The USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier along with a guided-missile cruiser and a nuclear-powered submarine are on their way to the Korean Peninsula to prepare for a potential war with North Korea, while Pyongyang reportedly plans new missiles tests.

As of Friday afternoon, the USS Ronald Reagan, with nearly 80 aircraft on board, was in the South China Sea on its way to the shores of US ally South Korea.

The two allies will conduct joint drills to detect, track, and intercept ballistic missiles, in addition to anti-submarine warfare training, Yonhap News agency reported, citing an unnamed South Korean official.

The official said the military exercises will likely be held around October 20.

The drills are to prepare the US military to defend its allies as well as maintain stability in the area, Rear Admiral Marc Dalton, commander of the USS Ronald Reagan’s strike group, told the South China Morning Post.

“The United States has been very clear about leveraging all options in order to get North Korea to change its path,” Dalton said.

Meanwhile, Russian lawmakers who visited North Korea this week said Pyongyang told them that it is planning to test a new long-range missile.

“They even gave us mathematical calculations that they believe prove that their missile can hit the west coast of the United States,” Anton Morozov, a member of the Russian parliament’s international affairs committee, said Friday, according to RIA Novosti.

“As far as we understand, they intend to launch one more long-range missile in the near future. And in general, their mood is rather belligerent,” Morozov said.

Ahead of previous US-South Korea drills in August, Pyongyang threatened “merciless retaliation,” saying that the exercises, which it claims are an invasion rehearsal, could lead to an “uncontrollable phase of a nuclear war.”

Washington dismissed calls to pause or downsize the drills amid heightened tensions, saying it has every right to carry out exercises with its allies and “that’s just not going to change.”

North Korea has carried out a series of nuclear tests over the past few months, in response to which the UN Security Council (UNSC) imposed several rounds of harsh sanctions against Pyongyang.

Having approved the sanctions and condemned the North’s nuclear tests, UNSC permanent members Russia and China have recommended that all sides avoid provocative actions.

In summer, Moscow and Beijing offered to try to strike a deal with the North, under which Pyongyang would cease nuclear tests and missile launches in exchange for the US and South Korea halting joint military drills in the region. Washington rejected the proposal.

US President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader have since exchanged a series of threats, with Trump saying the US could “totally destroy” the North if attacked, and that Kim Jong-un, who he often refers to as ‘Little Rocket Man,’ “won’t be around much longer!” Pyongyang responded in kind, calling it a declaration of war and threatening to shoot down American planes and unleash a nuclear attack on the US and its allies.

“All sides must ease rhetoric and find ways for face-to-face dialogue between the United States and North Korea, as well as between North Korea and countries in the region,” Russian President Vladimir Putin said Wednesday. “Only this would help find balanced and reasonable decisions.”

“We’ve been clear that now is not the time to talk,” White House spokeswoman Sarah Sanders told reporters Tuesday.

Uganda has not had a peaceful transfer of power since attaining independence in 1962. Now, the removal of the presidential age limit in the Ugandan constitution opens the way for a life presidency for incumbent Museveni and risks huge instability and violence.

By Stephen Oola*

Uganda is at a crossroads. Over the last few days, tensions have been flaring high around the emotive debate for and against the lifting of the Presidential age limit contained in Article 102 (b) of the 1995 Constitution of the Republic of Uganda. Article 102 (b) states that a person is not qualified for election as President unless that person is over thirty-five years and under seventy-five years of age. However, last week about 270 Members of Parliament from the ruling National Resistance Movement (NRM) party endorsed a move to table a bill in Parliament to scrap the Presidential age limit. This proposal was adopted by the Cabinet.

Many Ugandans, some ruling party members and all opposition political parties and civil society are vehemently opposed to the removal of the age limit. It is widely seen as an attempt to give the current President Yoweri Museveni a life presidency. In response, the government has relied heavily on the military and police to intimidate, suppress, arrest and prevent any public protests and demonstrations resulting in widespread violence and human rights abuses.

Insatiable thirst for power

President Museveni has been in power for the last 31 years, since 1986. He is now 73 years old – even though many Ugandans believe he is much older. If the Constitution is not amended, he would be ineligible to run for re-election in 2021 when his current fifth Constitutional term in office ends. By then he would be 77 years old.Once described as a “new breed of African leaders” by former US President Bill Clinton, Museveni’s major weakness has been his greed for power. This has seen him degenerate into one of Africa’s classical dictators. A man who once declared that “the problem of Africa are not its people, but leaders who overstay in office” is on the brink of becoming a life president. He has reneged on all his promises to retire from office and herd his cattle in the several ranches he owns across the country.

At his swearing-in ceremony in 1986, following his successful coup after four years of guerilla warfare, President Museveni promised Ugandans that the National Resistance Army/Movement (NRA/M) would be different from the past regimes that had destabilised Uganda. He said that the NRM is a clear-headed movement with very good people. He added that, what was happening then (the swearing-in) was not a mere change of guard but a fundamental change.

In the last 30 years however, most of the good people who surrounded Museveni have either been forced out or have abandoned him because of his refusal to leave power and his entrenchment of family rule. The NRM has relied heavily on its military wing, the National Resistance Army which under the 1995 Constitution was rebranded the Uganda People’s Defence Forces (UPDF). His regime has become as brutal as past regimes and all progressive steps and institutions are being gradually dismantled to maintain his grip on power.

Patronage and sycophancy

Alongside his reliance on the military to retain power, Museveni also oversees a complex patronage system. His transactional approach to governing has seen supporters rewarded and dissenters severely punished and politically suffocated.Over the last thirty years his closest allies, including his personal medical doctor during the bush struggles Dr. Kizza Besigye, have become his fiercest opponents and symbols of militaristic opposition. John Patrick Amama Mbabazi, one of Museveni’s closest and most trusted allies, also jumped ship and joined the opposition in the last 2016 general election when denied the chance to challenge Museveni for the party candidature.

However, Museveni is still surrounded by a batch of loyal cadres and political sycophants including MPs like Evelyn Anite and Ibrahim Abiriga whose own political survival depends largely on Museveni’s continued reign. In 2016, Evalyne Anite knelt on her knees to beg President Museveni to run for re-election even when Museveni had promised to serve his last term. Anite then proceeded to collect signatures for Museveni’s sole candidature.

Museveni agreed and rewarded Anite with a junior cabinet position. On the removal of the presidential term limit, Anite again became the champion, warning the opposition politicians that “they are the ruling party, fully in control and cannot be intimidated because they have the full support of the majje [army].” Abiriga on the other hand not only imitates Museveni but wears no other colour than the yellow NRM party colour. Abiriga even promised to resign from Parliament if the presidential age limit is not lifted.

Undressing the Emperor?

The loudest voices pushing for Museveni to elongate his stay in power are coming from politicians in the West Nile, a region much maligned by President Museveni because Uganda’s former President Idi Amin Dada who ruled from 1971-1979 came from that region. Museveni has often referred to Idi Amin and Uganda’s former rulers as killers, dictators and pigs.

Today, comparatively, there is not much difference and the longer Museveni stays, the more he looks worse than Idi Amin. Until very recently, West Nile, home of the Anites and Abirigas constituency had no tarmac road or electricity.

The population of West Nile are still very bitter and angry that Museveni demonised their son so much that to-date he remains buried in exile. They always contend that Uganda and the world generally have not acknowledged the patriotic side and contribution of their son, former President Idi Amin Dada, to Uganda.

So, one wonders, what is it that motivates the Anites and Abirigas of this world. Could it be that they deliberately want to undress the emperor to rewrite history? The Anites know so well that Museveni loves power and they will dangle it in his face to make him swallow all the bad things he said about Amin. As a life president, Museveni will have no cloth to wear in the politics of Uganda.

A recipe for disaster

As Barack Obama warned in his address to the AU in 2016, “when a leader tries to change the rules in the middle of the game just to stay in office, it risks instability and strife as we have seen in Burundi, and this is often just the first step down a perilous path….”In Uganda, the Presidential age limit under Article 102 (b) is now the only guarantee for a peaceful transition of power in Uganda. Of the eight Presidents who have ruled Uganda since attaining independence in 1962 not even one has handed over power peacefully to another. The changes have been characteristically violent with war following those ousted from power.

This history was evident in the minds of the framers of the 1995 Constitution who inserted two primary guarantees for a peaceful change of government in Uganda under Article 102 (b) and 105 (2). The removal of the age limit under Article 102 (b) automatically gives Museveni a life presidency with the risk of huge instability from him dying in office. Without this in place, peace cannot be guaranteed.

*Stephen Oola, Uganda Local Correspondent, holds a Master of Arts (MA) in International Peace Studies from University of Notre Dame- USA. Oola is also an Advocate (Attorney) in the High Court of Uganda. Oola heads research and advocacy at the Refugee Law Project, School of Law, Makerere University. He is acting coordinator of the DFID- funded Advisory Consortium on Conflict Sensitivity (ACCS) at the Refugee Law Project. Oola obtained a Law Degree (LLB-Hons) from Makerere University, Kampala. He holds a Post Graduate Diploma in Legal Practice (PGD. LP), from the Law Development Centre, Kampala. Oola also acquired a Post-Graduate Diploma in Conflict Management and Peace Studies (PGC) from Gulu University, Gulu Uganda.

This article was originally published by Peace Insight and is available by clicking here. The views expressed in this article do not necessarily reflect the views of TransConflict.

To: Rex Tillerson
From: Robert Reich
Subject: The Moron

I can understand why you feel Washington is a place of “petty nonsense,” as you said Wednesday when you called a news conference to rebut charges that you called Trump a moron last summer after a meeting of national security officials at the Pentagon.

I’m also reasonably sure you called him a moron, which doesn’t make Washington any less petty. You probably called him a moron because almost all of us out here in the rest of America routinely call him that.

But you’re right: There are far more important issues than the epithet you likely used to describe your boss.

On the other hand, your calling him a moron wouldn’t itself have mushroomed into a headline issue – even in petty Washington – if there weren’t deep concerns about the President’s state of mind to begin with.

I bet every cabinet secretary has from time to time called his boss a moron. I was a cabinet secretary once, and although I don’t recall ever saying Bill Clinton was a moron, I might have thought it, especially when I found out about Monica Lewinsky. But Bill Clinton was no moron.

The reason your moronic comment about Trump made the headlines is that Trump really is a moron, in the sense you probably meant it: He’s impulsive, mercurial, often cruel, and pathologically narcissistic. Some psychologists who have studied his behavior have concluded he’s a sociopath.

Washington is petty, but it’s not nonsensical. It latches on to gaffes only when they reveal something important. As journalist Michael Kinsley once said, “A gaffe is when a politician tells the truth – some obvious truth he isn’t supposed to say.”

Face it. You are Secretary of State – the nation’s chief diplomat – under a president who’s dangerously nuts.

Last weekend, for example, Trump publicly said you were wasting your time trying to open talks with North Korea. Does he have a better idea? Any halfway rational president would ask his Secretary of State to try to talk with Kim Jong-Un.

And there’s Iran. You and Defense Secretary James Mattis have both stated the nuclear agreement should be retained. That, too, is only rational. The International Atomic Energy Agency says Iran has been honoring the agreement. Without it, Iran would restart its nuclear program.

But Trump is on the verge of decertifying the agreement in order to save face (in the 2016 campaign he called it an “embarrassment to America”) and further puncture Barack Obama’s legacy. His narcissism is endangering the world.

You tried to mediate the dispute between Qatar and its Arab neighbors. That, too, was the reasonable thing to do.

But then Trump and his son-in-law Jared Kushner sided with the United Arab Emirates, where they have business interests. Less than one hour after you called for a “calm and thoughtful dialogue” between Qatar and its neighbors, Trump blasted Qatar for financing terrorism. That was also nuts.

You are rightly appalled at Trump’s behavior. I can understand why you distanced yourself when Trump blamed “both sides” for violence at a white supremacist rally in Charlottesville. And why you were horrified when Trump gave a wildly partisan speech to the Boy Scouts of America, which you once headed.

Given all this, I’m not surprised to hear that you’ve talked about resigning, but that Mattis and John Kelly, the White House chief of staff, have talked you out of it.

I urge you not to resign. America and the world need sane voices speaking into the ear of our Narcissist-in-Chief.

As Senator Bob Corker, Republican of Tennessee and chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee said recently, it’s you, Mattis, and Kelly who “help separate our country from chaos.” I don’t think Corker was referring to chaos abroad.

Let Trump fire you if he wants to. That would further reveal what a moron he is.

But if you really did want to serve the best interests of this nation, there’s another option you might want to consider.

Quietly meet with Mattis, Kelly, and Vice President Pence. Come up with a plan for getting most of the cabinet to join in a letter to Congress saying Trump is unable to discharge the duties of his office.

Under the 25th Amendment, that would mean Trump is fired.

A major chapter in American history – rarely taught in our schools – is how ever larger corporations have moved to game, neutralize and undermine the people’s continual efforts to protect our touted democratic society. It is a fascinating story of the relentless exercise of power conceived or seized by corporations, with the strategic guidance of corporate lawyers.

Start with their birth certificate – the state charters that bring these corporate entities into existence, with limited liability for their investors. In the early 1800s, the Massachusetts legislature chartered many of the textile manufacturing companies. These charters could be renewed on good behavior, because lawmakers then viewed charters as privileges contingent on meeting the broad interests of society.

Fast forward to now. The charter can be granted online in a matter of hours; there are no renewal periods and the job is often given over to a state commission. Over the decades, corporate lobbyists have had either the legislatures or the courts grant them more privileges, immunities and concentration of power in management, rendering shareholders – their owners – increasingly powerless. The same corporate fixers work for corporations and their subsidiaries abroad to help them avoid US laws, taxes and escape disclosures.

Remarkably, the artificial creation called the “corporation” has now achieved almost all of the rights of real people under our “We the People” Constitution that never mentions the words “corporation” or “company.”

Corporations cannot vote, at least not yet; only people can. That was seen as a major lever of democratic power over corporations. So what has happened? Commercial money to politicians started weakening the influence of voters because the politicians became increasingly dependent on the corporate interests that bankrolled their campaigns. The politicians use their ever-increasing corporate cash to saturate voters with deceptive political ads, and intimidate any competitors who have far less money, but may be far better representative of the public good.

To further shatter the principle of voter sovereignty, corporations have rewarded those politicians who construct restrictive political party rules, gerrymander electoral districts and obstruct third party candidate ballot access. By concentrating political power in fewer and fewer hands, corporate influence becomes more deeply entrenched in our democratic society. Politicians quickly learn that political favors will attract more corporate campaign cash and other goodies.

Institutions that are supposed to represent democratic values, such as Congress and state legislatures are meticulously gamed with the daily presence of corporate lawyers and lobbyists to shape the granular performance of these bodies and make sure little is done to defend civic values. These pitchmen are in the daily know about the inner workings of legislative bodies long before the general public. They often know who is going to be nominated for judicial and executive branch positions that  interpret and administer the law and whether the nominee will do the bidding of the corporate bosses.

