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Erdogan Says Women And Men Can’t Perform Same Kinds Of Jobs

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(RFE/RL) — Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said women cannot be placed “on an equal footing with men.”

Speaking at a summit on November 24, Erdogan said heavy manual work, such as “digging the soil” is not suited for women, whose “characters, habits, and physiques are different” from men.

Erdogan also said motherhood should be a priority for women, saying this was the correct Islamic way of life.

Erdogan left the Islamic-rooted Justice and Development Party in August to become president, a nominally non-partisan post.

During his 11-year tenure as prime minister, he was accused of seeking to erode Turkey’s secular principles and limiting civil liberties of women.

Erdogan has said every Turkish family should have at least three children, and proposed to limit abortion rights.

The post Erdogan Says Women And Men Can’t Perform Same Kinds Of Jobs appeared first on Eurasia Review.


EP To Discuss Motion Of Censure Against Juncker And Team

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A motion of censure on the European Commission as a whole will be debated by MEPs on Monday at 18:00 in the presence of Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker and the college of Commissioners. Marco Zanni (EFDD, IT), one of the authors of the motion, will take the floor first, followed by Mr Juncker and political group speakers. Mr Juncker will close with a five-minute response.

The motion will be put to a vote on Thursday. In order to dismiss the Commission, it would have to obtain a double majority: two-thirds of votes cast and a majority of all MEPs (i.e. 376).

The motion has been tabled by 76 EFDD and non-attached MEPs further to the “Lux leaks” plenary session debate with Mr Juncker on 12 November.

The post EP To Discuss Motion Of Censure Against Juncker And Team appeared first on Eurasia Review.

EU Lawmakers To Vote On Google Break-Up Motion On Thursday

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(EurActiv) — EU lawmakers will likely vote on Thursday (27 November) on a motion proposing the breaking up of Google and other Internet technology companies, increasing political pressure on the bloc’s antitrust regulators to take a stronger line on the search giant.

The European Parliament has no power to dismember a firm. But the vote, underlining widespread concern among EU politicians about American dominance of the Internet industry, would be a significant public challenge to Google’s business in Europe.

Andreas Schwab, a German Christian Democrat lawmaker at the European Parliament, and Spanish liberal Ramon Tremosa unveiled a draft of their resolution last week, saying separating search engines from other commercial services would ensure a level playing field for rivals in Europe.

The conservatives, liberals and Socialists, who command a large majority of the parliamentary seats, will work out a joint motion on Tuesday and expect to debate the issue in parliament on Wednesday and vote on it on Thursday, Tremosa’s aide said on Monday.

European politicians and some competing companies have complained that Google’s dominance allows it to promote its own services at rivals’ expense, and attacked it on a range of issues including its tax and privacy policies.

Google has regularly said it faces fierce competition in a constantly-changing market.

Parliament’s proposal to the commission, if passed, would put pressure on new EU Competition Commissioner Margrethe Vestager to take a tougher line than her predecessor in resolving complaints against Google.

Vestager’s predecessor, Joaquin Almunia, held four years of investigations, triggered by complaints from rivals including Microsoft. German publishing group Axel Springer has also complained about Google’s market power.

The European Commission has never ordered the break-up of any company for anti-competitive practices.

Kurt Lauk, the head of the pro-business wing of Germany’s conservative party CDU, which is also Schwab’s party, criticised the proposal to break up Google.

“Instead of exploiting the opportunities of the Web, some lawmakers in the European Parliament are nursing their phobias,” he told Saturday’s edition of German financial paper Handelsblatt.

“Threatening Google and other large Internet companies who are in fierce competition with each other, is a loser’s debate,” Lauk was quoted as saying.

Andreas Schwab and Ramon Tremosa, said on Monday that they were not waging an ideological battle against the world No. 1 search engine.

“Tremosa and Schwab are not ideological against Google! We are against monopolies,” the two lawmakers said in a joint statement.

“Unbundling is one of the ideas, but we proposed several ideas of solutions that are on the table including a ‘rotation mechanism’ (and) legislation on search engines.”

The post EU Lawmakers To Vote On Google Break-Up Motion On Thursday appeared first on Eurasia Review.

IAEA Says Iran Cuts Uranium Gas Stockpile, Complies With Interim Nuclear Deal

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Iran has reduced its stockpile of low-enriched uranium gas to comply with the terms of the interim nuclear agreement signed with the six world powers in 2013, a report by a UN nuclear agency has said.

The paper was released on Monday, the same day as the P5+1 bloc (China, France, Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and the US) agreed to prolong the talks on Iran’s controversial nuclear program until the end June.

Reuters has obtained a confidential monthly report on the implementation of the preliminary deal, issued by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for its member states.

According to the document, Tehran’s stockpile of uranium gas currently amounts to just under 7,400 kilograms, which is below the limit agreed last year.

The reduction of supply must’ve taken place in the last couple of weeks as it was above the limit earlier in November.

Under the interim deal, Iran agreed to convert a significant part of its low-enriched uranium gas into oxide, which is less suitable for processing it further into weapons-grade material.

Tehran also promised it would halt its most sensitive nuclear operations in exchange for easing of international sanctions.

The preliminary agreement between Iran and the six world powers was signed to buy time for the current talks on a final settlement of the 12-year dispute over Iranian nuclear program.

Despite Tehran saying that it is refining uranium to fuel its nuclear power plants, the West is concerned that further enrichment may result in Iran creating a nuclear bomb.

The post IAEA Says Iran Cuts Uranium Gas Stockpile, Complies With Interim Nuclear Deal appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Modi’s Historic Obama coup Reveals PM’s ‘Out Of The Box’ Vision For India – Analysis

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By Manoj Joshi

The decision to invite US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest at the 66th Republic Day is the clearest indicator of the directions of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strategic outlook.

An assertive China under the leadership of Xi Jinping is seeking to re-draw the geopolitical landscape of Asia backed by a modernised PLA and the massive cash reserves of the country. India’s ally Russia is drifting into the Chinese camp. New Delhi has so far been somnolent, but now, with a new and vigorous Government, it is staking out its response.

This is evident to those reading between the lines of official statements and comments made during the official visits of Modi to Japan, the US and Australia in recent months. Remarkably, till now, not a single American leader has ever been invited as the chief guest for Republic Day.

We have had the Chinese — Marshal Ye Jianying in 1958, and even the Pakistanis, Ghulam Mohammed in 1955 and Rana Abdul Hamid in 1965 — and of course, the Soviets, British, French and others, but never an American.

This was clearly no oversight, but a statement of India’s world view. Well, that world view is now changing. The decision to dump hidebound attitudes is very much in keeping with Modi’s “out of the box” approach in policy-making.

This was first evident in Modi’s invitation to all SAARC leaders to attend his swearing-in. Subsequently, he followed this up with close interactions with America’s two key Asia-Pacific allies Japan and Australia.

It was also marked by the showmanship visible in the public meetings with Non-Resident Indians (NRIs) in New York and Sydney which helped focus minds in Washington and Canberra.

There should be no doubt in any mind that these two countries march lockstep with the Americans and all our initiatives with them, especially those related to nuclear and strategic issues will come to nought, unless Washington is on board.

Actually, to be more accurate, the issue was more about India coming on board the American-led initiatives to coordinate a response to the rise of China.

Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee recognised this when he spoke of the US and India as “natural allies”.

Subsequently, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice privately declared that the US was ready to help India become a great power in the 21st century. Since 2010, Beijing’s growing assertion has been causing disquiet in many Asian capitals. It is to address this that the US announced a “pivot” to Asia, later rechristened “rebalance.”

Though India was facing its own pressures along the entire length of its 4,000km border with China, New Delhi chose to stick it out alone and try and work out an accommodation with Beijing.

Towards this end, it accepted the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement in October 2013 and accepted China’s invitation for a Maritime Security Dialogue.

But the events in September 2014, when supreme leader Xi Jinping’s visit was accompanied by a show of force by the PLA in Chumur, convinced New Delhi that the Chinese policy had a depth and purpose which required a new and more sophisticated response.

Towards that end, India has adopted a stance of cooperation and competition with China, manifested by its decision to be party to the Chinese-sponsored initiatives like the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, even while enhancing its own defence infrastructure and reaching out to countries wary of Beijing.

India’s relations with the US have zig-zagged since the mid 1990s when Robin Raphel and Bill Clinton sought to pummel New Delhi on the score of non-proliferation and Kashmir.

They reached their nadir with the nuclear tests of 1998, but the Talbott-Jaswant Singh dialogue led to Bill Clinton reaching out to India in the last years of his presidency.

The George W. Bush era (2001-09) was an Indian-American love fest culminating in the Indo-US nuclear deal which no one but Bush and the Republicans could have delivered.

But thereafter, under Obama, and the paralysis afflicting the UPA-II government in New Delhi, things were allowed to drift.

Obama may be a lame duck, but it is the American system we are engaging, and it is clear in word and deed that Washington has now come to accept the centrality of India to any future Asian pivot or re-balance.

The writer is a Contributing Editor, Mail Today, and Distinguished Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi.

Nawaz’s K-issue push to Obama

Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif has again sought US intervention to resolve the dragging Kashmir issue, asking President Barack Obama to take up the matter with the Indian leadership during his upcoming visit to attend the Republic Day parade as the chief guest.

Sharif, who has been spearheading a persistent campaign to internationalise the Kashmir issue despite India’s assertion that it should be handled bilaterally, raised the matter when Obama telephoned him late on Friday to inform him of his forthcoming visit to New Delhi.

Sharif “urged President Obama to take up the cause of Kashmir with the Indian leadership, as its early resolution would bring enduring peace, stability and economic cooperation to Asia”, said a statement issued by Pakistan’s Foreign Office.

A readout of the same conversation issued by the White House made no mention of the Kashmir issue, saying only that Obama spoke with Sharif to discuss efforts by the US and Pakistan to “advance shared interests in a stable, secure, and prosperous Pakistan and region”.

According to the statement from the Foreign Office, Sharif referred to his visit to India earlier this year to attend PM Narendra Modi’s swearing-in and said the trip was “aimed at taking Pakistan-India relations forward”.

Modi scored a diplomatic coup on Friday by getting Obama to accept his invitation to be the chief guest at the Republic Day parade.

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

Courtesy: Mail Today

The post Modi’s Historic Obama coup Reveals PM’s ‘Out Of The Box’ Vision For India – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Foreign Fighters Of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns And Punjabis? – Analysis

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By D Suba Chandran

There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.

The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.

What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?

Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.

The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.

The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.

The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.

While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.

Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.

Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.

It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh – played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.

Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.

A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.

If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?

There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.

D Suba Chandran
Director, IPCS

By arrangement with Rising Kashmir

The post Foreign Fighters Of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns And Punjabis? – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.

