 percent of crimes go unsolved.[iv] Amnesty International’s Marselha Gonçalves Margerin recently told National Public Radio that “the U.S. government has been treating these [Central American] governments as victims of organized crimes and not really making them responsible for how they are treating, and failing to protect, their citizens.”[v]

Berta Cáceres: A Symbol of Impunity

This year, the collusion between private actors, the military and the government in Honduras, was placed in the international spotlight. The assassination of indigenous activist Berta Cáceres six months ago is just the tip of the iceberg in terms of human rights violations in Honduras over the past seven years. Her death, however, is the “smoking gun” that makes it impossible for the United States to turn a blind eye to the Honduran government’s complicity in human rights violations against opposition activists.

Just before midnight on March 2 of this year, 44-year-old Berta Cáceres, founder of the Civic Council of Popular and Indigenous Hondurans (COPINH), was gunned down in her home. In the months leading up to her death, Berta had been carrying out a peaceful yet vocal campaign to prevent the construction of the Agua Zarca dam on a sacred river belonging to the indigenous Lenca population. While the government was entirely aware of the threats to Berta’s life, and was repeatedly urged by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) to offer her protection, any protection given was clearly inadequate. Given Berta’s stature as the winner of the international 2015 Goldman Environmental Prize, and an inspiring leader of a global movement to preserve indigenous rights, her death triggered fear among activists all over Honduras.

The response of the Honduran government to Cáceres’ death was wholly inadequate and emblematic of the way it deals with human rights violations against opposition leaders. Instead of immediately interviewing individuals from any of the 33 construction companies against whom she had lodged complaints of death threats, the government selectively interrogated individuals within Berta’s own COPINH organization. It was not until May 2, exactly two months after Berta’s assassination, that the government finally launched a so-called “comprehensive” investigation to find the culprits.[vi]

This state-led “Jaguar Operation,” initiated in large part due to growing international scrutiny over the government’s inaction, finally resulted in the arrests of five individuals. Unsurprisingly, two of the charged individuals were linked to the construction company behind the dam, Desarollos Energéticos S.A. (DESA), two others were active members of the military and one was a retired military officer. Yet evidence increasingly indicates that the assassins were not alone in plotting the attack, and that they received their orders from the state.[vii] In a previous article, COHA referred to the Jaguar Operation as a “sham investigation” that “was designed not to serve justice,” but was rather a “strategy to protect the masterminds behind Berta Cáceres’ murder.”[viii]

What the inherently biased investigation did reveal, however, is “the blatant collusion between private interests linked to DESA, active members of the Honduran army, and a corrupt administration,” according to COHA Research Associate, Emma Tyrou.[ix] A June report in The Guardian exposed further proof of the state’s ties to the murder. The article disclosed testimony from a former Honduran military sergeant Rodrigo Cruz, suggesting that Berta’s name had appeared on a military “hit-list.” “I’m 100% certain that Berta Cáceres was killed by the army,” he told the newspaper.[x] The government’s reluctance to interview the sole eyewitness to the murder—Mexican activist Gustavo Soto who was also a victim of the attack—as well as its initial attribution of the crime to little more than a failed attempt at burglary, further suggests the government’s likely role in scuttling the investigation.[xi]

In the six months since Berta’s death, the administration of President Juan Orlando Hernandez has continuously neglected the pleas of her family and the international community to allow an independent investigation to take place. Since the IAHCR derives its mandate from the Organization of the American States, and is therefore a competent authority in Honduras, it is the only body that can create a commission of independent experts to carry out an impartial investigation.[xii] “The Honduran state is too closely linked to the murder of my mother to carry out an independent investigation,” Berta’s youngest daughter, Laura Cáceres, 23, told the Guardian in May. [xiii] “It is the government who awarded the dam commission and the government who sent military and police to work with DESA’s private security guards, who threatened my mother.”[xiv] To date, the Honduran state has refused to allow experts from the IACHR into the country, further suggesting it has something to hide.[xv]

As the closest ally of the right-wing Honduran government and the country’s largest bilateral donor, the United States is uniquely positioned to pressure President Hernandez to do something about the appalling state of human rights in Honduras. At the very least, such pressure could seek to persuade him to allow an independent investigation of the Cáceres murder to take place.

The Honduran government’s murky role in the case of Berta Cáceres illustrates the controversial nature of U.S. aid to the country. Berta’s assassination is not an isolated incident and the United States cannot view it as such—she remains a symbol of the hundreds of Honduran activists targeted and killed by government, military, and police forces. Just days after Berta’s death, environmental activist, Nelson García was killed, and in July Lesbia Yaneth Garcia, another COPINH employee, was found dead with a machete wound in her skull. At least one member of the military and one man working on the hydroelectric project she was protesting have been implicated in Yaneth García’s death.[xvi] Global Witness recently reported that Honduras is the second most deadly country in which to be an environmental activist, and the Spanish newspaper, El País, described the nation as “a field of death for environmentalists.”[xvii] So while the overall number of homicides in the country may have decreased over the past few years, as Nazario notes in her article, the number of activists killed has markedly increased. Since 2010, 114 environmentalists have been murdered in Honduras.[xviii] And environmental defenders are not alone; anyone who publicly voices opposition to the state faces similar danger. According to the National Human Rights Commissioner of Honduras (CONADEH), 43 journalists were murdered between 2010 and 2014, and only twelve of the alleged murders had been brought to trial by the end of that year.[xix] The IACHR received reports of the murders of 86 legal practitioners and 22 human rights defenders in the same period.[xx] The Human Rights Watch World Report 2016 also found that peasants’ rights activists as well as LGBTQ activists have been victims of hundreds of uninvestigated attacks.[xxi] Essentially, it is no longer possible to express dissatisfaction with the government without becoming a target of the state.

Towards a “More Safe” Honduras

The uptick in activist murders can be traced back to the period directly following the 2009 coup d’état against President Manuel Zelaya. Zelaya had supported rural peasant and environmental movements, such as Berta’s, in their fight against land dispossession and mining. However, after 2009, the new administration led by President Porfirio Lobo cut subsidies for social programs, rolled back progressive land reforms, and sought to open infrastructure construction to foreign investors, declaring in 2011 that Honduras was “open for business.” [xxii] Encouraged by the United States, the successive rightwing governments have proceeded to grant mining concessions and dam-building contracts to foreign companies, displacing many indigenous communities in the process.[xxiii] This has made peasants’ rights groups and indigenous activists —who argue that the affected communities were not properly consulted by the foreign firms—political opponents of the government.[xxiv] As Greg Grandin reported in The Nation, “since Zelaya’s ouster, there’s been an all-out assault on these decent people—torture, murder, militarization of the countryside, repressive laws, such as the absolute banning of the morning-after pill, the rise of paramilitary security forces, and the wholesale deliverance of the country’s land and resources to transnational pillagers.”[xxv]

While the existing evidence is not sufficient to prove the United States’ involvement in plotting the coup, it is now clear that the State Department under Hillary Clinton was a key player in legitimizing the post-coup government and effectively prevented Zelaya from running for re-election. Though the Obama administration initially criticized the military coup that put Roberto Michelletti in the presidency and other leaders of the coup in his cabinet, the United States was the first to recognize the new Porfirio Lobo government that was put in place by elections months later.[xxvi] This recognition was granted despite the fact that all opposition candidates had boycotted the elections and all international observers (besides the U.S. Republican party) withdrew, refusing to recognize the elections’ legitimacy.[xxvii] While the U.N. General Assembly called for the “immediate and unconditional return of Zelaya,” and the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) refused to recognize the outcome of the elections, the U.S. State Department blocked the Organization of American States’ (OAS) resolution to not recognize elections held under the de facto government.[xxviii] Instead the United States praised Lobo for “restoring democracy” and promoting “national reconciliation.”[xxix]

Perhaps unsurprisingly, Washington continues to stand idly by as the rule of law in Honduras deteriorates. While former Secretary of State and current presidential candidate Hillary Clinton continues to deflect criticism of her involvement in the 2009 coup and her running mate, Tim Kaine, touts his time in Honduras as the most formative eight months of his life, the U.S. government maintains its commitment to propping up the very agents who are perpetuating injustice. Since 2009, the U.S. has sent $200 million USD in aid directly to the military and police force in the name of fighting crime and drug trafficking.[xxx] Instead, this money has allowed the state and the military to maintain the status quo, which is the violent repression of its citizens. Only a shallow analysis could describe such aid as a heroic contribution towards a safer Honduras. By solely focusing on the role of non-military spending in Honduras, Nazario’s article upholds the narrative that an infusion of U.S. taxpayer dollars will help to pull Honduras from the depths of poverty and violence. Last year, Congress approved a $750 million USD budget for the Alliance for Prosperity Plan (APP) to be administered by the U.S., Guatemalan, Honduran, and Salvadoran governments. The plan aims to address the “push factors” of violence in the so-called Northern Triangle. As analyzed in previous COHA articles, the APP could, in theory, be beneficial, but an alarming 60 percent of the funds to Honduras go to military financing and training.[xxxi] It remains to be seen how the vague conditions on this aid play out in practice.[xxxii]

With so much money invested in the training of the Honduran security forces, the United States cannot remain oblivious to the mounting evidence that the military is behind the recent murders. Fusina, one of the units of the military that allegedly received the “hit-list” with Berta Cacéres’ name on it, receives direct military training from the U.S. Marine Corps and the F.B.I.[xxxiii]

The Honduran police force teems with corruption as well. Marvin Ponce, Vice President of the Honduran Congress estimates that over 40 percent of the police force is involved in organized crime. [xxxiv] Additionally, Human Rights Watch reports that “the use of lethal force by the national police is a chronic problem… Investigations into police abuses are marred by inefficiency and corruption … and impunity is the rule.”[xxxv] Perhaps even more concerning, the assassinations of two Honduran investigators (in 2009 and 2011) looking at the complicity between drug traffickers, police leaders, and organized crime, were found to be linked to top Honduran police officials, according to leaked documents.[xxxvi] Of course, the Honduran government has fiercely refuted claims that either the state or the military are involved in human rights violations.[xxxvii] Following President Hernandez’ lead, U.S. State Department spokesperson John Kirby claimed at a June 22 press briefing that “there’s no specific credible allegations of gross violations of human rights” in Honduras.[xxxviii]

So why is it that the United States so steadfastly supports the Honduran state, despite all the evidence that it is allowing its citizens to be murdered with impunity? The answer stems from the strategic economic and military importance of Honduras. Honduras holds the United States’ only air base between South America and the United States, and since the contra war in Nicaragua in the 1980s, Honduras has served as the regional hub for U.S. military operations in Central America. American corporations also have extensive mining and hydroelectric investments in Honduras, as well as banana companies like Dole and Chiquita, and apparel, auto industry and other manufacturing plants. Out of all the Central American governments, the Honduran government is also the most ideologically aligned with the United States.