Then there is the press. Thomas Jefferson put great responsibility on the newspapers of his day to safeguard our democracy from excessive commercial power and their runaway political toadies. Certainly, our history has some great examples of the press fulfilling Jefferson’s wish. For the most part, however, any media that is heavily reliant on advertisements will clip its own wings or decide to go with light-hearted entertainment or fluff, rather than dig in the pits of corruption and wrongdoing.

What of the educational institutions that purport to convey facts, the lessons of history and not be beholden to special interests? The corporate state – the autocratic joining of business and government – exerts its influence all the way down to the state and local levels, not just in Washington. It works through boards of education and trustees of colleges and universities, drawing heavily from the business world and its professional servants in such disciplines as law, accounting and engineering.

Moreover, the most influential alumni, in terms of donations, endowments and engagements, come from the business community. They know the kind of alma mater they want to preserve. The law and business schools are of particular interest, if only because they are the recruiting grounds for their companies and firms.

Their subversion even extends to the sacrosanct notion of academic freedom – that these institutions must be independent centers of knowledge. For example, Monsanto, General Motors, Exxon and Eli Lilly are only a few of the companies that have pushed corporate, commercial science over academic, independent science through lucrative consultantships and partnerships with professors.

The unfortunate reality  is that the wealthy and powerful are driven to spend the necessary time and energy to accomplish their raison d’etre, which are profits and the relentless pursuit of self-interest. Citizens, on the other hand, have so much else on their minds, just to get through the day and raise their families.

The path forward is to learn from history how citizens, when driven by injustice, organized, raised the banners of change and concentrated on the ways and means to victory. These initiatives require civic self-respect and  an understanding that the status quo is demeaning and intolerable.

The requisite to such an awakening is the awareness that our two precious pillars of democracy – freedom of contract and freedom to use the courts – are being destroyed or seriously undermined by corporate influence. The contract servitude of fine-print contracts, signed or clicked on, is the basis of so many of the abuses and rip-offs that Americans are subjected to with such regularity. Add this modern peonage to the corporate campaign to obstruct the people’s full day in court and right of trial by jury guaranteed by our Constitution. The plutocrats have succeeded in gravely doing just that. Tight court budgets, the frequency of jury trials and the number of filed wrongful injury lawsuits keep going down to case levels well under five percent of what the needs for justice require.

Some fundamental questions are: Will we as citizens use our Constitutional authority to reclaim and redirect the power we’ve too broadly delegated to elected officials? Will we hold these officials accountable through a reformed campaign finance system that serves the people over the plutocrats? Will we realize that a better society starts with just a few people in each electoral district and never requires more than one percent of the voters, organized and reflecting public opinion, to make the corporations our servants, not our masters?

See my recent paperback, Breaking Through Power: It’s Easier Than We Think.

By Artyom Lukin and Lyudmila Zakharova*

(FPRI) — Russia’s relations with North Korea are often ignored in the West, being completely overshadowed by China’s. The conventional view is that Russia’s role with respect to the North is purely political and diplomatic, predicated on Russia’s permanent membership in the UN Security Council and participation in the now defunct Six-Party Talks.

Often overlooked is the fact that Russia maintains a range of economic links with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Taken together, they constitute quite a substantial leverage that Russia can exercise over North Korea, when and if it chooses to do so. The paper aims to investigate the economic dimension of the Russia-North Korea relationship.

The bulk of the paper looks at the most significant sectors of economic interaction between Russia and the DPRK, arguing that official statistical data on bilateral trade do not reflect the full picture. Special attention is given to energy flows from Russia to North Korea, detailing Russia’s oil supplies to Pyongyang. The issue of North Korean workers toiling in Russia is also addressed. The report examines Russia’s transportation and telecommunication links with North Korea, especially the Khasan-Rajin rail and port project operated by the state-owned Russian Railways. Finally, the article assesses North Korea’s domestic economic situation and its potential socio-political impact, mostly drawing upon Russian expert assessments.

Major Sectors of Russia-North Korea Economic Interaction

Economic exchanges between Russia and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea are a far cry from the heyday of the 1970s and 1980s when the Soviet Union accounted for up to 50% of North Korea’s foreign trade.

According to trade statistics, Russia is now responsible for a mere 1.2% of the North’s external trade, which still makes it the DPRK’s second largest trading partner (albeit a very distant second, after China, which holds the unassailable top position with 92.5%).1 Although formal customs data significantly understate the actual volume of Russian-North Korean trade, economic exchanges with North Korea barely register in Russia’s economy (with the partial exception of the North Korean labor whose presence is quite noticeable in the Russian Far East).

The limited nature of Russia’s economic engagement with the North is due to several factors. First, the DPRK is short on hard currency and thus is not a particularly attractive export market. Unlike the former Soviet Union, Russia is not willing to sell North Korea goods at friendly prices or provide preferential long-term loans. Economic dealings with the North are pragmatic and market-based. This differentiates North Korea from Russia’s post-Soviet allies, such as Belarus, to whom Russia does extend unilateral economic benefits.

Second, heavy international sanctions deter Russian companies, particularly major ones, from doing business with the DPRK. Severance of banking channels with the North, which makes settlement of payments and money transfers virtually impossible, is the biggest obstacle. Russian Ambassador to Pyongyang Alexander Matsegora admits: “Under sanctions normal trade is impossible, mainly because legal payment settlement flows are blocked. This is exactly why Russian-North Korean trade is almost at the zero level now. . . . As long as the DPRK is under such severe sanctions, any substantial development of trade and economic relations . . . has to be postponed.”2

Finally, North Koreans’ reliability as commercial partners still leaves much to be desired. As Georgy Toloraya and Alexander Vorontsov point out:

Russian businessmen are experiencing the same old hurdles, familiar for decades of cooperation under the Soviet Union: North Koreans seem to pursue short-term individual gains; unilaterally modify agreements; one-sidedly introduce new rules (sometimes retroactively) unfavorable to investors; break obligations; and deliver goods late. Decision-making mechanisms in North Korea are still opaque, decisions are often based on the spontaneous impulses of higher authorities that cannot be contacted, and there is general lack of coordination between different branches of the state system and economic organizations. Problems with communication persist.3

That said, there might be some changes occurring in North Korea’s approach to business with Russia. According to one practitioner of Russia-North Korea relations, since around March 2016, that is, when the first package of tough UN sanctions was imposed, the North Koreans have acted more seriously and business-like.4 Sanctions are apparently making the North adopt more flexible and effective business practices in its dealings with foreign partners, including Russia.

General Trade. According to Federal Customs Service of Russia, in 2016, bilateral turnover stood at $76.8 million. North Korean exports ($8.8 million) included frozen fish (24.6%), parts and accessories for tractors (22.3%), articles of apparel and clothing accessories (16%), and wind musical instruments (12.4%). Russian exports ($68 million) consisted mainly of bituminous coal (75%), lignite (5%), petroleum oils and gas (4%), as well as wheat (5%), and frozen fish and crustaceans (3%).5 Bituminous coal is an important raw material suited for making metallurgical coke, which is used in smelting iron ore. This type of coal is not found in North Korea, so the DPRK has to procure it from abroad. According to the International Trade Centre data, China had been the main supplier of bituminous coal to the DPRK until 2014, but since 2015, North Korea has received most of its coal imports from Russia (85% in 2015 and 75% in 2016). North Korea runs a chronic deficit in bilateral trade with Russia that is compensated by other economic exchanges, particularly by the exportation to Russia of North Korean labor.

There is some evidence of much higher volume of trade flows between Russia and North Korea that go undetected by official customs reports. This indirect trade is channeled through third-party countries, mainly China. According to Russia’s Ministry for the Far East Development, up to one third of China’s exports to North Korea (roughly $900 million in 2015) was actually made up of Russian-originated goods.6 This indirect trade is mostly constituted by petroleum products.

Oil. China has long been regarded as the exclusive supplier of oil and petroleum products to North Korea. This conventional view needs to be reconsidered as more and more evidence emerges that Russia is the other major provider of crucial fuel resources to the DPRK.

It is estimated that China exports about 500,000 metric tons of crude oil and 270,000 tons of oil products to North Korea each year.7 Russian-originated oil supplies to the DPRK, mostly gasoline and diesel fuel, are estimated to be within the range of 200,000-300,000 tons per year, which amounts to roughly $200-300 million in the current prices. These assessments are based on Russian and international sources. In particular, the senior-level North Korean defector Ri Jong-ho claims that North Korea secures up to 300,000 tons of oil products from Russia, making Russia even more important than China when it comes to the DPRK’s fuel imports apart from crude.8

According to Ri, shipments of Russian fuel are largely mediated through Singaporean brokers, traditionally Asia’s principal oil trade hub. Singapore may have played the role of the main intermediary for Russian fuel supplies to North Korea in the years prior to Ri’s defection that occurred in 2014. In recent years, however, most sources say that it is China that has been acting as the key middleman in petroleum product trade between Russia and North Korea.9 Gasoline and diesel are declared at the Russian customs as destined for China, Singapore, or elsewhere, but they end up in the DPRK. Selling oil via China makes sense mainly because direct financial settlements between Russian exporters and North Korean importers have become increasingly difficult due to international banking restrictions on the DPRK, while Chinese dealers have developed sophisticated conduits and mechanisms to conduct all kinds of business transactions with North Korea, including yuan-denominated deals and barter trade.

Procuring oil products from Russia, either directly or indirectly through China, makes perfect economic sense for North Korea, considering Russia’s proximity to the DPRK and the Russian oil industry’s high competitiveness, especially in the wake of the ruble’s drastic depreciation in 2014-15. Several oil refineries are situated in the Russian Far East, while the Eastern Siberia-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) oil pipeline’s main terminal sits near Nakhodka. Fuel shipments from Russia are carried by North Korea’s coastal tankers that load at Russian Far Eastern ports, such as Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Slavyanka. While North Korean tankers are relatively small, the distances travelled between Russian terminals and the DPRK’s east coast mean roundtrips can be completed in as little as three days.10 All Russian oil supplies to North Korea are carried out by private companies and executed on strictly commercial terms, based on world market prices. They possibly include some premium markup for risks involved in dealing with a heavily sanctioned country. This situation is different from China whose crude is delivered to North Korea via a state-owned pipeline, apparently at subsidized prices and on long-term credit, thus essentially constituting energy aid to the DPRK.11

Risks relating to oil trade with North Korea were made abundantly clear when, in June 2017, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned the Vladivostok-based oil trader Primornefteprodukt and its parent company Independent Petroleum Company (IPC, Nezavisimaya Neftyanaya Kompaniya) for their dealings with North Korea. Their blacklisting was made pursuant to Executive Order 13722, which gives the Treasury Department the authority to sanction entities operating in the North Korean energy sector. The ever-present threat of U.S. sanctions is likely to deter large Russian companies, who have significant international interests, from dealing with North Korea. The OFAC action against IPC and Primornefteproduct did seem to make a chilling effect on the Russia-North Korea oil business.12 However, Russian oil trade with North Korea is not going to stop, as it will likely shift to obscure small companies, relying on Chinese intermediaries, with minimal exposure to possible U.S. penalties.

UN Security Council Resolution 2375, adopted on Sept. 11, 2017, in response to Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test, capped exports of refined petroleum products to the DPRK at two million barrels per annum. That still leaves legal room for Russian fuel supplies, but the bigger question is whether North Korea will be able to pay for them, considering that the series of UN-mandated bans on its main export items have shaved off up to 90% of its currency inflows from foreign trade.

Labor. Labor exports from North Korea to Russia are perhaps currently the most substantial part of their economic bilateral relationship. There has long been a natural complementarity between Russia’s constant shortage of manpower and North Korea’s surplus labor. North Korean guest workers first came to the Russian (then-Soviet) Far East in the late 1940s under inter-governmental agreements. From the late 1960s to the early 1990s, at any given moment, there were between 15,000-20,000 North Korean laborers working in the USSR.13 According to some estimates, Russia is the world’s biggest recipient of North Korean contract labor, that is, those who arrive on work visas.14 China may host a higher number of North Korean labor migrants, but many of them enter the country and stay there illegally.

As of 2017, there are over 32,000 North Korean workers in Russia.15 Around 44% of the North’s laborers (14,000) are in the Russian Far East, while the rest go to Russia’s other regions, mostly big cities, such as Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Irkutsk, Krasnoyarsk, Omsk, Yekaterinburg, Nizhny Novgorod, and some others. At least 70% of the North Korean workers in Russia are employed in construction and related services, such as home renovation, while the rest find jobs in fishing, agriculture, logging, and restaurant services. This structure of employment significantly differs from the Soviet times when the majority of North Koreans were hired to work in the timber industry and lived on isolated compounds in remote areas. The stereotype of the North Koreans toiling in Gulag-like labor camps in Siberian wilderness persists in the West and is even reproduced by official reports.16 In reality, North Korean lumberjacks in Russia, numbering just over 1,000, can now only be found in Amursky Territory (Amurskaya Oblast’).

The virtual disappearance of North Korean loggers from Russia is due to the general decline of the Russian Far East’s timber industry which was hit hard by high export duties introduced by the Russian government in the mid-2000s in order to discourage the exports of unprocessed wood.17 Furthermore, in the 2000s the manual labor of loggers began to be increasingly replaced by wood harvesting machines.

There are surprisingly few North Koreans working in agriculture even though the rural sector in Russia has been experiencing acute labor shortages. The main reason seems to be that farmers and agribusiness enterprises in the Russian Far East prefer to deal with the Chinese who, unlike the North Koreans, provide not only labor, but also machinery, fertilizers, etc. and often guarantee certain levels of returns from agricultural land.18 This shows limitations on the use of North Korean menial labor in Russia.

There are noticeable differences in patterns of North Korean labor in Russia and China. In Russia, almost all North Korean guest workers are males hired to perform physically demanding jobs, while in China, the majority of North Korean workers are females employed in the textile and seafood industries as well as the food service and hospitality sectors.19 Moreover, Chinese firms sometimes hire North Koreans with high skills such as software engineers,20 which Russia doesn’t do.

It is well-known that North Korean workers who are permitted to go abroad must “share” a substantial part of their earnings with the DPRK authorities and their representatives such as consular officers, managers, and plain- clothed security agents. Russia is no exception. The amounts of such loyalty payments may range within $300-900 a month, mainly depending on the locality, season, and worker qualifications. Pyongyang’s annual revenue from the North Korean guest workers in Russia can reach $200 million per year.21 That said, a sizable portion of the money never reaches North Korea’s state coffers, being pocketed by officials and security agents stationed in Russia who are supposed to oversee and manage the guest workers. According to some sources, the level of corruption among the DPRK’s officials in Russia is quite high.

