Fans of the Star Wars franchise will have to wait more than a year from now to get their fix of Jedi-laden telekinetic spectacles on the big screen. The as-of-yet-to-be-titled Episode IX, the last installment of the space saga as was envisioned in 1977, won’t be released until December 2019.

In the interim, stalwart practitioners of Jedi ways and other Force-sensitive beings can look to the small screen and thank Virginia Tech researchers for a recently developed virtual reality technique called Force Push.

Force Push gives its users the ability to move faraway objects with Yoda-like calm, nuance, and focus using an approach for remote object manipulation in VR.

“You basically push the object in the direction you want it to move to, just like in Star Wars when the Jedi masters try to move an object that’s placed remotely, they can push or pull it,” said Run Yu, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Computer Science and the Institute for Creativity, Technology, and the Arts. Yu is first author on the recently published article in Frontiers in ICT detailing the research.

It’s as simple as using subtle hand gestures to push, pull, or twirl objects. Users employ their bare hands using a natural gesture-to-action mapping for object manipulation in a VR setting.

“We wanted to try and do this without any device, just using your hands, and also do it with gestures in a way that’s more playful,” said Doug Bowman, the Frank J. Maher Professor of Computer Science and director of the Center for Human Computer Interaction.

Force Push provides a more physical, nuanced experience than traditional hand controllers allow in VR. It responds to the speed and magnitude of hand gestures to accelerate or decelerate objects in a way that users can understand intuitively.

The ability to respond to nuanced hand movement is due to the technique’s novel physics-driven algorithms. Dynamically mapping rich features of input gestures to properties of physics-based simulation made the interface controllable in most cases. With Force Push, it’s just as easy for users to apply the gentlest of nudges to an object as it is to throw a heavy object across the room. The researchers also believe the physics-based technique makes Force Push more plausible, so that users have a “realistic” experience of these magical powers.

To perform user experiments the team used an Oculus Rift CV1 for display and a Leap Motion was applied for hand tracking. The virtual environment was developed in the Unity game engine, and the native physics engine of Unity was used to drive the physics-based simulation of the Force Push interface.

“Every week we kind of tweak something different in order to make the experience feel right,” said Bowman. “But now it feels really cool.”

The Japanese government should reform its laws and policies to end violence and harassment in the workplace, Human Rights Watch said in a letter to Japan’s Labor Policy Council. The council, an advisory body with representatives of workers, employers, and the public interest sector, is considering a first draft of proposals from the Health, Labor, and Welfare Ministry on measures to respond to harassment at work. A decision is expected by the end of 2018.

The Labor Ministry proposals, submitted on November 19, include amending existing laws to define and prevent “power harassment” – a term used in Japan to explain workplace harassment and bullying by a superior – and prohibit retaliation against people who make sexual harassment complaints. The Labor Ministry also proposed guidelines for preventing and responding to harassment by third parties, including clients and business partners. However, the proposals had serious shortcomings, among them that it did not prohibit all harassment or violence at work, but instead would consider banning sexual and power harassment at a later date.

“Japan’s Labor Ministry’s draft proposals on tackling harassment at work show good intentions, but they fall short of prohibiting and punishing in law all forms of workplace harassment and violence,” said Rothna Begum, senior women’s rights researcher at Human Rights Watch. “The Labor Policy Council should agree on comprehensive reforms that will tackle terrible abuses at work and allow all workers to enjoy their right to a safe working environment.”

If the Labor Policy Council agrees on a set of proposals by the end of December and submits it to the labor minister, the ministry will submit legislation to parliament for consideration in 2019.

Pervasive sexual harassment at work in Japan led to social media and large public protests dubbed #WeToo to express solidarity with victims beyond the self-identification of #MeToo. In early November, the #WeToo movement initiated an online petition to the Labor Policy Council calling for a new or revised law to prohibit workplace harassment and violence. Japan is the only high-income Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) country without a law prohibiting sexual harassment, according to the World Bank. Japan also has no law prohibiting other forms of harassment at work, including “power harassment.”

Numerous studies have highlighted the prevalence of violence and harassment at work in Japan. A 2017 Labor Ministry employee survey found that 32.5 percent of male and female respondents had experienced workplace power harassment in the past three years. Local media have reported egregious cases of power harassment, as well as suicides of victims following allegations of bullying at work.

A survey by the Japan Institute for Labor Policy and Training found that nearly 30 percent of the 9,654 women between the ages of 25 and 44 who responded reported being sexually harassed at work. In an online survey by Workers of Mass Media Information and Culture, 34 out of 428 male and female workers in publishing, broadcast, and print media who responded said that they were either asked in the context of work to go to a hotel or forced to have a sexual relationship. Many said they could not or did not report the sexual harassment or violence because they believed it would not be resolved or could negatively affect their work, among other reasons.

Japan’s Law on Equal Employment Opportunity Between Men and Women obligates employers to take measures to prevent and respond to sexual harassment in the workplace. However, it does not prohibit sexual harassment or provide sanctions against the harassers or redress for victims. There is no legal prohibition on other forms of harassment at work, such as bullying and power harassment. Workers can apply for a conciliation process at the Labor Ministry’s labor reconciliation committees, and courts often address harassment cases, including sexual harassment, as personal injury damages under the Civil Code.

Human Rights Watch raised several concerns and recommendations regarding the Labor Ministry’s proposals. In addition to failing to prohibit all forms of violence and harassment, it does not lay out in law possible sanctions for those found responsible or redress for the victims. A number of proposed measures would be provided only as guidelines, which would lack the force of law and be hard to enforce.

Harassment and violence at work violate workers’ rights and are matters of occupational health and safety, but they also carry serious costs for employers. The International Labour Organization (ILO) has cited numerous studies that show that there are direct financial costs for harassment and violence at work, such as absenteeism, turnover, recruitment, litigation, and compensation. There are also indirect costs in reduced productivity, and “knock on” effects that can harm the enterprise’s reputation, image, and competitiveness.

The ILO is considering an international convention to combat violence and harassment at work. Discussions began at the International Labour Conference in May, and a second and final discussion is scheduled for June 2019. Japan was one of the few countries at the May conference that did not expressly support a binding international convention. In October, Human Rights Watch met with Japanese Labor Ministry officials to present a submission on the convention and to discuss their concerns.

“Employers in Japan should recognize that it’s in their interests as well as their workers’ to support laws prohibiting all forms of violence and harassment at work,” Begum said. “The Japanese government should also seize this momentous opportunity to support an international labor convention to end abuse of all workers around the world.”

You’re probably hearing a lot about subpoenas. Or you will very soon, once Democrats take control of the House.

A subpoena is a legal command from a court or from one or both houses of Congress to do something – like testify or present information. The term “subpoena” literally means “under penalty.” Someone who receives a subpoena but doesn’t comply with it may be subject to civil or criminal penalties.

Here’s how it works.

Step one: Let’s say the Intelligence Committee of the House of Representatives issues a subpoena to the President for information about alleged conversations with Russian officials seeking their help in the 2016 election. Or say the House Ways and Means Committee subpoenas the President’s tax returns–which, in fact, a law enacted in 1924 after the Teapot Dome scandal of the Harding Administration specifically authorizes that committee to do.

Step two: If the person named in a subpoena–in these instances, Trump–fails to respond to it, the House committee issuing the subpoena can vote to issue a citation for contempt of Congress.

Step three: That proposed contempt citation would then go to the full House for a vote.

Step four: If a majority of the full House agrees, the Speaker of the House would then refer the contempt citation to a United States Attorney, or to a special prosecutor, for prosecution in federal court. The potential penalty is up to $100,000 and imprisonment for up to a year.

Step five: The defendant in such a lawsuit–in this case, Trump–would probably argue that contempt of Congress doesn’t apply to a President because of “executive privilege”–that is, the supposed Constitutional power of a President and other members of the executive branch of the government to withhold information from the legislative branch, in the public’s interest.

Step six: Regardless of how the lower court decides on the claim of “executive privilege,” the case could end up at the Supreme Court, where, unless they could find a way to avoid it, the nine Justices would have to balance Congress’s need for information with the executive branch’s claims of confidentially.

In the 1974 case of United States vs. Nixon, when the Watergate special prosecutor sought Richard Nixon’s audiotapes of conversations in the White House and Nixon claimed executive privilege, the Supreme Court sided with the special prosecutor, because Nixon had asserted only a generalized need for confidentiality rather than a specific public interest in keeping particular conversations confidential.

The Clinton administration invoked executive privilege 14 times. The George W. Bush administration, 6 times. The Obama administration, twice. All these matters were resolved before parties appealed them to the Supreme Court.

Alternative route: I should mention an alternative route for the House to enforce a subpoena–although it hasn’t been used in over 80 years. Under its inherent authority to investigate, the House could try someone who refuses to comply with a subpoena, for contempt, before the entire House chamber.

If found guilty by a majority of the House, the person who has been cited for contempt could then be arrested by the Sergeant-at-Arms for the House, brought to the floor of the House, held to answer charges by the presiding officer, and then held in the Capitol until he or she provided the testimony or documents sought, or until the end of the session of Congress.

Somehow I doubt this would happen to Trump. The last time this occurred was in 1934, and it was to a much lower-level official. But still, even with the formidable power of the subpoena, these days anything is possible.

Given what Moscow says are its goals in Ukraine, Ilya Kramnik says, it is unlikely to try to occupy that country or try to install its agent in power in Kyiv. Instead, “the most probable scenario of a war” will involve an aggressive air campaign” where Russia will play the role NATO did in Yugoslavia.

“The key goal of such an operation,” the Moscow military analyst says, “would be to deprive Kyiv of the chance to affect” what could then occur in the regions which Moscow wants to see have much greater autonomy than they do now including the ability to interact directly with the Russian Federation (profile.ru/politika/item/128415-tuman-vojny).

Of course, he acknowledges, “to predict the course and end of military operations should Russia and Ukraine really enter into a direct armed conflict is thankless in principle and completely senseless if the person making the prediction doesn’t know what the goals are: of both sides, something Kramnik says he “doesn’t pretend” to have.

Nonetheless, “we certainly can,” he says, “based on the declarations of Russian officials offer what Moscow’s goals will be. The Russian leadership will remain true to its officially declared priority,” the maintenance of the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine within the borders Russia currently recognizes, “that is, without Crimea and Sevastopol.”

“At the same time, one can reasonably presuppose,” he says, “that Moscow will seek to ensure the reform of the Ukrainian state structure,” and relations between Kyiv and the regions in particular. Moscow wants to see “the political weight” of the latter to increase, “including the definition of ethnic and language policies and also external economic ties.”

Given that, it is clear the strategy in any such conflict Moscow “must not adopt.” A drive to occupy Ukraine and install a new ruler in Kyiv “has no sense: this would not solve any of the long-term terms” Moscow has set for itself in that country. Instead, it needs to adopt a strategy designed to block Kyiv from using force in the regions.

There is a model for such a strategy: NATO’s air campaign against Belgrade in Yugoslavia. In Ukraine, of course, “Russia would play the role of NATO,” Kramnik says. It would seek to limit Kyiv’s ability to move forces to counter political actions in the regions and to do so primarily via air power.

“Such an approach,” the Moscow analyst says,, “is completely real considering the composition and military capacity of the air forces of the Russian Federation and the high probability that they would deprive Kyiv” of the chance to impose its will on the regions and thus “force it to reach an agreement with the regions.”

Ukrainian forces would not be able to counter such an approach effectively, he says, especially after two or three days of the start of such an operation. It simply wouldn’t have the resources to respond. Russia could destroy Ukrainian air bases and then turn its attention to military units that Kyiv might try to dispatch to the regions.

If Moscow did need to use ground forces, Kramnik says, it could make use of the ones which already exist in the Donbass rather than having to bring new forces in. “The fate of Ukraine in case of the successful realization of this strategy is quite cloudy – having been deprived of the instruments of force, Kyiv would sharply lose its political weight.

Indeed, for a future Ukraine, preservation “even in the form of a confederation would be an enormous success.” If some regions revolted against the central government, Moscow would certainly move to make sure that Kyiv couldn’t respond militarily against them and that might lead some of them to go their own ways.

Any plan has to include “reserve variants” in case things change. If Ukraine did get aid from the West and especially Western forces, “the Russian military leadership would have to despite its lack of a desire to do so introduce forces onto the territory of Ukraine,” first of all in “historic Novorossiya” and then in Kharkiv, Zaporzh and Dniprpetrovsk oblasts.

That would be necessary, Kramnik says, to “guarantee the right of the population of these oblasts to independently decide on their future like this was done in Crimea and Sevastopol in February-March 2014.” Talking about other alternatives involves too many unknowns to be useful, he suggests.

By Daniel Rosehill

Following the surprise resignation of former Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman (Yisrael Beiteinu) in protest at what he regarded as Israel’s weak capitulation in agreeing to a ceasefire after an almost unprecedented barrage of Hamas rocket fire from Gaza, two of Netanyahu’s key coalition partners, Justice Minister Ayelet Shaked and Education Minister Naftali Bennett (Jewish Home / Bayit Yehudi) staged a brief and unsuccessful coup attempt.