UK Thwarts 5 Islamist Attacks Including Assassination Of Prince Harry – OpEd

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Britain’s prestigious police agency, known to the world as Scotland Yard British, prevented or thwarted at least five Islamist terrorist attacks in 2014 alone, according to Police Commissioner Bernard Hogan-Howe, who appeared on BBC television news in London on Sunday morning. One the of the plots was the assassination of a member of the royal family, Prince Harry, in February, as described in an Examiner news story.
Prince Harry, who served two tours fighting terrorist in Afghanistan, was targeted for assassination by a British homegrown Islamic terrorist.
HMRA/Buckingham Press Office

“On average over the last few years it’s been about one [terrorist plot] a year, but this year alone it’s been up to five,” said Hogan-Howe in an interview with the BBC. The whole country has a part to play in combating the threat from terrorism, noted London’s Metropolitan Police commissioner, who was knighted by Queen Elizabeth as Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe.

He attributed the ability to stop terrorists in their tracks in 2014 to the public, the British businesses large or small, and the police officers and inspectors all working together with the security services — such as Britain’s interior MI5 and exterior MI6 intelligence units — that has created “an incredibly powerful team.” Sir Bernard noted has observed firsthand a “change in the momentum” in the seriousness of the recent plots, with a growing concern over so-called “long-wolf” attacks that police anti-terrorism experts say require less planning.

“It doesn’t take a lot of organizing. It doesn’t take to many people to conspire together. There’s no great complexity to it, so what that means is we have a very short time to interdict,” he said. Hogan-Howe also said that he believes about 500 Britons have traveled to Iraq or Syria to fight alongside the bloodthirsty and cruel Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS).

According to the British news media, the terror threat is currently at “severe” level on that nation’s threat matrix.. It was raised to the second highest of five possible levels this August, as the conflicts in Iraq and Syria intensified and fear grew of returning, battle-hardened Islamists. “The British cops like the cops in the United States are concerned over the prospect of deadly terrorists returning ‘home’ who are not only deadly but also know their way around the cities,” said Thomas Lansing-Hayes, an American law enforcement officer specializing in anti-terrorism and physical security.

In the case of an attack on the “royals,” 31-year-old Islamist, Ashraf Islam (birth name: Mark Townley), claimed he had a moral right to judge Prince Harry because he is a member of the British armed forces and he fought against Ashraf Islamic brothers at arms. Harry distinguished himself as a combat helicopter pilot in Afghanistan, where he served two tours-of-duty.

During his BBC appearance, Sir Bernard noted, “As a member of the public we want to keep each other safe and if you look right throughout this country 60 million people working together will notice a difference. They will notice when something is unusual, they will notice a change in behavior of a young person perhaps who is thinking of going to Syria. Well, tell the police. The best time to stop these young people becoming radicalized is before they go.”

London’s top cop also spoke about his department’s and London’s participation in a National Counter Terrorism Awareness Week that begins on Monday. Again, the police commissioner stressed the need for the police and the community to work together in combating the threat: “I think we have got our best chance of dealing with this by locally based community policing.” He added: “Our joint task has got to be to prevent people going abroad to get involved in acts of terrorism, to try and monitor their return, and should they return, either to charge them with offences should they have committed them or to monitor them in this country.”

The post UK Thwarts 5 Islamist Attacks Including Assassination Of Prince Harry – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

Russia Sanctions Over Ukraine Aid China Gas Plans – Analysis

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By Michael Lelyveld

China is gaining an edge in energy deals with Russia as Moscow faces sanctions pressure from the conflict in Ukraine.

The latest energy accords announced in Beijing on the sidelines of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit suggest that China is increasing its access to Russian resources while resisting demands for more favorable financial terms.

At a signing ceremony on Nov. 9, Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin sealed a memorandum of understanding for a second Siberian gas pipeline on a western route that Russia has promoted unsuccessfully for years.

The preliminary commitment to the project known as the Altai pipeline, named for a remote Russian border region, follows an agreement in May on an eastern Siberian gas line to supply China’s coastal cities and industrial northeast.

China has previously balked at proposals for access through Xinjiang, which already provides transit for its pipelines from Central Asia.

But Beijing is seen as more amenable to Russia’s push for the western route now that the eastern “Power of Siberia” project is underway, said Mikkal Herberg, energy security research director for the Seattle-based National Bureau of Asian Research.

The Altai line would add 30 billion cubic meters (1 trillion cubic feet) per year of import capacity to the 38 billion cubic meters (1.3 trillion cubic feet) of the eastern route, boosting China’s plans to replace more of its high-polluting coal with cleaner fuel.

“The signing of energy agreements between China and Russia is a win-win situation for both countries,” said Zhou Dadi, vice director of the China Energy Research Society, as quoted by the official Xinhua news agency.

“The western route is becoming the priority for our gas cooperation,” said Alexei Miller, CEO of Russian monopoly Gazprom, according to Reuters.

Miller said the projects could make Russia’s gas sales to China larger than those to Europe “in a mid-term perspective,” Itar-Tass reported.

Gas is expected to start flowing on the eastern route in 2019, while Gazprom hopes to sign a contract for the western line next year and complete construction in 2020.

On Chinese terms

China has been cool to the 2,600-kilometer (1,615-mile) Altai plan since Putin first proposed it in 2006, but Russia has hotly pursued a breakthrough to offset risks in Europe as sanctions on Moscow have tightened this year.

Both sides praised the mutual benefits of the gas deals, which were among 17 documents on cooperation signed during the summit, but China appeared in the stronger position.

“The Russians are having to come to terms with their reliance on China for energy markets and investment, so it’s being done mainly on Chinese terms,” Herberg said.

On Monday, Russian Finance Minister Anton Siluanov acknowledged the impact that Western sanctions have had on Moscow so far.

“We’re losing around U.S. $40 billion (245 billion yuan) a year because of geopolitical sanctions, and about U.S. $90-100 billion (552-614 billion yuan) from oil prices falling about 30 percent,” Siluanov told a press conference, Reuters reported.

Russia’s deals with China are unlikely to cover the difference with near-term cash relief.

While announcing Russia’s progress on the Altai route, Miller said Gazprom had given up on its long-sought goal of getting prepayments from state-owned China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC) for gas to help pay for the Power of Siberia project.

In May, Gazprom deputy CEO Alexander Medvedev said a prepayment of U.S. $25 billion (153 billion yuan) had been agreed “in principle” to defray Russia’s pipeline and infrastructure costs that Miller had estimated at U.S. $55 billion (336 billion yuan).

Instead, at the summit, Miller argued that gas prices had already been negotiated without an upfront payment.

“But since we have agreed finally on the price, we do not consider as possible using a prepayment as a financial instrument for further lowering of the price,” said Miller.

“We are not negotiating loans,” Miller also said.

Cost of development

Russia’s capitulation after years of seeking advance payments may leave it with high development costs at a time when oil revenues are dropping and its hard currency reserves have dwindled in defense of the plunging ruble.

Herberg cited Russian sources as saying that Chinese funds have started flowing into the country, but these appear to be commercial loans rather than the prepayments that Gazprom sought.

Total costs of the western line are unclear, although they are expected to be lower than those for the eastern route, due to Russia’s existing energy development in West Siberia.

Reports in 2012 estimated the project at U.S. $14 billion (85 billion yuan), but uncertainties about crossing the Altai region could drive costs higher.

Gazprom officials have yet to explain how they will cope with the environmental challenges of the mountainous wilderness and Altai’s Ukok Plateau, designated by UNESCO as a World Heritage Site.

According to engineering details published by the Russian website Regnum.ru in 2007, altitudes of the pipeline route reach as high as 2,600 meters (8,530 feet).

Tunneling through the mountains may be needed, a study for Gazprom’s Department of Strategic Development said.

On the Xinjiang side, the route would cover vast undeveloped distances before joining the corridor of China’s West-East Gas Pipeline system.

“Over 8,000 kilometers (4,970 miles) of pipelines will have to be built in total to reach industrially developed regions in China because the territory on the pipeline’s entrance to the country resembles a desert,” Mikhail Krutikhin, a partner at the RusEnergy consulting firm, told the Moscow Times.

Last week, CNPC director of foreign relations Zhang Xin told Interfax that the Altai route had been agreed despite offers of transit from third countries, apparently referring to Mongolia and Kazakhstan.

Krutikhin and other analysts believe China will have a strong hand to renegotiate gas prices because Russia will have huge investment costs and pipeline capacity to fill, with only one customer on the other end.

Herberg said Russia tried for years to avoid such a trap, arguing against single-customer pipeline projects, only to fall prey to isolation after annexing Crimea and supporting separatists in Ukraine.

Energy investment

There are also signs that Russia has thrown open its previously-barred doors to Chinese investment in its energy sector as sanctions put ventures with Western companies on hold.

At the APEC meeting, Russia’s state-owned Rosneft oil company announced a framework agreement to sell a 10-percent stake in its prized Vankor oilfield to CNPC for an undisclosed price.

The field, which produces some 440,000 barrels of low-sulphur crude per day, has been the main source of Russian oil deliveries to China through the East Siberian-Pacific Ocean (ESPO) pipeline.

Such key Russian resources have long been considered off-limits to foreign investment, particularly from neighboring China, but sanctions on Rosneft have been taking their toll.

“Nobody could get access to that or any of what Russia defines as strategic oil assets before,” Herberg said. “So, they’re clearly moving closer together in an energy sense, but I think it’s Russia basically throwing themselves into the arms of the Chinese.”

Sanctions on Western technology for liquefied natural gas (LNG) production in Russia may also affect its energy exports to China.

In Beijing, Miller suggested that Gazprom may be forced to scrap ambitious plans to develop LNG for the international market in the Russian Far East with a liquefaction plant at Vladivostok and consider building a second eastern export pipeline to China instead.

“We are carefully studying the possibility of supplying pipeline gas from the Far East to China,” Miller told Interfax. “Yes, this can be considered an alternative to LNG.”

The narrowing of Russia’s export markets for gas could give China the upper hand in setting terms.

Sanctions on LNG technology transfers are also reportedly clouding prospects for Russia’s plans to develop resources on the Arctic Yamal Peninsula with foreign partners.

CNPC and France’s Total each have 20-percent stakes in the U.S. $26.9-billion (164.6-billion yuan) project with Russian independent producer Novatek.

In June, a Total official voiced concern that the project would need U.S. technology that is currently banned.

But CNPC’s Zhang insisted last week that sanctions would block development.

“In our opinion, there are no problems with the Yamal project,” said Zhang, according to Interfax.

Earlier this month, Novatek shareholder and Putin cohort Gennady Timchenko told the Kremlin’s RIA Novosti news service that Chinese banks were prepared to invest over U.S. $10 billion (61.2 billion yuan) in the Yamal project.

But he added that investors “have begun to think and decide for themselves whether they need to get involved in this story or not,” the Moscow Times said.