North Korean workers are left with at least $300 per month as their personal disposable income.22 This amount is far more than the $50-70 a blue collar worker could earn in North Korea. Moreover, it is considerably higher than an average North Korean laborer would make in China (according to some reports, $120-150 a month)23 and in the Middle East ($200).24

Bribes amounting to $500-700 have to be paid for the privilege of working in Russia (for comparison, bribes for being sent on a work assignment to China average $200).25 After completing a tour in Russia, which usually lasts two or three years, a guest worker can return home with $4,000-6,000, which is a very hefty sum by North Korean standards. In many cases, the money is used to launch a family-owned business, such as a retail stall, eatery, or sewing shop thus contributing to the ongoing de facto marketization of the DPRK’s economy. Workers also invest in their children’s education, and they buy homes as well.26

North Korean workers who spend a few years in Russia cannot but undergo some cognitive changes, having experienced the life in a “normal” country where they can see substantially higher levels of prosperity and personal freedoms. A series of interviews conducted with North Korean guest workers in Vladivostok by Far Eastern Federal University researchers showed that the DPRK labor migrants adapt to life in Russia relatively easily and quickly. According to the interviews, the North Koreans, while in Russia, actively use mobile networks and the internet.27 According to some Russian sources who have regular direct contact with the North Korean workers, in private conversations, they often criticize their higher-ups, even though such criticisms almost never extend to the DPRK’s supreme leadership. There is little doubt that the sojourn in Russia does contribute to some emancipation in the North Koreans’ thinking. Defections of the North Korean laborers in Russia are extremely rare. This is not surprising: North Koreans go to Russia not to emigrate, but to make money and bring it home to their families.28

Pyongyang is definitely interested in expanding the workforce exports which provide it with a stable flow of hard currency revenue. According to Russian sources, in bilateral discussions, North Korean officials keep bringing up the issue of sending more workers to Russia. The importance of Russia in this respect has only risen as other traditional importers of the North Korean workforce, such as Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian countries, are turning away from Pyongyang under American pressure and in the wake of Kim Jong-nam’s assassination at the Kuala Lumpur Airport. There are also signs that China may be restricting the use of North Korean workers as relations between Beijing and Pyongyang are at a historical low.29

In recent years, the number of North Korean guest workers in Russia has stood within the range of 30,000-40,000 individuals. Russia remains interested to continue to import hard-working and disciplined North Korean labor. In the eyes of many Russians, North Koreans have a major advantage over guest workers from Central Asia, who currently constitute the main source of labor migration to Russia, since the DPRK citizens are non-Muslims and hence are perceived not to pose a terrorist threat.30 Unlike Central Asians, the North Korean migrants are considered law- abiding and do not give much trouble to law-enforcement authorities. Back in the 1990s, there were several cases of North Koreans engaged in currency counterfeiting and drug trafficking, but this problem no longer exists.31 In March 2017, the deputy director of the Migration Department of Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs visited Pyongyang to discuss further cooperation regarding North Korean labor exports to Russia.32

The United Nations Security Council Resolution 2375, adopted on Sept. 11, 2017 in response to North Korea’s sixth nuclear test, banned Member States from providing or renewing work authorizations for DPRK nationals in their jurisdictions, even though it did not demand immediate expulsion of North Korean guest workers whose contracts had been signed prior to the resolution adoption. However, upon expiration of their current contracts and work authorizations, all North Korean workers will have to leave Russia without being replaced by any new DPRK nationals. It remains to be seen how Russia will implement the ban on North Korean labor.33 The UNSCR’s respective clause is very laconic and somewhat short on specifics, thus leaving room for legal interpretations.

Transportation Links. With the exception of China, Russia is the only country that maintains overland transportation communications with the DPRK. Russia and North Korea are connected by a railway bridge across Tumen (Tumannaya) River through which cargo and passenger trains travel. In some cases, the bridge can also be used for the passage of cars and trucks. In addition to the existing railway link, in 2015, the two sides decided to build a dedicated automobile link which was planned as a floating (pontoon) bridge across the Tumen.34 However, this plan has been indefinitely postponed due to the lack of funding and rising strategic uncertainties.

In 2006, when inter-Korean relations were in a détente phase, Russia, South Korea and
North Korea signed an agreement to connect the Trans-Siberian railway with a future Trans-Korean railway. As the first stage, it was decided to modernize the infrastructure between the Russian border railway station of Khasan and Rajin (Najin) port in North Korea. Russian Railways, a state-owned company, invested about $300 million into the upgrade of the 54-kilometer railroad stretch between Khasan and Rajin as well as the modernization of the cargo terminal at the third pier of the Rajin port.35 In essence, a new railroad was constructed, boasting double-gauge tracks so as to make it compatible with both Russian and Korean rail cars.

The initial aim was to create a freight hub in Rajin, which would move containers from Asia to Europe and vice versa through the Trans-Siberian railway. It was envisioned that before the Trans-Korean railway becomes operational containers would come by sea from South Korea’s Busan to North Korea’s Rajin and then be loaded onto trains for a trans-Eurasian journey by the Trans-Siberian. However, by the time the construction work had been completed in 2014, North-South relations were at a low point, and Seoul had lost enthusiasm for the project. RasonKonTrans, a joint stock company set up by Russian Railways (70% of the shares) and the port of Rajin (30%) to operate the project, was left without South Korean customers. Instead of handling container traffic between South Korea and Europe as originally planned, RasonKonTrans had to switch to trans-shipments of Russian coal bound for China. Currently, coal makes up the bulk of the traffic passing through the Khasan-Rajin rail link, being loaded onto China- bound ships at the RasonKonTrans-owned terminal in the port of Rajin.

So far, the Rajin project is producing a loss for Russia. The operating breakeven point will be achieved if the annual freight volume handled by the joint venture exceeds 5 million tons. In 2017, the cargo volume is expected to reach 2 million tons.36 Apart from the Kaesong Industrial Complex, which was shut down in February 2016 by Seoul’s decision to withdraw, the Khasan-Rajin project may well be the single biggest foreign direct investment in North Korea. For Russia, strategic considerations involved in this undertaking may be even more important than purely commercial interests. The project gives Russia a direct presence in a North Korean port strategically located close to the Russian and Chinese borders. It is noteworthy that from the very beginning the Khasan-Rajin venture was vigorously supported by then-CEO of Russian Railways Vladimir Yakunin, reputedly a member of Vladimir Putin’s inner circle. Even after Yakunin’s departure from Russian Railways in 2015, Moscow has continued to back the project. Russia secured exemption of RasonKonTrans’ operations in Rajin from the provisions of the UNSC Resolutions 2270 (March 2016), 2321 (November 2016), 2371 (August 2017), and 2375 (September 2017) that imposed a general ban on North Korea’s coal exports as well as joint ventures with the DPRK.

In May 2017, a sea ferry line linking Vladivostok and Rajin was launched, using the DPRK-flagged and -crewed Mangyongbong ferry boat. It seems to be the only regular ferry line North Korea currently maintains with a foreign country. The Russian operator of the ferry line is a small private logistics firm InvestStroyTrest which is based in Vladivostok and has representation in Rajin.37

In addition to the rail and sea connections, Russia is the only country, besides China, that maintains permanent scheduled air service to the North. Currently, there are two flights per week between Vladivostok and Pyongyang operated by North Korea’s Air Koryo. All the other international airports with scheduled year-round service to North Korea are China’s Beijing, Shenyang, and Shanghai. Regular overland and air links make Russia an indispensable gateway for North Korea and the only available alternative to China. Senior North Korean officials travelling abroad routinely take Aeroflot flights via Vladivostok and Moscow. For example, in August 2017, the DPRK’s ceremonial head of state, President of the Presidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea Kim Yong-nam traveled to Iran via Russia rather than China, even though the China route was shorter.38 Incidentally, North Korean national flag carrier Air Koryo’s fleet entirely consists of Russian and Soviet-made aircraft: Tupolevs, Ilyushins, and Antonovs. This means that North Korea is dependent upon Russia for spare parts and some maintenance services. North Korean civil aviation pilots get their training at the Ulyanovsk Institute of Civil Aviation.

Russia is the only country other than China on which North Korea relies for access to the global internet. For a number of years, the Russian company SatGate has provided Pyongyang with a backup connection to the world’s cyberspace via satellite links.39

However, most of North Korea’s internet traffic still is routed through China. The Chinese monopoly on North Korea’s external digital traffic was broken in early October 2017, when a major Russian telecom company, TransTeleCom, began providing an internet connection to the DPRK via its fiber optic lines that run alongside the Khasan-Rajin railway.40 TransTeleCom is a subsidiary of state-owned Russian Railways. The decision to allow North Korea internet access via Russian networks could not have possibly been made without approval from the Kremlin.

Finance. Until recently, Russia was one of the few countries whose financial institutions carried out regular transactions with North Korea. Tellingly, in 2007, the Russian Far East’s Khabarovsk-based Dalcombank became the only bank in the world that agreed to perform the delicate task of mediating the transfer to North Korea of $25 million of the Kim regime’s assets that had been previously frozen in Macao’s Banco Delta Asia by the U.S. Treasury action.41

UNSC Resolution 2270 (March 2016) effectively suspended any bank cooperation between Russia and North Korea. The almost complete absence, at present, of legal banking channels with North Korea begs the question of how financial operations are at all possible between Russia and the DPRK. In particular, how does the North Korean government repatriate the revenue collected from its laborers who work in Russia? The primary option seems to be cash. North Koreans normally convert the rubles they earned in Russia into U.S. dollars and then bring them to the DPRK as cash . The amount of cash operated by North Koreans in Russia can be quite impressive. For example, in 2015, a Vladivostok-based commerce official from the North reportedly absconded to South Korea with $2 million.

Under Russian customs regulations, individuals leaving the country can carry with them cash not exceeding the equivalent value of $10,000. One can safely assume that many North Koreans departing Russia carry cash close to the $10,000 limit and sometimes even in excess of it. Customs officials at the Vladivostok airport routinely report incidents of North Koreans boarding flights for Pyongyang caught with sums of cash well above the permitted amount.42 One can also speculate that diplomatic pouches might be used to transport cash from Russia to North Korea—although there have been no publicly reported incidents.

Another option to move money between Russia and the DPRK would be through Chinese banks as many Russian banks, especially in the Russian Far East, maintain dollar and yuan correspondent accounts with China. In this case, North Koreans convert their rubles into dollars or yuan and wire them to a Chinese bank. However, since 2016, Chinese financial institutions have become increasingly reluctant to handle North Korean money transfers, which means that the DPRK has to rely even more on cash mules.

Illicit Trans-Boundary Networks. There is some evidence of illicit trans-border networks formed by Russian, North Korean, and Chinese nationals. According to some reports, the North Korean city of Rajin has become a major hub for the trade of illegally caught wild crab. Russian and foreign poachers bring the illicit seafood catches to Rajin, where it is then shipped to China. In April 2017, at the Bilateral Intergovernmental Consultations on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing, Russia formally raised with Pyongyang its concerns over the crab issue.43 These illicit networks are not limited to the seafood sector. In October 2015, Far Eastern customs officials reported successful interdiction in the Sea of Japan of a large shipment of Russian-originated jade that was headed for North Korea, with China as the final destination. The smugglers operating a vessel bound for the North were two Russian citizens.44

Russian Assessments of North Korea’s Economic Resilience

North Korea has not published regular economic statistics since the 1960s. Only separate bits of statistics are made available with some time lag. According to scholars at the Economic Institute of the DPRK’s Academy of Social Sciences, in 2014 the country’s GDP amounted to $26.132 billion, the population stood at 24.895 million people, and the GDP per capita was $1,053.45 It is not clear what methodology is used by the North Korean statistics agency to calculate the GDP and whether it includes informal sector production. What is interesting is that this GDP figure is much closer to the South Korean estimates of North Korea’s nominal gross national income (GNI) published annually by the Bank of Korea (USD 28.93 billion in 2014) than the DPRK’s GDP at current prices published by the UN Statistics Department (USD 17.4 billion in 2014). What is clear, though, is that North Korea’s internal economic situation has been improving in recent years.

Lyudmila Zakharova visited Pyongyang to conduct field research in late May-early June 2017. When comparing impressions to her previous stay in the city in 2005, Zakharova noticed that the city has enjoyed significant development in terms of construction, public and commercial transport, food supplies, and entertainment. According to Russian diplomats stationed in the DPRK, the most visible changes have taken place during the last three or four years and are not restricted to Pyongyang, but can be seen in some other cities, such as Wonsan, Chonjin, Nampho, and Rajin.46 There are signs of a construction boom and fledgling real estate market in North Korea.47

That being said, economic growth cannot guarantee the regime stability and its ultimate survival. In fact, there have been multiple historical cases of revolutions and uprisings against ruling regimes breaking out at times of relative affluence. As Andrei Lankov reminds, neither the American Revolution of 1776, the French Revolution of 1789, nor the Russian Revolution of 1917, came at a time when the lifestyle of each country’s citizenry could be described as destitute.48 The DPRK leadership may well understand the social and political risks that come with economic growth, especially the danger of income polarization becoming too conspicuous. Relative prosperity, leading to ever rising expectations, might eventually prove even more dangerous for the regime than austerity and destitution. Alexandre Mansourov, a former Soviet diplomat in Pyongyang who is now a U.S.-based North Korea analyst, argues that the regime does not want the living standards to rise fast or too high because that could result in social and political destabilization.49

Despite declarations of self-reliance, the North Korean economy still depends on the outside world for important products like crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel, coking coal, many kinds of industrial equipment, vehicles, and foodstuffs. To reduce this dependence, the country’s leadership is pushing for import substitution. Achieving self-sufficiency in energy is obviously a top concern and priority. Pressed by international sanctions, the DPRK needs to make sure that it can sustain a possible energy cutoff. To achieve this goal, North Koreans have been working on ways to produce synthetic liquid fuel from coal. This development is a key part of the DPRK’s efforts to create a “carbon-based chemical industry” under the five-year economic strategy (2016-2020) announced by Kim Jong-un at the 7th Party Congress in May 2016.50 It is not unprecedented for national economies to drastically reduce their dependence on foreign oil that becomes unavailable under the externally imposed isolation. Nazi Germany and Apartheid South Africa were relatively successful in creating large-scale coal liquefaction industries.51

At present, several countries, including China, operate coal-to-liquid-fuels projects. It is debatable whether, and how quickly, the DPRK can establish its own liquefaction industry even if it has the requisite technologies. Apart from coal, which the North possesses in abundance, this kind of chemical production needs massive capital investments and requires significant energy inputs, both of which Pyongyang lacks.

Chronic power shortages are one of North Korea’s major economic vulnerabilities. The country is extremely reliant on hydropower stations which, according to North Korean official sources, provide 56% of the national power- generating capacity.52 The U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates that hydropower provides up to 74% of the North’s electricity consumption.53 Hydropower output depends on precipitation and drops drastically in dry years. Developing nuclear energy has long seemed an obvious option for North Korea to bolster its energy security.