Public Pressure Mounts in the United States

Aside from Berta Cáceres’ three daughters who have traveled the world in recent months to call for international pressure on the Honduran government, international organizations, civil society groups, and U.S. policymakers alike have urged the Obama administration to leverage its financial support of the Honduran state to call for justice. Ever since 2009, in the face of mounting evidence that the United States is funding a criminal regime whose collusion with private interests is now well-documented, pressure on the U.S. government has grown. In 2010, thirty congressmen sent a letter to then Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, urging the Obama administration to stop funding the Honduran state, especially the police and military, until the culture of impunity is addressed. [xxxix]

After years of similar pressure on the State Department, including another congressional letter to Secretary John Kerry last year with lackluster results, opposition to the funding reached a crescendo this summer after Berta’s death. In June and July, a vocal campaign to “Stop Aid to Honduras” gained traction in the United States, using the U.S. Leahy law as the crux of its argument. Under this law, the State Department and Department of Defense are prohibited from contributing funds to any foreign military unit where there is “credible evidence of human rights abuses.”[xl] The United States is also prohibited from providing funds to a government instituted through a military coup.[xli] Despite a Wikileaks-exposed email from the U.S. ambassador to Honduras stating that the overthrow of Zelaya undoubtedly “constituted an illegal and unconstitutional coup,” the Obama administration has avoided calling it a military coup so that aid can continue unabated.[xlii]

On June 14, Henry C. Johnson (D-GA) proposed the Berta Cáceres Human Rights Act, which offers the opportunity for the United States to hold the Honduran government accountable for its actions. The bill would halt all aid to Honduras for military operations, training, and arms until the government carries out exhaustive and transparent investigations into the deaths of activists that have been linked to the Honduran police and military.[xliii] This is the bill to which Nazario refers in her article, classifying the legislation as “an attack from the left.” Though she acknowledges that the human rights concerns that the bill represents are legitimate, she claims that its passage “would be a mistake,” due to the beneficial violence prevention programs carried out by the police.

Conclusion

Because of the United States’ tightly bound relationship with Honduras—most importantly, the Honduran government’s dependency on U.S. aid—Washington has a responsibility to the Honduran people to make a serious commitment to ending the ongoing human rights crisis. Simply providing the government funds to “reform itself” will no longer suffice. It is time for the United States to recognize its complicity in funding a criminal regime, and halt all aid to the Honduran military and police until that government can prove its own commitment to justice. Once this happens, the United States can continue to fund beneficial social justice programs such as the ones Nazario mentions in her article. Until that happens, however, human and environmental rights defenders will face extreme peril at the hands of a government that does nothing to protect them and is in collusion with the very actors who use violence to maintain control over marginalized groups. In Berta Cáceres’ own words in her acceptance speech of the 2015 Goldman Prize, “Despertemos, despertemos humanidad, ya no hay tiempo”—wake up humanity, we’re out of time.

*Jessica Farber, Research Associate at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs

Notes:
[i] Nazario, Sonia. “How the Most Dangerous Place on Earth got Safer.” 11 August 2016. New York Times. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/14/opinion/sunday/how-the-most-dangerous-place-on-earth-got-a-little-bit-safer.html

[ii] Ibid.

[iii] Farber, Jessica. “War in Peace: Exploring the Roots of El Salvador’s Gang Violence.” 18 July 2016. Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.coha.org/war-in-peace-exploring-the-roots-of-el-salvadors-gang-vio-lence/

[iv] Farr, Sam. “Obama Asked to Curtail Assistance to Honduras.” 19 October 2010. The North American Congress on Latin America. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://nacla.org/news/obama-asked-curtail-assistance-honduras

[v] Gonsalves Margerin, Marcelha. “Seeking Justice after the Murder of Honduran Activist Berta Cáceres.” National Public Radio. 27 April 2016. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.wnyc.org/story/seeking-justice-after-murder-honduran-activist-berta-caceres/

[vi] “Una amplia y exhaustiva investigación basada en métodos técnicos y científicos,” statement issued by the Public Ministry of Honduras, published on social media by the Honduras media TN5 Estelar. May 2, 2016. Accessed July 7, 2016. https://www.facebook.com/TN5Estelar/photos/a.330734023616440.77404.326888920667617/1113789491977552/?type=3&theater

[vii] Lakhani, Nina and Ed Pilkington. “US investigating allegations Honduran military had hitlist of activists to target.” 8 July 2016. The Guardian. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/08/honduras-military-hitlist-activists-us-investigation

[viii] Tyrou, “The Symbol of Berta Cáceres Continues to Expose Criminal Coup Regime and its Deadly Extracgive Formula for Honduras.” 12 July 2016. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.coha.org/the-symbol-of-berta-caceres-continues-to-expose-criminal-coup-regime-and-its-deadly-extractive-formula-for-honduras/#_ftn11

[ix] Tyrou, Emma. “Justice for Berta Cáceres: Yet Another Murder Proves that Death and Impunity Prevail.” 11 July 2016. Washington Report on the Hemisphere, vol. 36, issue 11. Accessed 26 August 2016.

[x] Lakhani, Nina. “Berta Cáceres’ name was on Honduran military’s hitlist, says former soldier.” 21 June 2016. The Guardian. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jun/21/berta-caceres-name-honduran-military-hitlist-former-soldier

[xi] Birss, Moira and Gustavo Castro-Soto, “In Crisis, we Find Hope.” 28 April 2016. The North American Congress on Latin America. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://nacla.org/news/2016/04/28/crisis-we-find-hope

[xii] Oscar Arias Sánchez to President of the Republic of Honduras Juan Orlando Hernández. April 27, 2016. Accessed 26 August, 2016. http://bertacaceres.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Ex-Costa-Rican-president-and-Nobel-Peace-Prize-winner-Oscar-Arias-urges-JOH-to-allow-IACHR-investigation.pdf

[xiii] Lakhani, Nina. “Berta Cáceres murder: four men arrested over Honduran activist’s death.” 2 May 2016. The Guardian. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/may/02/berta-caceres-murder-four-men-arrested-honduras

[xiv] Ibid.

[xv] Blitzer, Jonathan. “Should the U.S. Still be Sending Aid to Honduras?” 17 August 2016. The New Yorker. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/should-the-u-s-still-be-sending-military-aid-to-honduras

[xvi] Associated Press. “ Police in Honduras arrest three in slaying of activist.” 13 July 2016. The Los Angeles Times. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.latimes.com/world/la-fg-honduras-activist-arrest-20160713-snap-story.html

[xvii] “New Data on the Murder Rate of Environmental and Land Activists in Honduras, the Highest in the World.” 4 March 2016. Global Witness. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.globalwitness.org/en/press-releases/global-witness-releases-new-data-murder-rate-environmental-and-land-activists-honduras-highest-world/

[xviii] Planas, Roque. “U.S. Aid to Honduras in Doubt after Killings of Activists.” 11 August 2016. The Huffington Post. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/honduran-aid-activist-killings_us_57acf39fe4b007c36e4dec10

[xix] “The World Report 2016: Events in Honduras in 2015.” The Human Rights Watch . Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2016/country-chapters/honduras

[xx] Ibid.

[xxi] Ibid.

[xxii] “Honduras is Open for Business.” 26 July 2011. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.coha.org/honduras-is-open-for-business/

[xxiii] Carasik, Lauren. “Blood in Honduras, Silence in the United States.”16 July 2016. Boston Review. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://bostonreview.net/world-us/lauren-carasik-blood-honduras-silence-united-states

[xxiv] Isacson, Adam, and Sarah Kinosian. “Which Central American Military and Police Units Get the Most U.S. Aid?” Washington Office on Latin America. April 15, 2016. Accessed July 08, 2016. https://www.wola.org/analysis/which-central-american-military-and-police-units-get-the-most-u-s-aid/

[xxv] Grandin, Greg. “The Clinton-Backed Honduran Regime is Picking Off Indigenous Leaders.” 3 March 2016. The Nation. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/the-clinton-backed-honduran-regime-is-picking-off-indigenous-leaders/

[xxvi] Frank, Dana. “Honduras: Which Side is the US on?” 22 May 2012. The Nation. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/honduras-which-side-us/

[xxvii] Ibid.