Timchenko is subject to U.S. sanctions, while Novatek appears on both U.S. and European Union sanctions lists.

The post Russia Sanctions Over Ukraine Aid China Gas Plans – Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.


Representing Bangladesh: My Years At The UN – OpEd

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By Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury

The practice of the art of being a diplomat has always been fraught with great circumspection. It is one of the hallmarks, indeed mainstays of the profession. Anecdotes on this score abound. For instance there is this story of Talleyrand, the Grand Old Man of French diplomacy in the nineteenth century. As a retired person, but still very involved in domestic and foreign issues, he was entertaining guests one evening in his Paris apartment. The year was 1830, the month was February, and the second French Revolution was breaking out. There was noise of fighting, emanating from the streets below. Talleyrand walked the steps to the window, with some effort as he had a game foot, and looked down to see. “It seems we are winning!” he observed. “But who are WE, Excellence?” his visitors asked, somewhat puzzled. “Hush!” replied Talleyrand: “I shall tell you tomorrow!!”

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury

Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury. Photo credit ISAS.

Modern diplomacy, particularly multilateral politics as conducted at the United Nations, is somewhat different. One often needs to take positions more clearly, and articulate them more unequivocally, in order to advance one’s country’s perceived national interests in a global forum. Yet one must avoid stridency that might offend. Unlike in warfare, victories in diplomacy must not be overtly celebrated, but merely noted, and factored into calculations, as one moves on to win greater gains. Restraint is a great virtue, tempered by a mature sense of positive initiative, being tough without being aggressive. The challenge is often to convert weaknesses to strengths, and moral force to power, more so if you are representing a country that is large yet poor, intellectually endowed but weak. Like Bangladesh, for instance.

My substantive association with the United Nations began three and a half decades ago, in 1978, when I was on a field trip to the UN headquarters in New York while writing up my PhD thesis in international relations at the Australian National University in Canberra. I was already a public official, nine years into my career as an erstwhile Civil Service of Pakistan (CSP) officer, already considered, as one was wont to those days, of appreciable seniority. So, my services were commandeered by Ambassador KM Kaiser, a legendary Bangladeshi Permanent Representative to the UN, for assisting with the lobbying for a seat in the Security Council.
Bangladesh defeated Japan in a straight electoral contest in the UN General Assembly on that occasion, and Dhaka was staggering under the weight of its bewildering success! Eventually I was to be Deputy Permanent Representative (1986-91), then Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and World Trade Organization in Geneva (1996-2001), and finally, Permanent Representative to the UN in New York (2001-2007). My links with the UN continued as I served as Foreign Advisor (i.e. Foreign Minister) in the Caretaker Government (2007-2009). Since 2009 to date, my connections with the UN have taken another dimension in a different avatar. I was no longer representing my country at the UN, but was now involved with this global organisation as an academic analyst and researcher, heading the ‘multilateral cluster’ as Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies, Singapore. Understandably, this paper will involve a trip down memory lane, drawing upon my notes and nostalgia.

At the UN, in both Geneva and New York, the myth of ‘equality of States’ operates as reality. In other words, the ambassador of San Marino or Liechtenstein, if she or he is good, could be as effective a player as those from Brazil or China (there is though some kind of US exceptionalism in New York, also because it is the host country to the UN). So it is not so much what you represent as who you are. There is therefore a premium on diplomatic and negotiating skills, and there is usually considerable peer-assessment. If one can pass muster, one can find for oneself a place at decision-making tables. This is not generally true of ambassadors in state capitals. The Icelandic Ambassador will have a lower place in the pecking order than that of Japan in Washington. Not necessarily so at the UN in New York or Geneva (or at the UN offices in Vienna).There is greater reward for individual capabilities in the latter places, and if you are seen and clever, you are more likely to be elevated to playing a higher role as Chair of some important committee of peers. This also brings a distinction to one’s country in addition to oneself, and that can be doubly satisfying.

As an Ambassador or Permanent Representative to the United Nations one is of course mandated to project the foreign policy of one’s country and thereby protect the State’s perceived national self-interest. Greek philosophers held that before engaging in any discussion one must define one’s key terms. So the expression ‘foreign policy’ will need to be explained. The foreign policy of a State, irrespective of its power or clout, or whether it is developed or developing, can be described as the sum-total of external interactions flowing from conscious decision to advance its welfare or interests. But this is not as easy as it appears. Such policies are often not clearly articulated or established, and the Ambassador would be required to take decision either through hasty consultations on telephone with the headquarters, or on the spot.

Some theoretical discussion on foreign policy is merited. Contemporary literature on the subject of foreign policy-analysis generally tends to be ‘process-oriented’ mostly in relation to developed countries, and ‘function-oriented’ with respect to developing states. The former (‘process-oriented’) concentrates on the detailed analyses of foreign policy making mechanisms, with emphases on such institutions as bureaucracies, political parties, and pressure groups and the influence they exert on foreign policy outcomes. Examples of such literature would be Graham Allison’s ‘Essence of Decision’, (Boston: Little Brown, 1971), Morton Halperin’s ‘Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy’, (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1974), or William Wallace’s “Foreign Policy and the Political Process’ (London: Macmillan, 1971).

In case of the developing countries, the argument has been advanced that their institutions, still being rudimentary, deserve less attention than the functions of foreign policy or the purposes they are put to. Their foreign policies are seen as ‘function of functions’. Some notable proponents of this view, and examples of their work, are: B. Korany, ‘Foreign Policy Models and their Empirical Relevance to Third World Actors: A Critique and an Alternative’ (International Social Science Journal, Vol.26, No.1,1974), F.B. Weinstein, (‘The Uses of Foreign policy in Indonesia, World Politics, Vol. xxiv, No.3, April 1972), and Maurice East (Foreign-Policy making in Small States: A Study of the Ugandan Ministry of Foreign Affairs’, Policy Sciences, Vol. 4, 1973).

However, on the basis of my own empirical observations spread across well over four decades, I would counter-argue that the pre-supposition that developing countries are so different from those that are developed that they require a distinctly different set of tools to examine their external behaviour-patterns cannot be sustained beyond a point. Such neat categorisation or division into two distinctly separate groups of states, is rendered difficult by the fact that in the contemporary international scene many countries have characteristics of both developing and developed states. This requires analyses that combine the need for the study of both the ‘process’ and ‘functions’ in such policy-making of most states.
In total I had spent about twelve years in New York (split between being Deputy Permanent Representative and Permanent Representative), and five more in Geneva (as Ambassador to the UN as well as to the World Trade Organization, a totally separate global body independent of the UN), representing Bangladesh. New York hosts the UN headquarters and the Secretariat, as also the six Main Committees of the UNGA, the Economic and Social Council and the Security Council. The UN in New York (as distinct from its Geneva counterpart) lays down the broad legislative parameters, and calls the political shots. The hundreds of resolutions that have been adopted there reflect the urges of humanity, but, except for those at the Security Council, have only recommendatory value. Decision-making is usually by voting, though ‘consensus resolutions’ supposedly carry more weight. Some powerful states such as the US take the stand that they are not morally obliged to abide by decisions they voted against, or that domestic laws override UN legislative adoptions. Alone among the UN entities the Security Council has the authority to implement its declarations, if needs be by force (Chapter 5), but there, as is well-known, the Permanent Five – the US, the UK, Russia, China, and France – have the power to veto any decision, a fact that has aroused considerable controversy, and even ire among others. Bangladesh has served in the Security Council twice, and on both occasions, its behaviour has conformed to a pattern of generally playing a low-profile role on high-risk issues, and high-profile role on low-risk issues.

As distinct from the largely political role of its New York counterpart, the UN in Geneva is concerned with economic and social subjects. Geneva hosts the major specialised agencies of the UN (some technically fall outside its purview) such as the International Labour Organization (ILO, which actually pre-dates the UN), World Health Organization (WHO), World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), as also the World Trade Organization (WTO), which, though distinct from the UN, performs a complementary role in trade, and more recently, in development. The Office of the Human Rights Commissioner is also located there. These bodies legislate within their mandates, collate and transmit ‘best practices’ and generally perform a role that pertains to daily ‘bread and butter issues’ of the common man. To that end, it is important to Bangladesh. This is where ‘special and differential treatment’ in trade for developing and ‘least developed countries’ (LDCs), such as ‘Generalized System of Preferences’ (GSP) or the provision of trade-benefits for ‘Everything But Arms’ (EBA) of the European Union are discussed and negotiated (though Brussels, which hosts the EU, is also concerned with some of these issues). Bangladesh has been an active leader of LDCs, both in the UN and WTO fora; and sometimes by seeking the Chair of relevant committees, and at other times by simply networking with key players, it has sought to retain and expand its market access, mainly for its principal export, garments.

However, there is one major political forum that is based in Geneva, but has not been able to deliver adequately in recent times. This is the Conference on Disarmament, the 65-member body that is the sole negotiating forum on arms control. Though earlier the CD succeeded in negotiating some landmark agreements such as the Chemical and Biological Weapons Convention, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), it has made little progress for years now. Its Rules of Procedure require that every year the Programme of Work has to be determined afresh, as on all issues, by consensus. It rarely succeeds in achieving agreement on such annual agenda. The main nuclear powers say that arms control is being achieved through their own negotiations, which causes them to neglect the CD. This is true except for occasions when the CD is needed to achieve another global agreement such as, in present times, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). At the moment Pakistan is successfully opposing it almost single-handedly, as it believes, it would accord its arch-rival India an ‘unfair advantage’ over it.

Normally Bangladesh’s direct interest on such subjects as nuclear issues may be limited. But this forum provides Bangladesh a platform to make itself useful to key global players intellectually by providing ‘ideas’ (such as in negotiating language for draft decisions) or by playing mediating roles. One example during my tenure (1996-2001) comes to mind. To monitor the CTBT the CTBT Organization (CTBTO) was to have been set up in Vienna. But this could only be done if all Regional Groups had elected their Bureaux. This included the Middle East and South Asia (MESA) Group, which has both Iran and Israel as its members. It could never elect its Bureau member (Vice Chair) because Iran and Israel refused to meet at all. The US Ambassador approached me if I could help break the impasse by agreeing to stand for the post. I agreed as it gave Bangladesh a leg-up in the Disarmament Forum. Though Bangladesh had no diplomatic relations with Israel, the Israeli Ambassador had no particular objection to Bangladesh, and Iran had no reason to disoblige us. But we insisted on public show of all-round support. As a result, and in pursuance of the deal, we ended up with Iran nominating Bangladesh and Israel seconding it, a truly rare diplomatic phenomenon! The CTBTO was thus able to be launched, and Bangladesh came out of it, smelling like roses, for helping cut the Gordian knot!