Since as early as the 1960s, the DPRK has been making efforts to build an atomic energy industry.54 Lack of funding and Pyongyang’s severely restricted access to the international market of civilian nuclear technologies have seriously hampered the North’s progress in this area. However, the DPRK continues to pursue nuclear-power generation. In particular, work has continued on Experimental Light Water Reactor at Yongbyon.55 There might also be other nuclear facilities in development and under construction whose primary function is civilian rather than military. So far Pyongyang has not treated its civilian atomic sector as the top priority, with most of the resources going into military- related nuclear programs. This situation, however, may change, especially if the specter of external trade and energy blockades loom larger. The DPRK may accelerate its civilian energy program in order to produce operational reactors as soon as possible.56

Some Russian experts, who have interacted with North Korean scientists and students coming to Russian universities, notice that in recent years the North Koreans have displayed an increased interest in the fields related to civilian nuclear energy. Some evidence suggests that the North is focusing on relatively primitive nuclear reactor designs with low safety standards,57 which might be especially dangerous in a seismically active area such as the north of the Korean Peninsula. The main concern is that the North Koreans may attempt to launch nuclear power plants with substandard and poorly tested reactors. Doing so would keep with the North Korean tradition of sacrificing safety standards in order to accelerate construction of high-priority industrial facilities.58 Part of the reason for carrying out such a hazardous move could be strategic. Pyongyang might locate its nuclear power plants close to the DMZ so as to create risks not only for itself, but also for South Korea and Japan. Finally, nuclear power plants may be used as a shield to deter a possible attack on the North. The U.S. and South Korea might have to think twice before conducting military strikes in the areas where North Korea’s active nuclear power plants would be located.

What happens to North Korea if the current sectoral sanctions on Pyongyang are enhanced to the level of an all-out economic blockade? Such a scenario could materialize if China and Russia cut all, or almost all, economic ties they still maintain with the North, especially energy shipments. This scenario may not necessarily mean the end of the DPRK. North Korea is probably the only non-continental-size economy in the modern world that can survive in the conditions close to autarky. Some economists call North Korea “the poorest advanced economy in the world,” meaning that North Koreans have succeeded in building a comprehensive industrial structure able to produce a wide range of capital goods like railroad locomotives, cargo vessels, turbines and generators for power plants, numerically controlled lathes, etc.59 The North Korean economy is consciously constructed in such a way as to maximally reduce dependence on foreign partners, while the population is thoroughly indoctrinated to endure various hardships stoically.

It would be a mistake to think that the worsening of living conditions caused by external pressure would take North Koreans to the streets against their rulers.

A complete or near-complete economic blockade will no doubt deal a hard blow to the DPRK and cause ordinary North Koreans much suffering, but it may not be nearly enough to bring the regime to its knees. The country did not implode in the 1990s when, in the wake of the Soviet Union’s demise, the North was left without the biggest economic patron. The DPRK’s foreign trade collapsed, and millions of North Koreans experienced starvation. The national economy is now much more resilient and flexible than it was in the early 1990s, thanks in no small part to the introduction of de facto market mechanisms. Core industries, including agriculture, have become more self-reliant. Harvested grain crops in North Korea increased from 5.03 million tons in 2012 to 5.89 million tons in 2015. The country must produce around six million tons of grain crops to satisfy domestic demand. Thus North Korea may be approaching basic food self-sufficiency. The North also likely has created strategic reserves of some imported key commodities such as oil and petroleum products.

Conclusion

After China, which accounts for the bulk of North Korea’s foreign transactions, Russia is at present the second most important economic partner for Pyongyang. However, Russia, unlike China, cannot serve as a major market for North Korea’s main commodities because Russia itself is rich in natural resources. Therefore, North Korean merchandise exports to Russia are miniscule. However, there are at least three areas where Russia does make a difference for the DPRK: (1) imports of bituminous coal from Russia, (2) exports of North Korean labor to Russia, and (3) imports from Russia of petroleum products, even though much of the oil trade is disguised by using Chinese and other intermediaries. Russia also remains the only country, apart from China, that provides the DPRK with regular transportation and telecommunications links—via air, rail, sea, and the internet—connecting the isolated nation to the outside world. Should Russia decide to curtail or terminate its economic contacts with the North, Pyongyang will feel real pain.

Russian-North Korean economic transactions are mostly pragmatic, driven by market demand and supply. Almost all Russian entities that deal with the North are private firms that seek commercial profit. The only exception is the Khasan-Rajin port and rail project, owned and operated by the state-controlled Russian Railways. Moscow sees its hefty investment in the port of Rajin not only as a potentially profitable venture, but also as a foothold in the strategically important location at the junction of North Korean, Russian, and Chinese borders. Unlike China, which provides economic assistance to the North such as deliveries of crude oil on preferential terms, Russia is not ready to subsidize the North. It is hard to think of any scenario where Russia would return to the Soviet pattern of being a major donor for the DPRK. The current leadership in Moscow is only willing to provide direct and indirect subsidies to those countries, mostly in the former Soviet Union, which it sees as belonging to Russian sphere of influence and those which have agreed to enter Russian-dominated institutions such as Eurasian Economic Union.60 North Korea matches neither of these conditions.

As long as the DPRK remains under UN-mandated sanctions, any meaningful development of Russia-North Korea economic ties is hardly possible. Moscow voted for the UNSC sanctions and enforces them, even though they carry obvious economic costs for Russia.61 Unilateral sanctions imposed by the United States pose another problem for Russian companies. Some Russian companies and individuals have already been hurt. The U.S. sanctions alone will not be able to stop Russia’s economic interactions with the DPRK, but they are making major Russian companies, particularly those with significant international operations, skittish about any dealings with the North.

Of special concern is the omnibus sanctions act on Russia, Iran, and North Korea signed by President Trump on August 2, 2017. This law creates potential risks to Russian companies dealing with the North, especially oil traders and employers of North Korean labor. It also singles out the Russian Far East’s ports of Vladivostok, Nakhodka, and Vanino for their possible handling of North Korean vessels.62 Moscow always has the option of taking special measures to protect Russian companies from U.S. penalties, such as compensating them for financial losses they might suffer due to U.S. sanctions.

The Kremlin took such steps with regard to some companies targeted by the Western sanctions in the wake of Ukraine and Crimea crises. Whether or not Moscow takes this option in the case of North Korea will depend, to a large extent, on the importance it attaches to the Korean Peninsula.

Regardless of the factors discussed throughout this report, North Korea’s economy has been visibly improving under Kim Jong-un. At least, this was the case until the latest round of harsh UN-mandated sectoral bans. But what can be the effects of the ever-tightening sanctions? The majority opinion among Russian North Korea experts is that even a near-complete blockade of the North, with the buy-in from China and Russia, will not bring Pyongyang to its knees. The regime is likely to survive, albeit at the price of the suffering, and perhaps starvation, of millions: “They would eat grass, but won’t abandon their nuclear weapons,” as President Putin put it.63 Attempts to impose full isolation on the North may push Pyongyang to take risky and even desperate actions, such as launching poorly constructed nuclear power plants or peddling its nukes and missiles to rogue international actors.

*About the authors:
Artyom Lukin is an Associate Professor and the Deputy Director for Research at the School of Regional and International Studies, Far Eastern Federal University, in Vladivostok.

Lyudmila Zakharova is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Korean Studies of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences, in Moscow.

Source:
This article was published by FPRI (PDF)

Notes:
1 Kent Boydston, “North Korea’s Trade and the KOTRA Report,” August 1, 2017, https://piie.com/blogs/north-korea-witness-transformation/north-koreas-trade-and-kotra-report?platform=hootsuite&__
s=%5Bsubscriber.token%5D&__s=uodw3dvouwdwzbqqastf.
2 Interview of Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora, April 14, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/nota-bene/-/as- set_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/id/2729503 (in Russian).
3 Georgy Toloraya and Alexander Vorontsov, “Russia’s ‘Turn to the East’ Policy: Role of Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula,” Interna- tional Journal of Korean Unification Studies, vol. 24, no. 3, 2015, p.59.
4 Remarks of a Russian official at the roundtable on Russia-North Korea relations held at Far Eastern Federal University, Vladivostok, February 2017.
5 Calculated by Lyudmila Zakharova based on the data of International Trade Centre, http://www.intracen.org.
6 “Alexander Galushka: Russia and the DPRK aim for a mutually beneficial cooperation without intermediaries,” Ministry for the Far East Development, Oct. 10, 2015, http://minvostokrazvitia.ru/press-center/news_minvostok/?ELEMENT_ID=3713 (in Russian).
7 “As U.S. and China find common ground on North Korea, is Russia the wild card?” Reuters, May 3, 2017, http://www.reuters.com/article/ us-northkorea-usa-russia-idUSKBN17Z0B7.
8 “N. Korea procuring Russian fuel via Singapore dealers: defector,” Kyodo News, June 28, 2017, https://english.kyodonews.net/ news/2017/06/6f47a07fd486-update1-n-korea-procuring-russian-fuel-via-singapore-dealers-defector.html.
9 That said, it seems that some oil transactions between Russia and the North continue to be mediated by Singapore-based firms (Leo By- rne, “Justice Department filing reveals North Korea’s money laundering, oil trade,” NKNews, August 24, 2017, https://www.nknews.org/ pro/justice-department-filing-reveals-north-koreas-money-laundering-oil-trade/ ).
10 Leo Byrne and James Byrne, “Mapped: North Korea’s oil routes,” NKNews, August 28, 2014, https://www.nknews.org/2014/08/mapped-north-koreas-oil-routes/.
11 However, China’s petroleum products, such as gasoline and diesel, are sold to the DPRK at market prices.
12 Leo Byrne, “North Korean tankers stay away from Russia, two months after OFAC sanctions,” NKNews, August 9, 2017, https://www. nknews.org/pro/north-korean-tankers-stay-away-from-russia-two-months-after-ofac-sanctions/.
13 Andrei Lankov, “A brief history of North Korean laborers in Russia,” NKNews, June 30, 2017, https://www.nknews.org/2017/06/a- brief-history-of-north-korean-laborers-in-russia/.
14 Marcus Noland, “North Korean Exports of Labor,” Dec. 15, 2014, http://blogs.piie.com/nk/?p=13692.
15 Interview of Russian Ambassador to the DPRK Alexander Matsegora, April 14, 2017, http://www.mid.ru/web/guest/nota-bene/-/as- set_publisher/dx7DsH1WAM6w/content/id/2729503 (in Russian).
16 See, for example, the US Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report 2017, June 2017, https://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/ tiprpt/2017/, pp. 336-338.
17 Artyom Lukin’s email communication with Denis Park, a Khabarovsk-based North Korea expert, July 2017. 18 Artyom Lukin’s email communication with Denis Park, a Khabarovsk-based North Korea expert, July 2017.
19 Adam Cathcart, “Chinese discourses on the new North Korea sanctions,” Sino-NK, Sept. 12, 2017, http://sinonk.com/2017/09/12/ chinese-discourse-on-the-new-north-korea-sanctions/.
20 Artyom Lukin’s conversation with North Korea researchers from northeast China. Vladivostok, March 2017.
21 This is comparable to the amount of cash Pyongyang gets from the North Koreans toiling in China, which is estimated to be between $100 and $200 million (Sylvia Yu, “Gaps in records cloak China’s North Korean ‘slave labourers’ in mystery,” The South China Morning Post, August 10, 2017, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/policies-politics/article/2105851/gaps-records-cloak-chinas-north-korean-slave- labourers?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=referral).
22 These assessments are based on multiple interviews and conversations, including those with employers of North Korean labor and North Korean workers themselves.
23 Yu, “Gaps in records cloak China’s North Korean ‘slave labourers’ in mystery.”
24 “Kuwait tells AP: North Korean workers welcome amid crisis,” AP News, August 10, 2017, https://apnews.com/d5c20e4ef36b4658a2a- c5385a2e6f344.
25 Andrei Lankov, “Slavery to dream about,” Carnegie Moscow Center, June 30, 2017, http://carnegie.ru/commentary/71394 (in Russian). 26 Lankov. “Slavery to dream about.”
27 The interviews were conducted in 2016 by Far Eastern Federal University researchers led by Associate Professor Kirill Kolesnichenko. 28 Lankov. “Slavery to dream about.”
29 “Chinese factories suspending North Korean labor imports,” Daily NK, August 18, 2017, http://www.dailynk.com/english/read. php?num=14679&cataId=nk01500.
30 “The Far East will be left without builders: how the sanctions against the DPRK will impact the region,” PrimaMedia, August 10, 2017, http://primamedia.ru/news/612921/ (in Russian).
31 Artyom Lukin’s conversations with law enforcement officials in Vladivostok, Feb. 2016.
32 News release by the Russian Embassy in the DPRK, March 18, 2017, http://www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/posolstvo/novosti-posolstva/357- o-sedmom-zasedanii-rossijsko-korejskoj-rabochej-gruppy-po-resheniyu-voprosov-svyazannykh-s-realizatsiej-mezhpravsoglasheniya-o-vre- mennoj-trudovoj-deyatelnosti (in Russian).
33 “North Korean nationals work in Russia legally — labor minister Maksim Topilin,” Echo Moskvy, Sept. 26, 2017, https://echo.msk.ru/ news/2062534-echo.html.
34 “A floating automobile bridge will be built between Russia and the DPRK,” Gudok, Oct. 20, 2015, http://www.gudok.ru/ infrastructure/?ID=1311879 (in Russian).
35 The DPRK authorities leased the pier to Russia for 49 years.
36 Takayuki Tanaka, “Russian-North Korean company draws up war contingency plan,” Nikkei, August 18, 2017, https://asia.nikkei.com/ Politics-Economy/International-Relations/Russian-North-Korean-company-draws-up-war-contingency-plan.
37 See InvestStroyTrest’s website at http://rajin-investstroytrest.ru/.
38 Elizabeth Shim, “North Korea’s Kim Yong Nam leaves for 10-day Iran trip,” UPI, August 1, 2017, https://www.upi.com/Top_News/ World-News/2017/08/01/North-Koreas-Kim-Yong-Nam-leaves-for-10-day-Iran-trip/6961501575985/?spt=su&or=btn_tw.
39 “North Korea’s Ruling Elite Are Not Isolated,” Recorded Future, July 25, 2017, https://www.recordedfuture.com/north-korea-internet- activity/. See also, Your Friendly North Korean Network observer, 2014, https://nknetobserver.github.io/.
40 Martin Williams, “Russia Provides New Internet Connection to North Korea,” 38North, Oct.1, 2017, http://www.38north.org/2017/10/ mwilliams100117/?__s=uodw3dvouwdwzbqqastf.
41 “Dalcombank transfers Macao funds to N. Korea,” RIA Novosti, June 25, 2007, http://sputniknews.com/world/20070625/67734563. html.
42 See, one typical press report of such an incident. “A North Korean tried to bring out of Vladivostok $25,000 undeclared,” PrimaMedia, June 7, 2017, http://primamedia.ru/news/596518/.
43 Ivan Korotayev, “What are crab fishermen hiding?” Konkurent, March 28, 2017, http://konkurent.ru/index. php?cont=article&id=&ida=14919 (in Russian). See also, “At All-Russian Scientific and Research Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO), fourth round of Russian-Korean consultation was held,” April 21, 2017, HTTP://WWW.VNIRO.RU/RU/NOVOSTI/VO- VNIRO-SOSTOYALSYA-CHETVERTYJ-RAUND-ROSSIJSKO-KOREJSKIKH-KONSULTATSIJ (in Russian).
44 “A major contraband of semiprecious stones intercepted by Far Eastern Operative Customs Unit: 3 tons, over 50 mln rubles,” Russian Federal Customs Service, October 20, 2015, http://www.customs.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=21871:2015-10-20- 11-53-40&catid=40:2011-01-24-15-02-45 (in Russian).
45 Lyudmila Zakharova’s conversation with North Korean economic scholars, Pyongyang, June 2017.
46 Zakharova’s interviews with Russian diplomats stationed in Pyongyang, May-June 2017. See also, Leonid Kozlov, “North Korea: A Trip
Report,” FPRI E-Notes, August 31, 2017, https://www.fpri.org/article/2017/08/north-korea-trip-report/.
47 Andrei Lankov, “Building socialism: N. Korea’s construction boom and shaky private enterprise,” NKNews, August 4, 2017, https://www.
nknews.org/2017/08/building-socialism-n-koreas-construction-boom-and-shaky-private-enterprise/.
48 Andrei Lankov, “North Korea’s economy is improving – but this may not save Kim Jong Un,” NKNews, August 14, 2017, https://www. nknews.org/2017/08/north-koreas-economy-is-improving-but-this-may-not-save-kim-jong-un/.
49 Cited in Evan Osnos, “The Risk of Nuclear War with North Korea,” The New Yorker, Sept. 18, 2017, https://www.newyorker.com/maga- zine/2017/09/18/the-risk-of-nuclear-war-with-north-korea.
50 Kim Jong-un, The Report of the Korean Workers’ Party Central Committee to the Party’s Seventh Congress, May 6-7, 2016 (Moscow: Knizny Mir, 2016), p. 53-54 (in Russian).
51 See, for example, Daniel Gross, “Thanks for the Cheap Gas, Mr. Hitler!” Slate, Oct., 23, 2006, http://www.slate.com/articles/busi- ness/moneybox/2006/10/thanks_for_the_cheap_gas_mr_hitler.html.
52 Investment Guide to the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK: Korea Foreign Investment and Economic Cooperation Committee, 2016), p.18.
53 Energy Information Administration, https://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis.cfm?iso=PRK. 54 Ilya Dyachkov, Non-peaceful Atom [Nemirny Atom] (Moscow: MGIMO, 2016), p. 97.
55 “North Korea’s Yongbyon Facility: Probable Production of Additional Plutonium for Nuclear Weapons,” 38 North, July 14, 2017, http:// www.38north.org/2017/07/yongbyon071417/. See also, the IAEA Director General’s report, August 25, 2017, https://www.iaea.org/ About/Policy/GC/GC61/GC61Documents/English/gc61-21_en.pdf.
56 Electricity produced by nuclear power plants is also essential for the energy-intensive technology of coal liquefaction (see above). This might serve as another argument in favor of the speedy deployment of nuclear energy.
57 Artyom Lukin’s interview with Oleg Shcheka, professor at Far Eastern Federal University, expert in nuclear technologies, Vladivostok, May 2017.
58 Soviet technical specialists who assisted the DPRK in the 1960s repeatedly noted North Koreans’ willingness to cut corners in terms of safety standards for the sake of construction speed (Ilya Dyachkov, Non-peaceful Atom [Nemirny Atom] (Moscow: MGIMO, 2016), p. 97.
59 Jeff Baron, “What if Sanctions Brought North Korea to the Brink? ‘Well, in 1941…’” (Interview with Mitsuhiro Mimura), 38 North, Sept. 7, 2017, http://www.38north.org/2017/09/jbaron090717/.
60 Venezuela represents the other case of Russia providing hefty financial assistance to a foreign country. However, Moscow gives loans to Venezuela mostly because the Kremlin-affiliated Rosneft company has a major stake in the country’s huge oil assets and hopes to profit from them (See, “Special Report: Vladimir’s Venezuela-Leveraging loans to Caracas, Moscow snaps up oil assets,” Reuters, August 11, 2017, http:// www.reuters.com/article/us-venezuela-russia-oil-specialreport/special-report-vladimirs-venezuela-leveraging-loans-to-caracas-moscow-snaps- up-oil-assets-idUSKBN1AR14U).
61 That said, Russia can reap some benefits from the sanctions. The ban on North Korean coal led to the rise in demand for Russian anthra- cite on Asian markets (Artyom Lukin’s conversation with a Japanese scholar, Vladivostok, July 2017), while the ban on North Korean seafood exports is going to raise the profit margins of the Russian Far East’s fishing industry.
62 “Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act,” August 2017, https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-congress/house-bill/3364.
63 “Putin: North Korea Would ‘Eat Grass’ Before Giving Up Nukes,” NPR, Sept. 5, 2017, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo- way/2017/09/05/548676414/putin-north-korea-would-eat-grass-before-giving-up-nukes.