[xxviii] Zunes, Stephen. “The U.S. Role in the Honduras Coup and Subsequent Violence.” 19 June 2016. The Huffington Post. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/the-us-role-in-the-honduras-coup-and-subsequent-violence_us_5766c7ebe4b0092652d7a138

[xxix] Frank, Dana. “Honduras: Which Side is the US on?” 22 May 2012. The Nation. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/honduras-which-side-us/

[xxx] Blitzer, Jonathan. “Should the U.S. Still be Sending Aid to Honduras?” 17 August 2016. The New Yorker. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/should-the-u-s-still-be-sending-military-aid-to-honduras

[xxxi] Iesue, Laura. “The Alliance for Prosperity Plan: A Failed Effort for Stemming Migration.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs. 1 August 2016. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.coha.org/the-alliance-for-prosperity-plan-a-failed-effort-for-stemming-migration/

[xxxii] Ibid.

[xxxiii] Isacson, Adam, and Sarah Kinosian. “Which Central American Military and Police Units Get the Most U.S. Aid?” Washington Office on Latin America. April 15, 2016. Accessed July 08, 2016. https://www.wola.org/analysis/which-central-american-military-and-police-units-get-the-most-u-s-aid/

[xxxiv] “Ponce claims 40% of police tied to organized crime.” 21 July 2011. Honduran Weekly. Accessed 26 July 2016. http://www.hondurasweekly.com/joomla-pages-iii/archieved-articles/53-news/national/6730-ponce-claims-40-of-police-tied-to-organized-crime

[xxxv] Frank, Dana. “Honduras: Which Side is the US on?” 22 May 2012. The Nation. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.thenation.com/article/honduras-which-side-us/

[xxxvi] Malkin, Elizabeth and Alberto Arce. “Files Suggest Police Leaders Ordered Killing of Antidrug Officials.” 15 April 2016. The New York Times. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/16/world/americas/files-suggest-honduras-police-leaders-ordered-killing-of-antidrug-officials.html?_r=0

[xxxvii] “HONDURAS: Government Denies That Military Killed Cáceres” Latin News, June 24, 2016. Accessed July 8, 2016. http://www.latinnews.com/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=69211&uid=17952&acc=1&Itemid=6&cat_id=802664 &utm_content=buffer7ec07&utm_medium=social&utm_source=facebook.com&utm_campaign=buffer

[xxxviii] “Press Briefing with John Kirby.” 22 June 2016. U.S. Department of State. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2016/06/258980.htm

[xxxix] Farr, Sam. “Obama Asked to Curtail Assistance to Honduras.” 19 October 2010. The North American Congress on Latin America. Accessed 26 August 2016. https://nacla.org/news/obama-asked-curtail-assistance-honduras

[xl] Carasik, Lauren. “Blood in Honduras, Silence in the United States.”16 July 2016. Boston Review. Accessed 26 August 2016. http://bostonreview.net/world-us/lauren-carasik-blood-honduras-silence-united-states

[xli] Ibid.

[xlii] “A Selection from the Cache of Diplomatic Dispatches.” 19 June 2011. The New York Times. Accessed 26 June 2016. http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/11/28/world/20101128-cables-viewer.html?hp&_r=0#report/cables-09TEGUCIGALPA645

[xliii] “H.R. 5474: Berta Cáceres Human Rights in Honduras Act.” 14 June 2016. Govtrack Accessed 26 August 2016. https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr5474/text


The Journey To Significance Starts From Within – OpEd

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Ike Amadi is a fiercely passionate and energetic young Nigerian whose vision in life is to inspire others to do something to better themselves and their communities. He is a graduate of computer engineering from the Moscow Power Engineering Institute. Ike has served in several leadership capacities and is currently the leader of The LA Family, a vibrant group charged with encouraging one more person to learn and apply the word of God. He also leads Do Something Club.

In this interview, Ike Amadi, now a doctoral candidate in computer engineering, spoke recently to Kester Kenn Klomegah, an independent research writer on Russia-African affairs, about his motivation to begin writing books and the significance of his message to the present generation.

Here are interview excerpts:

"Do Something Signifant!" by Ike Amadi.

“Do Something Signifant!” by Ike Amadi.

Q:What are the motivational or driving factors to write books?

Amadi: Thanks, when I observe something missing in the society – especially in my immediate community, I try to address it through my writing; basically to call attention to that malady. It is a way for me to teach and transfer my learning. And thankfully, I find that my thoughts are usually well received, which in turn motivates me to write more and to reach a wider audience.

Another important factor is the fact that I am originally a story teller. I love telling stories – of the things I have experienced, and the stories I have heard. When these stories are told, they usually help other people find their direction or identify the missing piece in their journey. I believe stories are like maps and that is why I have to keep telling stories – good stories, to give direction and also make people lead happier lives. We create happiness for other people by adding value to them.

Q:You have written two books while studying at the university, how similar or different are they?

Amadi:The two books – “Do Something!” and “Do Something Significant!” are quite similar in the theme they address – in that they are written to inspire action; by content however, they are quite different. Or better put, one is a continuation of the other. “Do Something Significant” is the continuation of “Do Something!”

If my first book,“Do Something!” is seen as a beginner’s manual – for someone who wants to do something meaningful with their life; the second one “Do Something Significant!” is the manual for personal development. That is, that person has already started doing something, but wants to know how he can plan his life and actions better in order to yield better results and gain significance in life.

Q: What is the key message in both books for readers?

Amadi: The key message is “Indolence is costly” and that “the journey to significance starts from within.” You must do something, if you want to get something out of your life; and after you have done something, you do something significant! So the first question is how do we get started? Keep asking yourself the right simple questions and make sure you strive to get the right answers. Try to overcome fear and failure! As the saying goes, nothing is given on a platter of gold, so you must do something you have never done; and even if you have done it before, you must work relentlessly towards its improvement and learn to take it by force. You might finally ask, what changes are you making in different stages of your life to become significant to the society?

Q: What difficulties did you face while writing these books and how did you overcome them?

Amadi: Writing a serious work while studying was not very easy; I had to be able to properly manage my time in order to meet mywriting deadlines, as well as not get kicked out of school for poor performance. At that time also, I kept a part-time job, and so time it was a great challenge for me. But I managed by cutting off every time-wasting activity, and by using the night time, nay, every spare time I had very well. I also think because I was all too confident in my message, I was able to put in every effort and more to see that the work was completed. And thank God it was.

Q: Can you discuss your vision for future?

Amadi: Yes, I certainly can. I am looking forward to and planning for a time when I can do things like these full time, and reach out to more lives especially the young people who are struggling with finding direction for their lives.

Right now, I have two social and spiritual projects I am working on – The Learn and Apply Family (LA Family), which is an online Bible study platform that encourages people to study the word of God daily; and Do Something Club which mentors young people and helps them understand how life works. It is my desire that we will solidify and institutionalize these platforms so that they can outlive me and my team. This will include setting up some permanent structures for the propagation of the vision and message to the rest of the world.

That is the overarching vision for my life. And so I am working on it, and developing myself and building a strong team with people who understand my vision – to inspire our generation.

*Kester Kenn Klomegah is an independent research writer on Russia-African affairs.

Avert Sino-US Showdown Over South China Sea – OpEd

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By Sudhanshu Tripathi*

With the US piling up its warships with fighter planes and stationing troops in South China Sea, where China has hectically been active since long past, the likely scenario bodes bad omen with all chances of a major regional war breaking out between the two which may include regional navies like Japan, Australia and South Korea.

Indeed, the mounting tensions in South China Sea are due to China’s own creation which cropped up there few years back – in 2011 – because Beijing advanced its sovereign claim over entire South China Sea as its maritime territory citing some historical evidences. But that claim was rejected by a five-member panel from the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague, Netherlands on July 12, 2016, while deciding on Philippines’ complaint lodged in 2013 for arbitration on grounds of alleged Chinese infringement into Manila’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), under clauses of violation of the United Nations Treaty governing “Laws of the Sea” (UNCLOS) to which China is also a signatory. Unfortunately, this legal defeat has made Beijing more aggressive and irresponsible in its behaviour as it has resumed threatening all the littoral states of Asia-Pacific including India, thereby endangering the already tense scenario in this region.

In the recent past, while pursuing its ill-founded claim, China not only raised its naval presence with increasing number of naval warships, submarines and aerial support and monitoring and performing regular naval exercises with bold display of its awesome military power but also creating artificial reefs in the ocean with a view to reclaim land amidst sea for stationing troops, armaments and other logistical purposes. Obviously, this highhandedness was bound to ignite intense reactions not only among littoral powers in the Asia-Pacific – now rechristened Indo-Pacific – like Southeast Asian countries including India but also the distant regional naval powers including Japan, Australia and the US.

In Southeast Asia, China is already engaged in several disputes over sovereignty of islands in South China Sea. It has disputes with Philippines, Vietnam and Malaysia over the control of many islands and reefs as well.

The US has been carefully monitoring all these developments as it has its precious stakes in this region particularly owning its strategic relations with many of Southeast countries and also major powers in the Far East. It has also to ensure and monitor the safe and uninterrupted passage of maritime trade and commerce passing through different sea-lanes in South China Sea region, connecting East Asia with Persian Gulf and West Asia and beyond which would have been stopped pending China’s permission had Beijing’s claim proved its legal validity. The US is also well aware that global geopolitics is moving towards East after around two hundred and half years from its traditional Euro-Atlantic centre of power. That is why the US had already concluded a significant military agreement with Australia in 2011 following its “Asia Pivot” policy having a covert agenda to contain China’s imperialistic-militarist aggressions in the Asia-Pacific so as to provide a security cover to the smaller regional powers and also to establish that the US is still the global power and also maintains its hegemony all across the world.