The WTO, in Geneva, deserves a special mention. It encompasses a dozen or so agreements, each on a major trade subject. The WTO functions through a General Committee, its plenary body which serves as the main legislative organ, which also has two other faces in the form of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB), and the Trade Policy Review Body (TPRB).The DSB can and does pass judgments on complaints of breaches of agreement, and can also impose penalties. The TPRB reviews trade policies of member states to determine their WTO- compliance, and where this is lacking, can provide countries with assistance in this regard. Developing countries often find this useful. A constraint for Bangladesh was the small size of its global trade, and therefore, of its objective importance. We tried to make up for it by raising our profile through other roles. For instance I chaired the TPRB, and a key body known as Committee of Trade and Development (popularly known as ‘CommTD’). Also, by seeking to advance LDC interests by chairing it.

Additionally, I was able to play a key role in resolving an impasse with regard to the election of the Director General (which had to be by consensus), by proposing, and thereafter negotiating, a splitting of the term between the two main candidates, Mike Moore of New Zealand and Supachai Panitchpakdi of Thailand. These enabled us to get Bangladesh invited to the ‘Green Room’, an ante-chamber of the Director General, where key players in the WTO tended to meet and take decisions, which were later mostly adopted without too much debate, sometimes even rubber-stamped, by the General Committee.

The hochpolitik (‘high politics’) of the WTO is, as far as developing countries are concerned, to my mind, two-fold: First, the argument that ‘development’ is a goal of trade, which found a modicum of acceptance both in the Singapore WTO Ministerial Conference in 1996, and by the cognomen attached to the later Doha Round of Trade Negotiations as ‘Development Round’: and the second, that ‘implementation’ be emphasised rather than new agreements, as the WTO was thought to have already bitten off more than it could chew. Negotiations in the WTO can be intensely technical. This is where developing countries generally tend to feel constrained, and they, including Bangladesh, need to train hard to develop requisite skills. Here on the one hand you have the US and the European Union, highly organised. On the other extreme you have countries whose people would tend not to buy Japanese radio sets because they were afraid they would not understand what the radios were saying!

So, one major problem developing countries face, particularly in Geneva, which has so many multilateral bodies of varied mandates scattered around the city, compared to New York where most are housed together within a single UN structure, is the lack of resources and dearth of personnel to cover the increasing number of meetings. A former head of the UN in Geneva, Under Secretary General Vladimir Petrovsky once told me that in that city there were around 7000 meetings of the UN system annually! The life of a developing country diplomat, is, therefore, NOT at all like how that city’s most renowned citizen, the mighty Voltaire, had said of the local elite: ‘Le matin je fais des projets et le soir je fais des sottises’ (‘In the mornings I make good resolutions, in the evening I commit follies!’)

My induction to the New York scene in late-2001 was a baptism of fire. I presented my credentials to Secretary General Kofi Annan at noon on 6 November. Bangladesh was then in the Security Council, and remained so for rest of the year, and for a small overworked Mission like ours the associated tasks were often harrowing! Even before submitting my papers, earlier that morning I had to make interventions at a Security Council informal meeting on Afghanistan. We were deliberating on the choice of Hamid Karzai as the head of the interim government in Kabul. On 20 December we in the Council authorised the deployment of International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, which today, fourteen years down the line, is poised to leave that country. That month I also submitted the report to the Security Council on the Sierra Leone Sanctions Committee, of which I was the Chairman. This function had exposed me to the horrors of trade in ‘blood diamonds’ in Africa by the elite, many of whom were the subjects of the mandatory sanction measures.

What provides Bangladesh considerable traction as a positive international actor is its role in UN Peacekeeping. By now over 100,000 uniformed personnel would have served as ‘blue helmets’ in missions as diverse as in Cambodia, Bosnia, Georgia, Rwanda, Cote d’Ivore, East Timor, Congo, Mozambique, Namibia, Liberia, and Sierra Leone. Bangladeshi general officers have been in command positions in Mozambique, Georgia, and Cote d’Ivore. It all began in 1988, at a time when I was DPR, with the end of the prolonged Iraq-Iran war. Deployment of a UN Iraq-Iran Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG) was contemplated and approved. Prompted by a Fijian colleague, I approached Marrack Goulding, Under Secretary General for Political Affairs, enquiring about the possibility of our participation. British to his bootstraps, Goulding entertained nostalgic recollections of the old Bengal Lancers, and was very enthusiastic. But problem came from an unforeseen source: Iran. The Iranian Ambassador, on grounds that Bangladesh had (also) congratulated Saddam Hussain of Iraq for ending the war, did not approve. After much ‘diplomatic cajoling’ (as is sometimes necessary under such circumstances), he relented, and consequently a batch of thirteen Bangladeshi officers was despatched!

While peacekeeping had the advantages of bringing in fame and resources, and kept troops trained and fighting-fit, there was still a price, at times heavy, to pay. This involved sacrifices in terms of deaths and injuries. As I recall, the first casualty was that of a Bangladeshi officer, Lieutenant Colonel Fazlul Karim in Windhoek, Namibia, in 1989. I needed to liaise with South African authorities on that which entailed some issues as there was no diplomatic relations with apartheid-practising Pretoria those days. Nine soldiers were killed in the Congo in 2005. The bodies were flown to Dhaka and we needed to retain liaison with many points in New York, the Army Headquarters in Dhaka, our Foreign Ministry, and the French who provided the coffin boxes for the myriad associated tasks. There were many such other cases of valiant sacrifice that the Bangladeshi troops made for the sake of peace, in faraway lands, away from friends and families. In January 2004 the BBC described the Bangladeshi soldiers as ‘the cream of UN peacekeepers’.

‘Peacekeeping’ has now morphed into ‘peace-building’ which implies a series of measures in post-conflict societies to prevent the slide-back into anarchy. Many of these activities like non-formal education, women’s empowerment, poverty alleviation are what Bangladesh is good at, and should further develop these skills to make itself useful in ‘peace-building’ as it has done in ‘peacekeeping’.
At the UN, developing countries seek to organise themselves through the Group of 77 (and China), a body that now has many more members. The G77 as it is called submits draft resolutions on behalf of its members in the Second (Economic) and Third (Social) Committees. During my time Bangladesh led the LDCs and piloted a resolution for the LDCs through the G77 for adoption in the Second Committee. Though all were developing countries, LDC interests were not always co-terminus with those of G 77. The main philosophical difference was that the LDCs sought greater global support without wanting structural and systemic changes in the global economy, which sometimes the more ardent G77 ideologues aspired to. Donors therefore felt a tad more comfortable with LDCs. Yet it was necessary to retain a show of developing country solidarity. Hence a bit of tightrope- walking was necessary. This was particularly so at one point in time during my tenure when I chaired both the Second Committee and the LDC group.

The Security Council is, of course, the most powerful organ in the UN system. It is the only one to which the UN Charter provides the authority to enforce its decisions through military force. It comprises the P5 (Permanent Five, i.e. the US, the UK, China, Russia, France), and rotating ten members (jokingly often referred to as the ten ‘observers’, since all substantive decisions are taken by the veto-wielding five powers), representing various geographical groupings. It is said to no longer be representative of current global realities, and in need of reforms. This would include expansion of permanent membership with newer players. India, Brazil, Japan, Germany and South Africa believe they fit the bill. Their neighbours (or near- neighbours) believe otherwise, since it is rare for a rising power to be a darling in its own region. The latter organised themselves into what was known as the ‘coffee club’ and now as ‘uniting for consensus group’ opposing such expansion tooth and nail. For most others, who have no direct interest, it would at times entail having to run with the hare and hunt with the hound. Bangladesh needed, and will need, to be extremely circumspect in not unnecessarily upsetting the apple-cart in terms of relations with any side.

In most member-states of the UN and Bangladesh is no exception, foreign-policy making is largely an elite preserve. This elite, particularly in developing countries, even though they had often led the independence movement of their respective countries, remained linked to, and at times dependent upon, the ‘metropolitan’ (former colonial) power, from which they continued to draw their intellectual, cultural, and often material, nourishment. The UK continues to exercise influence over the ‘Commonwealth’, France over the ‘Francophonie’, Spain on Latin America and Portugal on the ‘Lusophone’ countries. This is often reflected in cross-regional groupings in both Geneva and New York. This comes to the fore particularly during elections for posts. Bangladesh has to take note of this in its ‘electoral diplomacy’ at the UN, which takes up a fair amount of its Mission’s time and energy.

It is worth mentioning that on this dependence, a whole body of literature developed when we were younger diplomats, known as the ‘dependencia school’ particularly in Latin America. Among those associated with it were thinkers like Celso Furtado (‘The Brazilian Model’), Johan Galtung (‘A Structural Theory of Imperialism’), Andre Gunder Frank (‘The Development of Underdevelopment’), and Samir Amin (‘Unequal Development’).They argued that this dependency relationship between the ‘periphery’ and the ‘metropolis’ or ‘centre’ is exploitative in nature, and impedes development, apart from creating a ‘comprador elite’ class in post-colonial societies, which must be broken if real development is to be achieved. Such ideas had become less fashionable over the decades, but many feel, have returned again, though in a less extreme form with leaders like Lula of Brazil, Chavez of Venezuela, and Gutierrez of Ecuador.

One agency that was suspect in Western eyes for harbouring views in empathy was the UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which was once led by the neo-Marxist, Raul Prebisch of Argentina, who was its Secretary General from 1964 to 1969. After my tenure as Ambassador in Geneva, I served nearly a year as a Special Advisor to one of his more recent successors, Rubens Ricupero of Brazil, yet another thinker of prodigious repute, in 2001. UNCTAD’s development philosophy was not seen as being in tune with the major global capitals, and so some of its key functions were hived off and relocated to the UN headquarters in New York, reducing UNCTAD to being something akin to a toothless Think Tank. (Some even unkindly translated the acronym UNCTAD into ‘Under No Circumstances take any Decisions’ – alas, it no longer had any powers to take any decisions anyway!)

As stated earlier, one way to enhance the relevance and influence of a less-powerful country like Bangladesh was to get elected into key positions in various committees and governing bodies. I chaired the UN Information Committee, the Second Committee, the Population Commission, among others, and sat in governing bodies of institutions like the UN Development Fund (UNDP) and the Children’s Fund (UNICEF). As a country committed to women’s empowerment, we also got our candidate elected to the Committee for the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).

Bangladesh successfully projected itself as a liberal and secular democracy, on its way to achieving the targets of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), a model worthy of emulation by countries of comparable milieu. This was a key element in my appointment as a ‘Facilitator for UN Reforms’ by the UNGA President Jean Ping in 2005, when I helped draft the ‘Outcome Document’ adopted by the Summit of global leaders in New York in 2005.