By Baker Atyani

The days of Pakistan depending on the US for its military and other requirements are over, Prime Minister Shahid Khaqan Abbasi has signaled in an interview with Arab News.

“If one source dries up … we have no option but to go to another source,” he said.
The prime minister said most of Pakistan’s “frontline weapons were of US origin but that has changed over the years. We have Chinese and European systems. Recently, for the first time we have introduced Russian attack helicopters. So it’s more diversified now.”

Abbasi, who became prime minister in August after his predecessor Nawaz Sharif was barred from public office by the Supreme Court, said there was concern in Pakistan over US President Donald Trump’s new South Asia policy, announced the same month.

Trump accused Pakistan of harboring terrorists and giving them sanctuary on its soil, leading to continued instability in Afghanistan.

In what Abbasi described as a “candid” discussion with US Vice President Mike Pence at the UN General Assembly last month, he said Trump’s policy statement had caused “a lot of apprehension” about “what it meant for Pakistan-US relations.”

“Whatever concerns they have, we have shown our willingness to address those concerns,” Abbasi said.

“We can categorically state that we do not provide any sanctuaries to anybody … we have a common objective that is to destroy terror and bring peace to Afghanistan.

“Much of the area bordering Pakistan is controlled by the Taliban. The people we are fighting in Pakistan today, their sanctuaries are in Afghanistan, their leadership is living there, the planning is done there, the logistical bases are there, and they regularly cross the border and attack our installations.”

Abbasi said Pakistan wanted peace in Afghanistan through a solution that is “owned and led by the Afghans,” and cautioned that Washington’s desire to add India to the mix would be detrimental.

“We do not believe that injecting India into the Pakistan-US relationship will help resolve anything, especially in Afghanistan where we don’t see any role for India.”
The prime minister said Pakistan wanted the world to recognize Pakistan’s efforts in fighting the “world’s war” on terror.

“Nobody has fought a bigger war against terror than we have with our own resources,” he said. “Even the most conservative economic estimate of Pakistan’s losses in this period is over $120 billion,” in addition to the immense loss of life, both civilian and military, with “200,000 of our troops deployed” fighting this war even today.

He said Pakistan will not devalue the rupee or seek help from the International Monetary Fund to address its fiscal challenges.

A rising trade deficit, a potential currency crisis and a sharp decline in exports have placed Pakistan’s foreign exchange reserves under pressure. Financial analysts believe the reserves are probably falling more quickly than government projections suggest.

“We have discussed devaluation but it’s not on the cards,” Abbasi said. “There has been a slight decline in the rupee but that’s market based. In fact, because we are linked to the dollar and the dollar is weaker today, there has been a certain devaluation … compared to the other currencies.

“Economies have also slowed down in the Gulf, where most of our remittances used to come from.”

“There has been a decline in the reserves but hopefully the last two months show an improving trend and the numbers for September will come in… and we expect to resolve that issue within our resources and not have to resort to the IMF. I don’t think the IMF program is something that we intend to pursue.”

Abbasi said Pakistan and its economy were in an “expansion phase,” and were placing their hopes for the future on Chinese investment — particularly CPEC, the China Pakistan Economic Corridor, part of China’s ambitious $1 trillion One Belt One Road initiative.

“If you look at any economy, the basic ingredient is more infrastructure to resolve infrastructural issues and this is a quantum leap in that direction,” he said.

“It’s a massive investment, over $60 billion today. It’s mostly in infrastructure that we badly needed. Our roads, ports, industrial zones … it will open up western channels access to the world. It will help us to move our commerce faster. It will help us develop more industries and help with exports.

“It’s really a game changer and it will have multiplier effect. It will attract more investment, it will attract more projects. So, it’s really something that we feel will pay very high dividends for Pakistan.”

Abbasi rejected suggestions that large investments would give China undue influence in Pakistan.
“It’s a two-way relationship,” he said. “They have equity investments here but mostly it is debt or loans of some kind and it is basically focused on certain areas. We do not view it as a threat of any kind.
“Pakistan’s economy has the capacity to repay those loans. They have been targeted very carefully and the economic dividends will pay for more than the loans are worth. So, it’s an economic relationship in that sense.”

By Raghida Dergham*

These days in Washington, they say that as long as the military trio are in charge of foreign policy, it does not matter what President Trump says about his Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson, nor what Tillerson denies having said about Donald Trump.

Some insist that the president is determined to appoint the US ambassador to the UN, Nikki Haley, as Tillerson’s replacement, not just because she has the same hawkish position as Trump on North Korea and Iran, but also because he wants to replace her at the UN with current Deputy National Security Adviser Dina Powell, to keep her away from federal investigations into allegations of collusion with Russia. Others surmise that Trump is unsatisfied with Haley; they say he considers her a lightweight who could not fill the post at the State Department.

This tragi-comic drama will not threaten US national security because the military trio — Defense Secretary James Mattis, National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster and White House Chief of Staff John Kelly — remains in charge, and the president is fine with that as long as the key principles remain the subject of agreement. According to informed sources, these are: Maintaining the US foreign policy status quo, including the nuclear deal with Iran albeit with an attempt to improve or tighten it; maintaining accord with Russia, in Syria and elsewhere; and third, containing any surprises.

Some in Washington believe the “safety valve” protecting foreign policy from utter chaos is Rex Tillerson himself. These voices say that Trump is dangerously irrational and incoherent, and that Tillerson must therefore stay at the helm of US foreign policy.
Yet those who respect Tillerson want him to step down for being “tainted,” after Trump mocked him publically a few times, most recently when he said: “I told Rex Tillerson, our wonderful Secretary of State, that he is wasting his time trying to negotiate with Little Rocket Man,” in reference to the North Korean leader Kim Jong Un. On more than one occasion, Trump undermined his secretary of state and his efforts, for example during the Qatar crisis when Trump sided with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, and Bahrain while Tillerson tried to take the middle ground.

This week, Tillerson had to adapt to the situation. He preferred to keep the post and accept the terms that come with it. “He surrendered. They wrote him the script and he caved,” one Washington observer said, in reference to the military trio. Tillerson dismissed reports this week that he had called Trump a moron, and denied that he intends to resign. “I serve at the appointment of the president and I’m here as long as the president thinks I can be useful to achieving his objectives,” he said.

This means the crisis with Tillerson has been contained on Trump’s own terms, which require Tillerson to stick close to the script in all circumstances. It also means that Nikki Haley’s hopes of replacing him have hit a solid wall, at least for now.

There are two views regarding Haley and what Trump wants for her. One says Trump greatly admires her and he has been making trouble for Tillerson because he wants her to replace him. The other, according to a source close to the White House, says this view is wrong. The source says President Trump is as furious with Haley as he is with Tillerson, because “they are both freelancing and competing with each other, when their job is to implement the president’s policy.” The source adds: “President Trump believes that Nikki Haley is selling Nikki Haley in the media, acting like a politician when she should act like an ambassador and not steal the limelight from the president.” President Trump, according to the source, and many in the White House, see Haley as “not substantive,” as someone who is using the post to further her political ambitions, which include running for president, as the source said.

Many in Washington also dispute reports suggesting Dina Powell could serve as the US envoy to the UN as replacement for Haley, and argue that Steve Bannon, who still has some influence over the White House, would not allow it.

None of this chaos is unusual in the era of Donald Trump and the many sackings and resignations that have affected his administration. The president himself is seen as “lame” by half of Americans, as one source put it. Not only is he the object of division between the Republicans and Democrats, but also among Republicans themselves, whose party had reluctantly nominated Trump. Thus, the US domestic political landscape remains on the edge of collapse.

Under Trump, foreign policy, as furthered by the military men now in the administration, is a continuation of Barack Obama’s foreign policy, with exceptions regarding relations with the Gulf states and Egypt. Barack Obama had placed the Iranian priority above all other considerations, and accepted distance with the Gulf nations and Egypt to safeguard his bid to effect a qualitative shift in US-Iranian relations, culminating with the nuclear deal. He turned a blind eye to and even sanctioned Iran’s regional incursions into Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon for the sake of that deal.

Trump pledged to mend these gaps in Obama’s policies in relation to Iran’s actions in the Arab world, but in reality he is implementing the “sequel” to these policies. For this reason, his administration is doing little to nothing to stop Iran from dominating the territories retaken from Daesh in Syria and Iraq, via its arms and proxies. Nikki Haley is engaging, meanwhile, in verbal one-upmanship at the Security Council, but reality on the ground indicates that the accords with Russia, which include rewarding Iran on the ground in Syria, is a fixed tenet of US foreign policy, designed by the president and his military men led by Mattis, McMaster and Kelly.

Trump relies on this military trio to avoid any surprises and safeguard the status quo. The crisis with Tillerson has been contained and no further independence or improvization is to be expected of him. Foreign policy may thus be less incoherent, at least publically. And most probably, Nikki Haley will restrain her media gymnastics now that it is clear Tillerson will be in his post for now.

The first step for this newfound coherence will be when the Trump administration speaks with one voice regarding the review next week of the nuclear agreement with Iran. The defense secretary, addressing the Senate last week, expressed support for the deal: “The point I would make is if we can confirm that Iran is living by the agreement, if we can determine that this is in our best interests, then clearly we should stay with it. I believe at this point in time, absent indications to the contrary, it is something the President should consider staying with.”

This narrative diverges from earlier threats made to tear apart the agreement. So does Trump’s announcement regarding decertification of the nuclear agreement. But the impact is not lost on Iran who backed down this week and bowed to Trump’s demand that ballistic missiles must be discussed as part of the future of the nuclear agreement.

The clash of personalities in the Trump administration is likely to be contained only temporarily. The next chapter will soon reintroduce the matter of who will be the next Secretary of State. In the meantime, the question on whether Trump’s policy is the sequel to Obama’s policy is manifested clearly so far in Syria.

• Raghida Dergham is a columnist, senior diplomatic correspondent, and New York bureau chief for the London-based Al-Hayat newspaper since 1989. She is the founder and executive chairman of Beirut Institute. She is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and an honorary fellow at the Foreign Policy Association and has served on the International Media Council of the World Economic Forum. Twitter: @RaghidaDergham

California lawmakers have just passed “sanctuary state” legislation – the first state since Oregon, which 30 years ago passed a law preventing state agencies from targeting undocumented immigrants solely because of their illegal status.

Other states should follow California’s and Oregon’s lead.