As a scholar Martin Jacques also predicts in his oft-cited book “When China Rules the World” that China will surpass the US and will become a dominant global leader with none to challenge its hegemony. Obviously, the US is to remove such floating confusions about its sagging global power image and that has, now, brought it into full steam in South China Sea because Beijing has offered it a new opportunity.

Indeed, these events do not bode well for the peace and security of the Indo-Pacific region because China too is very image conscious and particularly because it is still suffering from “Middle Kingdom Complex”, which has propelled it adopt novel ways, like the latest Silk Road and Maritime Silk Road initiative, to assert it regional and global hegemony according to an American scholar, Randall Peerenboom. Obviously, if war begins between the two, it may end up involving Australia, Japan, South Korea and US’ other NATO allies besides Southeast nations, and also India. Its further advancement will inevitably lead to a Third World War which will very horrible as all the key parties in the likely war are, today, nuclear powered belligerents.

To avert the possibility of having another major war destroy this world, China must abide by the decision of the Hague Arbitration. Both sides ought to observe restraint and must seek some diplomatic solution with the help of the United Nations. If China disagrees, it can be diplomatically isolated, although the cost of doing the same will be too high to pay. Here India, being a founder member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and also a prominent South Asian power, can play a meaningful role in resolving the imminent crisis by evolving fresh global initiative towards peace and non-violence in the world as “nothing is beyond human endeavour”.

*Dr. Sudhanshu Tripathi is Associate Professor of Political Science, MDPG College, Pratapgarh, Uttar Pradesh. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

Greater Confidence-Building Measures Needed In Kashmir – Analysis

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By Neha Gupta*

As Jammu and Kashmir witnesses persistent curfew with the death numbers increasing day by day, expectations from the Chief Minister of Kashmir to solve the issue are going high. The situation of Kashmir became worst following the killing of Hizbul Mujahideen Commander Burhan Wani after which numerous cases of human rights violations were reported and series of public protests were witnessed in Kashmir Valley. Chief Minister of Jamuu and Kashmir, Mehbooba Mufti condemned Pakistan for fuelling the ongoing mayhem in the valley. She presented a “three-pronged action plan” that incorporated a dialogue with all stakeholders during the talks that Mufti had with the Prime Minister in New Delhi. She released the outline of this “three-pronged action plan” before the Prime Minister for the resolution of the Kashmir problem, and which includes involvement of separatists and Pakistan in a realistic dialogue to bring Kashmir out of its existing geo-political reality.

Mehbooba also stressed on the initiation of significant political action to revive reconciliation and resolution which was started by the then National Democratic Alliance government headed by Atal Bihari Vajpayee between 2002 and 2004. The intra and inter-state Confidence Building Measures (CBM) started during that time had facilitated constructive changes in the condition of the state and the region.

She further insisted to pick up the threads from where they left in 2004 and restart the reconciliation and resolution process with new determination, hoping that the present Prime Minister has the command to make courageous political moves on Kashmir as was earlier executed by Vajpayee. She asserted that it was the only chance to resolve the dispute and which could be because India may not always get such a powerful leader who takes decisions boldly.

The meeting that took place following almost two months of violence between the Centre and state chief minister Mehbooba Mufti, has also highlighted the misuse of mobiles and loudspeakers in provoking violence among the people in Kashmir. The centre has ordered the state to take control of the law and order situation which is spinning out of control as it is the chief minister’s responsibility to keep the state in order. The centre has agreed to the formation of a new team that will initiate talks in Kashmir through informal channels and will also facilitate to resolve the crisis that has crippled the state for more than 50 days.

The union government has begun the search for those who can effectively work on this team and bring to end the spiralling hostility. The initiators of the talk would be the people upon whom the residents of the state rely heavily. The announcement of new team will take place when an all-party delegation visits the Valley. The government clean-up against separatist leaders and their supporters, nevertheless, persisted across the Valley. Recently, police have detained dozens of senior separatist leaders during raids and either put them to jail or had house arrested them.

No doubt conditions in Kashmir has improved from what it was almost 50 days ago, but it cannot be guaranteed that the human rights violation that allegedly took place and the provoking elements that imbibed the local people against the centre and the state will not pop up in future. So the government should deal with such sensitive issues with great concern and should furthermore build confidence and trust measures among the local people and the government.

*Neha Gupta is a Research Scholar at Dibugarh University, Assam. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

India And EU: ‘Natural Partners’ Need To Do More To Strengthen Strategic Partnership – Analysis

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By Ankita Dutta*

Europe and India are two pluralistic communities that share much in common – from traditions to histories and cultures, plurality and diversity, commitment to democracy and human rights, independent judiciary and free press, and the strategic role that both are required to play in today’s rapidly changing world. Both have emerged from the debris of the past while dealing with the age old boundary conflicts and border issues. India’s interactions with Europe during the Cold War mainly revolved around the bipolar nature of the global order.

India’s attempt to minimize the adverse effects for the country of the highly polarized Cold War environment led to its non-aligned position, which allowed it to pursue productive relations with both east and west and served it well during most of the decades involved. The end of the cold brought many changes for both Europe and India. On the one hand, the emergence of European Union after years of conflicts and uncertainties has been the most remarkable development of the 20th century, and on the other, the liberalization of Indian economy paved the way for the European companies to make large investments in India, which has been reciprocated by the Indian companies substantial investments in Europe in the recent years.

The Indo-European relationship has, since its inception, been dominated by trade. However, while historically the trade relationship tended to be ‘eurocentric’, the current trend is towards a much more equal dynamic. India is an important trade partner for the European Union (EU) and an emerging global economic power. The value of EU-India trade grew from € 28.6 billion in 2003 to € 72.5 billion in 2014. EU investment stock in India is € 34.7 billion in 2013. Trade in commercial services quadrupled in the past decade, increasing from € 5.2billion in 2002 to € 23.7 billion in 2013. However, trade figures show that India’s economic interaction with European countries is very much focused on specific players within the EU, with the vast majority of India’s trade focused on only a handful of states.

The absence of political will in Brussels is partly due to the preference of the larger member states for dealing bilaterally with India; the partnership is essentially driven by those member states which have substantial trade and economic ties with India. The EU suffers from “a lack of consensus” because different states have different economic competences and priorities. There is considerable time lag in decision- making within the EU because of its compulsion to work by committees and consensus. The dispersal of decision-making power among the different institutions hinders EU’s ability to interact in strategic terms with India. Despite the differences of opinions, there has been immense co-operation and progress between India and Europe – the economic relations are growing fast, especially in the area of foreign investments and co-operation in the fields of biotechnology, telecommunications and energy.

The major step towards strengthening the EU-India relationship was the launching of Strategic Partnership at the Hague Summit in November 2004. The sixth Summit meeting between India and EU held in New Delhi in September 2005 was significant, as it endorsed a comprehensive and ambitious Joint Action Plan (JAP) which provides a framework for deeper cooperation and engagement over a range of issues, especially in economic, trade and investment matters. The JAP provides ways and means of enhancing cooperation over several areas, including the social sector, science and technology, space, energy, clean development, and environmental improvement. Then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh described India and the European Union as “natural partners”. The EU especially after its enlargement, he acknowledged, was emerging as “a politically influential, economically powerful and demographically diverse regional entity” in the world. The strategic partnership symbolized “a qualitative transformation in our interactions based on trust and mutual confidence”.

The EU is widely acknowledged in India as an economic powerhouse and a formidable negotiator in multilateral trade negotiations. But the fact remains that the EU has no coherent and strategic vision or perspective as to what kind of relationship it really seeks with India. The absence of a politically active and influential Indian diaspora makes it even more difficult to get attention. India shares European aspirations for forging a multipolar, rule-based world order, but it did not view the EU as a credible counterweight to the United States given the structural difficulties of making multipolarity work effectively apart from the inherent constraints of an evolving CFSP in a more diverse and heterogeneous Union. India remains highly skeptical about the EU’s political and foreign policy capabilities. Moreover, there is a qualitative difference in the attention and focus given by the European Union to China. The policies towards China are more proactive than those for India.

There has been constant debate on the visibility of Europe and European Union in Indian political scene as well as of India in EU. Most of the European states are unanimous in their belief that India considers United States of America to be far more crucial than the Union; because it is perceived as the “hyperpower” in a unipolar world in which no conceivable combination can possibly challenge the US. Since US has the most impact on the national security environment of India, it has been willing to undertake political risks in dealing with India whereas Europe has not been willing to do so. As a rising power, India is more sympathetic to the American effort to rework the rules of the global game (the most recent example being the July 2005 India-US agreement on civilian nuclear technology) from which it could benefit. Such a quantum jump for the EU is unimaginable.

Despite the divergences and convergences in the political and economic dimensions of the relations between Europe and India, the tremendous effort is placed on the people to people contact, which has been growing effectively over the years. There has been substantial progress on strengthening people-to-people contacts through the India window of the Erasmus Mundus scholarship programme, scientific and technical cooperation, trade exchanges and two-way investment and EU assistance through partnerships with selected Indian states and use of EU’s budgeted funds for supporting Indian government’s programmes on health and education.