Two days after Lieberman’s shock resignation, Bennett met with Netanyahu regarding the former’s “demand” to be named defense minister. Evidently, the meeting didn’t go as Bennett had planned. After a weekend of feverish speculation in the Hebrew-language press that the country was headed for early elections, Shaked and Bennett announced a press conference in the Knesset for the following morning.

In the background, the Jewish Home leaders had issued Netanyahu with an ultimatum—this time asserting that if the prime minister didn’t reconsider his rejection of their demand to name Bennett the new defense minister, they would resign and thereby topple the government.

The fall of the government was looking like a certainty at this point.

What happened next, however, took the country by surprise. In an embarrassing about-face at the press conference, the pair retracted their threat, saying that instead, and in the interests of the stability of the state, they would allow the current government to die a natural death (Knesset elections must be held in less than a year by law). For those enjoying the spectacle from the sidelines, it seemed the popcorn had been popped just a little bit prematurely.

At his own press conference that evening, designed to coincide precisely with Israel’s prime-time news slot, Netanyahu appointed himself the country’s replacement minister of defense.

The government had been saved, but only via the greatest concentration of power in a sitting cabinet arguably since the foundation of the state.

How many portfolios is too much?

Besides currently serving his third successive term as prime minister, a tenure approaching ten years (in addition to a previous three-year-stint as the country’s ninth prime minister before being replaced by Ehud Barak), Netanyahu is now Israel’s minister of foreign affairs, minister of defense, and minister of health. The count would be even higher had Netanyahu not ceded his position as minister of communications to Ayoob Kara (a fellow Likudnik) following a criminal investigation into his relationship with a major media publisher.

This would be a worrying enough concentration of power in itself, had Netanyahu not also allegedly recently intoned that he was “ready to leave my position tomorrow as prime minister, but I have no one to leave the keys to.” Or with the seeming sense of normality with which the Israeli press now routinely refers to “Prime Minister and Defense Minister Benjamin Netanyahu” (to introduce him by his full title “Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Minister of Health…” might echo too starkly of North Korea).

For those concerned about the vitality of democracy in Israel, there is therefore a threat to countenance besides the growing power of the ultra-religious parties, who see the country’s future as a theocracy to be governed by Jewish religious law (recent municipal elections saw Moshe Lion, a candidate considered close to the ultra-orthodox community, prevail over his secular challenger in Jerusalem, seemingly cementing the capital city’s future as a right-wing religious enclave).

Netanyahu’s ability to repeatedly grant himself strategic portfolios whenever he feels that he has “no one to hand the keys to”—and without providing a timeline or commitment to appoint a successor—has become a staple of Israeli political life.

With his many portfolios, Netanyahu now simultaneously wields ultimate control over the Israel Defense Forces, the country’s diplomatic corps, as well as all state organs subsumed directly under the authority of the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), which include both Mossad and Shin Bet, Israel’s internal intelligence agency. That’s not to mention the country’s health system, of which Netanyahu is also the current titular head.

What’s next at the top?

With Israel’s population leaning toward right-wing, conservative parties, and primarily concerned with the perceived existential threat that Iran’s nuclear program poses, Netanyahu’s reign at the top of both the country and his pick of its strategic ministries shows no signs of changing—whether the government falls early or on schedule. “I don’t like Netanyahu, but don’t have faith in any of the alternatives,” is an oft-heard refrain from the Israeli public. At this stage, the two outstanding corruption charges facing the prime minister (“Case 2000” concerning Netanyahu’s alleged bribery of a major news publisher and “Case 1000” concerning gifts he allegedly received from a Hollywood mogul) seem like the most likely routes to regime change in the country.

Irrespective of how long Netanyahu remains at the helm of a growing array of Israel’s leading institutions, the string of developments that Lieberman’s resignation brought about have shone fresh light on a worrying lack of checks and balances within Israel’s executive branch.

Relative to comparable democracies, Israel’s cabinet has always been marked by ministers holding concurrent portfolios which often come close to throwing up conflicts of interest (David Ben Gurion, Israel’s first prime minister, was also its first minister of defense).

But the self-appointment system that the Netanyahu era has heralded, in which coalition partners are stripped of their portfolios in acts of thinly disguised political vengeance, as well as the growing and unfettered power of a figure who believes himself to be uniquely capable of leading the country, are both worrisome developments that should be vigorously resisted by all who care about the country’s democratic future.

The opinions, beliefs, and viewpoints expressed by the authors are theirs alone and don’t reflect the official position of Geopoliticalmonitor.com or any other institution.

Amidst ongoing global debate about how best to engage China is a more fundamental contestation over what kind of international order is emerging in the coming years. To this end, realist, liberal and constructivist assumptions of political behaviour are worth revisiting to make sense of existing political dynamics that shape how states (especially smaller ones) seek to relate with Beijing.

By Benjamin Ho*

The recent conclusion of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Summit in Papua New Guinea witnessed for the first time in the grouping’s history, a non-issuance of a joint statement. This reflects the existence of deeper – and possibly more fundamental – divisions over how best to resolve the ongoing trade war between the United States and China. As Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong noted, any fallout between both superpowers in a protracted trade war would result in considerable loss – not just to Washington and Beijing – but also to countries like Singapore and others in the region.

Indeed, the past few years have witnessed substantial discussion among scholarly circles over what a rules-based regional (or international) order entail and the extent to which China subscribes to the norms and patterns of such existing arrangements. To this end, I argue that what is at stake lies more foundational assumptions over what is the ultimate decisive factor(s) in determining political behaviour, namely, material power, the international system, or ideational (or cultural) influences.

Realist School: Balance of Power

Most practitioners of international politics would insist on the importance of maintaining a balance of power among big powers however precarious and difficult it might be. This is what many states over the world would prefer as it would allow them to maximise their policy options instead of being forced to choose.

In Asia, it is argued that China, by virtue of its size and population, has created a “fundamental asymmetry” between itself and other countries in the region. In this view, China’s growing might would necessarily be viewed as a challenge to the status quo – regardless of what its leaders say over its intentions about peaceful development.

More specifically, the rise of China – and its territorial ambitions – are seen as representing a challenge to regional stability and consequently posing problems to the national interests of a number of countries in the region, which historically is tied to a Western-led liberal order.

In this view, a Chinese-dominated international order is seen as one that purports to attempt to revise the accepted norms of international conduct and thus fundamentally at odds with the national interests of many states.

Internationalist Position: New Rules for Changing Times

The second position is evinced by those who perceive the existing international order as fundamentally problematic and in need of change, particularly to reflect the growing interests and importance that countries from the global South ought to play in international politics. Indeed, they see the present arrangements of international power as privileging the West and are designed to perpetuate the interests of the United States and other Western powers.

Given the global economic crisis of the past decade, the benevolent character of the West is called into question and its ability to prosper others increasingly disputed. Indeed, such a view would perceive the West in decline and the rise of the East (and China) as an undisputed global reality.

Hence, the rise of China is seen as an opportunity to relook the rules of the international system and consequently the need to reexamine states’ national interests to ensure they cohere with a new reality whereby Western power and influence is diminished and the East (as represented by China) is in ascendance.

Constructivist Position: View From History

A third position which finds considerable sympathy among historians and cultural studies’ experts maintains that what is needed in perceiving the rise of China is the appreciation of its history and culture. In this view, what is needed is for our analysis to go beyond power and economic indicators and to instead focus on historical and ideational forces in order to understand Beijing’s modern political behaviour.

In this respect, one might say that there exists a fundamental cleavage between Western conceptions and Chinese conceptions of international order.

Within China, there are also growing numbers of Chinese scholars who attempt to articulate a Chinese worldview and approach to international relations, taking into account the repository of ideas found in indigenous Chinese traditions and its history. Such approaches would maintain that for one to understand how Chinese leaders think, there is a need to deeply embed oneself in the habits and practices of Chinese culture.

This might be seen as a middle ground compared to the earlier two frameworks (realist and internationalist). Hence, China’s rise is viewed primarily within a comparative framework vis-à-vis the West in which both challenges and opportunities exist as a result of deeper, more foundational differences that exist between Western and Chinese political thought.

Future of Indo-Pacific Regional Order

From the above, I argue that at the heart of the debates on how best to engage with China is a contestation over which of the above three positions, and their associated assumptions, are believed to be most decisive in the conduct of diplomatic relations with China.

The realist position tends to emphasise the importance of geopolitical forces, the internationalist position places weight on economic relations while the constructivist position takes ideational and cultural factors as its starting points. As the outcome of the APEC Summit has shown, the debate over the future of regional and international order remains pointedly contentious.

*Benjamin Ho is an Associate Research Fellow with the China Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore. He is also a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Indonesia can no longer centralise its Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) initiatives in Jakarta given the growing complexities involved in counter-terror efforts in the country. Instead, Indonesia should start by involving local governments in the crafting of sustainable CVE programmes. There are lessons to be learned from the case of Purwakarta Regency, West Java.

By Chaula Rininta Anindya*

Civil Society Organisations (CSO) in Indonesia had always been at the forefront of reintegration programmes for former terrorist suspects. Some of their initiatives include integrating ex-terrorists back into society by providing them with the means and training to start small business enterprises. Although unemployment does not necessarily lead an individual to commit terrorist acts, it may predispose the individual to approach radical networks when gainful employment is not present as a source for refuge and counsel.

In the author’s recent interview with a former terrorist convict, Agus (alias Agus Marshal) revealed that he was never exposed to initiatives from CSOs. Agus, a Central Jakarta native, is currently employed as a cleaning supervisor at Sadang-Cikopo Street in Purwakarta Regency, West Java thanks to Dedi Mulyadi, former regent of Purwakarta. Nonetheless, it is considered quite rare for local governments to initiate integration programmes to assist former terrorists. The case of Agus Marshal in Purwakarta regency therefore provides a shining example of the pivotal role local governments can play in facilitating CVE initiatives in Indonesia.

Economic and Social Reintegration

Agus returned to his wife’s hometown in Purwakarta when he was released from jail in 2015. Dedi Mulyadi who served as the Regent of Purwakarta at that time offered some start-up capital for Agus to run a food stall at a local market as a means of reintegrating him into society. However, Agus did not receive any business training. As a result, his business did not last long. In addition, there was also no regular monitoring of the financial status of Agus’ business.

Mulyadi only found out that Agus’ business failed after he visited Agus in the aftermath of the “Pressure Cooker” bomb attempt in Bandung in February 2017. Mulyadi met with Agus to confirm Agus’ past affiliation with the perpetrator, Yayat Cahdiyat. Agus joined the same pengajian (Quran recital meeting) with Cahdiyat before he was arrested for involvement in a robbery to fund an Aceh military training camp for terrorists back in 2010.

Shocked, Mulyadi was willing to assist Agus financially again, but Agus turned down the offer as he felt that he was incapable of running a business. He personally told Mulyadi that he would rather work as a regular employee as he had prior experience working in a factory.

Difficulties Faced by Ex Detainees

Former inmates, not limited to terrorist inmates, would naturally encounter obstacles in securing regular jobs due to their past criminal record. To apply for a job in Indonesia, applicants are required to submit a Police Clearance Certificate. Most institutions in Indonesia, either public or private, are reluctant when recruiting individuals with criminal records. Dedi Mulyadi eventually assisted Agus in his job hunt as a cleaning supervisor near his house in Cibening Purwakarta.

In addition of his newfound job, Agus also had the opportunity becoming a speaker for the Purwakarta Ideology School thanks to Mulyadi. The Purwakarta Ideology School is a flagship programme under Mulyadi’s leadership. It was established in 2016 to introduce the national ideology of Pancasila into local societies targeting students from junior high schools, high schools, and universities and even teachers, villagers and officials from youth communities in Purwakarta.

Classes are held once a week. The school allowed former terrorists like Agus to share his experiences and also to educate students on the perils of extremist teachings. It also emphasises a culture of tabayyun or “verify and confirm” amongst students when it comes to sensitive information and news relating to politics and religion. Other prominent speakers are also involved such as Islamic scholar Azyumardi Azra and religious freedom advocate Romo Antonius Benny Susetyo, who happens to be a Catholic priest.

Role of Local Governments in CVE Efforts

The Purwakarta Government’s initiative is thus seen as a viable alternative model to reintegrate former terrorists in Indonesia. As Indonesia is a vast country whereby authorities often encounter challenges in the monitoring of former terrorists across the country, it is not enough to merely depend on the direction of the central governmental administration in Jakarta or even CSOs due to their limited outreach.

The National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) does not have representatives stationed at local regions who can regularly monitor the effectiveness of reintegration programmes. There is also a limited number of experienced local CSOs. For instance, the Peace Generation CSO based in Bandung had to assist in numerous reintegration programmes for deportees in various districts in West Java, such as Bandung, Majalengka, and Subang. As a result, their resources were spread too thin given the limited number of staffs and vast distance in between.