Since January, when Attorney General Jeff Sessions ordered immigration authorities to target “public safety” threats, federal arrests of undocumented immigrants have increased by over 37 percent. California is home to an estimated 2.3 million unauthorized immigrants.

California’s law limits the authority of state and local law enforcers to communicate with federal immigration authorities, and prevents officers from questioning or holding people depending on their immigration status or immigration violations. But it still allows federal immigration authorities to enter county jails to question immigrants, and allow police and sheriffs to share information on people who have been convicted of serious crimes.

This is a fair balance. Sanctuary protections like these make sense because:

1. Under them, undocumented immigrants are more likely to come forth with information about crime when doing so won’t put them at risk of deportation. This improves public safety and builds trusts with law enforcement.

2. By contrast, turning state and local police into immigration agents invites more crime because it diverts limited time and resources to rounding up undocumented immigrants.

3. Undocumented immigrants commit crimes at a lower rate than native-born citizens, so it makes even less sense for local and state police to spend their precious time and resources rounding them up.

4. A dragnet aimed at finding and deporting all of America’s 11 million unauthorized immigrants is cruel, costly, and contemptible. It turns this country into more of a police state, breaks up families, and hurts the economy.

We must resist Jeff Sessions and his dragnet. Help make your state a sanctuary.

Western analysts and those Russians who follow their lead get themselves into immense difficulties when they analyze Russian poltics by using terms drawn from Western experience that simply do not apply in the Russian case, according to US-based Russian historian Irina Pavlova.

In a new blog post entitled “Is the Russian Leviathan Weak?” (ivpavlova.blogspot.com/2017/10/blog-post.html), she points to a recent interview Mikhail Yampolsky gave (http://gefter.ru/archive/228740) as an example of this approach and of the serious errors in understanding it simultaneous reflects and gives promotes.

Among Yampolsky’s observations, the Russian says, are the following: the majority of the Russian population “doesn’t support the policies which Putin is carrying out,” “there is no ideology in general,” “the state in principle no longer exists,” and “Putin is absolutely impotent and can do nothing.”

Yampolsky, a professor comparative literature and Slavic studies at New York University, Pavlova continues, thus “offers in this interview the typical view of an intellectual who looks on Russian reality through the prism of understandings of Western culture and Western political science.”

In this, he is hardly unique or the first. In the early 1990s, when Western researchers gained access to Soviet archives and saw the extend of disorder, crime and theft under the CPSU, they concluded that what they had found was “testimony to the ineffectiveness and weakness of Stalin’s power and its inability to impose order in the country.”

But their conclusions and Yampolsky’s reflect their use of Western concepts like “state,” “institutions,” and “defense of property rights,” all terms that do not apply to the Russian case, she argues.

Thus, it is not the case that “the state does not exist anymore,” as Yampolsky suggests, but that it never existed in Russia. That country was only beginning to construct a state “in the Western sense” of agreement of various social strata and groups, “a state as the civil service,” at the end of the Imperial period. But everyone knows how this ended in 1917.”

“In Russia,” Pavlova argues, what arose historically was not ‘a state’ but ‘a power,’ power as a demiurge not responsible before the people inhabiting the country; and if it does something for this population then it is acting only on the basis of its own pragmatic considerations.”

Moreover, she continues, “the power itself creates the social space which it then manipulates for its own purposes.” That is exactly what the power in Putin’s Russia is doing, and therefore it is a mistake in principle to talk about the collapse of institutions of various kinds “if they were never there.”

Yampolsky’s conclusion that “the powers … can’t do anything,” she says, is “completely inadequate.” “This is the same thing that Western historians wrote about Stalin, but can one consider the Stalin power weak, given that it moved tens of millions of peole and forced them to change their traditional way of existence.”

“Any wise individual even today will not deny that under Putin over the course of the years of his rule, enormous changes have taken pace in the country. Not simply changes but modernization … but in a direction which the current regime needs to secure itself from any threat both within the country and from outside.”

The problem, however, is that “this power has different priorities” than those Yampolsky and those who share his approach assume. On the one hand, the priority of the Putin power is to secure its own strengthening and to ensure its domination of the people.” Putin has done what Stalin did and even more effectively because he hasn’t needed to use mass repressions.

And on the other, Pavlova says, “the priority of a regime of this type is the establishment of military industry which gave and gives it the chance to carry out its designs for the spread of its influence and the affirmation of its status in the international stage.” It needs the people only to follow its orders to make this possible.

What has happened to the people is not so much “the degradation of civil society,” as Yampolsky imagines but rather a display of the fact that “there was never a genuine civil society in Russia. The Russian people was and remains a state people, completely dependent on the powers.”

But today, just as in Stalin’s time, the people are not simply dependent.” They display a slavish attitude to the powers “as the result of the re-Stalinization that has been practically completed.” Never in the history of post-Stalinist Russia has there been a ruler in the Kremlin who so openly celebrates Stalin.

More than that, she says, “never has there been an elite” in Russia which considers “modernized Stalinism” as a worthy goal in opposition to the West. “And finally never has there been such a high percentage of the Russian population which displays such a positive attitude toward Stalin.”

All this makes sense if you view Russia as a country ruled by a demiurge-power. It only confuses those who think that the powers that be there are a state in the Western understanding. And all of this leads one to conclude that the Putin regime is more powerful than people in the West imagine instead of being on the brink of collapse as the Yampolskys would have it.

Because many countries allow the sale of energy drinks to young people, identifying ways to minimize potential harm from energy drinks is critical. A new study published in the Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior provided unique insights into intervention strategies suggested by young people themselves to reduce consumption. In addition to more research and education, these strategies included policy changes targeting energy drink sales, packaging, price, and visibility.

Energy drinks, nonalcoholic beverages containing caffeine and other ingredients marketed as improving energy, concentration, metabolism, and performance account for more than $30 billion in sales from over 160 countries. Energy drinks can cause adverse health effects such as headaches, nausea, sleep difficulties, seizures, anxiety, cardiac abnormalities, and sudden death, with data in the United States and Australia indicating caffeine overdoses and adverse reactions to energy drinks are prevalent and increasing in adolescents. Thus, researchers from Australia used group interviews to explore knowledge of energy drinks, factors influencing consumption, and intervention strategies to decrease energy drink consumption in young people.

“We found confusion surrounding energy drinks, which suggests educational campaigns are needed to increase young people’s knowledge,” said lead author Jacinta Francis, PhD, of Telethon Kids Institute, Perth, Australia. “Likewise, interventions are needed to raise awareness about potential consequences of energy drinks and promote alternative ways to improve energy levels, such as good nutrition, physical activity, and adequate sleep.”

Interviews were conducted with 41 people, aged 12 to 25 years, with groups arranged so that all participants fell within a 5-year range. Participants were recruited based on a convenience sample of those in the Perth area, of the correct age, who spoke English. A discussion guide was constructed and eight group interviews lasting 30 to 50 minutes were conducted by the same facilitator.

Respondents were familiar with energy drinks, with some previously consuming them in large quantities. The precise definition of an energy drink was complex, however, with confusion across all age groups as to whether coffee, sports drinks, nutritional supplements, and soft drinks were included. Some participants were aware energy drinks contained caffeine and sugar, but few could name other ingredients or how they influenced energy; serving size also caused confusion.

Participants reported easy accessibility to energy drinks and consuming the beverages for the perceived increase in energy. After increased energy, taste was the second most common reason for drinking energy drinks, but taste also proved to be a deterrent.

An understanding of the ingredients and health effects was also a deterrent to consuming energy drinks. Some participants were unaffected by energy drinks, but many reported experiencing negative physiological effects or knew someone who had. Peer pressure and social norms also influenced adolescent consumption, as did parental beliefs and behaviors, particularly among the youngest participants. Participants noted that energy drink advertisements, promotions, and giveaways all encouraged consumption.

As a result of the group discussions, participants suggested five broad strategies to reduce young people’s energy drink consumption: (1) restrictions on sale and availability, (2) changing packaging, (3) increasing the price, (4) reducing visibility in retail outlets, and (5) conducting research and education.

“From the five key interventions identified by participants, those relating to research and education may need to be targeted to specific age groups,” Francis added. “In addition, it would be helpful to implement and evaluate policies that regulate the marketing and promotion of energy drinks, as well as advocating for changes to warning labels and ingredients. Finally, implementing an adverse event reporting system, such as mandatory recording of hospital admissions related to energy drinks, may assist researchers and policy makers.”

The Libyan Prosecutor General said in a statement on Friday that the remains of 20 Egyptians killed by ISIS in Feb. 2015 were uncovered.

The 20 nationals were filmed as they were beheaded by militants belonging to ISIS. As a response, the Egyptian army announced it had launched eight air strikes on specific targets, including camps and ammunition stores belonging to the extremist group in Derna.

At the end of last month, Libyan officials said it arrested a suspect accused of filming the beheading of the Egyptian Copts.

Islamist militants and reportedly the Al-Qaeda-affiliate Derna Mujahideen Shura Council (DMSC) control the city of Derna, which the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) army has been trying to seize. However, ISIS militants were still in Derna by the time the 2015 joint strike took place.

After the incident, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi called on the U.N. Security Council for international intervention in Libya. The Security Council stressed in a statement that ISIS must be defeated “and that the intolerance, violence, and hatred it espouses must be stamped out.”

In April 2016, the DMSC announced that ISIS militants have been forced out of Derna after the armed conflict that occurred between the two groups, according to the British Broadcast Corporation.

In 2014, Egypt’s diplomatic staff members were evacuated from Libya as a security precaution that the Egyptian ministry affirmed would not impact upon relations with the neighboring country.

Egypt has strong ties with the Libyan Government of National Accord, as Sisi met earlier in May with Haftar, and stressed the importance of the support of the national army in combating terrorism, as well as seeking a peaceful solution in Libya.

There have been reports about several cases of Egyptian nationals being kidnapped in Libya following the intensification of clashes between the two warring governments in the oil-rich country. The lapse in power structures in Libya has allowed ISIS-affiliated groups to gain control over large swathes of land.

Original source

An armed attack took place on the Saudi Royal palace in Jeddah, with two Saudi guards shot dead while three others were injured on Saturday morning when a man drove up to the gate of the palace and began shooting, the interior ministry said in a statement carried by state news.

Royal Guards killed the gunman, identified by the interior ministry as Mansour al-Amri, a 28-year-old Saudi national; he was armed with a Kalashnikov rifle and three Molotov cocktails.

Interior Ministry spokesman Mansour al-Turki told al-Arabiya TV that Amri did not have a criminal record or any known connection to extremist groups.

The attack occurred at a checkpoint outside the western gate to the Peace Palace in Jeddah, where the royal family conducts official business during the summer months, according to Reuters.

Saudi King Salman was not present as he is currently outside the kingdom on a historical state visit to Russia, according to Reuters. The whereabouts of his son, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, were unknown at the time, although recent state news reports have placed him in Jeddah.

An investigation was underway to determine the motive for the attack, according to the Saudi interior ministry.

Earlier on Saturday, the United States Embassy in Saudi Arabia had warned US citizens to exercise caution in the area around the palace after reports on social media of an attack there. “Due to the possibility of ongoing police activity, American citizens are advised to exercise caution when traveling through the area,” the embassy had warned.

Groups such as al-Qaeda and more recently ISIS, have carried out a number of attacks in Saudi Arabia. Attackers have targeted Shia mosques in the country’s eastern provinces where much of its Shia minority is based, as well as security forces. Earlier this week, Saudi police raided hideouts of a “terror” cell linked to ISIS, killing two people and arresting five. In July this year, Saudi authorities said they foiled an attack on the Grand Mosque in the Muslim holy city of Mecca, which they blamed on ISIS.

According to the MTA 2011 report (by İlker Şengüler) and Eskişehir Anadolu University 2014 Academic Article (by Korhan Usta, Hatice Kutluk), there are two horizontal local lignite coal layers extending underground at depth from 250 to 450 meters in the Eskişehir-Alpu coal basin in the southwest-northeast direction with layer thicknesses range from 0.55 to 31.60 meters.

The amount of proven reserves is about 1.5 billion tons. The upper layer had an average ash content of 36%, sulfur content of 1.87%, moisture content of 36% and an average lower calorific value of 1950 kcal / kg.

In the lower horizontal layer, average ash content is 28%, sulfur content is 1.13%, humidity is 32% and average lower calorific value is 2150 kcal / kg.

It is apparent that Eskisehir-Alpu lignite which is the third biggest lignite basin of Turkey has very important economic value.

Eskişehir Alpu coal fields, currently belonging to Electricity Generation Inc. (EUAS) were covered in the scope of new privatization. With the provision of a 1080 MW power plant, the project will be handed over to the private group which will give the lowest electricity sales price in terms of UD cents per unit kw-hour.

According to the news of the local Dünya (World) newspaper on 28 September 2017 (by reporter Mehmet Kara), the tenderers who will participate in the tender by means of negotiations will compete with the commitment to sell electricity to the EUAŞ at the lowest price. The negotiation procedure shall be implemented by subtracting from the initial sale price and shall be concluded by an open auction to be made by the participation of the prequalified bidders whose bidding negotiation is continued, if deemed necessary by the tender commission.

The deadline for qualification for the privatization of the Eskişehir Alpu coalfields, with the condition of establishing a new 1080 MWe thermal power plant and the transfer of operating rights, was set as January 26, 2018.

Underground coal deposits will be mined, 1080 MWe capacity thermal power plant will be constructed nearby at mine mouth, coal will be enriched here, then  electricity will be produced, then will be sold to national grid, and treasury will give a purchase guarantee. At the privatization administration, the minimum sale price is expected to be around 5-6 US cents / kWh.

Eskişehir Alpu Coal fields privatization tender required TL 25 million in temporary bid bold for the interested parties for the transfer of operating rights.

According to the pre-investment project as developed by EÜAŞ earlier, approximately 116.8 hectares of 1,125 hectares of coal production area are planned, and about 30 hectares of coal stock areas are to be allocated. The thermal power plant will be constructed within the scope of the project with estimated value of US $ 1.8 billion. The total installed capacity is 3 X 360 MWe and the thermal power is 900 X 3 MWt. As the main fuel is the local coal of Eskişehir Alpu underground coal fields for the 1080 MWe Alpu Thermal Power Plant. Approximately 6.3 million tons of domestic coal (lignite) will be burned in the plant annually. When the plant goes into operation, a total of 1 million 950 thousand tons of coal waste will be generated, including 1.6 million tons of base ash and 350,000 tons of gypsum per year. The new plant will be supplied with coal from sector B, covering 1,787 hectares.

In Turkey, with low calorific value of domestic coal, there are thermal power plants with proven designs in long term operation, let us name them. Soma-B # 5-6, Seyitömer # 4, Kangal # 3, Afşin-B.

They are all very good at burning domestic coal, they all proved themselves in 20-30 years long operation. They solved the problem of domestic coal burning, but there may still be in need of new dust filters, and new FGD desulfurization.