It would not be out of place here to mention the role of spouses and families of diplomats at the UN. They offer enormous support, not just in terms of providing encouragement from home, but also networking with their counterparts in the workplace. In this respect I wish to mention in fond remembrance, my wife Nicole, whom I lost to cancer in 2009. She was most certainly the wind beneath my wings, and had a huge contribution to whatever may have been my achievements, by spreading the web of our contacts. Also, effective and targeted entertainment is a very important aspect of diplomacy; it is difficult to quarrel with someone you have broken bread with. It is essential to have good working relationships for the Ambassador with other colleagues at the Mission. The support staff of assistants, secretaries and drivers often work under most challenging circumstances, particularly with meagre emoluments, and they deserve to be recognised for what they do. Rewards need not always be material. Every day at around 9:30 am we at the Bangladesh Mission used to have a meeting to exchange notes with one another at what we referred to as ‘morning prayers’. Retaining close connections with Dhaka, with not just the Foreign Office, but other relevant Ministries like Economic Affairs, Commerce, Finance, Labour, Women’s Welfare and the Armed Forces Division is essential. Our diplomats at the UN have the advantage of exposure to uniquely significant events and ideas, and would do our system a great service by reporting home on them as best as they can. It is my view that whoever is in government at home – and during my time I saw the Jatiyo Party, the Awami League, and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party in office – policies with regard to the UN hardly change, and the Permanent Representative and the Mission remain and will remain key elements in shaping them.

So, to sum up, why is the UN important to a country like Bangladesh? First, the UN system buttresses Dhaka’s sense of security. For weaker states, it often acts as a protector. When the sovereignty of one member state, Kuwait, was extinguished by a more powerful neighbour Iraq, the UN rallied to restore it. The UN provides for ‘rule of law’ among nations, and developing countries prefer a Lockean international ambience which the UN seeks to create than Hobbesian circumstances of disorder (The English philosopher saw life in the lawless state of nature as ‘nasty, brutish and short’). Second, the UN is a source of material and intellectual support. The Great UN Conferences of the 1990s (including the Rio meet on Climate Change and others), the MDGs, the Monterrey Conference on Financing and Development and the like have inextricably involved the UN as a resource-provider, or at least as a resource mobiliser. It is in the interest of developing countries to bring ‘development’ to the centre-stage of UN activities. Third, the UN provides us with a forum to air our views. When our leaders speak at its podium the world gets informed about us. It also enables us to exchange views with others such as the Nonaligned Movement (NAM) or G 77, which avoids having to affront any party singly.

Finally, since Bangladesh does not have the resources to deal with most countries bilaterally, the UN provides a convenient venue to do so. Where else could a country like Bangladesh relate to Vanuatu, Costa Rica and San Marino so easily? Particularly when Dhaka’s interest lies in getting as many stakeholders with interest in it as possible, even simply, as friends?

There is of course much criticism of the UN that is current. It has not stopped wars, nor has it impeded outrages from being committed, particularly when the transgressors are powerful. Its leadership is too pliant to big powers. Its bureaucracy is large and flabby; a joke making rounds when I was there was one involving a tourist asking a UN guard, pointing to the Secretariat Building: “How many people work there?” Pat came the reply: “Not half of those that are inside!”

Nonetheless, for a country like Bangladesh, how it relates to the world is critical to its existence, and the UN is the most useful medium for it to do so. The UN is not there to create a world government, but a world that is governed better. It is not perfect; but it is the most useful multilateral organisation humanity has so far been able to devise and forge. The nineteenth century English poet, Alfred Lord Tennyson, in a long and rambling poem called ‘Lockesly Hall’ had spoken of a ‘Parliament of Man’. The UN is not it. But it is the closest proximate that we can aspire to.

About the author:
Dr Iftekhar Ahmed Chowdhury is Principal Research Fellow at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He is a former Foreign Advisor (Foreign Minister) of Bangladesh, and he can be contacted at isasiac@nus.edu.sg. Opinions expressed in this paper, based on research by the author, do not necessarily reflect the views of ISAS.

Source:
This article was published by ISAS as ISAS Special Report, No. 20 – 21 November 2014 (PDF).

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Coming To Terms With IS’‘New World Order’– OpEd

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Just as communism arose out of the contradictions of imperialism a century ago, Islamic revolution is the inevitable result of today’s version of imperialism. IS may be harsh and uncompromising, but it should be treated with respect, not vilified. The caliphate project, implementing sharia, the determination to overthrow the Saudi monarchy, the rejection of fiat money–these are legitimate goals and deserve serious analysis.

IS continues to confound. Not only negatively for its restrictions on women and its grim revolutionary justice, but because on many fronts, it is spot on.

  • It has put the caliphate project back on track after almost a century of Muslim humiliation
  • It has made sharia (at least its version) the basis of its social order
  • It has (correctly) targeted Saudi Arabia as the font of corruption and decadence, the Muslim world’s ‘enemy at home’
  • It is set to become the only ‘state’ to back its currency with gold coinage. ISIS says the new currency will take the group out of “the oppressors’ money system”, and return control over the money supply from bankers to the state.

Perspective

IS is ghoulishly depicted in western media as blood-thirsty murderers reveling in violence, mad nihilists intent on destruction. To put things in perspective, the US is killing dozens if not hundreds of Muslims (quite a number of them babies) every day, all of them innocent of anything beyond defending their lands and homes. Remember the fairytale of Saddam Hussein killing babies on the eve of the 1991 Gulf War? All revolutions spill blood of those who profess to be hostile to the new order, and IS is no exception. In Cuba, between 500 and 2,000 enemies of the state were executed following the 1959 revolution.

The Middle East is in revolutionary upheaval, and has been for a century now. Just as the Russian revolution of 1917 was the logical conclusion of upheavals against imperialism in yesteryear, so Islamic revolutions are the logical consequence of imperialism today. The Iranian revolution of 1979 set the stage, and actions of the US in the past two decades (since the first invasion of Iraq in 1991) have ensured that this upheaval will continue and have an Islamic nature.

The end of communism came by the imperialists wearing down the secular communists through war and subversion until the system was sufficiently weakened, allowing internal dissent to overthrow it. Is this really the plan today? Unending torment and slaughter inflicted by the West on the Middle East? Keep in mind, Islamic resistance is grounded in a much more convincing way than was communism, and will not be defeated so easily.

IS strategy

The major stumbling block in coming to terms with IS is its insistence that while its ultimate goal is to dismantle Israel, the first step in this process is for Muslims to rid the Muslim world of its fifth column. That flies in the face of 70 years of official resistance by Arab governments (put in place by Britain-US) and the Palestinian support movement (dominated by soft Zionists, urging acceptance of Israel as a Jewish state). The Arab governments are corrupt and venal, and benefit unjustifiably by hiding behind the Palestinians. The Palestinian support movement is timid and ineffectual. Genuine supporters of the Palestinians realize this and realize that Saudi-led ‘resistance’ to Israel will never lead to a liberated Middle East.

So IS has a point, and we can’t just dismiss its strategy out of hand. CIA agent Mortem Storm revealed that Saudi officials proposed a deal to Al-Qaeda in the Arab Peninsula leader Nasir al-Wuhayshi in 2011: “They would pardon Wuhayshi and donate weapons and money if they stopped fighting the Saudis and the Americans and focused instead on fighting Shia rebels in northern Yemen.” Simply put, the Saudis are Islam’s fifth column, and IS is the only group willing to say this openly. IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi renewed his call for attacks against the rulers of Saudi Arabia in November. “We announce to you the expansion of the Islamic State to new countries, to the countries of the Haramayn [Saudi Arabia], Yemen, Egypt, Libya, Algeria. O soldiers of the Islamic State … erupt volcanoes of jihad everywhere. Light the earth with fire against all dictators.”

Human rights

As for IS’s reported atrocities, given IS’s commitment to sharia and the Quran, those Christians and Shia caught in the (Sunni) IS order–if they value their lives and want to remain in their homes–must organize and present themselves to IS leaders as loyal citizens, opposed to IS’s enemies–the West, Israel and Saudi Arabia. Sharia makes allowance for the protection of non-Muslims, who must pay a protection tax (jizya). That will end the sectarianism.

At present, these dissidents are sitting ducks, and the crocodile tears of western leaders and the media are making things worse for them. This cynical use of dissidents has long been ammunition in the western arsenal to confront imperialism’s enemies, as the Soviet Union experienced. They are custom-made martyrs for western media–and quickly discarded when the West’s armies and carpetbaggers are welcomed as liberators.

Given the nightmare that US invasions have resulted in during the past quarter century, and that Israeli invasions have resulted in during the past 70 years, the rough edges of the revolutionaries will have to be tolerated by fretful liberals as the lesser of two evils–women and minorities are suffering horrendously under US ‘protection’ now. Over time, the hard edges of the revolution will be worn down and women and minorities will be better accommodated, as even Saudi Arabia crudely shows.

Can we believe western media reports about atrocities? First, for all its revolutionary justice, there is no evidence that IS indulges in torture–unlike the US, which was quick to set up a worldwide system of rendering suspects after 9/11, and has actively promoted torture ever since. What guilty US officials have been prosecuted or even chastised in the pursuit of justice?

The worst country for public executions–beheadings–is Saudi Arabia (79 in 2013). IS is supposed to have beheaded 75+ Syrian and Lebanese troops this year. The real problem is westerners, approximately five of whom were beheaded, including US-Israeli Jerusalem Post journalist Steven Sotloff. But should IS be expected to simply free its captives? And why is the beheading of an enemy soldier or an enemy reporter intent on defaming IS more reprehensible that, say, the beheading of a Saudi witch?

The Canadian diplomat Robert Fowler, as a hostage in the Sahara in 2009, for example, was surprised at how well he was treated, and saw no evidence of torture. He was awed by the al-Qaeda kidnappers’ selflessness and courage. In his ‘season in hell’ the hostages were treated the same as the captors treated each other. Fowler understood why they became terrorists and why simple Muslims support them: their personal asceticism, disdain for western consumerism, personal commitment to Quranic principles, desire to emulate the great leaders/ followers of the past, and their bravery, vs the venality of the Muslim establishment. His conclusion: al-Qaeda will continue to attract young recruits not concerned with long life (their options in the Muslim world are bleak), but rather authenticity and martyrdom.

IS confirms Fowler’s account. His ‘season of hell’ was in fact paradisiacal compared to the hell that many, many Muslims are living–and dying–through every day. It is time westerners recognize the simple truth of a century of imperial intrigue and end this living hell, not by killing the ‘enemy’, but simply by getting out and staying out.

The US, by supporting Nusra and training the anti-Assad rebels in Jordan (including IS), by turning a blind eye to Saudi machinations, by flooding the region with arms, above all by kowtowing to Israel, has driven the region to the current impasse. IS promises a way out which at least makes sense, and has the advantage of ridding the region (nay, the world) of the worst violators of human rights–Saudi Arabia and eventually Israel. The loss of Saudi oil is a small price to pay.

Time to give IS a chance to evolve into a world actor. This is what the US should have allowed with the Taliban in Afghanistan and didn’t. That day of reckoning now looms. Time to respect and recognize as legitimate those Muslims who are willing to sacrifice their lives to help bring down the Saudi tyranny and rebuild the caliphate, rather than continuing to slaughter them.