In the case of the local government in Purwakarta, they are able to provide suitable programmes for Agus despite the absence of specific guidelines and instructions from the central government. The stigma of former terrorists reintegrating into local society was largely overcome due to the presence of the Ideology School which allowed for dialogue to take place between former terrorist and local people.

The local government in Purwakarta also provided financial assistance for Agus, though these kind of assistance should be tailored according to the circumstances of the individual. It should not be limited to just small entrepreneurs but also other forms of employment. In this way, the individual will not only be indebted to the actions of the local government but can also allow the local apparatus to monitor the reintegration process more effectively.

The Purwakarta Model is still far from perfect, however. The BNPT should work together with CSOs to further refine their initiatives. An example would be to help local governments conduct professional development programmes and formulating regular monitoring procedures.

*Chaula Rininta Anindya is a Research Analyst with the Indonesia Programme of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore.

The sad news on Friday of Former US President George .H. Bush’s death at the age of 94 spread all over the world in no time. His lasting legacy on the US political system and his accomplishments during his presidency from 1989 to 1993 touches nearly everyone. Former President Obama also paid tribute, saying: “America has lost a patriot and humble servant in George Herbert Walker Bush” While our hearts are heavy today, they are also filled with gratitude”.

In 1989 when Vice President Bush assumed power, his foreign Policy strategy was unfamiliar to the world. For the next four years, his administration tried to make the best out of the bad, often impossible task to change the course of United States (US) relations with former Soviet Union (USSR) and Warsaw bloc nations. Apart from diplomatic efforts his Presidency focused on economic diplomacy. The signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) transformed trade ties with the trading bloc. Former President Bush addressing one of his key speeches on trade, in 6 February 1989 e stated, “We don’t want an America that is closed to the world. What we want is a world that is open to America”

Bush senior was a modern American Foreign policy architect credited for ending of the Cold War. Hence looking back it was a moment for celebration and pride when George Bush was chosen as Vice President during Regan’s two-termed presidency. It was apparent as President Bush laid out policy approach of overcoming numerous national security and diplomatic challenges. However, his major foreign policy problems from the start had been the Soviet Union (USSR) and integration of East European nations into the European Union (EU). It took full four years and turned to be as one of the most rigorous consultative processes in the US- USSR relations. In fact, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, the meeting was held between George Bush and Mikhail Gorbachev on the Mediterranean island of Malta. The collaborative diplomacy between the two superpowers with considerable negotiations between Bush and Gorbachev in reducing the nuclear warheads during the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) -1 and 2 had its cost. Having the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) as the prime subject of summit and the arrangement took nine years in taking the real shape. Comparatively START -1 was the main understanding since the marking of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by Reagan and Gorbachev in 1987. The idea behind conducting a summit on START is to lessen the percentage of nuclear weapons of both the United States (US) and the USSR by about 35 percent in more than seven years down the line.

During this period, there was intense debate about the meaning and scope of new foreign ties with Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS ) states, East European nations and the expansion of NATO agenda over the former Warsaw led nations. A crucial element in these changing pictures was US’s shift on the status question with former Soviet Union (USSR) nations, after the collapse of the former Soviet Union in 1991.

Unexpected summer of 1990 turned out to be a testing time for his presidency on the Iraqi invasion by Saddam Hussein. The question was much concern and caused debate. Hence, the events in the oil rich Kuwait attracted considerable global attention. On 17 January 1991 early in the morning where the allied forces launched their first attack that included in excess of 4,000 bombings owned by coalition aircrafts and a month later on 24th February a large scale invasion pushed by the allied forces liberated Kuwait. The US led Gulf war and liberation of Kuwait was highly sensitive issue and wreaked Bush’s Presidency. In 1992, President Bush of the Republican Party lost to Bill Clinton of Democratic Party in Presidential elections.

Over the decades after retirement from Presidency, there has been an opposing view on his presidency. In 2011 it was another turning point in US political history where Bush seniors son George. W Bush junior became the 43rd President, which only happened twice after John Adam’s son who also served as US president. During his presidency, Bush senior along with Clinton toured tsunami-hit nations. In 2011 the much-loved peoples President was honored with the Medal of Freedom, the most astounding US non-military personnel respect granted by then President Obama.

It is a powerful reminder of the manifold ways his presidential influence go beyond the scope of America and well beyond the first world nations essentially shaping global foreign policy mandate. When America fell silent on the sad demise of George H. W. Bush, many Americans and the international community might have felt they lost a hero. Yet Bush’s legacy represents the aspirations, the hopes of the American people and the global community. Perhaps these beliefs and values can build a more tolerant and respectful global society in the near future.

*Srimal Fernando a research scholar at Jindal School of International Affairs (JSIA ) , India and an editor of Diplomatic Society for South Africa and Pooja Singh, a scholar of Masters in Diplomacy, Law, Business at Jindal School of International Affairs, India.

One of the biggest threat of 21st century is terrorism, all states whether developing or underdeveloped are equally getting affected by it. The alarming new component of terrorism is its spread in cyber space. Cyber space is a virtual world where all essential sectors of national life of state have presence and thus, it makes it an attractive target for terrorist groups which are driven by political agenda. The common difficulty in identification of terrorist is that they blend in with general population and are thus harder to identify. This benefit of anonymity is also present in cyber space that terrorist are utilizing all over the world to spread their ideology, carry out their recruitment process and to generate funding.

In this era of globalization cyber space allows a person sitting in one end of the world to carry out action in other part of the world without even being identified. All person might need to carry out such an action is access to information technology and knowhow. Owning to the fact that information technology is easily accessible and its knowhow is not some secret, makes it excellent medium for state and non-state actors to carry out malicious activities against other states and non-states actors. Threat of terrorism or cyber terrorism is from which no country is safe, even most secure countries with world largest armies. However, countries such as Pakistan which are unfortunate to be located in a region that is prone to all types of conflicts whether they are traditional or non-traditional; are more exposed to threats like cyber terrorism. According to scholars cyber terrorism could be defined as “Cyber terrorism is socially or politically illegal attack on computers, network systems and stored information for political gains”. Although, there are no mass events of cyber terrorism reported in Pakistan but according to former NSA contractor Edward Snowden, Pakistan is the second most spied on country and NSA has intercepted more than 13.5 billion pieces of information from Pakistan. But, if one talks about cyber terrorism specifically in Pakistan, many terrorist organizations are running their recruitment pages and financial set-up electronically.

These groups and their online presence is serious issue because through these pages, websites, blogs and video they spread hate, sectarianism, violence and messages to overthrow the governments. Absence of strong filters and blocking mechanisms is helping these organizations to carry on their malicious activities. Pakistan is already fighting against terrorism by conducting military operations on state level. In future when it would become harder for terrorists to launch physical activities against state they will move towards the unguarded territory of cyber space. So, it is necessary for Pakistan to nip the evil in the bud.

So far to stop the cyber terrorism different govternment in Pakistan have taken few actions but most of these actions are to regularize different crimes that are taking place in realm of cyber space. Such initiatives include Pakistan Telecommunication Reorganization Act 1996, Electronic Transaction Ordinance 2002, Payment systems and Electronic Fund Transfer Act 2007, Electronic Crime Ordinance 2007, Cyber Security Strategy Bill, Prevention of Electronic Crime Bill and National Action Plan.

However, due to lack of proper institution handling emerging threats in cyber space implementation of these legislative measures is very weak reason being the politicization of the issue of cyber security rather than its securitization. It is true that security measures taken by states in arena of cyber security fall under the grey area where they step on the human liberties but security comes with the price. To securitize Pakistani society from the evil of cyber terrorism it is necessary that strong executive measures shall be taken, separate institutions shall be made to handle all threats emerging from cyber space because one small branch under one federal investigation authority is not dynamic enough to handle threat of cyber terrorism.

*Ahyousha Khan, Research Associate at Islamabad based think-tank Strategic Vision Institute

By Gen. Shashi Asthana*

The G-20 Summit 2018 will be remembered for extraordinary  large number of bilateral and trilateral meetings, which seem to be even more significant than the main purpose of the meet. There are some high profile bilateral meetings like US – China and US – Russia (Scheduling of which has seen many flip-flops) which are very significant in context of Trade-War or Ukraine crisis. The two trilateral meetings involving US-Japan-India and China-Russia-India are also seen to be very significant because of centrality of Indian position in both the meetings. One of the reasons for this phenomenon is that the world is that the world has got interlinked so much as never before, hence even bilateral relations between global powers impact the world directly or indirectly.

When a large number of countries including US allies, strategic and trade partners joined AIIB, against the wishes of US, it was quite evident that a time has come that many countries will like to have alternate sources of funding other than west dominated IMF or Japan dominated ADB and will follow their own national interest. Similarly when China exhibited aggressive design of converting feature and atolls to artificial islands, with a view to have South China Sea as ‘Chinese lake’ based on unilateral interpretation of history ignoring international laws, UNCLOS and decision of ICJ, a group of democratic countries huddled together to form QUAD with a potential to counter balance such moves, which have possibility of obstructing global trade and exploitation of global commons. The Russian aggression westwards post Crimea, brought many western countries together resulting heavy sanctions on Russia, (followed by the recent standoff with Ukraine, Martial Law in some parts of Ukraine and the criticality continues. The Western opposition and sanctions was instrumental in pushing Russia nearer to Beijing. The international relationships and strategic interests of most countries in the interlinked world of today are so interwoven, that it is difficult to count countries only in one grouping; hence many new issue based groupings have emerged in last few decades.

Are Global Powers pushing everyone to Strategic Balancing?

In the exuberance of pursuing ‘America First’ policy, in last few years US has been highly critical of some of its allies, strategic and trade partners, whenever they did not follow a course which was of interest to America. In some cases it used threatening gestures, while some others were put under sanctions. The policy got a major jolt, when they threatened everyone to support their decision of shifting embassy to Jerusalem, but many countries junked the threat and voted as per their own perception. A similar issue came up earlier, when the last US President got all Head of States of ASEAN countries together to discuss South China Sea issue and wanted a joint statement, condemning Chinese actions, but those countries did oblige.  Pulling out of Paris accord for climate change, Iran Nuclear deal, TPP are some more examples when all the ‘Friends of US’ are not on the same page, and decided to continue with it even without US. Pulling out of nuclear deal with Russia is under global criticism, as it could trigger fresh arms race and a dangerous one, although US has some strategic logic to do so in American interest. The last G-7 Summit was not a pleasant experience for US allies due to alleged self centered economic approach of US. The NATO allies are also relatively lesser confident of US backing and keep waiting for next surprise from US Administration. Under these circumstances, Is US Concept of ‘With US’ or ‘Against US’ is outdated in Interlinked World?

On the other hand Chinese after announcing Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in 2013, with elevation of President Xi Jinping from ‘Chairman of everything’ to ‘Core’ and ‘Leader for life’, exhibited its expeditionary design starting from South China Sea to land grabbing in Indian Ocean. With its fast growth it tried to showcase its methodology of governance better than democratic model. Its ‘Incremental Encroachment Strategy’ in Doklam as well as South China Sea exhibited its ambitions exceeding beyond peaceful growth to the arena of global strategic dominance; hence it started facing opposition from a group of democratic countries in various forms like formulation of QUAD and other groupings. Interestingly most of Chinese neighbors did not buy its method of governance and some of them went democratic in recent past, while maintaining good relations with it. In case of Russia also, we find Germany, a US ally drawing gas from them. Russia and China helping out North Korea with fuel and essentialities immediately after Singapore Summit between President Trump and Kim. Russia a strategic partner of India supplying military hardware to Pakistan and many other countries. A cross pollination of relations is therefore quite evident.

Analysing the cases of three global powers above, a time has come when most countries want to manage their international relations as per their own national interest, and do not want their strategic choices to be dictated by others. The strategic autonomy is quite dear to every sovereign country. It is also a fact that the world today is much more interlinked; hence issue based relationships is increasing. In context of the above let me analyze few cases justifying the ‘Compulsion of Strategic Balancing’ in international dynamics.

Japan’s Insecurity and Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China followed by meeting Indian Counterpart

During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to China on the 40th anniversary of the ‘Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and China’ hardly any issues of divergences was discussed. It was looked as an effort to ‘Fostering Mutual Political Trust’ and ‘Cooperation and Confidence Building in Maritime and Security Affairs’. Beyond good optics, It can be seen as an effort to balance out/reset relations with China, and a messaging to Uncle Sam, about independence in foreign policy formulation of Japan. Immediately after this first visit to Beijing since 2012, Prime Minister Abe hosted Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, in a resort near Mount Fuji for a luncheon Sunday, just a day after returning from talks with the leader of China. While the leaders may call India-Japan partnership having been strengthened as a ‘special strategic and global partnership,’ but beyond the optics, it can be termed as an effort to balance relations between China and India as well.  India would perhaps be looking to move forward in convergences, and need not be concerned of Sino -Japan engagement because India and Japan have hardly any issues of divergences. The balancing/resetting by Japan in international relations was again exhibited, by the fact that Japanese PM seems to be  “determined” to wrap up talks toward peace treaty based on 1956 declaration with Putin, stipulating the return of two of four northern islands by Russia to Japan, while retaining claim on all four. The self confidence of Japan in balancing act between US, China, Russia and India is noticeable.