Our investors investing in domestic coal have not told us about the results of their investments in China- Korea- Far East designs, plants where most of them bought from Far Eastern companies. We do not have details of their operations as explained in exhibitions in panels at conferences. There are no success stories told. There are no high efficiency, no high availability information. The leaked news are not good. Once a project is realized, the project operation results are generally shared with everyone in public.

There is nothing publicly disclosed about CFB (circulating fluidized bed) domestic coal investments in the last 10 years. There is a deep silence in new plants with most of the domestic coal-burning CFB technology. Nobody explains anything, on thermal power plant operations where billions of dollars are invested. There is no news made public, no information made available. Operation results are not explained, information is not given.

Our explanation is as follows, we have very wet, almost 50-55% water content- domestic coal containing moisture which can not be burned properly without preheating, dehumidification, dewatering systems. In extreme amounts, available wet lignite fuel can not be operated without using high amount of supplementary fuel oil, which means there is a hidden non-operation or failure problem.

New plants have continuous failure in coal feed and ash/ slug removal systems.

Continuous rehabilitation is being done. The systems are completely renewed. ESP Dust filters, FGD flue gas desulfurization systems are not working properly, they are often shut down. However, the plants still continue to work, and hence they pollute the environment.

Far Eastern companies are proposing ready-made (off the shelf) CFB designs, all-in-one solutions, with the cheapest financial packages of their exim banks. Domestic investors, who are influenced by very cheap prices, are convinced. China-Korea-Far East design CFB technology are not suitable for our indigenous coal reserves. Senior management decision makers who make this investment decision are aware of the situation. They keep silent until they retire, they do not make a sound.

The thermal power plant, which will be located at a distance of 40 km from the city center of Eskişehir, may become a real disaster for the Eskisehir city if the environmental equipment would be inadequate, if the project is not carried out under proper international strict tender conditions, if the contractor firm is not strictly regulated by international norms, standards, rules and regulations. An uncontrolled project that has left at the mercy of a Far Eastern contractor who will leave after 2-3 years from the installation of the plant is wrong. The main contractor of this project must be a competent local company that has been tested in the past with proven past references at the same or higher output capacities.

Textiles dating from between 1,000 and 400 BC survive in mineralized forms often found in burial sites. The material was frequently placed in contact with metals conducive to their reservation, buried alongside the bodies in the form of ornaments or tools. New research is unravelling what these fragments can tell us about the cultures that produced them.

Fabric doesn’t hold up well over millennia, with a few notable exceptions garments are rarely discovered. But tiny fragments found alongside micro-organism killing metals can offer insight into population movements, trade and culture. The metal salts create casts of the fibers, preserving the microstructure for analysis and comparison.

By the meticulous use of digital and scanning electron microscopy, high performance liquid chromatography and other advanced methods, the EU-funded PROCON project uncovered information on the nature of the structural features of the raw material, such as weave, thread thickness and thread count along with other parameters.

The findings, and the conclusions drawn from them, are presented in a recently published paper, Tracing textile cultures of Italy and Greece in the early first millennium BC. Dr Margarita Gleba, the study’s author and researcher at the McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge, states that there is overwhelming evidence for frequent contact between Italy and Greece during the first half of the first millennium BC, but that the textile traditions of each culture were very different.

Her research indicates that the populations of the two regions made an active decision to clothe themselves in a certain way, perhaps in connection with traditions already established in the Bronze Age. This runs counter to our previously held assumption that Italy and Greece had similar technological and aesthetic traditions of textile production during the first millennium BC.

What can ancient cloth tell us about the people who spun and wore it?

Economic activities related to metal, ceramic and agricultural production and their relationship to urbanisation in Iron Age Italy and Greece has long been of interest to researchers. But the more ephemeral commodity of fabric and the light it shines on wealth generation and subsistence has not been investigated. The project considered the significance of the production and consumption of textiles in the development of city-states (as clothing, elite regalia, trade and exchange items).

PROCON looked at warp, weft, thread diameter, thread twist direction, the type of weave or binding, thread count indicating cloth quality, the edges and the material of the fibers. The textiles reviewed, 192 for Italy, and 107 for Greece, came primarily from funerary contexts, with only a few fragments excavated in settlements, and a special group that was found frozen in the Italian Alps. This means their purpose was to clothe or wrap rather than, for example, use as sails or furnishing.

The colour of the mineralised textiles is unknown, but dye analysis of some of the organically preserved finds indicates the use of sophisticated dyeing methods and a variety of plant dye sources, including muricid shellfish for purple, madder for red, woad for blue and a variety of yellow dyes. The paper explains textiles were probably decorated with various beads, buttons and appliqués in precious materials, such as bronze, gold, amber, glass and faience, found in their hundreds and even thousands in rich Iron Age tombs across Italy. Small domed bronze buttons are particularly common over a very wide geographic area.

Analysis shows similarities in the Grecian samples with techniques of weaving used in the Near East rather than Central Europe, mirroring the close connections that existed between the areas. One textile form was found to have spread westwards early in the first millennium. In central Adriatic Italy, on the other hand, the predominance of another type of weave appears to agree with the generally accepted Adriatic- or Balkan-looking trends in the local material culture.

PROCON (PROduction and CONsumption: Textile Economy and Urbanisation in Mediterranean Europe 1000-500 BCE) aims to investigate the role of textiles in the urbanisation and state formation of Mediterranean Europe (Greece, Italy, Spain) from 1000 to 500 BC and to demonstrate that textile production and consumption were a significant driving force of the economy and in the creation and perception of wealth.

Cordis Source: Based on project information and media reports

By Dr Subhash Kapila*

Post-Dokalam Standoff in which China defused the confrontation as a political expedient to save the BRICS Summit in Beijing in September 2017, the new Chinese flavour of the season advocated by the Chinese Ambassador to India is that China believes that the “Elephant and the Dragon Can Dance Together”—totally inconceivable.

Conceding that even if this inconceivable sentiment becomes a reality at some date in the future, China has to first peel off the layers of ‘STRATEGIC DISTRUST” that it has generated in India of its motives and intentions. The first stepping stone to pave the way for Chinese noble intentions vis-à-vis India would be to (1) Recast its South Asia policy heavily Pak Army-Centric in its orientation, and (2) Cease the over-militarisation of the Tibetan Plateau in China Occupied Tibet. China’s feverish military buildup in Occupied Tibet betrays China’s offensive orientations against India. Can China rise to these heights of visionary statesmanship?

This inconceivable sentiment had been earlier mouthed in 2015 also by then acting ambassador and now repeated by China’s articulate Ambassador in India Luo Zhaohui. The onus for this mistaken belief that the “Elephant and Dragon Can Dance Together” was placed by the Chinese Ambassador on the outcome of the meeting between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Indian Prime Minister Modi on September 5, 2017 in China. The Chinese Ambassador stated that “They believe….” And further presumably expressing his own sentiment that India and China could “make one plus one eleven,”

China and India as “One plus one equal to Eleven” can emerge as a reality when China concedes India strategic equivalence with China—something which China itself feverishly seeks from the United States. Despite some asymmetric metrics in power, China undeniably has to learn to increasingly live with the fact that in global perceptions India is viewed as an existential counterweight to China. This itself is an implicit global admission that India enjoys a strategic equivalence with China. Will China learn?

Indian PM Modi with diplomatic niceties may have made pronouncements at BRICS Summit in Xiamen on the imperatives of good China-India relations but no evidence is available that PM Modi resorted to the effusiveness which the Chinese Ambassador in India has projected. India seems to be measured and deliberate in its policy approaches to China co-relating them to China’s military developments on the India-China Occupied Tibet Border and also in the Indian Ocean

It is inconceivable for China and India to dance together, simply, because as contending powers in the Asian security environment, there are far too many strategic divergences at play than strategic convergences. Increase in economic and cultural exchanges—a favourite by-line of Indian academia and many in the Indian strategic community, cannot be a substitute to paper over strategic divergences.

No official Chinese Statements incorporating this sentiment could be found on Chinese Foreign Ministry website or Indian official websites, beyond the usual platitudes that prevail on conclusion of major political events. Surely, a drastic overhaul of China-India relations is a desirable imperative but the onus for the same rests on China as the prime destabiliser of the Indian security environment , primarily, and the South Asia security environment additionally.

Before moving to an analysis of the Indian Elephant and Chinese Dragon dancing together, it would be appropriate to refer to dictionary meanings and amplifications on the ‘Elephant’ and ‘Dragon’ to highlight how inconceivable is this sentiment even in literal terms putting aside more pious thoughts.

In brief, the amplifications for the word ‘Elephant’ emphasise that an elephant is one of nature’s most intelligent creatures with exceptional memory and that elephants “can distinguish from voices a potential threat and elephants then switch into a defensive mode.”

Amplifications on the word ‘Dragon’ signifies that it is a mythical creature ranked highest in the Chinese hierarchy of animals, strongly associated with the Emperor and the power and majesty of China. Further, it is described as a ‘fire -spewing’ animal and in European tradition the ‘Dragon’ is typically “fire breathing and tends to symbolise chaos and evil.”

Analysing the above and placing it in the context of the Asian geopolitical and security environment and the demonstrated records of China’s and India’s strategic and military postures that have unfolded in the recent years (2008-17), what stands out is that China has not desisted from spewing fire in all its confrontations extending from the Seas of the Western Pacific and extending to the High Himalayas that form the LAC on the India-China Occupied Frontiers.

In glaring contrast to China’s record of generating tensions and chaos on its borders with neighbouring countries, India has intelligently and with great forbearance sought to soothe the security tensions and confrontations that China has lately wreaked on the Indo Pacific Region. Yet, in the last three to four years, India like the proverbial elephantine sense of impending danger and taking note of the China Threat more acutely has moved into a proactive defensive mode.

In 2017 during the Dokalam Standoff what came into play was not only China’s desire to save the BRICS Summit in China in September 2017, but also a belated Chinese military realisation that India’s military postures as now operating endowed it with a capacity and capability of not being a military pushover against Chinese brinkmanship and aggression.

Geopolitically too, as pointed out in my recent SAAG Papers on Dokalam that China in 2017 stood geopolitically isolated as a result of its belligerent postures and underwriting the military adventurism of its nuclear weapons proxy creations of Pakistan and North Korea. In tandem with China, both Pakistan and North Korea have become notorious for being regional spoiler states acting on China’s behest. China only stands diminished in global stature when harbouring such acolytes and in its bid for Superpower status.

Perceptions being the building blocks of contemporary international relations, in 2017, China perceptionaly has heaped on itself layers of military confrontations, aggressive brinkmanship and supporting Pakistan’s proxy terrorist outfits attempting to destabilise India. The current perceptions on China, globally, are all NEGATIVE in block capitals.

Perceptionaly, India is increasingly being viewed regionally and globally as assiduously engaged in fostering regional and global security and stability. Many nations, in one way or the other, are involved in India’s emergence as a global power convinced that it will be a global force for good. Current global perceptions of India are POSITIVE in block capitals.

Moving to the direct equations of China& India relations in 2017, what stands out glaringly is that ever since 1962 more specifically, China has avowedly lost India’s trust in terms of Chinese motives, China’s protestations of friendship and China’s desire for good relations with India. Simply, because “China has NOT Walked the Talk” in its policy attitudes and manifestations towards India.

The Great Wall of China which stands between China and India is India’s marked “STRATEGIC DISTRUST OF CHINA”. The question of Strategic Distrust of China is not an India-specific phenomenon but a widely held Asian perception, even articulated in international forums like the Shangri La Dialogues.

The first small step, but a giant step towards good India –China relations, is for China to make the first moves in eradicating the “STRATEGIC DISRUST OF CHINA” that heavily pervades not only India’s policy establishment but also the entire citizenry of the Indian Republic, minus a small fringe Indian China-apologists.

Harking back to my SAAG Papers of more than a decade earlier, China has no other option but to recast its entire South Asia policy and recognise the natural primacy and predominance of India in the Indian Subcontinent. China has to cease to view South Asia from Pakistan’s prism.

In 2017, China’s policy of building Pakistan over six decades as a Chinese counterweight to and proxy state against India, even with Chinese nuclear weapons and Chinese missiles arsenal has failed, simply because Pakistan does not possess the ‘Natural attributes of Power’. Further, Chinese nuclear weapons and Chinese missiles, have not made Pakistan and North Korea into ‘Major Powers’. They are viewed as ‘Rogue Nuclear Weapons States’ created by an irresponsible China. Has not China’s Grand Strategy, especially in the South Asia context failed miserably?

Have nuclearized Pakistan and North Korea added any strategic weight to China’s geopolitical standing? China can best answer this question. Both these nations have been non-performing assets for China’s foreign policy.

In conclusion, what needs to be emphasised is that in terms of China and India good relations, and a bright future thereof, what needs to be realised is that India with its historical traditions, benign approaches, and contemporary global standing cannot transform itself into the mould of the Chinese Dragon, BUT China can certainly make concerted efforts to transform itself from the mould of a fire-spewing Chinese Dragon to the gentler mould of an ‘Elephant’ –majestic yet benign. Elephants can Dance together. But it is not possible for the Dragon and the Elephant to Dance Together.

This is China’s 21st Century Challenge and it needs to be watched as to whether such a transformation of the Chinese Dragon into a gentle yet powerful Elephant fits-in with the ‘Great Chinese Dream’ of China’s current President Xi Jinping.

*Dr Subhash Kapila is a graduate of the Royal British Army Staff College, Camberley and combines a rich experience of Indian Army, Cabinet Secretariat, and diplomatic assignments in Bhutan, Japan, South Korea and USA. Currently, Consultant International Relations & Strategic Affairs with South Asia Analysis Group. He can be reached at drsubhashkapila.007@gmail.com

Afghanistan and Vietnam are two different countries in two different eras, influenced by different ideologies and geopolitics.

By M. Ashraf Haidari

In a recent New York Times article What Trump Needs to Learn from Vietnam, David Elliot draws lessons from America’s experience in Vietnam for Afghanistan. His opinion follows those of a few others, who have similarly argued over the past 16 years that Afghanistan has slowly turned into America’s Vietnam, a quagmire, from which the United States must disengage. While studying the complexity of Vietnam War remains interesting for academics and policymakers, it offers no relevant lessons for international engagement in Afghanistan.

These are two different countries in two different eras, influenced by different ideologies and geopolitics. In Vietnam, the United States sought to protect its remote interests against the expansion of an ideological threat from Communism. By contrast, in Afghanistan, the United States seeks to avert the spillover effects of terrorism, radicalism, and criminality that directly threaten America’s homeland security. 9/11 is a tragic reminder!

In his recent address to the 72^nd session of the United Nations General Assembly, President Donald Trump pointed out the transnational nature of the terrorism threat. He called on the world leaders to “deny the terrorists safe-haven, transit, funding, and any form of support for their vile and sinister ideology. We must drive them out of our nations.” He singled out the threat of state-sponsorship of terrorism, calling for global collective action “to expose and hold responsible those countries who support and finance terror groups like al Qaeda, Hezbollah, the Taliban and others that slaughter innocent people.”