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Ukraine To Hold Referendum On Joining NATO: Poroshenko

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Ukraine will hold a referendum on joining NATO once it has met certain criteria for membership, President Petro Poroshenko has said, according to BBC News.

At a joint news conference with Lithuania’s president, Poroshenko said he had “worked out the criteria”, but gave no further details.

Last week, a Kremlin official called for “a 100% guarantee” that Ukraine would not think about joining NATO.

Ukraine has been fighting pro-Russian separatists for most of the year.

Poroshenko did not say what the criteria for Ukraine’s membership were.

NATO itself says: “There is no fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new member states to join the alliance.”

However, countries are only admitted to NATO if it believes they will “contribute to security and stability in the North Atlantic area”.

Analysts say Ukraine, destabilized by the fighting, is therefore unlikely to be seen as viable by NATO.

President Vladimir Putin’s spokesman Dmitry Peskov has accused NATO of breaking a historic promise by gradually approaching Russia’s borders. He was quoted by the BBC as saying that the alliance was attempting to break the “balance of power”.

Three countries from the former Soviet bloc joined NATO in 1999, followed by several more in 2004, including Lithuania and the other Baltic states.

On Monday, Nov 24, Lithuania joined other NATO members in offering military assistance to Ukraine. It is not clear whether the aid President Dalia Grybauskaite has offered will include lethal equipment.

Fighting has continued in east Ukraine despite both sides signing a cease-fire agreement on Sept 5.

In the eight weeks since the Minsk agreement was signed, almost 1,000 people have been killed, the UN human rights office says.

Three Ukrainian soldiers have been added to this toll in the past 24 hours, while reports have come in of heavy shelling in Donetsk.

Since the conflict began in April, more than 4,300 people have died and almost one million have been displaced, the UN has said.

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King Mohammed’s Visit To China: Underlying Strategic Impetus Of Sino-Moroccan Relations

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Today, the Moroccan Ministry of the Royal Household, Protocol and Chancellery issued a communique announcing that King Mohammed VI will pay an official visit to China on November 27. During this royal visit, HM the King will hold official talks with his Excellency the president of China, the ministry said in a statement, adding that the two heads of States will chair the signing ceremony of bilateral agreements. President Xi Jinping will also offer a dinner in honor of HM the King and the accompanying delegation.

Many Moroccan political and economic analysts have begun to discuss the advantages of being closer to Asia, especially China, the pivotal Asian force. Morocco and because of its emerging economy and political stability, will naturally look towards Asian regional economic powers for trade and investment. Moroccan exporters have established links with the Chinese market and adapted their production to the needs of that market. This upcoming Royal visit will allow Moroccan companies to successfully penetrate the Chinese market. Undoubtedely, strategies will be implemented to put firms in contact with appropriate partners, familiarize them with the rules and standards, and establish a market presence in China and vice versa.

With the right strategies, Morocco and China could reap greater benefits from a win-win partnership. Morocco would improve its access to the Chinese market. China could use Morocco as a platform for the entire Africa. Morocco’s efforts in West Africa to give the South-South cooperation a face full of solidarity, has resulted in its continued commitment to noble causes of peace and development, as well as its constant position to express solidarity towards the concerns of developing countries, and their aspirations for progress and well-being.

Morocco is also seeking to develop a strategy for tripartite cooperation to channel aid funds made
available in the framework of international programs for the financing of infrastructure projects or socio-economic development in African countries and to entrust those projects to Moroccan companies (consultancies, engineering companies, service providers, etc) Morocco has initiated many African countries to triangular cooperation, rich and varied, based on a true partnership and effective solidarity, in addition to cooperation programs implemented bilaterally. It has many advantages and allows many African countries to benefit from the know-how and expertise already experienced in the land of Africa and to overcome the lack of budgetary resources. Morocco will continue to be present in Africa and reinforce south-south cooperation to contribute to the development of the African continent. Since China is looking to expand its strategic influence in Africa, Morocco looks as the most convenient hub to access the African market.

Trade between China and Morocco has grown at solid double digit-rates over the past decade, making China one of Morocco’s top five trading partners and a major new source of greatly needed investment. Now, it is high time for Morocco to build a relationship with China. Goods and services from China are much more affordable than those from western countries. Chinese companies are improving their knowledge, efficiency, and quality of services all the time.

Several high-ranking Moroccan delegations have made their way to China recently to encourage companies to invest in Morocco, a uniquely stable country for the region which offers hefty tax breaks for foreign firms. The effort seems to be paying off. From 2000 to 2012, there are approximately 36 Chinese official development finance projects identified in Morocco through various media reports. These projects range from a $248 million MOU with the Export-Import Bank of China to build the Berchid-Beni Mellal highway to a CNY 150 million preferential loan agreement in Rabat to build and equip eight private general hospitals in various regions in Morocco.

The various economic trends binding Sino-Moroccan relations will likely continue to intensify and grow over the next few decades, especially as growth potentials in new areas remain open for further cooperation and development.

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Middle East: Alliances In Times Of Turmoil – Analysis

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The Middle East is becoming a region with multiple centres of instability and increasingly complex conflicts.

By Haizam Amirah-Fernández

Faced with the increase in regional instability and the –relative but firm– advance of powers fighting against the status quo from very different positions, there is a real risk of implosion, which would subsequently disfigure the Middle East. The growing sense of insecurity among the different regional actors has a direct effect on their choice of alliances and foreign policy-making. A combination of factors bodes for an unstable short-term future in the Middle East, where today’s alliances can change abruptly and where one has to be prepared to expect the unexpected.

Analysis:

If anything can define the Middle East in 2014, it is its character as a region that is messy and in rapid flux. In this part of the world, as in others, insecurity leads to power struggles. Regional foreign policies are aimed at eliminating or containing threats, whether perceived or real, to ‘security’, which can be understood in different ways. National security is often confused with the security of the regime and its capacity to remain in power. It also encompasses interests of the State, such as sovereignty, territorial integrity and the capacity to exert influence. The latter may be aimed at reaching regional leadership, advancing economic interests or gaining recognition from the major powers.[2]

From a realist perspective, when faced with a serious threat, these states will often either seek balance by forming alliances or ‘bandwagon’ as opportunists. In other words, the choice is between forming alliances against common threats or aligning with the source of the threat in an attempt to remain safe from harm.[3] The ensuing security dilemmas are, therefore, how countries can defend themselves without their rivals feeling threatened and subsequently triggering an arms race. Another security dilemma facing several countries in the Middle East is the choice between developing their own defensive capabilities and ‘contracting’ their defence from the major international powers. These dilemmas often generate paradoxes and contradictions.

For decades, the countries in the Middle East have formed different alliances, been the target of multiple threats and suffered numerous overlapping conflicts. These processes seem to have become much more complex in recent years. Three factors –which will be dealt with later– contribute to this growing complexity: (1) the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the consequences of having upset internal and regional balances; (2) the ‘Arab Awakening’ and the socio-political transformations experienced in the region since 2011; and (3) the foreign policy of the Obama administration towards the area, in part conditioned by the two preceding factors.

The Middle East is becoming a region with multiple centres of instability and increasingly complex conflicts, which stretch from north to south and east to west. The destruction of Syria, decomposition of Iraq, unrest in Egypt and Libya, rivalries between the petro-monarchies of the Gulf, complicated relations with Iran, widespread social discontent, exploitation of the ethno-sectarian divides, the spread of jihadism, confusing US policy in the area and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict are some of the symptoms –and results– of the growing complexity that the Middle East is experiencing.

The panorama described above is producing a rapidly growing uncertainty among the different regional actors, which increases the sense of insecurity. This, in turn, has a direct effect on their choice of alliances and foreign policy-making. Faced with different threats –real or potential– alliances arise that are not necessarily exclusive in character. Allies against one threat may not be the same against another. In today’s Middle East there are rivals who share common enemies, allies who support opposing sides of the same conflict, contradicting interests between ‘friendly’ countries, common interests between ‘enemies’, partnerships that until recently were unimaginable and unnatural pacts. Some old friendships and enmities are being replaced by new alliances in a highly volatile environment.

Three shock waves

Three factors –referred to here as ‘shock waves’ due to their capacity to dramatically increase tensions and generate explosions– are contributing to disfiguring the Middle East and altering the alliances and balances of power among its members. The first shock wave was produced by the invasion of Iraq, led by the US in 2003, and the consequent regime change in Bagdad. According to the neo-conservatives, this invasion would serve to transform the country into a loyal ally of the US and make it a model for democratisation for its neighbours. The reality, a decade later, is quite different: Iraq is a fractured country, plagued by violence and radicalism and whose sectarian government is in the hands of allies close to Iran.

US actions in the Middle East after 9/11 have contributed – unwittingly– to Iran’s regional rise. On the one hand, in 2001 the US put an end to the Taliban regime in Afghanistan (an enemy of the Iranian Ayatollahs), which handed power in Kabul over to groups allied with Tehran. On the other hand, in 2003 the George W. Bush’s Administration toppled Saddam Hussein, who had acted as a containment wall against Iran’s ambitions of hegemony in its Arab neighbourhood. A predictable consequence was the increase in Iran’s influence on the arc that stretches from Iran to Lebanon and through Iraq and Syria. This, on the one hand, has sparked strong reactions from Iran’s rivals and, on the other, reluctance on the part of the US to become involved in further Middle Eastern ventures.

The second shock wave was produced by the so-called ‘Arab Awakening’, which, since 2011, has generated internal shake-ups in several countries. The effects of the socio-political changes can be felt throughout the region and have put all authoritarian regimes on the defensive, faced with the risk of coming under increasing criticism from their populations. This has led all regimes to try to ‘shield’ themselves with all possible resources: economic (trying to contain social discontent or influencing other potentially problematic countries), ideological (exercising influence through certain religious-political interpretations), identity-focused (mobilising socio-political actors by appealing to their primary identities, whether tribal, religious or ethnic) or resorting to dependence (seeking protection from external security providers in exchange for guaranteeing certain strategic interests).[4]

The third shock wave was the change in the policies of the Obama Administration towards the Middle East. Much has been debated about whether Washington is disengaging from the region as a result of its pivot towards Asia. What seems clear is that, more than having a ‘policy’ towards the region, Obama has adopted an ‘attitude’ based on the belief that such deep involvement in these countries creates more problems for the US and depletes energy for tackling serious challenges in other regions.[5] That change in attitude is altering the calculations of the traditional US allies, which, in turn, is generating nervousness and mistrust in countries like Saudi Arabia, Israel, Egypt, Turkey and the small petro-monarchies of the Gulf.