South Korean bonhomie with North Korea

South Korea despite being apprehensive of dangerous arsenal of North Korea, continues to be an ally of US. Deployment of THAAD, military exercises with US forces, have caused great anxiety not only in North Korea, but in China and Russia as well. Despite heavy sanctions on North Korea, it continued with its nuclear and missile tests. When President Trump started giving confusing signals of ‘America First’ and asking allies to pay for their security, South Korea was inclined to attempt peace in Korean Peninsula and making it nuclear free. It was successful in seemingly impossible diplomatic exercise of getting together Kim and President Trump together for a summit. As an analyst, I do not count the summit anything beyond optics, as nothing worthwhile has changed in nuclear and long range missiles capabilities of North Korea as well as UN sanctions, but South Korea has improved its relations with North considerably applying the theory of strategic balance. North and South Korea had Summits, exhibiting lot of bonhomie, decided to field one sports team under single flag, started people to people contact, and South Korea started helping North Korea with essential humanitarian needs, where China and Russia joined in to start business as usual with North Korea, immediately after Singapore Summit. The optics of keeping missiles and nukes away from North Korean parade does not mean that it will really destroy the only leverage it has, which is making US talk to him, and condemning Rouhani and Assad, looking for regime change there. Some symbolic destruction of few testing sites by North Korea and destruction of few posts along demilitarized zone does not mean that South has full confidence over North Korea but it clearly indicates that South Korea is balancing/resetting relations between them.

India’s Strategic behavior: Is it different than Balancing/Resetting International relations?

Post Wuhan visit of Prime Minister Modi to China it is being alleged by western media that India has perhaps drifted towards China. In my opinion there is hardly any worthwhile change in Indian strategic behavior. India has a set of convergences and divergences of interests with major global players namely China, USA and Russia. India has so far been able to keep these relations exclusive of each other; hence has been able to successfully manage an independent foreign relationship without any bias. In the turbulent complex environment of today, our convergences and divergences have started impacting each other. India’s differences with China on certain aspects of Sino-Pak nexus, use of global commons in South China Sea, its adventurism in Indian Ocean, and obstruction to Indian entry in NSG can also be viewed as convergence of interests with US. India’s differences with US on trade, tariff, and CAATSA in context of Russia can be seen as convergence of interests with China The silver lining is that US being our strategic partner will like to have well equipped Indian Forces to balance China and Indian connectivity to Afghanistan, in case Pakistan does not serve its strategic interest. The US waiver on Chabahar port and connectivity to Afghanistan, as well import of Iranian oil for next six month is a welcome step by US towards its strategic partner India.

After Indian expression to expand the scope and dimension of QUAD, opening it up to other affected countries, there is a general feeling amongst other QUAD members that India is perhaps getting softer towards China in progressing QUAD agenda. The reality is that India has an independent foreign policy.  In Indo-Pacific, it stands with US, Japan and Australia in checking Chinese encroachment of global common like South China Sea, stands for seamless movement in international water and rule based order. Interestingly none of the QUAD members have common unsettled land borders with China. In land frontier and combating proxy war, India has to fight its own battle with some help from friendly countries including equipment from Russia, Israel, France to name a few, besides Indian friends from QUAD, hence it has to tackle relationship with China in a different manner than other members of QUAD. India therefore has to maintain harmonious relations with all its friends and neighbors to pursue its national interest. Despite such complexities, the silver lining is that the US, as well as China want better relations with India and vice versa. Russia also will not like to give up the largest purchaser of military hardware and a strategic partnership which stood the test of time even in ‘Heated Cold War’ era, hence, with smart diplomacy, India should be able to manage an independent foreign policy in current global environment. The number of bilateral and trilateral meetings attended by India clearly explains the balancing diplomatic exercises carried out by India, as per its National interest. Indian participation in two significant trilateral meetings namely US-Japan-India and China-Russia-India signifies the centrality of India. It clearly indicates the efforts required to balance out relations with two separate groupings which have wide gap in perceptions.

Unilateralism is Outdated/Impractical Concept

There is a growing opinion that US needs to revise its policy of sanctions and CAATSA. The analysis suggests that President Trump’s reintroduction of sanctions on Iran,(with many of its allies still honoring Iran Nuclear Deal), as well as further push on CAATSA (without modification) on countries trading with Russia might edge US towards its own diplomatic/ strategic and economic isolation in the long run . The ICJ decision on 03 October 2018 ordering US to remove any restrictions on the export of humanitarian goods and services to Iran to some extent shows that the world may not always buy US narrative on sanctions. Similarly Chinese aggressive stance in South China Sea will continue to bring resistance in different forms by collective efforts of affected parties, and its purse diplomacy will not work everywhere. Ongoing Trade War, strengthening of Taiwan and military posturing in South China Sea are indicators which will discomfort China.  In interlinked world interactions with all countries wherever their interests converge is the order of the day. Japanese trade with China, visit of Prime Minister Abe to China followed by visit of Prime Minister Modi and Countries pursuing relations with Saudi Arabia despite CIA revelations are some examples of this new normal in future. It is also expected that in a multilateral world of today, no one country will be able to dictate the strategic choices of others or force any country not to act in its national interest in future. It also proves a point that any country, which thinks that it can rule the world all by itself, is sadly mistaken in the future world, which is overly interlinked.

About the author:
*Gen. Shashi Asthana is a veteran Infantry General with 40 years experience in international fields and UN. A globally acknowledged strategic & military writer/analyst; he is currently the Chief Instructor of USI of India, the oldest Indian Think-tank in India.

Source:
This article was published by Modern Diplomacy

There was a high-five from Vladimir Putin. And for Xi Jinping and Narendra Modi it was business as usual.

At home, Saudi Arabia’s media trumpeted Mohammed bin Salman’s meetings with world leaders, tweeting pictures of his encounters, which also included the presidents of South Korea, Mexico, and South Africa.

However, Western leaders appeared to avoid the crown prince during the family photo at the Group of 20 summit in Buenos Aires – after almost two months of global outrage at the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi. The only Arab leader there, the prince stood rather isolated at the end of the line, at times looking uncertain and nervous.

US President Donald Trump, Prince Mohammed’s most vocal backer, did not have time for a one-on-one meeting.

Argentina’s President Mauricio Macri kept the prince hanging on when it came to finding time to talk.

During an informal conversation on the sidelines of the summit, French President Emmanuel Macron was overheard admonishing Mohammed, saying he “never listened”, while the crown prince tried to assure him that “it’s OK”. French officials later said the men were discussing the killing of Khashoggi at the Saudi consulate in Istanbul and the war in Yemen.

Similarly, British Prime Minister Theresa May opted to focus on those two topics, rather than economics and trade as her country struggles with the uncertainty of Brexit, the UK’s departure from the European Union. May insisted Riyadh needed “to build confidence that such a deplorable incident could not happen again”, referring to the Saudi team sent to Turkey to murder Khashoggi.

The message Prince Mohammed probably took home from the G20 summit was that illiberal democratic, authoritarian and autocratic leaders were happy to do business with the kingdom and the crown prince despite persistent assertions that he ordered the killing.

Trump and western Europe’s leaders appeared to play to public opinion but do nothing to threaten their relations with the kingdom. The US president also chose not to have a formal meeting with Prince Mohammed’s foremost detractor, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

The crown prince may also have been heartened that Prime Minister Justin Trudeau of Canada, which Saudi Arabia had a diplomatic row with earlier this year, was the only leader to raise the Khashoggi issue during the G20’s formal proceedings.

Other US allies made clear the kingdom’s financial largesse and willingness to guarantee the flow of oil would go a long way to ensure they would choose realism above principle.

The Saudi Press Agency reported after Mohammed’s meeting with Modi that the crown prince pledged to meet India’s oil and petroleum product needs.

Prince Mohammed may have achieved his goal of showing Saudi Arabia – specifically himself – remained a player by attending the G20 summit, despite the storm surrounding Khashoggi’s death still raging.

But the prince is not out of the woods yet. The kingdom, eager to project itself as a regional and world power, has suffered significant damage to its reputation which will take time and hard work to repair.

Just how hard depends on whether the US Congress decides to sanction Riyadh, if the Europeans will follow suit, and on Turkey successfully pushing for an international investigation into the killing.

“We have never seen Khashoggi’s murder as a political issue,” Erdogan told a news conference in Buenos Aires. “For Turkey, the incident is and will remain a flagrant murder within the Islamic world. International public opinion will not be satisfied until all those responsible for his death are revealed.”

He described Saudi Arabia’s response to the killing as “unbelievable”.

The US Senate, meanwhile, pushed forward last week – despite opposition from Trump – with a resolution that would end American military support for the Saudi-led war in Yemen, a conflict which has cause a major humanitarian crisis.

Prince Mohammed’s case was not helped by the leak of a CIA report saying he sent 11 messages to Saud al-Qahtani – a former close aide – at the time Khashoggi was killed. However, the intelligence agency admitted it lacked direct evidence of the crown prince “issuing a kill order”.

Qahtani has been accused of overseeing the killing and been fired from his position as Mohammed’s adviser and information tsar. He has also been sanctioned by Washington.

The CIA claims Prince Mohammed told associates in August 2017 they “could possibly lure [Khashoggi] outside Saudi Arabia and make arrangements” if the Washington Post columnist refused to return to the kingdom from the US.

Nevertheless, the G20 summit suggests Prince Mohammed and the kingdom may have taken their first step towards putting the Khashoggi affair behind them. Even if US lawmakers slap sanctions on the kingdom, the prince is likely to remain secure in his position as king-in-waiting.

Keeping Khashoggi in the headlines will prove increasingly difficult as it seems much of the world has signalled that it is moving on.

This article was published at South China Morning Post and reprinted with permission.

By Captain Kapil Bhatia*

It’s one of the great paradoxes of our time that the very technologies that empower us to do great good can also be used to undermine us and inflict great harm. —President Barack Obama

On May 24, 2017, Qatar’s state news agency reported that Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani supported Hamas, Hizballah, Iran, and Israel.1 In response, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt cut off relations with Qatar, a fellow member of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).2 The four countries released a list of 13 demands that aimed to align Qatar’s national policies with that of other Gulf and Arab countries.3 However, Qatar’s state news agency quickly disavowed the report on its Web site and Twitter account and attributed it to a cyber attack.4 The attack on Qatar’s state news agency to promulgate false and misleading information marks a new phase in the use of cyber means for political warfare. An analysis of the goal, target audience, and means of this cyber attack, as well as the results of the attack and the implications of evolving technologies, suggest that defending against such attacks requires a multifaceted effort from individuals, organizations, governments, and the international community.

Political analyst Graham Fuller, a former vice chairman of the National Intelligence Council at the Central Intelligence Agency, postulates that the aim of the 2017 cyber attacks was to compel Qatar to align its foreign policy with Saudi Arabia, end its good relations with Iran, cut off military ties with Turkey, and terminate its support for al Jazeera news network.5 Qatar has close diplomatic ties with Iran because they jointly exploit the South Pars natural gas fields.6 In 2014, Qatar signed a defense agreement with Turkey and agreed to allow Turkey to establish a military base in Qatar.7 Fuller explains that these international ties allowed Qatar to chart its own foreign policy independent of Saudi Arabia. In the aftermath of the Arab Spring, which threatened the rule of authoritarian leaders in the region, many Arab leaders saw al Jazeera’s news channels as threatening to their control of information in the region.8 The target audience of the cyber attack was not only the political elites in Qatar, but also the leaders of other countries in the GCC (that is, Kuwait and Oman) and key decisionmakers in the United States. By highlighting Qatar’s close ties with Iran and Hamas, a U.S.-designated terrorist group, the bogus news reports aimed to politically isolate Qatar from the United States. The other GCC states were expected to rally along religious lines to support the Saudi coalition, which adheres to the Sunni branch of Islam, against Iran, a Shiite state.

To reach these audiences, the UAE, as part of the Saudi coalition, enacted a program of cyber attacks into Qatar’s state news agency to insert false news reports. Hackers began their operation in April 2017, gaining total control of the Qatari News Agency’s network, email accounts, Web sites, and social media platforms.9 This control was used to disseminate false information from May 24 to May 25, before the state media’s information technology experts were able to regain control.10 The cyber attacks supported a broader campaign that included all elements of national power including diplomatic, military, and economic efforts. After the attack, the Saudi coalition severed diplomatic ties and gave Qatari citizens 14 days to leave their territory while banning their own citizens from traveling to or residing in Qatar.11 Under diplomatic pressure from Saudi Arabia, countries such as Yemen, Maldives, and Libya severed their diplomatic ties with Qatar.12 The Saudi coalition also closed their airspace to Qatari aircraft and banned all ships flying the Qatari flag or serving Qatar from docking at any ports.13 Saudi Arabia closed Qatar’s only land border as well.14 These efforts on land, sea, and air aimed to cut off Qatar’s supply routes and threaten its economy.