India’s growing stature and influence regionally and globally, growing economic interest in a rapidly and consistently growing economy of a billion-plus people with an annual GDP growth rate of over 6 per cent for over a decade, the world’s fourth largest and second fastest growing economy, has lead to the acceptance of India as an important player in international politics. Whether India–EU cooperation forges a meaningful and beneficial relationship would depend on the relative importance of India and EU as the international system evolves. The ‘global war on terror’ which was a consequence of 9/11, failure of the BrettonWoods institutions and the ineffectiveness of the P-5 to represent the diverse range of interests in the world today have called into question the assumptions on which the international order was based. The international community appears to be in a difficult position while dealing with the questions of political participation, terrorism and non-state actors, economic progress and poverty alleviation, nuclear energy and proliferation, environmental sustainability and development, state sovereignty and human security. The realization that the individual—his/her rights, duties and well-being—must be better represented in governance to assure peace and prosperity in the world has become central to international, regional and national action. In such a scenario, their common adherence to democratic institutions and an inclusive society make India and EU natural partners in restructuring of the international system.

The India-Europe relationship is not based on any specific short-term or immediate requirement, but on long-term interests in which both sides seek to widen and deepen mutual cooperation on a broad range of issues. The prospects and potential of the India-EU strategic partnership are indeed considerable. EU-India relations have been, and will continue to be driven by trade and commerce, with limited prospects of really substantial cooperation in political and strategic issues. Both sides routinely stress shared values, but though shared values tend to facilitate the widening and deepening of a relationship, they do not necessarily lead to improved relations.

*Ankita Datta is pursuing PhD in European Studies from Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

Pakistan’s Next Army Chief: Will Nawaz Sharif Have A Say? – Analysis

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By Amitava Mukherjee*

A war of authority between the civil and military authorities of Pakistan over the selection of a new army chief is likely to take place as Raheel Sharif, the incumbent chief of the Pakistan army, is set to retire in coming November. Already the army has forced Nawaz Sharif, the Prime Minister of Pakistan, to appoint retired Lieutenant General Zamirul Hassan Shah as the new defence secretary, although the civilian government had at first rejected Zamirul Hassan’s name and called for a change in army’s recommendation. But, the army refused to budge.

Speculation is rife in concerned circles that the ongoing tension in Indo-Pak relations may influence the ultimate selection of the next Pakistan army chief and that a hawk may occupy the position. That the army had felt comfortable enough to send the name of a retired Lieutenant General for the post of the defence secretary is a clear indication that Nawaz Sharif has lost much of his political as well as governmental authority. But Sharif, the wily politician, must have had enough of the army’s shenanigans and it is equally probable that he might choose the next army chief depending on the latter’s attitude to the civilian government.

There are four senior Lieutenant Generals in line from whom Nawaz Sharif is expected to pick up his next army chief. The senior most among them is Zubair Hayat, the present Chief of General Staff (CGS). Hayat is a voracious reader and is known to be an ‘intellectual’ in the armed forces. In the race for the army top slot, Hayat is now in an advantageous position because his previous stint as the Director General of the Strategic Plans Division (SPD), which looks after the country’s nuclear command and strategic assets, had given him an opportunity to work directly and in a close manner with Nawaz Sharif.

Zubair Hayat is very much conversant with the culture at the General Headquarters (GHQ) because he had once served as the Principal Staff Officer to General Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, the previous Pakistan army chief. His previous postings as the Corps Commander,Bahawalpur, the General Officer Commanding(GOC), Sialkot and the Chief of the Staff Duties Directorate will definitely go in his favour. But he has never served in any conflict zone. It will be interesting to watch as to what extent Nawaz Sharif attaches importance to this limitation.

Zubair Hayat’s close contestant will be Ishfaq Ahmed, a previous CGS and presently the Multan Corps Commander. Compared to Hayat Ishfaq Ahmed has much more operational experience. Ishfaq must be a hot favourite with Raheel Sharif, the incumbent army chief, as the former is the actual architect of the blueprint of Zarb-e-Azab, the army operation against Islamic militants in North Waziristan. Two factors may tilt the scale in Ishfaq’s favour- his previous stint as the CGS and his present position of the commander of a mechanized corps which is very prestigious in army hierarchy.

There are two other Lieutenant Generals whom Nawaz Sharif must keep in consideration while choosing the next army chief. They are Javed Iqbal Ramday and Qamar Javed Bajwa. Both have experiences of commanding corps and both are known to be skilful generals. Bajwa, now the Inspector General of Training and Evaluation in the GHQ, once commanded the 10 Corps which is the largest of its kind in the Pakistan army and is responsible for guarding the Line of Control in Kashmir. Similarly Ramday is now leading the Bahawalpur Corps and was previously the GOC, Swat.
Three other generals namely Mazhar Jamil, Syed Wajid Hussain and Najibullah Khan may come into the picture at any time.

But, the central figure in this all important exercise will no doubt be Nawaz Sharif himself. This will be the fifth time when he chooses the next army chief- a unique record he holds among all the prime ministers of Pakistan. He chose Pervez Musharraf for the top slot superseding many senior generals. But in return he got an army coup and exile from the country. He again selected Raheel Sharif, the incumbent army chief, over legitimate claims of at least two senior generals but the ambitious army commander-in-chief has nearly made Nawaz Sharif a titular head.

But this time the Pakistan prime minister may try to break free from the army yoke under which he must be chafing for a long time. First of all, going against the civilian governments declared policy, Raheel Sharif, the army chief, had stymied peace process with the Taliban by launching the Zarb-e-Azab without governmental or parliamentary sanction. Then he forced Nawaz Sharif to abandon legal proceedings against Pervez Musharraf. Peace process with India also took a back seat.

Still Nawaz Sharif adjusted with the overbearing attitude of the army and by a strange arrangement the army took over Pakistan’s foreign and nuclear policy and all security related issues in Karachi as well as in the Afghan border. Nawaz Sharif was left only with the economy of the country and Punjab, his home turf. But after the gory mayhem of Christians at a park in Lahore in last March the army took control of the security of the Punjab province and publicly emphasized that it was under orders of Raheel Sharif and not that of the prime minister.

Now will Nawaz Sharif try to reestablish his authority by appointing a pliant general as the army chief?

*Amitava Mukherjee is a senior Indian journalist and commentator. Comments and suggestions on this article can be sent on: editor@spsindia.in

Brazil: The Impeachment Of Dilma Rouseff – Analysis

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By Gautam Sen*

Dilma Rouseff, the democratically elected, leftist, first lady president of Latin America, has been finally impeached on 31 August 2016 and removed from Brazil’s presidency. As can be expected, there have been outbursts of contrasting public expressions, of dismay and support, for the decisive decision of Brazil’s Senate – with 61 votes against and 20 for – to impeach her. The lower house of Brazil’s parliament, the Chamber of Deputies, had already recommended, and the Senate vetted, the initiation of Rouseff’s impeachment process on 12 May this year. While seven Latin American countries, viz., Venezuela, El Salvador, Ecuador, Bolivia, Nicaragua, Uruguay and Cuba, had expressed their disapproval-cum-apprehension when Rouseff was suspended from the presidency for 180 days consequent on the Senate decision, three of these – Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia – have not only condemned outright the final impeachment of Rouseff as a constitutional coup but have also withdrawn their ambassadors from Brasilia. This diplomatic remonstration has, in turn, invited a sharp reciprocal response from the incumbent Brazilian Government of interim President, Michel Temer, who is likely to be confirmed in that position for the remainder of Rouseff`s term ending in 2018, though he will be unelected to the post.

It may be worthwhile to explore how Rouseff’s impeachment impacts Latin American politics, particularly the left-oriented regimes, at least in the immediate future. This is because some of the governments in the Western hemisphere with political proclivities similar to that of the erstwhile Workers’ Party Government of Dilma Rouseff, though installed in power through a democratic process, are presently facing strong internal opposition. These governments, because of their socio-economic policies, are being buffeted by the rightist and conservative forces attempting to reverse them, and extra-constitutional means are being used by both the governments in power and their opponents to retain and acquire power, respectively.

The salience of the impact of the Rouseff-related developments lie in the fact that there is a degree of similarity in the economic policies of the erstwhile Rouseff Government and its counterparts in some of the other Latin American countries like Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia that have been affected by the so-called ‘pink tide’. It will be interesting to watch whether the labour-friendly, socially inclusive and egalitarian policies in these countries can be sustained even after their originators like former Brazilian presidents Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff have been removed from positions of power, or can be maintained only by forcefully entrenching the incumbent political leadership associated with such policies through extra-constitutional means and constricting the space for the political opposition as being attempted in countries like Venezuela. Temer, Brazil’s interim President, has quickly reversed many of Rouseff’s progressive policies: capping expenditure on healthcare and education while increasing the salaries of government officials, winding up the Ministry on Women Affairs, Racial Equality and Human Rights and symbolically appointing a former police officer as Minister of Justice. In contrast, some of the other regimes in the region cited above are showing greater political will to retain their progressive policies even at the cost of deepening societal divisions and undermining political institutions.

Rouseff has appealed to Brazil’s Supreme Court against her impeachment, but relief appears unlikely considering that the impeachment proceedings were carried out by Senate under the supervision of the Supreme Court Chief Justice. A significant aspect of the Senate verdict is that, though Rouseff has been removed from her present constitutional position as President, she has been allowed to hold public office including in the bureaucracy in future. This decision, as part of the impeachment verdict, is reported to be the outcome of a behind-the-scenes political compromise among Brazil’s political parties, particularly between Rouseff’s Workers’ Party and Temer’s Partido do Movimento Democratico Brasileiro (PMDB) as well as a few Senators and political leaders including some from PMDB against whom some corruption charges are looming. This compromise will enable Rouseff to remain active and relevant in politics for some more time. Other Latin American countries may draw the lesson from the impeachment verdict to the extent that, while jostling for political power there could be a way to give space to political opponents without aborting a democratic or a pseudo-democratic process altogether.