Growing levels of energy self-sufficiency, together with traumatic experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, have led the US to ask its allies (and also its former enemy Iran) to assume more responsibility in guaranteeing a framework of regional security that does not depend almost entirely on Washington. This focus explains why, in November 2013, an interim agreement was signed in Geneva –described by many as ‘historic’– between Iran and the five permanent members of the UN Security Council plus Germany. The agreement was focused on the Iranian nuclear programme, although its reach would be much broader with the gradual lifting of international sanctions against Iran and its opening to the rest of the world. A key issue for Iran lies in the recognition implied in negotiating ‘face to face’ with the major world powers.

Uncertain alliances in a convoluted region

The traditional analytical framework for explaining the formation of alliances in the Middle East is revealing serious limitations, owing to the fact that several of these states are fragmenting and have ceased to operate as cohesive actors. In fact, Syria and Iraq have ceased to act as states in their internationally recognised territories for some years already. The concept of the ‘State’ in the region as a whole is increasingly under question. The borders inherited from European colonialism (determined in the Sykes-Picot agreement) are also being brought into question, as well as the traditional leadership models in societies with large numbers of young people, low expectations in wealth distribution, little respect for freedoms and an increasing openness to the outside word.

Several of the conflicts currently affecting the Middle East are often viewed as part of a sectarian war between members of the two main branches of Islam: Sunnis and Shiites. While it is true that the religious element figures highly in the discourses of both sides’ ideologues, the key does not lie in a religious war but in a bloody power struggle in the face of increasing insecurity, in which the opposing religious identities are replacing nationalism as a mobilising agent. It is easy to identify a kind of ‘Cold War’ in the Middle East between Saudi Arabia and Iran, each of which relies on clients and allies (both states and non-state actors) whom they support with resources, guarantees and direct involvement when possible.

Today, three regional blocs can be identified: the bloc under Iranian-Shiite leadership (which includes the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad, the Iraqi regime of Nuri al-Maliki, Hezbollah and, in a more or less intermittent way, Palestinian militias like Hamas or the Islamic Jihad); the Saudi-Sunni bloc (on which the Egyptian regime depends, headed by Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, together with countries like the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Jordan and, to an extent, the Palestinian National Authority); and, lastly, a much weakened bloc formed mainly by Qatar and different organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. The military/civilian coup against the Egyptian government of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013 strongly affected the composition of these alliances, as that government was close to both Qatar and Turkey. For its part, although Israel has not declared itself to be a member of any of the blocs, it is a de facto ally in the Riyadh-Cairo axis.

Despite the apparent clarity of the blocs described above, there is a high degree of complexity regarding their alliances and interactions. While Saudi Arabia and Qatar compete with one another and take opposing positions over the destiny of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the two countries are allied against Iran and its protégé al-Assad, supporting Syrian groups composed of the Muslim Brotherhood, among others. For its part, Iran massively supports the al-Assad regime against the Syrian Islamist rebels, who are backed by the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian movement Hamas, which, remarkably, have also received support from Tehran. With regard to Turkey, this country maintains good relations with the Arab Gulf states and is siding with them against al-Assad, while holding a very different view with regards to the support that the military-backed Egyptian regime should be receiving. And, lastly, there is the so-called Islamic State (or ISIS), which has taken control of territories on both sides of the border between Syria and Iraq and is currently threatening countries that had previously given it their support.

Conclusion: Whither the Middle East?

Faced with the increase in regional instability and the –relative but firm– advance of powers fighting against the status quo from very different positions, there is a real risk of implosion, which would subsequently disfigure the Middle East. This could be caused by the disintegration of certain borders, the decomposition of more states, wars between neighbours or a regional conflagration. The question is whether there is time to halt the processes that could result in one of these scenarios and, if so, what policies could now avoid the appearance of much more serious problems in a not very distant future.

The US seems to be trying to square the circle: reaching a definitive agreement with Iran, maintaining its traditional alliances in the Middle East, containing the devastating effects of the decomposition of Syria and Iraq, and, at the same time, avoiding being dragged into a new military intervention in the region. Achieving all these goals does not seem easy, or even probable; something many are counting on and will try to take advantage of when the time comes. All of the above bodes for an unstable short-term future in the Middle East, where today’s alliances can change abruptly and where one has to be prepared to expect the unexpected.

About the author:
Haizam Amirah-Fernández
Senior Analyst for the Mediterranean and Arab World at the Elcano Royal Institute and Professor of International Relations at IE Business School | @HaizamAmirah

Source:
This article was published at Elcano Royal Institute.

[1] This analysis was originally published in the IEMed Mediterranean Yearbook 2014, edited by the European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed). The content of the Yearbook can be accessed here.

[2] Hinnebusch, Raymond and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds). The Foreign Policies of Middle East States (2nd ed). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2014.

[3] Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990.

[4] Amirah-Fernández, Haizam. “International Relations of the Gulf: Interests, Alliances, Dilemmas and Paradoxes”. Elcano Royal Institute (15 March 2011).

[5] Khouri, Rami. “A New Age in United States-Mideast Relations”. Agence Global (29 October 2013).

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Ferguson Remains On Edge After Violent Night

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The Midwestern U.S. town of Ferguson, Missouri, and surrounding areas are bracing for more protests after a grand jury decided not to indict a white police officer who shot and killed an unarmed black teenager in August.

The decision, announced late Monday, sparked a night of violence that saw protesters loot businesses and set fire to cars and at least a dozen buildings.

The violence erupted despite appeals for calm from U.S. President Barack Obama and the family of 18-year-old Michael Brown, who was fatally shot by officer Darren Wilson on August 9. The family was expected to make a public statement at 11 a.m. local time Tuesday.

Protesters planned to demonstrate on Tuesday outside the courthouse in nearby Clayton, where the grand jury began meeting within weeks of Brown’s fatal shooting August 9.

In nearby St. Louis, the police chief promised to beef up security following 21 arrests for vandalism, including broken storefront windows, on Monday evening.

“A large presence, very early on, will be a deterrent,” Chief Sam Dotson said, according to Reuters news service. For Tuesday evening, “we’ll have resources deployed.”

The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights joined the calls for restraint Tuesday, urging protesters “to avoid violence and destruction” in the wake of the grand jury decision. In a statement, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein said, “People have the right to express their dismay and their disagreement with the grand jury’s verdict, but not to cause harm to others, or to their property, in the process.”

Worst violence in months

Although no serious injuries were reported, Monday night’s unrest was the worst in suburban Ferguson in months.

At least 61 people were arrested there, largely for burlary and trespassing, according to The Associated Press. St. Louis County Police Chief Jon Belmar said at least a dozen buildings were set on fire, most of them destroyed. He said there were no reports of injuries.

“Those are businesses that may never come back. So, frankly, I’m heartbroken about that,” Belmar said.

“Now the good news is we have not fired a shot,” he said. “As far as I know, we don’t have any serious injuries to police officers. They got banged up a little bit with rocks. One lieutenant from the patrol got hit in the head with a glass bottle, but … as far as I know, we haven’t caused any serious injuries tonight.”

Early Monday night, police used smoke and tear gas to disperse the protesters, some of whom set police cars on fire and threw objects at police. Sporadic gunfire could be heard in the neighborhood.

Firefighters on Tuesday morning continued monitoring the scene in Ferguson, dousing the charred remains of some businesses, The Associated Press reported. Though broken glass still littered the sidewalk in front of looted stores, downtown streets were calm.

Schools in Ferguson and surrounding cities cancelled Tuesday classes.

Protests spread to other cities

Demonstrations were also held in cities across America. At Times Square in New York City, protesters held signs decrying “police tyranny” and chanted the “Hands Up, Don’t Shoot” slogan that has become popular at rallies against police violence.

In Chicago and Oakland, California, protesters flooded freeways, blocking cars with their hands held in the air. In Washington, D.C., a small crowd of protesters also gathered outside the White House.

Brown’s shooting death inflamed tensions in the predominantly black St. Louis suburb, which is patrolled by an overwhelmingly white police force.

The shooting sparked weeks of sometimes violent protests and looting. Adding to the tension was the often heavy-handed response by police, who used armored vehicles and tear gas.

Brown’s family members, who have called for restraint, issued a statement saying they were “profoundly disappointed” at the ruling.

Lawyers for Wilson said in a statement that the grand jury’s decision shows the officer “followed his training and followed the law” during the confrontation with Brown.

Appeal for calm

In a statement from the White House, President Barack Obama acknowledged some are “deeply disappointed” at the ruling, but called on protesters to be peaceful.

Attorney General Eric Holder said federal investigations continue into the shooting and into whether the Ferguson Police Department is engaging in unconstitutional practices.

Calling Brown’s death a “tragedy,” Holder said it is “far more must be done to create enduring trust” between law enforcement and the communities they serve.

Accounts of August 9 shooting

Stories differed as to what happened in the August 9 shooting. Lawyers for Brown’s family said he was trying to surrender when the officer shot him. Wilson’s supporters said he shot Brown in self-defense.

St. Louis County Prosecutor Robert McCulloch said the grand jury met for 25 days and heard 70 hours of testimony from 60 witnesses.

McCulloch praised the jurors for completing “this monumental responsibility,” and he lauded the “unprecedented cooperation” between federal investigators and local authorities.

He said that much of the witness testimony contradicted evidence from the scene and that many witnesses later changed their stories, admitting they had not actually observed the confrontation.

The prosecutor also extended his sympathy to Brown’s family over his death. McCulloch concluded his prepared remarks by saying he joined with the family, clergy and others “in urging everyone to continue the demonstrations, continue the discussion … but do so in a constructive way.”

The father of the slain teenager appealed for calm last week. In a video posted online, the elder Michael Brown said hurting others or destroying property is “not the answer” to frustration over what is seen as racial injustice.

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Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico, Venezuela Won’t Cut Oil Production

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Delegations from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Mexico and Venezuela have met for the first time in such a format for talks in Vienna to discuss rapidly dropping oil prices. The group agreed to monitor prices for a year

The energy ministers have not agreed upon cutting oil production, as such agreements can only be reached during OPEC meetings, the Venezuelan Foreign Minister Rafael Ramirez said following the talks held at the Park Hyatt in Vienna on Tuesday.

He added that the group also believes the current oil prices are too low, and named a fair price at $100 per barrel.

Russia’s Energy Minister Aleksandr Novak and Igor Sechin, the head of state oil company Rosneft, attended the meeting.

Sechin said the group agreed to monitor prices during the year and possibly meet in the same format each quarter.

Though the oil price has dropped to almost $40 per barrel in the past five months, it is “not critical” the Rosneft head told journalists.

“We can move the implementation period of certain capital-intensive projects. But of course, it will affect the overall level of oil supply,” he added.

He said that Rosneft has already reduced its production by 25,000 barrels per day. However, this was done due to an increase in production efficiency and the effectiveness of the company’s shareholders, as well as the terms of market distribution, Sechin said.