Less Than Success

Despite the use of all elements of national power, the Saudi coalition did not succeed in achieving its aim of isolating Qatar from the GCC and the United States. Qatar did not give in to the 13 demands presented by the coalition.15 In the immediate aftermath, the U.S. Secretary of State called for the crisis to be resolved diplomatically, while the U.S. Department of Defense and Ambassador to Qatar publicly praised Qatar for hosting the al Udeid Air Base and its commitment to regional security.16 Kuwait and Oman, the other two members of the GCC, did not cut off their diplomatic ties with Qatar. Less than a month after the hacks against Qatar, U.S. intelligence officials attributed the cyber attack to the UAE and stated that the attacks had been directed by senior members of its government.17 The land, sea, and air blockades did not have a significant impact, as Turkey and Iran sent food and basic supplies directly to Qatar.18 Turkey also sent more military forces to its base in Qatar in order to deter any Saudi military action.19 The failure of this cyber attack, despite the close coordination of all instruments of national power, supports the theory posited by some cybersecurity researchers that states using cyber attacks rarely achieve their intended objectives, and successful compellence could require the overwhelming national power of countries like the United States.20

However, while the ploy to isolate Qatar was exposed, there has not been any public censure or consequences to the UAE for its conduct of the cyber attacks. The lack of consequences for the UAE could set a precedent and embolden future adversaries to leverage cyber attacks in support of political warfare. The proliferation of such attacks could indicate that the “strategic logic of cyber is shifting to one of disruption and constant harassment designed to signal capability and the threat of escalation.”21

Looking Forward

Future cyber attacks and information operations would exploit the development of software that could manipulate voice and video. In November 2016, Adobe, a company known for its Photoshop software, unveiled Project VoCo, a program that makes it possible to take an audio recording and alter it to include words and phrases that the original speaker did not say, in the voice of the original speaker.22 Another company, BabelOn, is developing software that can translate a person’s voice into another language instantly.23 Researchers at the University of Washington are experimenting with the use of artificial intelligence (AI) to convert audio files into realistic mouth movements, which could be used to falsify videos of public personalities giving speeches.24 The widespread use of such technologies would blur the lines between truth and falsehood, allowing malicious actors to conduct a persistent campaign of distortion to smear the reputation of certain world leaders or countries in order to reduce their soft power and influence over time.

A strong, multifaceted defense is needed against the abuse of such new software and AI. This defense will require action by individuals, organizations, governments, and the international community. Adobe’s acknowledgment of the potential abuse of its software is a good step toward building public awareness to inoculate individuals against insidious influence campaigns. More effort should also be focused on developing software that can detect such voice and video manipulation quickly. Learning from the experience of Qatar, governments and organizations should be prepared to embrace transparency and quickly report cyber attacks when they occur to shape the narrative, clarify the position of the government or organization, and prevent the spread of distorted information. Governments and organizations should also be consistent in their public outreach efforts to prevent any misunderstandings from being exploited during a crisis through the use of fake photos, videos, or sound recordings. One example of this can be seen in the Summary of the 2018 United States National Defense Strategy, which calls on the United States to be “strategically predictable” in demonstrating its commitment with allies to deter aggression.25 Additionally, there should be an increased effort to strengthen international norms against such forms of cyber attack and to increase the costs to countries conducting such attacks. The NATO Cooperative Cyber Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia, which has released two Tallinn Manuals on cyber conflict, is one such organization that could help to develop such cyber norms.26While the cyber attacks on Qatar were ultimately unsuccessful, they marked a new use of cyber means to distort information. This use of cyber means could become increasingly common, especially as technological advances make it easier to conduct such attacks and falsify or distort information, and the risks and downsides of being caught remain low. The United States should build public awareness of such threats, enhance its public diplomacy efforts as a preemptive measure, and leverage its allies and partners in the international effort to establish norms against such activities. It should also censure the countries conducting such activities, when appropriate. This preemptive approach will establish norms for the appropriate use of cyber and contribute to the protection of the United States and its allies.

About the author:
*Captain Kapil Bhatia, Indian Navy, wrote this essay while a student at the U.S. Naval War College. It won the 2018 Secretary of Defense National Security Essay Competition.

Source:
This article was published in the Joint Force Quarterly 91, which is published by the National Defense University.

Notes

1 Bethan McKernan, “Qatar Accuses UAE of Violating International Law by Hacking State News Agency,” Independent, July 17, 2017, available at <www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/qatar-uae-international-law-hacking-news-agency-al-jazeera-cyber-attack-gulf-united-arab-emirates-a7845456.html>.

2 Alex Shanahan, “U.S. Role, Stake in Gulf Feud,” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 36, no. 5 (August–September 2017), 46.

3 “Arab States Issue 13 Demands to End Qatar-Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera, July 12, 2017, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/06/arab-states-issue-list-demands-qatar-crisis-17062 3022133024.html>.

4 “Foreign Minister: ‘Qatar Will Address the Media Campaign Targeting It,’” Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs News, May 25, 2017, available at <https://mofa.gov.qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/05/25/foreign-minister-%27qatar-will-address-the-media-campaign-targeting-it%27>.

5 Graham E. Fuller, “Does Qatar Really Threaten the Gulf?” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs 36, no. 5 (August–September 2017), 20.

6 “Qatar-Iran Ties: Sharing the World’s Largest Gas Field,” Al Jazeera, June 15, 2017, available at <www.aljazeera.com/indepth/interactive/2017/06/qatar-north-dome-iran-south-pars-glance-lng-gas-field-170614131849685.html>.

7 “President Erdogan Visits Turkey Military Base in Qatar,” Hurriyet Daily News (Istanbul), November 16, 2017, available at <www.hurriyetdailynews.com/president-erdogan-visits-turkey-military-base-in-qatar-122498>.

8 Fuller, “Does Qatar Really Threaten the Gulf?” 20.

9 “Qatar Says Cyberattack ‘Originated from the UAE,’” Al Jazeera, July 20, 2017, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/07/qatar-sheds-light-cyberattack-official-media-170720151344996.html>.

10 Karen DeYoung and Ellen Nakashima, “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites,” Washington Post, July 16, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/uae-hacked-qatari-government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-intelligence-officials/2017/07/16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html?utm_term=.fef1e4846f4a>.

11 “Qatar Crisis: What You Need to Know,” BBC, July 19, 2017, available at <www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-40173757>.

12 Noah Browning, “Arab Powers Sever Qatar Ties, Citing Support for Militants,” Reuters, June 5, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar/arab-powers-sever-qatar-ties-citing-support-for-militants-idUSKBN18W0DQ>.

13 “Qatar Crisis: What You Need to Know.”

14 Ibid.

15 “Qatar Crisis: Saudi-Led Coalition Drops 13 Demands to End the Boycott,” Haaretz (Tel Aviv), July 19, 2017, available at <www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/qatar-crisis-saudi-led-coalition-drops-13-demands-to-end-the-boycott-1.5431407>.

16 “Tillerson Says Break with Qatar by Saudi Arabia, Others Won’t Affect Counter-Terrorism,” CNBC, June 5, 2017, available at <www.cnbc.com/2017/06/05/tillerson-says-break-with-qatar-by-saudi-arabia-others-wont-affect-counter-terrorism.html>; DeYoung and Nakashima, “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites”; and Phil Stewart, “U.S. Military Praises Qatar, Despite Trump Tweet,” Reuters, June 6, 2017, available at <www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-qatar-usa-pentagon/u-s-military-praises-qatar-despite-trump-tweet-idUSKBN18X2G2>.

17 DeYoung and Nakashima, “UAE Orchestrated Hacking of Qatari Government Sites.”

18 “Iran, Turkey Send Food to Qatar Amid Fears of Shortages,” Voice of America, June 11, 2017, available at <www.voanews.com/a/tillerson-cavusoglu-qatar/3895653.html>.

19 “How Turkey Stood by Qatar Amid the Gulf Crisis,” Al Jazeera, November 14, 2017, available at <www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/11/turkey-stood-qatar-gulf-crisis-171114135404142.html>.

20 Brandon Valeriano, Ryan C. Maness, and Benjamin Jensen, Cyber Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming), 111.

21 Brandon Valeriano, Ryan C. Maness, and Benjamin Jensen, “Cyberwarfare Has Taken a New Turn: Yes, It’s Time to Worry,” Washington Post, July 13, 2017, available at <www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/07/13/cyber-warfare-has-taken-a-new-turn-yes-its-time-to-worry/?utm_term=.474c4314fa45>.

22 Matthew Gault, “After 20 Minutes of Listening, New Adobe Tool Can Make You Say Anything,” Motherboard, November 5, 2016, available at <https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/jpgkxp/after-20-minutes-of-listening-new-adobe-tool-can-make-you-say-anything>.

23 Nathan Ingraham, “BabelOn Is Trying to Create Photoshop for Your Voice,” Endgadget, June 22, 2017, available at <www.engadget.com/2017/06/22/babelon-is-trying-to-create-photoshop-for-your-voice/>.

24 James Vincent, “New AI Research Makes It Easier to Create Fake Footage of Someone Speaking,” TheVerge, July 12, 2017, available at <www.theverge.com/2017/7/12/15957844/ai-fake-video-audio-speech-obama>.

25 Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America: Sharpening the American Military’s Competitive Edge (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 5, available at <www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf>.

26 “Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations to Be Launched,” NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, February 2, 2017, available at <https://ccdcoe.org/tallinn-manual-20-international-law-applicable-cyber-operations-be-launched.html>.

In yet another protest against a change to Macedonia’s name and identity, Macedonians converged, en masse, in front of Macedonian parliament, despite road blockages and intimidation, carried out by the US-installed illegitimate government of Zoran Zaev.

Yes, Macedonia is on the brink of collapse due to interference from foreign elements. Its very sovereignty and the existence of the Macedonian people, including millions in the neighbouring countries and throughout the world, are in jeopardy.

Why? Because the US and European Union have deemed it a priority to increase NATO and EU membership and are demanding that the Republic of Macedonia change its name, identity, ethnicity and rewrite its history, contrary to all human rights conventions and international law. The end goal is to appease Greece, which opposes Macedonia’s name, all for the promise that Greece might lift its veto to allow discussions for the Republic of Macedonia’s potential NATO and EU membership.

Case in point: During an illegal session of Macedonian parliament on October 19, eight opposition MP’s were held in a chamber by the illegitimate government of Zoran Zaev until they followed orders to vote to change Macedonia’s name and identity. MP’s, with women especially targeted, were blackmailed, bribed and threatened with prison sentences, including threats to their families. This treasonous and illegal vote paves the way for two further parliamentary votes and for the complete annihilation of Macedonia’s right to self-determination.

These brutal tactics were sanctioned by US Ambassador Jess Baily, who was present in Macedonian parliament at the time. The mere presence of a foreign diplomat violates Macedonian (and any other country’s) parliamentary rules. But Baily is not alone. Joining him in interfering in Macedonia’s internal affairs are EU Commissioner for European Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini, US Secretary of Defense James Mattis and most, recently, US Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell, who have all visited Macedonia recently to issue blatant threats. The common message is “Change your name or else”.

So why does Greece want to rename Macedonia and redefine the identity of the Macedonian people? Former Greek Prime Minister Constantine Mitsotakis admitted, in 1995, that Greece manufactured the name dispute in order to deny the existence, and persecution, of its large Macedonian minority.

The name being imposed on Macedonia would be “Republic of North Macedonia”, and the new identity given to all Macedonians would be “Northern Macedonian”. There is a 19-page document known as the “Prespa Agreement” that redefines the terms “Macedonia” and “Macedonian” and gives Greece the power to punish Macedonia if it “misuses” any term to describe itself.

Does this seem normal?

And we are not just referring to Macedonians in the Republic of Macedonia. The entire region of Macedonia was partitioned in 1913 (a fact admitted by all, oppressors included) among Serbia/Yugoslavia (now the independent Republic of Macedonia), Bulgaria, Greece and later, Albania. Macedonians have been fighting attempts at eradication ever since. Greece, ironically, outlawed the term “Macedonia” and denied its existence until a dramatic propaganda switch in 1988, when it began a campaign of trying to deceive the world into believing that Macedonia was “Greek”. Let’s not forget though, that our other oppressors also claim Macedonia. Or, instead of being bogged down in a brutal game of Balkan roulette, we could just use common sense. Macedonia is Macedonian.

In a shocking interview recently on Macedonian television, Zoran Zaev even admitted that he was put into power to ensure Macedonia’s EU and NATO membership by forcing through a name change. But he fears no repercussions because he has the backing of the United States and European Union.

As a result, Zaev has used tactics such as ordering riot police to attack Macedonians who oppose the changing of their name and identity, falsifying election results, imprisoning dissenting Macedonians, firing people from public and private sector jobs, shutting down opposition media outlets and blocking social media access to those who dare oppose him.