That is why, unlike Vietnamese, Afghans invited the United States and its NATO allies to rid our country of terrorism, which remains entrenched in South Asia. While a few countries were supporting counter-insurgency in Vietnam, America is now joined by more than forty other countries to help stabilise Afghanistan against terrorism with regional and transnational roots. In this fight, the Afghan people and their brave forces remain a strategic asset, unlike Vietnamese.

“Today, there are over 20 international terrorist groups with an imposed presence on Afghan soil,” President Ashraf Ghani recently told world leaders at the United Nations General Assembly. He noted: “[T]hough we may be on the frontlines, the threat knows no boundaries.” “For terrorist groups who are harbored in the region, an attack in Kabul and an attack in Brussels, Paris, Barcelona, London, or anywhere else are equal victories,” he reminded the international community.

Moreover, while the United States administrations, Congress, and public were divided on Vietnam War, Afghanistan has consistently enjoyed bi-partisan support over the past 16 years. The 9/11 commemorations recently remind us of the enduring public support for Afghanistan’s transformation from a pariah state under the Taliban that repeatedly targeted Americans to a country where our multifaceted achievements — including institutionalisation of democracy and human rights — remain a shared work in progress.

And, unlike former National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, who lacked on-the-ground Vietnam experience for effective war policymaking, Lt. General H.R. McMaster has served in Afghanistan and knows its surrounding region exceptionally well. That is why President Trump’s regional strategy focuses on addressing the key drivers of insecurity in Afghanistan: external state sponsorship of terrorism, which maintains the Taliban and provides an enabling environment for other terrorist networks.

The National Unity Government of Afghanistan complements the United States strategy by pursuing a robust reforms agenda and effectively partners with the international community to implement our National Peace and Development Strategy that holistically addresses Afghanistan’s security, governance, and development needs and challenges. In this endeavor, President Ghani and Chief Executive Abdullah provide unified, visionary leadership, unlike the North-South ideological divide that fueled two competing capitals and presidents in Vietnam.

The fact that the Afghan people and our leaders stand united against terrorism completely sets us apart from the complexity of Vietnam’s operational environment. This reality renders the perception of a civil strife in Afghanistan baseless, while Vietnam was torn by a civil war between those that supported Communism and others that opposed it and sought to institutionalise democracy. But the weak leadership by President Ngo Dinh Diem, a Catholic, who discriminated against the majority Buddhist population, undermined rather than complement America’s war efforts. “The Ultimate Protest” on 11 June 1963, directly resulted from a failing regime that quickly eroded American domestic and international support for the Republic of South Vietnam.

All told, the international community led by the United States must stay the course in Afghanistan until we firmly stand on our own. With the support of the Afghan people and Government, the United States is on the right path, helping us win against terrorism, radicalism, and organised crime that destabilise Afghanistan and threaten America’s homeland security. That is why Americans should be patient and not allow politics to get in the way of Mr. Trump’s strategy for shared success against our common enemy.

This article originally appeared in The Hill.

By Lisa Ferdinando

The distribution of food and water remains the top priority in Puerto Rico following the devastation from Hurricane Maria, Gov. Ricardo Rossello said Sunday at a news conference in San Juan.

Puerto Rico officials continue to work closely with the Defense Department, the Federal Emergency Management Agency and with state partners through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, he said.

“We have over 12,000 — almost 13,000 — DoD personnel in Puerto Rico, over 4,000 Puerto Rico National Guard and EMACs together,” he said. “There’s an expectation of 3,000 more to come to Puerto Rico in the next couple of weeks as well.”

Puerto Rico Guard Delivering Essentials

The Puerto Rico National Guard will deploy to the municipalities to help distribute food more effectively, he said, noting complaints of food not being properly delivered.

“Water and food delivery keeps being a top priority, making sure the people of Puerto Rico have the elements important to survive through this crisis,” he said.

Other priorities include restoring energy through generators or the power grid, as well as hospital sustainment and repair and maintenance of generators.

USNS Comfort Mission in Aguadilla

The hospital ship USNS Comfort is deployed  on a mission to Aguadilla, the governor said.

“I remind you that it has the capacity of having about 1,000 patients and 250 beds,” he added.

USNS Comfort has more than 800 personnel embarked for the mission, including Navy medical and support staff assembled from 22 commands, as well as more than 70 civil service mariners, Navy Medicine East officials said. Navy Medicine East is one of two regional commands that manage the Navy’s worldwide health care system.

Help With Prescriptions from HHS

Thanks to an effort with the Department of Health and Human Services, the governor said, the island will now have the Emergency Prescription Assistance Program to help 500,000 residents who do not have access to health care.

The governor said he stressed the urgent needs of the island to a visiting congressional delegation yesterday, calling for an immediate relief package for at least $4.6 billion and then a longer-term recovery package.

Website Provides Status Updates

In addition, he said, people can visit http://www.status.pr for status updates regarding the recovery efforts. An icon in the home page’s top-right corner allows the user to see the site in either English or Spanish.

As of Sunday morning, the website reported 78 percent of the island’s 1,100 gas stations are open, 77 percent of the 456 supermarkets are open, and 66 assisted hospitals are operational.

By Sven Milekic

On October 8, Croatia marked the anniversary of the 1991 declaration confirming the earlier proclamation of independence and terminating all ties with the Yugoslav state.

Stjepan Mesic, Croatia’s first Prime Minister, but only for a short period, also became President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia; later, he became the speaker of the Croatian parliament and Croatian’s second President between 2000 and 2010.

On October 8, Croatia marked the day in 1991 when the republic’s parliament held a session in secrecy that severed all ties with Yugoslavia.

The assembly thus confirmed the parliament’s earlier Declaration of Independence from Yugoslavia, passed on June 25, 1991.

After the city of Zagreb and the office of President Franjo Tudjman were bombed by Yugoslav Army jets on October 7, the parliament decided to meet in secret in the conference hall of the energy company INA in Zagreb.

Parliament thus terminated all state and legal ties with other republics and provinces of Yugoslavia, confirming the decision made in June 25, but which Croatia had under pressure agreed to put under a three-month moratorium.

“Armed aggression of the Republic of Serbia and of the so-called JNA [Yugoslav People’s Army] has been inflicted on the Republic of Croatia. The Republic of Croatia is forced to defend itself with all available means.

The so-called JNA is proclaimed an aggressor, an occupying army, and must without delay leave Croatian territory, which it has temporarily occupied,” the decision read.

“All countries, especially members of the European Community and the United Nations, are invited to establish diplomatic relations with the Republic of Croatia,” it concluded.

Full international recognition of Croatia followed in January 1992, after Germany warned other EU countries that it intended to recognise the new state.

Independence followed the formation of the first multi-party government in the republic since the Second World War in May 1990.

This then adopted a new constitution in December 1990.

The situation in the republic worsened rapidly in the summer of 1991, as armed conflict erupted between Croatian forces and Croatian Serbs opposed to the drift towards independence.

The JNA, by then increasingly controlled by Serbia, intervened on the side of the Croatian Serbs, and together they overran about a quarter of the republic’s territory.

The war ended in 1995 when the re-equipped Croatian army speedily regained control over the lost territory in a series of lightening offensives.

By Chito P. Manuel

After a 28-year absence, Egypt will be back in the World Cup finals next year in Russia with a 2-1 victory over winless Congo at Borg El-Arab Stadium in Alexandria Sunday night. Mohamed Salah played a whale of a game for Egypt, scoring twice including a last-gasp penalty to send the Pharaohs to their first World Cup finals since 1990.

Salah scored the game-winning spot kick with a minute left to the five-minute added time. He earlier put Egypt on the scoresheet with a goal on 66 minutes. Substitute Arnold scored the equalizer for Congo on 88 minutes after outfoxing El-Hadary from inside the area.

Egypt joins Nigeria as the Africa teams to qualify thus far for the 2018 FIFA World Cup Russia. Both Egypt and Nigeria qualified from Group B and Group E respectively with a game to spare.

With the win at home, Egypt collected 12 points from five matches to guarantee itself top spot in their group while eliminating Uganda from the race. Uganda is on 8 points from five matches.

Only one ticket to Russia 2018 is up for grabs in each of the five groups in the African qualifying competition.

The desperation to qualify was so great ahead of the Congo match that Argentina-born Egypt coach Hector Cuper admitted he was taking medication for high blood pressure, according to an AFP report.

“I am taking hypertension medicine due to the stress I suffer from continuing criticism,” he told reporters without specifying who his critics were.

“Life is full of stress, but the challenge of reaching the World Cup is the toughest stress I have faced.”

Egypt also beat Congo away and Ghana and Uganda at home to accumulate 12 points, with the only loss away to Uganda.

By Baria Alamuddin*

I increasingly hear diplomats and academics talking about the next Lebanon war as if it were simply a matter of time. Perhaps we require no more authoritative conformation of this than statements emerging from Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah himself.

Nasrallah appears to relish the prospect of war; with fire-breathing speeches warning “the Jews” to leave Palestine to avoid being eliminated; and threatening to bring forth militias from Afghanistan, Yemen, Pakistan and God-knows-where else to join the conflict. There is some truth in Nasrallah’s boasts that Hezbollah is today better armed with long-range missiles; can operate on a front extending to the Golan; and now has domestic facilities for manufacturing its own arms and missiles — thanks to kind Uncle Khamenei!

Hezbollah in 2006 faced overwhelming military force, but because it survived and resupplied, propagandists claimed victory. However, there was a third protagonist in that conflict — the Lebanese people. Lebanon was the indisputable loser, with entire villages and urban districts bombed back to the stone age. Hundreds of civilians were killed by Israeli bombing while the world sat on its hands. Even now, hardly a day goes by without children in south Lebanon being maimed or killed by cluster-bomb fragments.

Let’s take Sayyid Nasrallah at his word and accept that Hezbollah today is 10 times better armed than before, with thousands of battle-hardened mercenaries at its disposal — the blood of Syrian citizens still dripping from their uniforms. Will Israel not be 100 times as ready, having spent every day since 2006 quietly preparing?

I’m sure it will be an impressive propaganda victory if rockets hit the outskirts of Tel Aviv. Does that make it worthwhile when Beirut gets pounded to dust? For every Israeli citizen killed, Israel never fails to avenge itself with 20 times the murderous fury against Arab non-combatants. When Nasrallah embarks on these adventures, knowing precisely how the enemy will respond, does he not also have Lebanese blood on his hands?

If the world in 2006 reacted to the conflict with embarrassed platitudes, in 2017 we can expect Trump to be Israel’s biggest cheerleader; opening the floodgates of US funding and military hardware with which to bring down Armageddon upon Lebanon. It was less obvious in 2006 that the UN and the international system were fundamentally broken. It was a psychological shock when the likes of Tony Blair proclaimed Israel’s right to defend itself and refused to call for a ceasefire. The international community’s lethargic response to renewed regional conflict in 2017 may leave us feeling nostalgic for Blair’s forked tongue.

Nasrallah is proud of having performed so well against disorganized bands of Syrian rebels and the women and children of Aleppo. Does he now believe himself to be invincible?

Awash with US funding, Israel is frequently rated as having the most technologically advanced military on earth, with an unrivalled air force. Iran’s annual funding to Hezbollah has risen to an estimated $800 million. How does this compare with Israel’s on-the-books annual military spending of around $20 billion? I mention this not to praise Israel, but so that, as Hezbollah drags us towards war, we aren’t deceived about what to expect. Israel has earned the undying enmity of us all, after waging so many bloody and futile incursions into Lebanon.

Tel Aviv has been remarkably quiet in the face of Nasrallah’s bluster. Does Nasrallah believe he’ll catch the Israeli army unawares? On the contrary, while Israel’s leadership recognizes it cannot emerge from such a conflict unscathed, Israel would obviously never sit back and allow armies of Iranian proxies to take up residence along its northern borders, without cutting them down to size at the right moment. When this conflict is triggered, it will be infinitely more bitter and destructive for Lebanon than 2006.

Tragic Lebanon is in no fit state to face even limited conflict. For decades Lebanon has hosted a vast refugee population from Palestine and beyond. And after 2011 this tiny state opened its borders to a substantial proportion of the displaced Syrian nation. Consequently, public services long since passed breaking point. Unemployment exceeds 30 percent, with a dangerously high debt-to-GDP ratio of 150 percent. The Lebanon I grew up in was a prosperous and flourishing nation; when I return I’m shocked by growing social hardship. Since 2011 alone, the population living below the poverty line has risen by a shocking 66 percent.

Hezbollah displays contempt for Lebanon, seeing themselves as mighty regional actors (a delusion shared by a disturbing number of Lebanese). Nasrallah somehow claims the right to decide issues of peace and war, life and death, on behalf of the Lebanese people. Many of us thought that the Syrian war would weaken Hezbollah, particularly when domestic criticism intensified after more than 2,000 Lebanese fighters perished in a foreign conflict. Hezbollah has displayed itself to be contemptuously independent of domestic support, as long as Iranian funding flows into its coffers.

Indeed, Hezbollah has intensified ideological control of Shiite districts. It meanwhile embarked on expansive construction projects in areas between the Shiite heartlands, such as south Beirut and Beqaa, to ensure territorial contiguity and sectarian hegemony. This is paralleled with massive sectarian engineering projects across Syria through to Iraq, to ensure a pliant population across which Iran’s pawns can move with impunity. For obvious reasons, the expansion of proxy paramilitaries in Golan has been a priority.

We have entered an era of raw power, when nobody even cares about the moral high ground. Putin, Nasrallah, Khamenei and Assad came out on top in Syria through unlimited brute force. The rulers of Lebanon’s political fiefdoms compete to ally themselves with these self-styled strongmen. A word from Bashar Assad no longer makes or breaks Lebanese governments — Assad’s Iranian and Russian powerbrokers today call the shots.

Hezbollah’s growing stranglehold over the Lebanese political system is manifested in actions against Sunni militants. Nobody disputes that many of those detained and executed are primarily a plague on their own communities. However, such campaigns begin to resemble sectarian purges; thus fueling sectarian militancy which had already been exacerbated by the export of the Syrian conflict on to Lebanese soil.

Much as we resented Western interference, we must acknowledge that in previous decades diplomats were active behind the scenes neutralizing Lebanese disputes and preventing the political system from blundering off a cliff. Today, Western diplomats have largely washed their hands of such a role, and GCC financial support has plunged.

Everybody seems to have forgotten the lesson that Lebanon is the Arab world in microcosm – managing crises in Beirut frequently prevents contagion to the rest of the region.

Israel and Hezbollah are like two ageing and punch-drunk street brawlers who relish their periodic sparring matches, while trampling Lebanon to shreds beneath their feet. Meanwhile their sponsors — Iran and America — sit back and spectate from a safe distance.

Are we content to also passively sit back and watch Israel and Hezbollah tear Lebanon to pieces, simply to prove who’s the biggest thug in the region?

• Baria Alamuddin is an award-winning journalist and broadcaster in the Middle East and the UK. She is editor of the Media Services Syndicate, a foreign editor at Al-Hayat, and has interviewed numerous heads of state.