The left-oriented political forces or the ‘pink tide’ proponents have received some setbacks in the past few years. After the demise of Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez in 2013, the successor government headed by Nicolas Maduro, though managing to retain power through an election process criticized by his opponents to have been partially rigged, does not seem to be doing well so far as administration of the economy and governance in general are concerned. There has been widespread public mobilisation against the Maduro Government and the latter, in turn, has imposed restrictions on public protests notwithstanding the anti-Maduro forces drawing political support from a few Latin American countries. In neighbouring Argentina, the leftist President Christina Kitchener has been replaced by a conservative, Mauricio Macri, through a democratic process. And Peru’s leftist President Ollanta Humala has been replaced by a right-of-centre politician, Pedro Pablo Kuczynski.

The impeachment verdict against Rouseff and the manner in which the former Brazilian President has dealt with the process leading to her impeachment are noteworthy. A senior Brazilian politician, Fernando de Mello, who was forced out of the presidency in 1992 and later became a Senator and now voted for Rouseff’s impeachment, has, however, expressed doubts about the legal basis for her dismissal. A widespread view in Brazil is that Rouseff’s budget manipulations – one of the prime charges against her being that she made up for her government’s budgetary shortfalls by drawing upon funds from public sector banks – cannot be considered as a ‘crime of responsibility’. Many Brazilians are of the view that, while Rouseff may be held responsible for improper macro-management of the economy, she was not a direct beneficiary of corruption-related political activities such as illegitimately drawing upon funds from the country`s petroleum entity ‘Petrobras’, etc. Many also give her credit for not restraining the judicial investigation of the ‘Car Wash’ or ‘Lava Jato’ scandal, which involved mis-utilisation of position and authority by politicians and bureaucrats towards obtaining commissions on state-entities’ contracts for political and personal benefit, notwithstanding the likely damaging fallout on her governing Workers Party. While there has been a strong political context to the impeachment process, Rouseff has shown her determination to contest her trial constitutionally and through the due process of law. In contrast, in many of the other Latin American countries, the political contestation seems to be occurring outside of a mutually accepted legal or constitutional framework.

If Roussef’s political revival occurs, if not within a few months but in a time-span of one or two years or at least by the time the next presidential elections are held in 2018, it will have an impact throughout Latin America given Brazil’s geopolitical status and socio-economic resources, even if its economy were not to be restored to a high growth path. The way political developments are playing out in Brazil, i.e., with a door left open for Rouseff to reclaim her political space by virtue of not being embargoed from political and legislative opportunities, an outcome as visualized above seems possible. In such an eventuality, the coalescing of like-minded left-oriented political forces on a transnational basis in the Latin American context may be more effectively facilitated. Such a development may help reinforce the efforts of the middle income Third World countries – the group to which most Latin American countries belong – towards promoting a more egalitarian and participative international order. But a prerequisite for such a scenario to evolve is that the Latin American regimes of leftist or socialist hue and forces supporting them should first survive and be able to retain their respective political constituencies and support bases. It is doubtful whether this can be achieved through peaceful means if the manner of the present contestations is any indicator.

*The author is a retired IDAS officer, who served till recently as an Additional Chief Secretary-level Adviser on developmental and finance issues to a State Government.

Views expressed are of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the IDSA or of the Government of India. Originally published by Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (www.idsa.in) at http://idsa.in/idsacomments/latin-america-post-impeachment-dilma-rouseff_gsen_060916

Undiscovered Asteroid Buzzes Earth

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Astronomers have discovered a new asteroid—just in time to catch it as it hurtled past us at less than a tenth of the distance between us and the moon. It’s the second time that’s happened in two weeks.

This most recent asteroid, 2016 RB1, was both slightly smaller and slightly closer than 2016 QA2, the other undiscovered asteroid that brushed by us at the end of August. Still, their specs are pretty similar. 2016 RB1 measured in at somewhere between 10-15 meters and came by us at a distance of 40,000 km yesterday. 2016 QA2 was around 75,000 km away and measured over 18 meters.

Despite their close approaches, neither asteroid was actually on-course to hit Earth at all. Still, the fact that they are so close—and we had no idea until they were practically on our doorstep—is a little surprising.

Part of it is due to the classic space problem: Space is very big and it’s easy to miss things even when they are about to fly right through our orbit. The other problem is that it gets much harder to predict what asteroids are going to do once they get closer to us, because of a curious effect of nearing the sun on the paths of asteroids.

Asteroids rotate and, as they come closer to the sun, the side closest starts to heat up. This built up heat can then push the asteroid miles into a different and sometimes hard-to-predict path.

Tonight, NASA is going to be launching their first mission to capture some dirt from yet another near Earth asteroid, Bennu. But they also hope the trip will give them a chance to get a better idea of how these sun-powered pushes, called the Yarkovsky effect, work. If they’re successful, we could get a whole lot better at predicting where nearby asteroids are going to go, before they’re right next to us.


The Mahathir-Anwar Handshake: Patching Up To Shake Up? – Analysis

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Mahathir’s surprise move to reach out to Anwar is promising to shake up Malaysian politics. Can they succeed?

By Yang Razali Kassim*

On Monday 5 September 2016, former prime minister Mahathir Mohamad did the unthinkable: He turned up at the High Court for Anwar Ibrahim’s filing of an interim injunction to stop the government from enforcing the newly-passed National Security Council Act. Mahathir shook hands with his former ally-turned nemesis and both exchanged pleasantries, as if they were friends again. He even wished Anwar well and prayed for the jailed opposition leader’s success. Indeed both chatted for a good 45 minutes in the witness room – a long time indeed for two bitter foes.

It was the first time both had come into contact since Mahathir, then prime minister, unceremoniously sacked Anwar on 2 September 1998 as his deputy and subsequently had him jailed for abuse of power and sodomy. Coming just three days after the 18th anniversary of that fateful event, the Mahathir-Anwar handshake was a ground-breaking ‘reunion’. Mahathir said he was there “not to talk about the past” but to show support for Anwar’s bid against the NSC, which he, like Anwar, saw as unconstitutional and feared would give Prime Minister Najib Razak too much power.

What’s Brewing?

This is, however, not the first time that Mahathir and Anwar have attempted to come together. Earlier in March, Mahathir launched his Citizens’ Declaration ‘rainbow movement’ to mobilise public support against Najib who is fighting for political survival arising from the 1MDB scandal.

There were moves at the time to get the divided political opposition to throw their support behind Mahathir who was emerging as Najib’s harshest critic. Anwar, freed in 2004 but now back in jail, initially intimated his endorsement. He later pulled back when Mahathir showed more interest in just toppling Najib than to bring about sweeping reforms to the political system, including the national leadership. Anwar’s change of heart raised doubts about his trust in Mahathir.

Anwar’s wife, Dr Wan Azizah who succeeded him as opposition leader, is still bitter with Mahathir for throwing her husband into jail 18 years ago on what she still regards as trumped-up charges. After the historic meeting in court this week, Wan Azizah, though still guarded, seemed more accepting. If so, it could be because of Mahathir’s gesture of apparent reconciliation. For a man of immense pride, Mahathir’s decision to turn up in court to support Anwar was doubtless a big gesture. It was magnanimity, eating humble pie and realpolitik all rolled in one.

The shrewd politician that he is, Mahathir must be fully aware that his presence at Anwar’s court hearing could be interpreted in many ways; one is whether or not this was a tacit apology to Anwar and his family. Wan Azizah said she would take things from here. Anwar, when besieged by the media, said “anybody who supports the reform agenda must be given a chance”.

Rebuilding the Opposition?

Will this mark the start of yet another chapter in Malaysian politics? Top UMNO leaders as expected shot down the Mahathir-Anwar reconciliation as a political gimmick born out of Mahathir’s desperation to unseat Najib. Nothing would come out of it, they said, not from two men who have lost faith in each other. But it would be a folly for UMNO to underestimate the Anwar-Mahathir tag team.

Both know that much can be done by them, if only they could overcome their animosity and join forces once again – as they did in the past. For in a rather deceptively peaceful way, Malaysian politics is going through an existential crisis that could do with their statesmanship.

On the ruling coalition side, the pillar that holds up the system – UMNO – is under pressure to defend or replace its controversy-ridden president who is also prime minister. If UMNO goes through another leadership upheaval, the entire ruling Barisan Nasional (BN) coalition could unravel. The UMNO crisis has pushed Mahathir and former deputy premier Muhyiddin Yassin out of UMNO and into the fold of the anti-Najib front.

Yet the opposition, once strong and unified under the leadership of Anwar when he was free, is now suffering its own debacle. With Anwar back in jail, there is no leader of the same stature and pulling power, no rallying point. The once-promising multi-ethnic Pakatan Rakyat (People’s Alliance) has now split and reconfigured to become Pakatan Harapan (Alliance of Hope). In that leadership vacuum has emerged Mahathir and Muhyiddin’s new party, Pribumi Bersatu. This new mix is, however, fragile. Can Mahathir or Muhyiddin be the new de facto chief of the opposition that is still loyal to Anwar as its spiritual leader? Or will they all rally around Anwar?

It is within this state of flux in both ruling and opposition coalitions that the Mahathir-Anwar handshake of 5 September should be seen. Both know they are rushing against time. If there is any lawful change to be made, it must be done through the general election. The signs are that Najib may hasten the next GE to capitalise on the opposition’s disarray. He might call a snap poll next year instead of waiting till the full term in 2018. It takes time for the opposition to rebuild itself – what more one that has been badly split.

Ever the wily political animal, the single-minded Mahathir saw the solution now in a new modus vivendi with his former protégé. Anwar, ever the embracing politician, signalled his willingness to go forward and “engage” Mahathir. A new page in opposition politics, and perhaps the broader Malaysian politics, is being drafted, or is it?