Despite blatant and admitted interference, the US and EU have the gall to claim that “Russian meddling is destabilizing Macedonia”. American foreign policy dictates that “offence is the best defence”. In other words, accuse others of your own despicable tactics while continuing to employ them, with each successive one becoming more brazen.

Macedonians are simply demanding that their human rights and self-determination be defended. No one expected that it would be against attacks led by the West.

A solution that satisfies the West’s insatiable goal for Macedonian NATO and EU membership while actually respecting human rights, international law and decency? Instead of forcing Macedonia to jump through hoops on its way to cultural extinction, the West could remove the one-country veto rule in NATO and the EU or simply direct Greece not to use its veto power. The West must uphold the principles that it claims to respect, or it will be complicit in the demise of an entire ethnic group. Our Name Is Macedonia. Who gave you the right to change it?

*Bill Nicholov, President Macedonian Human Rights Movement International

After only seven months leading the US Navy’s Fifth fleet, Vice Admiral Scott Stearney – who led the American Navy presence in the Middle East from its base in Bahrain – has been found dead in his residence, the Navy announced Saturday evening.

Stearney, a Chicago native and graduate of the University of Notre Dame, assumed control of the fleet from Vice Adm. John C. Aquilino back in May after Aquilino had served in the role for only eight months. He was in his late fifties at the time of his death.

The circumstances surrounding the admiral’s death are not yet known. News media is reporting that his death was an apparent suicide. Bahrainian authorities are cooperating in an investigation, according to a statement released by the US Navy.

During his 36 years in the Navy, Stearney served as a fighter pilot before leading an aerial strike force in Kabul during the 2000s, before ascending to the upper management ranks of the military, according to his Navy bio. As commander, he was responsible for more than 20,000 U.S. and coalition sailors, Marines, Coastguardsmen, and civilians. Rear Admiral Paul Schlise, the fleet’s deputy commander, has assumed control of the fleet.

The Fifth Fleet helps oversee operations in areas like the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. According to CNN, the fleet is critical to US security interests due to its proximity to Iran and Iran-backed Houthi rebels in Yemen, both of which are seen as threats to shipping in a region that’s seen as one of the most critical arteries for shipments of crude oil and gas. Before Stearney took over, the fleet was involved in one of the biggest controversy in recent US military history when Iran captured two Navy ships that were part of a carrier strike group and temporarily detained 10 US sailors. Ships that were part of the fleet has been involved in several confrontations with Iranian ships since, though they’ve received far less media attention.

By Jim Garamone

The world is awash in change, but the new National Security Strategy serves as a rock of stability for the nation and like-minded countries, Defense Secretary James N. Mattis said at the Reagan National Defense Forum in California.

The secretary spoke about the new strategy and why it is important during his presentation at the annual forum, held at the Ronald Reagan Library and Museum.

“Go back in time two years: we were fighting overseas yet automatic spending caps had resulted in the smallest U.S. military since 1940,” he said. “We had munitions shortages, aircraft that were unable to fly, ships to often unable to sail; an aging nuclear deterrent and an eroding technological edge over our adversaries in an era of renewed great power competition.”

He noted the situation was much like what President Ronald Reagan faced when he took office in 1981.

A year ago, President Donald J. Trump released the National Defense Strategy. The document is meant to map out the U.S. military from a time of strategic atrophy, Mattis said. The document was also meant to “expand the competitive space with our adversaries.”

Lines of Effort

The strategy focuses on three lines of effort: improving lethality, strengthening and expanding alliances, and reforming the Defense Department to emphasize performance, affordability, and accountability.

Improving lethality is a hot button item for the secretary. “We have put America’s adversaries on notice: work with … Secretary of State [Mike] Pompeo’s diplomats, for if the U.S. military is called to the fore, it will be your longest and your worst day,” he said. “We are engaging in long-overdue recapitalization of our nuclear deterrent to keep it safe and secure, and we are recognizing the stability it has brought over sixty years, we are investing to keep our triad credible, ensuring as President Reagan stated in his 1984 State of the Union, ‘a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought.’”

At the same time, the government is dealing with Russian President Vladimir Putin’s duplicitous violation of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force Treaty. The U.S. is in full compliance with its obligations under the treaty today. There are no new U.S. missiles in Europe. But Russia has emplaced missiles. “We will re-energize our arms control efforts, but the onus is on Russia,” Mattis said. “This is highlighted by Russia’s brazen contempt and dismissal of their 2003 agreement with Ukraine that allowed both Russian and Ukrainian ships free passage through the Kerch Strait, an agreement brazenly violated last weekend.”

Lethality reaches into infantry units as well. “Our Close Combat Lethality Task Force is integrating human and technological factors to ensure our close-combat units never enter a fair fight,” he said. “I bring this up because somewhere around 85 percent of our casualties since 1945 have been taken in our close-combat infantry units. They deserve every advantage we can give them.”

From increased production of critical munitions, to procuring advanced fighter jets, to increasing our fleet size, the U.S. military is becoming more lethal while supporting a stable, efficient industrial base.

Alliances

Alliances are key to U.S. success, movement and staying power. “We pursue strengthening our alliances, because history is clear: nations with allies thrive,” he said. “America’s alliances are a durable, asymmetric advantage no competitor can match. Unlike other nations, we don’t buy friends – we earn them. We do not seek vassal states; we want empowered partners who invest in their own sovereignty and determine their own destiny.”

In Europe, NATO allies represent half the Earth’s economic and military might. “Thanks to President Trump’s unrelenting call, in 2017, allies boosted defense budgets by a combined 5.2 percent – the biggest increase in a quarter century,” Mattis said. “Combined, our twenty-eight NATO allies have increased spending by $41 billion in the last two years, and it is now clear to every observer, including Moscow that NATO is strong and growing stronger. It is adapting to be fit for its time.”

In the Indo-Pacific region, the United States is strengthening decades-old alliances while building new partnerships. The visit of the Navy’s aircraft carrier USS Carl Vinson to Vietnam earlier this year highlights the progress. The United States is also working ever more closely with India, the secretary said.

“In Korea, our diplomats speak from a position of unquestioned strength as they endeavor to achieve the complete verified denuclearization of North Korea,” he said. In the Middle East, Mattis said, the coalition to defeat the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria – which consists of 79 nations and international organizations – has confined ISIS to less than 2 percent of its geographic caliphate.

“In Afghanistan, President Trump’s decisions have changed the game,” he continued. “For the first time in seventeen years the U.N. believes we have hope for peace. Afghan troops are in the lead in the fighting and taking hard casualties. But NATO and the international community are stepping up their commitments. The Taliban may now be open for the first time for sincere talks about peace. We’ll see.”

Alliances work in our own hemisphere as well and Mattis touted progress made to increase democratization. “From Ottawa to Mexico City to Buenos Aires to Santiago, we see increasing democratization and, despite economic headwinds and crime, opportunity for the Americas to become a region of increasing political and economic stability,” he said.

Responsible Spending

The third line of effort is to be good stewards of taxpayer dollars. “Last month, we completed our first ever consolidated financial audit in DOD history,” Mattis said. “It covers $2.7 trillion in assets. We conducted it to find problems. I intended to find problems. I would have been disappointed had we not. We embrace the findings. We are taking corrective action on a host of revealed issues. We intend to uphold the trust of the American taxpayers and the Congress.”

DOD is also pushing technology and innovation. “While much remains to be done, we are reclaiming our mantle of technological enterprise and signaling our determination to achieve more here, in space, in hypersonics and artificial intelligence,” he said. “The work goes on – in changed tactics, heightened incorporation of space and cyber operations, training and readiness, equipment and maintenance.

“America’s warriors rehearse their grim game from the firing range to the flight deck, from the sea floor to outer space.”

The erosion of America’s competitive advantage has been halted, but the country is not out of the woods yet. “Without sustained, predictable funding, the gains we’ve made will swiftly fade and our investments will never realize their full potential,” he said. “I share a responsibility with Congress: that not just the next secretary of defense, but the secretary after next, has the military advantages necessary to deter conflict or win if we must fight.”

Iran on Sunday defended its controversial missile programme describing it as “defensive”, after the U.S. accused it of test-firing a rocket capable of hitting Europe.

ehran’s foreign ministry said on Sunday that its missiles arsenal does not break international law and is purely defensive in nature, despite the U.S. slapping more sanctions on Iran over the programme.

“Iran’s missile programme is defensive in nature… There is no Security Council resolution prohibiting the missile programme and missile tests by Iran,” IRNA quoted Foreign Ministry spokesman Bahram Qasemi as saying.

It follows a statement from U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo on Saturday, in which he accused Iran of test-firing a missile capable of carrying nukes and in breach of the 2015 nuclear agreement agreed between Tehran and world powers.

“We condemn these activities… and call upon Iran to cease immediately all activities relating to ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons,” he said.

U.S. President Donald Trump announced in May that the U.S. was withdrawing from the nuclear agreement describing it as “the worst deal ever”, announcing a series of tough sanctions on the country in the following months.

Iran’s missile programme and regional interference were described as factors in the U.S.’ decision to pull out of the pact.

Iran did not confirm or deny that it carried out a missile test, but Tehran has insisted it is not pursuing nuclear weapons and the missiles and not designed to carry nukes.

“It is… ironic that you cite a resolution that you have not only breached through your unilateral and unlawful withdrawal from the (nuclear) accord but that you also encourage others to breach or even threaten to punish and sanction them if they carry it (accord) out,” the Iranian foreign ministry official added in the statement, according to Reuters.

Tensions have continued to rise between the two sides in the Gulf region, with Iran unveiling a “stealth” warship on Saturday.

A nuclear deal agreed between world powers and Iran was supposed to curb Tehran’s nuclear ambitions and lift sanctions on the country.

The election of Trump set-back relations between the two sides, with conservatives also becoming more assertive in Iran and side-lining moderates.

Original source

Strategic Outlook

In July 2018, for the first time in its modern history, the Philippines publicly released its National Security Strategy (NSS). Against the backdrop of a seemingly unconventional approach to foreign policy, the document nevertheless provides an insight on how Manila—particularly the security establishment—perceives the geostrategic environment, as well as how to navigate the challenging currents of international relations.

“The Philippines’ current external security environment,” the NSS provides, “is marked by increased uncertainty and unpredictability.” Driven by the rise of China, the rivalry of major powers has been identified by the document as “the most important long-term strategic concern” of the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. The NSS also recognizes the geographical vulnerability of the country. Situated between the South China Sea (SCS) and the broader Pacific ocean—essentially the grand chessboard of Washington and Beijing—the Philippines, particularly its location and natural resources, have “provided a strong temptation to expansionist powers.”

Cognizant of its security environment, the NSS identifies the SCS as “the foremost security challenge to the Philippines’ sovereignty and territorial integrity.” While the current Philippine administration has openly expressed its affection for the Chinese leadership, the strategy document describes Beijing’s presence in the SCS as “aggressive,” which is partly spawned by the Asian power’s “increasing demand for energy resources, and renewed stirrings of nationalism.” As a result, the NSS admits that Manila “suddenly [gave] the same attention to territorial defense as it does to internal security threats.” The document candidly acknowledges that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) is “one of the weakest in Asia” which places “doubt [in Manila’s] ability to protect and defend [the] sovereignty and territorial integrity” of the country.

Philippines-US Alliance

To address these concerns, the NSS underscored not only the importance of developing the AFP’s “credible defense capability,” but also strengthening its alliance and partnerships in the region. Shortly after coming to power in 2016, the current Philippine government has repeatedly threatened to downgrade Manila’s alliance with Washington. Indeed, in his first presidential trip to China, Rodrigo Duterte announced the Philippines’s “separation” from the United States (US). Critical of US foreign policy, Duterte also threatened to abrogate the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with Washington.

By contrast, the NSS has a more nuanced assessment of the US. Noting that America is the world’s “only superpower” and the Philippines’ “sole defense treaty ally,” the strategy document emphasized that US security presence in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region is a “stabilizing force.” Mindful of US President Donald Trump’s vision of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” the NSS reaffirmed Manila’s commitment to work with Washington on a whole range of security and economic concerns.

Together with their US counterparts, Philippine officials have worked, with less fanfare, to improve bilateral relations. In May 2018, key figures from the Philippines’ national security apparatus, led by Executive Secretary Salvador Medialdea, visited the Hawaii-based US Indo-Pacific Command. The Philippine delegation included the foreign, defense, and interior secretaries, as well as the ambassadors for the US and the United Nations (UN). During the September 2018 meeting of the Mutual Defense Board and Security Engagement Board (MDB-SEB), the allies agreed to conduct 281 security cooperation activities for 2019, an increase over 2018. In October 2018, US and Philippine marines conducted the “Kaagapay ng mga Mandirigma ng Dagat” (KAMANDAG) or “Cooperation of Warriors of the Sea” amphibious landing exercise. Later that month Admiral John M. Richardson, US Navy Chief of Naval Operations, visited the Philippines. His itinerary included a trip to Palawan, where Admiral Richardson received a SCS situation briefing from Lt. Gen. Rozzano Briguez, Commander of the AFP’s Western Command—the military unit in charge of defending the Philippines’ territory in SCS.

Washington has also supported the AFP Modernization Program (AFPMP). In 2018 alone, the US provided the Philippines with Scan Eagle Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) and the Special Airborne Mission Installation and Response (SABIR) system, both of which aim to boost the intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance capabilities of the AFP. In addition to providing the Philippine Marine Corps with personal protective equipment, the US also announced that it will transfer four OV-10 Bronco light attack planes to the Philippine Air Force (PAF). In an apparent move to further improve relations, US Defense Secretary James Mattis announced the returned of the Balangiga Bells to the Philippines. Duterte has publicly criticized Washington over the issue of the bells, which he described as reminders of “gallantry and heroism” against “American colonizers.” On the economic front, the allies have also agreed to negotiate a free trade agreement.

Partnerships

Beyond the Philippines-US alliance, the NSS called on enhancing ties with security partners. Japan and Viet Nam are the Philippines’ “strategic partners,” while Australia is a “comprehensive partner.” Acknowledging Tokyo’s “proactive contribution to peace” initiative, the strategy document reaffirms the “strengthened strategic partnership” between the Philippines and Japan. I have argued elsewhere that Duterte has thus far sustained his predecessor’s initiative of forging close security cooperation between Manila and Tokyo. Indeed, in 2018, Japan has completed the turnover of all of the ten multi-role response vessels (MRRVs) to the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG), an initiative under the Maritime Safety and Capability Improvement Project funded by the Japan International Cooperation Agency. Participating in the Philippines-US KAMANDAG exercises, Japan donated military training aircraft to the Philippine Navy (PN), as well as spare parts and maintenance equipment to the PAF. President Duterte, who declared that the Philippines-Japan strategic partnership has entered a “golden age,” personally welcomed a visiting Japanese flotilla—which included helicopter carrier JS Kaga (DDH-184)—last September 2018.

While not explicitly mentioned in the NSS, the Philippines-Viet Nam strategic partnership is a crucial security relationship between two ASEAN member-states. Both SCS claimants, the two countries have developed confidence-building measures, particularly the military interaction in Southwest Cay—previously occupied by the Philippines and is currently under Viet Nam’s control—where officers from both countries play sports and share information on topics like maritime security.

The NSS identifies Australia, along with other states like India, South Korea, and Russia, as “crucial in the peace, stability, and prosperity of the broader Indo-Asia-Pacific region.” Similar to Viet Nam, the Philippines-Australia comprehensive partnership was not explicitly mentioned in the NSS. Nevertheless, Manila’s partnership with Canberra is crucial as both are part of the US-led hub-and-spokes system of bilateral alliances in the region. Moreover, Australia is the only country, apart from the US, with which the Philippines has a Visiting Forces Agreement.

Strengthening the Alliance and Partnerships

Recognizing that the Philippines is a relatively small country with limited geopolitical options, the NSS underscores the importance of Manila’s alliance and partnerships in promoting national security. In furtherance of the strengthening these key relationships, Manila may consider the following options.

First, a careful assessment and recalibration of Manila’s strategic communication should promote a perception of coherence and lessen possible misperceptions of its foreign policy. Mindful of the US-China rivalry, the Philippines should not be viewed as abandoning one power over another through its pronouncements. Neither should Manila issue statements that could diminish opportunities for managing foreign policy challenges, particularly the SCS issue.

Second, the implementation of the EDCA must be fast-tracked. While the first major project under EDCA was initiated at Basa Air Base in April, broader implementation of the pact appears to have been delayed. As other observers have argued, further postponements—particularly at Antonio Bautista Air Base in Palawan, which is near the Spratlys—means that Washington may find it challenging to assist its ally in the SCS if needed.

Third, the Philippines may continue to negotiate a VFA with Japan to further promote closer security cooperation and interoperability. A similar framework may also be explored with Viet Nam.

At eve of the 2018 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) summit, European Council President Donald Tusk, in response to the criticisms from President Trump, reminded Washington to “appreciate your allies, after all you don’t have that many.” Tusk also called on Europe “spend more on your [defense], because everyone respects an ally that is well-prepared and equipped.” The same message is also true for the members of a network of alliances and partnerships—particularly for relatively smaller and weaker states, as well as their leaders—in the Indo-Asia-Pacific, a region facing immense foreign policy challenges against the backdrop of major powers competing for geopolitical preeminence.

*Mico A. Galang is a researcher at the National Defense College of the Philippines (NDCP). The views expressed are the author’s alone and do not necessarily reflect the official position of NDCP.

In October, the murder of a Bulgarian TV journalist Viktoria Marinova caused worldwide condemnation. The case of the journalist, raped and killed in Ruse, northern Bulgaria, was covered in international media. Although it caused quite a fuss, the attention drawn to the topic faded quickly as it was revealed that the murder wasn’t connected to the fraud investigation led by Marinova.

Viktoria Marinova’s body was discovered in a park in a Danube border city of Ruse on October 6. She was killed by blows on the head and suffocation and raped while she was still alive, the authorities said. On October 9, Severin Krassimirov, a 20-year-old Bulgarian national suspected of raping and murdering the journalist was arrested in the German town of Stade. Later in court Krassimirov admitted hitting the woman in the face and throwing her in the bushes before blacking out. He denied, however, raping and robbing her.

According to Bulgarian officials, DNA evidence found on Viktoria Marinova’s body indicated that Krassimirov took part in her killing. Also, items belonging to the victim were found in the suspect’s house.

Recently, there emerged a peculiar detail – Severin Krassimirov was transported to a mental hospital since the Prosecution insisted on psychiatric expertise. As stated by Ruse Mental Center, the suspect is mentally retarded.

Marinova’s murder provoked international condemnation and caused speculation that it might have been a “warning” as she was investigating alleged fraud involving EU funds, high-ranking Bulgarian officials and business persons. In this connection, Bulgaria’s prime minister, Boyko Borisov, launched an attack on journalists and his political opponents.

“I read monstrous things about Bulgaria in the past three days and nothing was true,” he said. “We, as a country, did not deserve to be smeared like this.”
Borisov lashed out at political opponents for “sending emails to Brussels and the United States, as if this is not something that happens in other countries and is an isolated case”.

Despite Borisov’s indignation, it’s no wonder that Bulgarian officials are suspected of being involved in the murder as the country has been ranked the 111th in the world when it comes to press freedom, lower than any other EU state.

Days before her death, Marinova presented her program which involved an interview with two journalists investigating corruption. “Viktoria’s death, the brutal manner in which she was killed, is an execution. It was meant to serve as an example, something like a warning,” said Asen Yordanov, the owner of the investigative website that featured on the program.

Although it seems that Viktoria Marinova’s murder has nothing to do with her work, journalism in the EU has become dreadfully dangerous in recent years. In past October, Daphne Caruana Galizia, a prominent investigative reporter in Malta, was killed in a car bombing. On February 21, the Slovakian investigative journalist Jan Kuciak and his fiancée were murdered at his home in the village Velka Matca, 50km east of Bratislava; the organizers still haven’t been found. The recent case of Jamal Khashoggi shows that no one can feel safe even in the building of a diplomatic mission.

Those who stand behind these crimes know: they have impunity. However, these are only the most famous cases; many journalist murders weren’t covered that broadly. According to the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ), a New-York based organization defending the freedom of the press, at least 43 journalists have been killed in 2018 so far. In 2017, 46 journalists were killed. Journalism has always been a dangerous profession but today those whose illegal activity is targeted by journalists prove to one another that there are no consequences if you “deal with the problem” in such a way. What we should do is to support the people who do their hard and dangerous work and not let their efforts and names be forgotten…

*Marija Bogdanovic is the founder and Executive Director of the Endowment for Public Awareness (EPA).

I sifted through the children’s backpacks laid at the Isaiah Wall, across from the United Nations, looking for one labeled with the name of an 11 year-old boy. That’s the age of my son, and carrying it would help me feel closer to the lives we were mourning. I found one.

Abd al-llah Abdullah Hussein al-Raza, along with 39 other school children, was killed in a Saudi airstrike on August 9, 2018, in Yemen’s Saada province. They were traveling on a celebratory end-of-year field trip when a bomb hit their bus, killing eleven adults as well as the children. The United States supplied the bomb, manufactured by Lockheed Martin. In press photos, heaps of the children’s bloodied, blue backpacks anchored the grotesque tableau of a massacre.

It should not have taken the murder of school children to at last focus the world’s attention on the war that Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates having been waging on Yemen since March 2015. Merciless bombardments, the sealing of ports, disease, mass starvation, and the suffering of children have been its hallmarks. Since the war’s start, more than 85,000 children under the age of five may have died from hunger alone. Any purported justification of the war as a means to thwart Yemen’s Iranian-backed Houthi rebels has vaporized long ago in this ferocious depravity.

Nor should it have taken Saudi Arabia’s savage murder of U.S.-based journalist Jamal Khashoggi to give urgency to American concern about the U.S. role in the conflict. Saudi Arabia is the biggest importer of U.S. arms. The leader of the anti-Houthi coalition, it has fought the war with American blessings, weapons, training, and, up until a few weeks ago, the refueling of its warplanes.

But here we were on November 8 — 100 or so activists with blue backpacks and the names of the murdered children, stepping off for a short trek to Saudi Arabia’s New York City consulate. Our silent hope was that some good might yet come from the children’s deaths, if the lives of others could be spared.

“Stop the Starving! Stop the Bombing!”

Calling itself Voices for Yemen, a grassroots coalition of peace groups held the demonstration. Among them was Voices for Creative Non-Violence, led by the intrepid, Chicago-based activist, Kathy Kelly. Kelly has spent decades protesting U.S. military aggression, sometimes from within the war zones of Afghanistan and Iraq. She has organized national efforts to awaken America about the Yemen conflict, while a New York City contingent has held a weekly vigil in Union Square for the last year and a half.

Led by puppet figures of weeping mothers, the mourners curled their way through the noontime crowds, who were visibly puzzled or moved by the spectacle. The protest’s purpose was as serious as its mood: to physically block entry, at risk of arrest, to the Second Avenue building that houses the unmarked Saudi consulate. Two dozen or so demonstrators, backpacks on display, took their positions at separate entrances. Some delivery men honored the grim picket, while a few indignant office-goers pushed through the linked arms.

Kneeling before the center entrance, David Barrow broke the hypnotic recitation of the names of the dead to bellow slowly, “Stop the bombing! Stop the starving! Stop the killing of the children of the children of Yemen!” The words felt like an ancient injunction, at once otherworldly and deeply human — a calling out of elemental evil, and a plaintive defense of life itself.

Tensions rose with the harassing presence of plain-clothed embassy thugs, of the sort employed by autocrats all over the world to guard their foreign outposts. Dozens of New York City police officers soon arrived, ready with their plastic cuffs. The protesters sang and chanted, conducted impromptu interviews with Democracy Now and Al-Jazeera (the sole news outlets to cover the demonstration, despite its ample promotion in a press release), and held their ground.

Encounters like this are mistaken as simply rituals of speaking truth to power — here with bodies, as well as words. Equally much, these encounters elicit the response of the powerful when confronted by truth. Mostly fortressed in their offices, the Saudis of course knew we were there and why. The Saudis’ calculated reserve, and reliance on the NYPD to clean up our trespass, bespoke both cowardice and contempt at the idea of being held to account, no matter by whom.

Fear inside the consulate of more bad press for the Yemen war may have forestalled what seemed like imminent arrests. After an hours-long standoff, the police refused to move on the blockaders, as sometimes happens. By whose decision remained unclear.

At the scene, Kathy Kelly spoke with Detective Frank Bogucki, who recalled having arrested some of those present in the wake of the 2003 “Shock and Awe” bombing of Iraq. “Detective Bogucki said we are preaching to the choir,” Kelly wrote in her post-demo email wrap up on November 8, “when we tell him about crimes happening inside the consulate. . . We believe ‘the choir’ must unite by resisting child sacrifice, child slaughter.”

Weapons Sales and Child Slaughter

Since the August 9 bombing, and the murder of Khashoggi especially, establishment Washington has been scrambling to do something about Yemen. All of a sudden, the self-professed choir has gotten bigger, with some new voices promising to restrain the Saudi war. Recent talk has ranged from requiring Congressional approval for U.S. military involvement in the conflict, to sanctioning Saudi Arabia, to cutting off arms sales to the oil kingdom.

In congress, there have been some well-meaning voices all along, as well as near misses in efforts to at least limit the conflict. Early in 2018, Senators Chris Murphy (D-CN), Bernie Sanders (I-VT), and Mike Lee (R-UT) sponsored a Senate resolution to “remove United States Armed Forces from hostilities” in Yemen, besides those directed at Al Qaeda. The measure failed by a narrow 55–44 margin. In truth, the bill sought only to restrict “aerial targeting assistance, intelligence sharing, and mid-flight aerial refueling ” by the U.S. military. The CIA, which directs the notorious drone strikes in Yemen and could fill in for a scaled back military, is exempt. The proposed bill hardly ends the war, nor disentangles the United States from it. American-made bombs can still kill Yemeni civilians, whether guided by U.S. planners or not.