Big Challenge Ahead: Re-engineering the System

The big task ahead for both Mahathir and Anwar, however transcends everyone. The political system as a whole needs more than reform. It needs re-engineering. UMNO as the political core, even insiders agree, needs a shake-up to root out deep-seated corruption, but can any leader do it when UMNO has proven to be impervious to change and reform?

Three high-ranking UMNO leaders – Anwar, Mahathir and Muhyiddin – are now out of the party to bring about change from the outside. This is as ironic as it is telling. The alternative political template – the Opposition – is proving to have its own albatross around its neck. It seems an elusive journey to become the government-in-waiting. If a two-coalition system in Malaysia is unworkable, could there be a new political paradigm? Interestingly, some maverick UMNO leaders, such as Rais Yatim, are already thinking of bringing together both sides of the political divide.

If Mahathir and Anwar succeed in forging a new alliance to challenge BN at the coming GE, they will still need to prove this new alliance can win. Assuming they do and throw BN and Najib out of power, Mahathir and Anwar will still have to bring about real political change. What that will be remains uncharted, but they are clearly disturbed by the legacy that may be left behind for the next generation.


*Yang Razali Kassim
is a Senior Fellow with the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore. This also appeared in The Straits Times.

Croatia: Election Stalemate Likely

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By Sven Milekic

Croatia’s parliamentary elections on Sunday are unlikely to result in a clear win by either of the two main centre-left and centre-right blocs, the latest surveys suggest.

As Croatian voters prepare to cast votes in early parliamentary elections on Sunday for the second time in ten months, surveys suggest neither the centre-left People’s Coalition nor the centre-right Croatian Democratic Union, HDZ, will emerge as the clear winner.

Several recent public opinion surveys indicate that neither coalition will win a majority of 76 seats in the 151-seat parliament.

Besides 140 seats in ten constituencies in Croatia, eight seats are guaranteed to national minorities and three to Bosnian Croats and the diaspora, making 151 in total.

As in the last elections, both the centre-left coalition – led by the Social Democratic Party, SDP – and the HDZ will depend on seats won by third, smaller parties: the centre-right Bridge of the Independent Lists, MOST, the anti-establishment Living Wall or the coalition gathered around Zagreb Mayor Milan Bandic.

A survey published on Wednesday, conducted by a polling agency Ipsos puls, using secret voting by 4,200 people in all ten 14-seat constituencies, predicts that the People’s Coalition will win 55 seats and the HDZ 53 seats.

The same survey suggests that MOST will win 12 seats, Living Wall, eight and Bandic’s coalition, seven. Three smaller parties will win between one and three seats each.

An earlier survey published on September 2 showed the People’s Coalition could win 61 seats and the HDZ 56. That survey, conducted through telephone calls, was carried out by the polling agency Hendal and included 10,000 participants.

As in the Ipsos puls survey, this survey suggested that a major role in forming the next government will go to MOST, with 13 seats, and to Living Wall, with six.

Besides these parties, an important role will be played by MPs representing national minorities. The HDZ will meanwhile most likely win all three seats representing voters from outside Croatia, as it did so far.

The date for the early elections was set in mid-July by President Kolinda Grabar Kitarovic after the HDZ-MOST coalition government fell in June.

The SDP is still led by its president and former prime minister, Zoran Milanovic, while the HDZ in July chose a new president, Andrej Plenkovic.

In the last elections in November 2015, the HDZ-led Patriotic Coalition won 59 seats, while the SDP-led Croatia Grows coalition won 56. MOST was the biggest surprise of the elections winning 19 seats and becoming the post-election kingmaker.
– See more at: http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/croatia-elections-to-again-bring-left-right-deadlock-09-09-2016#sthash.qEbeHPZV.dpuf

North Korea’s Nuclear Test: A Reflection Of Multiple Failures? – Analysis

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By Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan

North Korea conducted its fifth nuclear test Friday morning at 9.00 am local time in yet another defiance of UN resolutions. The South Korean government reported that this was possibly the biggest explosion so far and it appears that Pyongyang is beginning to make serious nuclear advances. South Korean President Park Guen-hye termed the test an act of “self destruction“; the US issued a warning of “serious consequences.” Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe reacted to the test saying it “absolutely cannot condone” the test and would “protest adamantly” to North Korea. He added that Pyongyang’s “nuclear development is becoming a graver threat to Japan’s safety and severely undermines the peace and safety of the region and the international community.” China too called upon the North Korean’s regime to exercise restraint and avoid further action, though it appeared to justify Pyongyang’s action by suggesting that it was possibly a response to the deployment of the US anti-missile defence system THAAD. Yukiya Amano, head of the International Atomic Energy Agency too stated that test was in violation of UN Security Council resolutions and that it is “a deeply troubling and regrettable act.”

Given the nature of the regime in North Korea, there is no clear information on the kind of yield, the type of weapon, among other things. South Korea reported that it may be a 10 kt (Kiloton, or the explosive equivalent one ton of TNT) weapon although others have suggested that it may be a 20 kt. Just to offer a sense of the magnitude of the yield, the bomb that the US dropped in Hiroshima was 15 kt. But the yield suggests that this was not a hydrogen or a fusion bomb.

The test might also indicate North Korea’s success in miniaturising their weapon to mount it on top of a long-range ballistic missile. North Korea claimed this after their last nuclear test in January. US military officials also suggest that Pyongyang may have managed to miniaturise the warhead though US civilian officials appear to be more skeptical. It must also be added that North Korea has carried out a series of ballistic missile tests as well in the recent months, the most recent one in the beginning of the week as world leaders gathered in Hanzhou for the G20 Summit.

What motivates the North Korean regime is of course the key question. Ever since Kim Jong-un took charge in Pyongyang, one has seen a much more belligerent North Korea. No amount of UN sanctions seemed to have had any impact on the regime. So how can the world respond to today’s test? North Korea is already isolated, especially after the tough sanctions imposed on Pyongyang after the January 2016 nuclear test. What more can be done to isolate an already isolated regime? One can debate additional means to put pressure on the regime, but it is more important to ensure that existing sanctions are fully implemented. This brings to particular focus the role of China. Has China been on board in implementing the last round of sanctions? China remains the only country that has offered political and economic support to the regime. It is understandable that Beijing does not want to see the North Korean collapsing, which would mean that the power vacuum could possibly be filled by South Korea or even the US.

This test also affects Asian security dynamics. There have been continuing debates within South Korea and Japan on whether they should develop their own nuclear weapons. Japan’s debate is particularly noteworthy. Given the strong domestic opposition to nuclear weapons, the fact that these debates are taking place at all says a lot about the new security dynamics in play. Tokyo has all the technological wherewithal to build nuclear weapons but the question has been about its willingness to go down this path given its strategic culture and how it might upon Japan-US security equations. Clearly, on the first question, the indication that the rest of the world will not do much to control North Korean nuclear weapons is increasing support for a Japanese nuclear arsenal, though this is, as yet, by nowhere near the majority opinion. But unless the rest of the world does something about North Korea, Japanese domestic opinion could continue to swing towards exercising its own nuclear option.

The second issue is about US support. There has always been also the question of the credibility of the US nuclear umbrella. The recent talk of a US No First Use (NFU) policy triggered fresh debates in this regard. The US debate on the NFU has been shelved for the time being but the need for independent security capabilities is not going to go away, at least in the minds of US allies. Japan has also worried about a possible Iran-like solutions worked out sometime in the future between the US and China, which leaves North Korean nuclear capability in place, leaving Tokyo to fend for itself. But should Japan go nuclear, South Korea will follow suit and the situation would become rather dire.

Lastly, the North Korean nuclear belligerence is also a reflection of the lack of effectiveness of the global non-proliferation regime. NPT has been in a crisis mode and the failure to tackle cases such as North Korea either through the non-proliferation regime or by the great powers will leave the neighbouring countries to fend for themselves.

Failure Of Institutionalised Cooperation In South Asia – Analysis

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Regional integration in South Asia lags behind other regions in the world despite efforts at institutionalized cooperation through the SAARC. Economic cooperation and connectivity in South Asia can pave the way for shared problem solving and greater economic development for all states in the region. The SAARC efforts remain ineffective due to its narrow focus on the removal of tariffs on intraregional trade. Led by a motivated political leadership, SAARC could greatly benefit from identifying and resolving the unaddressed barriers to regional integration, rather than relying on progressive tariff reduction on intraregional trade in goods as the single means for facilitating regional integration.

By Nivedita Jayaram*

South Asian regional integration facilitated by economic cooperation and connectivity has emerged to the forefront of multilateral relations in the region due to the increasing awareness that only concerted effort can help South Asia jointly address the problems of developing nations with large populations. However, institutionalized cooperation, in the form of the South Asian Association for Regional Integration (SAARC), formed in 1985, has failed to achieve expected results. The region remains one of the least integrated in the world.  This can be attributed to the SAARC’s failure to fully implement its main instrument for improving intraregional trade, namely, the South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) due to a variety of reasons.

First, the SAARC-envisioned progressive trade liberalization programme has not been sufficient to ensure the full implementation of the SAFTA, due to the existence of Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs), while the SAARCs main focus has remained tariff reduction alone. Second, low levels of regional connectivity, as well as the lack of border infrastructure to facilitate the smooth flow of goods and people, have hampered the creation of a regional supply chain. Third, the failure of the SAFTA can also be explained by its narrow scope, in that it covers only intraregional trade in goods while excluding other important aspects of regional economic cooperation such as trade in services, and investment and financial cooperation between South Asian states.