In response to the August bus bombing, a bipartisan group of legislators attached conditions for continued military assistance to Saudi Arabia in its assault on Yemen to the annual defense appropriations bill. The conditions required that the Trump administration certify that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are taking “demonstrable actions” to limit civilian casualties, and pursuing in “good faith” an end to the conflict. Citing unbroken rates of death and disease, aid groups challenged that these conditions had been remotely met. But on September 12, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo filed the necessary certifications with congress, later endorsed by Defense Secretary James Mattis.

The press soon reported that Pompeo overrode State Department staff concerned with the war’s civilian death toll. Pompeo had been advised by the head of the legislative affairs team at the State Department, Charles Faulkner. Prior to joining State, Faulkner had been a lobbyist with the weapons manufacturer Raytheon. Failing to certify, Faulkner warned Pompeo, would jeopardize two billion dollars in arms sales from Raytheon to Saudi Arabia and the UAE. In the tug of war between war profiteering and human rights, weapons sales and child slaughter won.

The most ambitious legislation yet, H.Con.Res.138, invokes constitutional prerogatives under the War Powers Resolution to order the president to stop a war Congress had never declared. Post-Khashoggi, it gained real momentum, including the support of powerful Democrats who had opposed similar, earlier measures within their caucus. But in a barely reported move, Republican House leaders maneuvered on November 13 to have the bill die without consideration from the full chamber. A spokesperson for Speaker Ryan explained that the legislation was now superfluous, given the Trump administration’s revised stance on the refueling of Saudi aircrafts. Whether the bill can be revived in the fading days of the current congress, or may roar to life when the Democrats take control of the House in January, remains to be seen.

Meanwhile, the Sanders-Lee-Murphy bill — newly supported in a letter to Mitch McConnell (R-KY) signed by former Secretary of State Collin Powell, a Nobel Laureate, and other eminences — came for reconsideration by the Senate. If passed, to become law it would still need a matching bill from the House, and then to override a possible presidential veto. As yet, the votes exist for neither.

The Trump administration bitterly opposes the measure, as Secretary Pompeo made clear in a closed-door, morning meeting with Senators on November 28. In it, he stressed the vital role of the U.S.-Saudi alliance and the war in Yemen in checking Iranian hegemony. ­­­Lapsing into doublespeak, he urged, “The more support from you we get, the better chance we have of ending the conflict and stopping the suffering that none of us are happy about.” The prospects for peace apparently depend on defeating a measure opposing war. Rejecting this non-sense, the Republican-led Senate passed later that afternoon by a 63-37 vote a resolution advancing the bill towards full debate by the Senate. It is a stunning rebuke to President Trump, though of no immediate relief to the people of Yemen.

Handwringing and Senate votes aside, the United States government remains for now committed to the war in Yemen. Even the best legislation falls far short of the protestors’ call that the United States fully and permanently withdraw from the war. With evasion and duplicity, the war’s backers somehow choke back the embarrassment that it has not even achieved its objective of breaking the Houthi rebellion. For this meager result, the United States has joined in unleashing violence and suffering all but unparalleled in the world today. Ending wars is not easily left to the war-makers.

“A Mean and Nasty World”

This legislative wrangling, unknown in its detail to all but the fraction of Americans who closely follow such things, has been overtaken by Trump’s outrageous defense of Saudi Arabia. Excusing Khashoggi’s murder, Trump reminded us that it is ” a mean and nasty world out there.” Greatness, he suggests, lies in turning this dismal reality to one’s advantage, not seeking to change it.

For Trump, this dispiriting insight is something of a cosmic first principle, whether in business or in life. Now it appears elevated to the center of a Trump foreign policy doctrine, where it is used to exonerate oligarch assassins with lots of oil and a ferocious hatred of Iran. The implications are terrifying. If the very public death of Khashoggi — a well-connected journalist, backed by powerful media institutions and a formidable nation like Turkey — only emboldens Trump’s tough guy realism, what chance do the children of Yemen stand? How might any vulnerable population fare, should the president deem their suffering acceptable or even useful?

It has been depressing to watch Trump’s backers rally around this rot. Support generally comes from two camps. The first comprises his sycophants, deep into the derangement of the cult of personality that Fox News and Trump himself have carefully crafted. To this group, anything Trump says or does, no matter how obnoxious, offensive or dangerous, is lauded as some norm-busting bit of genius, a master move in a game only Trump knows how to play. They credit him for choosing expedient devils as bedfellows, and for pressing for the right deals with them.

Greg Gutfield, the pinhead pundit on Fox’s largely unwatchable “The Five,” epitomizes this flattery. Cheap gas prices, peace between the Israelis and Palestinians, and stability in the region, Gutfield clucked in a recent blog, is the haul that Trump is poised to win. In truth, Saudi Arabia alone can deliver none of these things. But truth has no necessary place in the magical thinking of the true believer. The lives of Yemeni civilians are sacrificed for a mirage.

The second camp are opportunist-insiders, of flagrantly neo-conservative vintage. They use Trump as a potent vehicle for crusades they have long championed. Witness here the recent New York Times column by Iran hawks Michael Doran and Tony Badran, titled, like eye candy for the president, ” Trump is Crude. But He’s Right About Saudi Arabia.”With breathless concision, they excuse Trump’s obfuscation about who ordered Kashoggi’s death because it serves a sound national strategy; rail against Tehran’s evil as a way to diminish Riyadh’s; and puzzle out how any U.S. punishment of Saudi Arabia would only empower the real enemy, Iran, who had bewitched Trump’s feckless predecessor. Trump’s critics, they conclude, err by favoring “abstract morality” over “strategic wisdom.”

Such is the cynical alibi — given a new, populist prestige by Trump — of self-professed wise men, as they condemn others to death by their hard-headed geo-political calculations. Yet there is nothing abstract about weeping mothers, pulverized children, bloodstained backpacks, and bomb fragments with insignia from an American manufacturer. If nothing else, the demonstration at the Saudi consulate sought to convey just that.

Save the Children

There, is of course, a frightful candor to Trump’s transparent preference for weapons sales and strategic alliances over human rights and the defense of global democracy. For decades, other presidents have made the same bargain. By these terms, the ends of “national security” justify the repellent means often used to achieve them. President Obama, after all, green-lighted the Yemen war to curry further favor with Saudi Arabia. Every president since the start of the Cold War has backed dictators and thuggish insurgents, and burnt villages to save these “allies” from America’s enemies.

Trump, his supporters gush, simply dispenses with the self-serving niceties other presidents have used to cloak their sound and prudent motives. It would be a mistake, however, to consider this refreshing honesty. To recognize the legacy of American hypocrisy should not be to excuse or celebrate it, nor to transcend it by becoming an unapologetic brute. If Trump’s cavalier acceptance of child sacrifice in Yemen further discloses the endemic corruption of American imperial power — so often driven by weapons lobbyists and think tank zealots, no matter the president — then his venal bluster will have taught us something valuable.

What we do with that knowledge may one day save some other busload of children, in some other distant country where American bombs have no place being.

*Jeremy Varon is a Professor of History at The New School, editor of The Sixties: A Journal of History, Politics and Culture , ­­and a member of Witness Against Torture.

Originally published on http://www.publicseminar.org/2018/11/what-will-it-take-to-save-the-children-of-yemen/

Cross-Strait Relations or China-Taiwan relations is one of the most complex and controversial issues in today’s international relations. The two entities, while having a shared heritage and language, have very different aspirations for their futures. For China, Taiwan is considered a wayward province that it needs to reunite with, by force if necessary. Taiwan, on the other hand, increasingly considers itself as a sovereign state capable of making sovereign decisions and participating in international affairs.

Taiwan’s relations with the mainland can often be predicted by the leadership or regime in power. Support for the idea of independence and its proponent — the incumbent Democratic Progressive party — has been increasing. On the other hand, the Kuomintang Party, which favors reunification, has been losing the support of the Taiwanese people as evident in the electoral successes of DPP’s Chen Sui-bian (2000-2008) and Tsai Ing-wen more recently.

Tsai Ing-wen, in particular, has been irritating China lately because of her refusal to be subservient  to the mainland. Although claiming to favor the status quo, it is under her administration that Taiwan’s Navy and Air Force have been conducting trainings, patrols and naval drills in the Taiwan Strait, as well as completing the militarization of Itu Aba – the sole Taiwan-occupied feature in South China Sea.  Taiwan’s relations with the United States have also been flourishing under Tsai and US President Donald Trump.

Aside from commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act, its ascription to the role as the global champion of democracy makes the US feel bound to help Taiwan protect itself from invasion or forceful reunification with China’s authoritarian leadership. Losing a democratic Taiwan will challenge the role of the United States as a leader of the West and a major proponent of liberal ideals. Taiwan is also strategically important because under the banner of democracy promotion, the US is able to maintain its presence and keep an eye on China’s aggressive actions in the region and conduct operations in the controversial areas of Taiwan Strait, East and South China Seas.

After adopting a One China Policy during the Carter administration in 1979, the United States has dealt with Taiwan relations with strategic ambiguity. While there are no official established diplomatic relations, the United States counts  Taiwan as an ally, vital in securing its regional interests. The Trump administration has made policies and pronouncements that have gone beyond those of his predecessors. Aside from unveiling a new de facto embassy in Taipei and signing the Taiwan Travel Act, the administration appears to continuously support Taiwan’s bid for independence by helping it stand up to China’s aggression, through support for US manufacturers’ arms sales to Taiwan and having the US Navy navigating in the Taiwan Strait. Trump officials have also been hinting at a stronger response to China’s moves in the South China Sea, committing to provide defense neccessities of Taiwan and opposing any effort to alter the status quo. The US president also signed the National Defense Authorization Act which has sections devoted to the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan defense cooperation through joint military exercises, trainings and exchanges. Moreover, the United States’ disinvited China from the Rim of the Pacific Exercises reportedly because of its militarization in the South China Sea, hoping to send a message that the US is willing take strong diplomatic actions regarding China’s aggression.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has made it clear to Trump that Taiwan would be the “most important, most sensitive core issue in China-US relations”. Taiwan is considered to be one, if not the number one, on China’s list of its core interests. While China has been slowly negotiating with other claimant states in the South China Sea for a Code of Conduct, reunification with Taiwan is deemed non-negotiable. Xi himself stated that any actions and tricks to split China will meet the ‘punishment of history’. Hence, it is no surprise that in response to this perceived threat to its sovereignty, China stepped up its legal and military pressure towards Taiwan, including suspending regular diplomatic contact due to Tsai’s refusal to endorse the 1992 consensus since she took office. In April this year, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee passed a revised version of China’s surveying and mapping law intended to safeguard its claims in the South China Sea and Taiwan. At the same time, China conducted live-fire drills in the Taiwan Strait, sending signals to both Taiwan and the United States. China has moreover used its economic muscle to show Taiwan its place by buying diplomatic recognition of smaller countries. In 2018, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, and Burkina Faso cut ties with Taiwan in favor of recognizing the One China principle and establishing ties with Beijing. In another vein, the Chinese government also demanded that foreign airlines revise their website references to Taiwan to reflect China’s claim on Taiwan.

Despite its efforts to resist China’s pressure with regards to reunification, Taiwan’s economy is tightly linked with that of the mainland. Economic ties and trade are often affected whenever there is political disagreement or tension between Taiwan and China. Many Southeast Asian states, Australia, Japan and others are faced with the same dilemma of looking at China as powerful economic partner yet relying on the United States as a security provider, particularly whenever China becomes aggressive vis. territorial disputes.

Taiwan can be said to be in a more precarious position because of its complicated, non-state status. Most countries that have the ability to offer considerable defense assistance recognize and have strong economic ties with Beijing – making it difficult for Taiwan to establish defense cooperation and alliances. It instead attempts to woo other countries in the region through economic cooperation via its New Southbound Policy. The policy is dubbed modestly successful in engaging and keep Taiwan’s presence felt in South Asia, Southeast Asia, Australia and New Zealand. However, even with US support, NSP pales in comparison to China’s grand Belt and Road Initiative.

What Taiwan needs is to establish similar relations with other countries that it has with the United States and Singapore. The city-state, despite pressure from China, has said it would not stop its long-standing defense training exercises (Project Starlight) conducted with Taiwan. Other US allies like Japan, South Korea, Australia and India should consider going beyond criticizing China when it comes to cross-strait issues. If the allies want  to ensure US presence and guarantee that the western notion of a rules-based order is maintained in the region, then helping Taiwan defend its security would be in their interest. How they can package such cooperation without suffering a  backlash from China would be the major challenge.

*Florence Principe Gamboa is a research analyst at Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress and a graduate student of International Studies at the University of the Philippines Diliman. This article appeared at Asia Pacific Pathways to Progress.