Former Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh stated at the 16thSAARC summit in 2010 that, “We have created institutions for regional economic cooperation but we have not empowered them adequately to enable them to be more proactive”. This statement is relevant in a scenario where South Asian nations acknowledge that regional integration is a geographic necessity, but the institutional arrangements fail to make integration possible, as they are retarded by a number of challenges which remain unaddressed. Presently, negotiations for establishing a South Asian Economic Union by 2030 are underway. However, the progressive trade liberalization programme under the auspices of the SAARC has performed poorly as South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world.n_table

Non-Tariff Barriers

The greatest impediment to intraregional trade, it has been pointed out, is in the Non-Tariff Measures (NTMs). These provide necessary protection to the importing countries and hence, are difficult to address. However, NTMs become barriers to trade in the form of NTBs, only when they are combined with unnecessary bureaucratic procedures, corruption and lack of information. As in the case of South Asia, NTBs have increased the cost of intraregional trade and also reduced quantities traded. Regional trade has remained below five percent of the total trade of South Asian countries, as it is more expensive than trade with countries outside the region.

Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), which are essential for protecting the health of consumers, environment, product quality and standards, comprise the largest share of NTMs in the region. SPS deals with regulations for food safety and plant and animal health. TBTs are measures taken to protect domestic markets, consumers and industries, which can indirectly discriminate against imports from other countries. Each country follows different standards and procedures with relation to SPS/TBT regulations, and also applies different standards to exporting countries based on the level of hostility or ideological differences between them. While these NTMs cannot be eliminated, it is important to ensure that they are accompanied by relevant policy measures so that they do not hamper trade and become NTBs. Further, NTMs unfairly discriminate against exports of smaller nations with lesser capacities as they lead to high costs. Another major NTB comes in the form of customs duties, rules, and regulations,. These are sometimes unreasonable and reflect the inability of South Asian countries to overcome protectionist economics.

Connectivity and Cross Border Infrastructure

Lack of connectivity in the region also adversely affects intraregional trade. The creation of a smooth flowing regional supply chain will require investment in physical infrastructure for transport across borders. There is a lack of synchronized and coordinated border infrastructure in road freight, rail, shared waterways, and connectivity by sea. For instance, goods transported between Delhi and Dhaka would take only five days with improved road connectivity. Border infrastructure such as land customs stations and warehouse facilities are weak. The low yield for investment in such projects have discouraged governments from taking a more active role in trade facilitation through cross border infrastructural development. Additionally, border authorities in South Asian countries have been noted as highly dysfunctional, further affecting trade.

South Asia can be understood as comprising three sub-regions: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Nepal (BBIN) in the east; India, Maldives and Sri Lanka in the south and India; Pakistan and Afghanistan in the west. The BBIN countries have recorded higher amounts of integration by undertaking measures for trade facilitation and improved connectivity. The Bangladesh-India Memorandum (2010) enables improved bilateral trade between the two countries, while also allowing Bangladesh access landlocked states of Bhutan and Nepal through Indian territory. It also envisions heightened energy cooperation, thereby building upon the region’s strengths in the form of meeting the rising demand for energy. In 2015, BBIN member countries signed a Motor Vehicles Agreement, which simplifies transport of goods and people across borders, as cargo and passengers are no longer required to transfer into the other country’s transport vehicle at the border. India has been given access to Bangladeshi port in Ashuganj, since June 2016, in order to access its remote northeastern region. Bus connectivity was established along the Kolkata-Dhaka-Agartala route in June 2015. The Dhaka-Shillong-Guwahati bus service, which was to start operating in May 2015, has been stalled due to technical issues.Improving bilateral relations within a sub-region can lead the way for the rest of South Asia by demonstrating its successes. It can encourage and help implement similar projects in the rest of the region.

Narrow Focus of the SAFTA

Loopholes in regional integration can also be attributed to the SAFTA’s narrow focus on trade in products. Services constitute one third of South Asia’s exports and 50 percent of the region’s GDP, mainly in information technology, energy, business process outsourcing, and tourism and travel. The service sector is especially important due to South Asia’s underperforming industrial sector and declining productivity in agriculture. Comparative advantage on trade in goods is difficult to exploit in the region, as all countries are characterized by labour surpluses and lack of capital. However, in the case of services, national comparative advantages can be exploited. For instance, neighbouring countries could benefit from India’s well-developed health sector, tourism potential in Sri Lanka and Maldives, and gas transmission services in Bangladesh. An agreement on services is necessary to complement the SAFTA. The South Asian Trade in Services Agreement (SATIS) has not yet materialized owing to inability of the South Asian nations to take the steps necessary to make SATIS a reality.trade-agreements-nivedita

It has been demonstrated that enhanced investment has positive effects on intra-regional trade. Indian investment in Bhutan’s hydroelectric resources, majority of which is sold to India, comprises a major share of Bhutan’s income. India also holds more than 60 percent of Bhutan’s debt stock and is one of its largest aid providers. Other smaller nations with untapped resources due to capital unavailability in the region could benefit from intraregional FDI flows to achieve rapid economic development. If developed, these resources could be used to meet the food and industrial input requirements of India. India should be encouraged to invest in these resources, and integrate LDCs into India’s rising economy on mutually beneficial terms. However, this has been hindered by the fears of Indian interference in the domestic politics of these countries, and lack of initiative on the part of India. Intraregional investment therefore remains less than one percent as no agreement has been negotiated for the same.Financial cooperation in the form of multilateral financing agencies, such as the vision for a South Asian Development Bank, has also seen slow progress.

Conclusion and Recommendations

The SAARC’s trade liberalization programme has been partially successful, in that intraregional trade has shown a steady, if slow, improvement. It increased fourfold between 1990 and 2000, and is expected to increase by 1.6 times when all tariffs are removed. The SAARC must, therefore, prioritize the removal of all bottlenecks, which impede the full implementation of these measures. South Asia is characterized by the historical baggage of conflict and mistrust, as well as being socially, economically and politically heterogeneous. Added to this is India’s presence as the largest country in the region, and its economic and military might, which make smaller nations wary of India’s dominant role in setting the agenda for the region. The SAARC’s focus must then be on ensuring that policies enabling integration are informed by the unique characteristics of South Asia’s political economy. Policy undertaken to facilitate integration should clearly spell out what each country is to gain from integration, as well as how security concerns of hostile nations are to be addressed, in order to create a win-win situation.All regional integration arrangements must clearly spell out the preferential treatment to Least Developed Countries, so that they are not unfairly discriminated in the process of economic integration. Allowing the SAARC’s agenda to be hijacked by political tensions will lead to lack of political will in addressing the challenges to economic cooperation.

One way to address this is to allow the increasingly important private sector in South Asian countries to lead the discussions on improving bi/multilateral cooperation. Strong linkages between enterprises in these countries, acting as a pressure group, will push the political leadership into negotiating policies that are favourable for businesses. Trade facilitation measures for achieving the full implementation of the SAFTA and paving the way for progressive integration must be the primary focus.

The negative effects of NTBs can be avoided by creating a transparent system with uniform standards in the region.Standard certificates issued by the exporting country should be accepted by the importing country.Special testing laboratories must be made available at border regions to avoid delays. Border warehouses will improve trade in perishable items, which constitute 1/3rd of intraregional trade.All countries should follow a single set of mutually agreed customs procedures, rather than an arbitrary model.  Efforts must be undertaken to build the capacity of small and medium enterprises in smaller nations to meet export standards in order to allow them to benefit from trade.

Regional transport and communication links must be improved through investment in cross border infrastructure and trade-transit agreements between countries. The disincentive to invest in infrastructure can be addressed by creating a transport network across countries that have a free trade agreement in place. This will increase the traffic along these routes. Private sector investment can be sought on such projects as they will yield high profits, and can be engaged in a Build-Operate-Transfer model. Trade is affected when one country’s infrastructure is less developed than its trading partner. It is necessary to harness funding by setting up regional multilateral financing institutions in order to synchronize infrastructure standards across countries. Trade facilitation through the creation of trade-transit agreements should be undertaken on an urgent basis. Efficiency at the level of border authorities will simplify cross border transit and will complement improved connectivity.

Trade, financial cooperation, and investment reinforce one another and must be undertaken simultaneously. The SAFTA must be complemented with agreements in investment and financial cooperation in order to make it more feasible.It has been repeatedly proven in international relations that the benefits derived from economic cooperation outweigh the domestic nationalist in hostile states. Integration is possible when participant states view it is an opportunity, rather than a threat.

*Nivedita Jayaram is a project intern with Mantraya and is associated with Mantraya’s “Regional Economic and Cooperation and Connectivity in South Asia” project.

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Backlash After Hillary Calls Half Of Trump Supporters Bigots

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Baskets have never been so controversial. Hillary Clinton’s now-infamous “baskets of deplorables” jibe ignited a fierce political spat online: Trump got angry, Clinton somewhat apologized, and then Trump used an Obama quote to attempt a checkmate.

It all started when Clinton, speaking at a LGBT fundraiser in New York, described half of Trump’s supporters as comprising “a basket of deplorables.”

“You know, to just be grossly generalistic, you could put half of Trump’s supporters into what I call the basket of deplorables … the racist, sexist, homophobic, xenophobic, Islamophobic – you name it,” Clinton said, even though admitting she was being “grossly generalistic.” She went on to say that these people “are not America.”

Trump immediately jumped on the comment calling it “SO INSULTING” and claimed it would cost Hillary dearly at the polls.

He quickly changed his tactics to try and play to Clinton’s supporters claiming he would respect them regardless of whether they vote for him or not.

Donald Trump Jr. jumped in to remind the Clintons that they have a “deplorable” political record of their own.

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