The unexpected talks come amid a roughly 30 percent drop in oil prices since June. Meanwhile, ministers from OPEC member countries, which do not include Russia and Mexico, are scheduled to meet on Thursday in Vienna.

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Rethinking A Progressive Democratic Afghanistan – OpEd

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By Nasurullah Brohi

The newly formed unity government of Afghanistan under President Ghani is yet to declare its internal and foreign policies formally however; the new regime has some significant judgments about country’s relations with China and Pakistan.

The priority policy objectives of the new government appear to make over Afghanistan from a failed state to progressive democratic state focusing on the augmentation and intensification of Afghanistan’s role and relations in the affairs of the region in general and association with the neighbouring countries in particular to further strengthen the bilateral and multilateral dealings. Moreover, the national reconciliation process is also inevitable for the new government to attain its policy objectives.

The recent visit Afghan President Ashraf Ghani to Islamabad may not have produced any vivid declaration, but it would definitely prove to become a new era of Pak-Afghan relations. The accommodating and conciliatory views of President Ashraf Ghani towards Pakistan are all the more important factors in stabilizing the ties of the two neighbouring countries. The lasting hallucination expressed by both countries to enhance the trade and exploit the economic opportunities and to address the security issues through cooperation of both sides is the realization of the fact that without peace and stability, the dream of national growth and prosperity will never come true. Pakistan and Afghanistan are bound with a historic intact relationship based on religious, ethnic, cultural and neighbouring ties therefore; two friends and natural partners join each other inseparably.

For Afghanistan, the development of mutual trust and responsive consultation with the neighbouring countries is exceptionally crucial at the moment. The Pak-Afghan relations in the past were harmed by continuously blaming each other for cross-border infiltrations. Especially, in the tenure of President Hamid Karzai the relations never ran so smoothly. But the recent visit of Afghan President has created a sense of hope and optimistic ambiance for future cooperation and mutually addressing the common challenges of security and economic development by the both sides.

In the midst of security measures, the President Ghani’s government is also stepping forward for the economic development of his country. The recent visits of Afghan leadership to Pakistan and China envision the political foresight, as the drawdown of allied forces is getting closer that will categorically minimize the US role in Afghanistan. The new government gives high priorities to independently strengthen its relationship with neighbouring and regional countries therefore; the aim also aspires to a new episode of relations and cooperation with economic-power China.

Thanks to the Karzai regime who laid the foundation of lasting friendship between Afghanistan and China. Ashraf Ghani has also called for setting up a security commission comprising China, Pakistan and Afghanistan. China also emphasizes on the collective loom to curb the menace of terrorism, extremism and narcotics. China on
its part is also showing a willingness to assist Pakistan and Afghanistan in defying the threats of terrorism, extremism and narcotic trafficking. The China-Afghanistan venture could bring immense economic strength and prosperity in Afghanistan, that’s why President Ashraf Ghani has associated $30 billion agreements during his visit to China.

The new regime in Afghanistan realizes the fact that peace could not be restored in Afghanistan without Pakistan’s cooperation that’s why President Ghani prefers improving ties with Pakistan instead of India. The security cooperation for the peaceful development on both sides is inevitable for Pakistan and Afghanistan. Any
lack of security cooperation and improper border management mechanism will never enable both countries to control the penetration of the militant groups therefore; the predicament of militancy and terrorism will only nurture and create chaos and bitterness for both sides. The commotion of terrorism and militancy has had the
darkest effects on Afghanistan and Pakistan. Merely, tackling terrorism as a common enemy is only way to guarantee the regional security. Pakistan for its part has assured the Afghan leaders for security cooperation as the drawdown of NATO and ISAF force is getting closer.

Recently, Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff General Raheel Sahrif also offered to train the Afghan troops and provide an infantry brigade with latest military equipment. Pakistan had also offered training to Afghan security forces in 2010 and in 2013 respectively. The offer was designed to reduce the trust deficit between the two and as an initiative of creating confidence-building measures.

In 2013, the Afghan defence delegation led by the Defence Minister Bismillah Muhammad visited Pakistan for inspecting the Pakistani training facilities. The Afghan delegation’s visit was seen as a foremost paradigm shift in Afghanistan’s perceptions about Pakistan.

The leadership on both sides seriously needs to be concerned about the collective security efforts in their countries in the coming days, especially after the withdrawal of the US-led NATO forces from Afghanistan. For Pakistan, the operation in North Waziristan is underway and another front of militancy and terrorism from the other side of the border will further engage its men and resources at large.

However, security being a prime challenge to both Afghanistan and Pakistan, the historic decisive moment is underway to witness the political wisdom and a leaders’ foresight for their nations.

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Trotsky At The IMF – OpEd

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The International Monetary Fund has finally admitted that it was wrong to recommend austerity as early as it did in 2010-2011. The IMF now agrees that it should have waited until the US and EU economies were on a sustainable growth-path before advising them to trim their budget deficits and reduce public spending.  According to a report issued by the IMF’s research division, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO):  “IMF advocacy of fiscal consolidation proved to be premature for major advanced economies, as growth projections turned out to be optimistic…This policy mix was less than fully effective in promoting recovery and exacerbated adverse spillovers.”

Now there’s an understatement.

What’s so disingenuous about the IMF’s apology,  is that the bank knew exactly what the effects of its policy would be, but stuck with its recommendations to reward its constituents.  That’s what really happened. The only reason it’s trying to distance itself from those decisions now, is to make the public think it was all  just a big mistake.

But it wasn’t a mistake. It was deliberate and here’s the chart that proves it:uriedems11

(Democrats Reap What They Sowed, Rob Urie, CounterPunch)

There it is, six years of policy in one lousy picture. And don’t kid yourself, the IMF played a critical role in this wealth-shifting fiasco. It’s job was to push for less public spending and deeper fiscal cuts while the Central Banks flooded the financial markets with liquidity (QE). The results are obvious, in fact, one of the Fed’s own officials, Andrew Huszar,  admitted that QE was a massive bailout for the rich.  “I’ve come to recognize the program for what it really is,” said Huszar who actually worked on the program, “the greatest backdoor Wall Street bailout of all time.”  There it is, straight from the horse’s mouth.

So now the IMF wants to throw a little dust in everyone’s eyes by making it look like it was a big goof-up by well-meaning but misguided bankers. And the media is helping them by its omissions.

Let me explain: Of the more than 455 articles on Google News covering the IMF’s mea culpa, not one piece refers to the man who was the IMF’s Managing Director at the time in question. Doesn’t that strike you as a bit odd?

Why would the media scrub any mention of Dominique Strauss-Kahn from its coverage? Could it be that (according to NPR):

“The IMF’s managing director wanted to give Greece, Portugal and Ireland the time needed to put their accounts in order, and he also argued for softening the austerity measures associated with the bailouts for those countries.

Greek economists say that under Strauss-Kahn’s leadership, the IMF was a counterbalance to the strict austerity policies favored by northern European leaders. In fact, according to the daily Le Monde, Strauss-Kahn is fond of calling those who argue for tighter austerity “fous furieux,” which roughly translates as “mad men.”

Strauss-Kahn’s view is that shock-therapy measures imposed on Greece and other European countries with sovereign debt crises will lead only to economic recession and severe social unrest.

Several commentators pointed out Monday that at a time of turmoil in the eurozone and division among European leaders, it was the IMF, under Strauss-Kahn’s leadership, that kept the eurozone’s rescue strategy on track.

The Financial Times said that the IMF’s single most important influence in the resolution of the eurozone crisis was political — amid a lack of political leadership, the paper said, the IMF filled a vacuum.
(IMF Chief’s Arrest Renews Euro Debt Crisis Fears, NPR)

Ah-ha! So Strauss-Kahn wasn’t on board with the IMF’s shock doctrine prescription. In fact, he was opposed to it.  So there were voices for sanity within the IMF, they just didn’t prevail in the policy debate.

But why would that be, after all, Strauss-Kahn was the IMF’s Managing Director, his views should have carried greater weight than anyone else’s, right?

Right. Except DSK got the ax for a sexual encounter at New York’s ritzy Sofitel Hotel. So the changes he had in mind never took place, which means that the distribution of wealth continued to flow upwards just like the moneybags constituents of the IMF had hoped for.

Funny how that works, isn’t it? Funny how it’s always the Elliot Spitzers, and the Scott Ritters, and the Dominique Strauss-Kahn’s who get nailed for their dalliances, but the big Wall Street guys never get caught.
Why is that?

The fact is, Strauss-Kahn was off the reservation and no longer supported the policies that the establishment elites who run the IMF wanted to see implemented.  They felt threatened by DSK’s Keynesian approach and wanted to get rid of him. That’s it in a nutshell.

Do you know why the bigwig plutocrats hated DSK?

It had nothing to do with his sexual acrobatics at the Sofitel Hotel. Nobody cares about that shite.   What they were worried about were his plans for the IMF which he laid out in a speech he gave at the Brookings Institution in April 2011, one month before he got the boot. The speech got very little attention at the time, but– for all practical purposes– it was DSK’s swan song.  And, I think you’ll see why.

The experience must have been a real shocker for the gaggle of tycoons and hangers-on who attend these typically-tedious gatherings. Instead of praise for “market discipline”, “labor flexibility” and “fiscal consolidation”, Strauss-Kahn delivered a rousing 30 minute tribute to leftist ideals and wealth-sharing sounding more like a young Leon Trotsky addressing the Forth International than a cold-hearted bureaucrat heading the world’s most notorious loan sharking operation. By the time the speech ended, I’m sure the knives were already being sharped for the wayward Managing Director. To put it bluntly, DSK’s goose was cooked. Here’s a clip from the speech that will help to explain why:

“…The outstanding faults of the economic society in which we live are its failure to provide for full employment and its arbitrary and inequitable distribution of wealth and incomes”…
Not everyone will agree with the entirety of this statement. But what we have learnt over time is that unemployment and inequality can undermine the very achievements of the market economy, by sowing the seeds of instability…

.. the IMF cannot be indifferent to distribution issues…

Today, we need a similar full force forward response in ensuring that we get the recovery we need. And that means not only a recovery that is sustainable and balanced among countries, but also one that brings employment and fair distribution…

But growth alone is not enough. We need direct labor market policies…

Let me talk briefly about the second lung of the social crisis—inequality…IMF research also shows that sustainable growth over time is associated with a more equal income distribution…

We need policies to reduce inequality, and to ensure a fairer distribution of opportunities and resources. Strong social safety nets combined with progressive taxation can dampen market-driven inequality. Investment in health and education is critical. Collective bargaining rights are important, especially in an environment of stagnating real wages. Social partnership is a useful framework, as it allows both the growth gains and adjustment pains to be shared fairly…

We have also supported a tax on financial activities (and) organized jointly with the ILO … to better understand the policies behind job-creating growth…

Ultimately, employment and equity are building blocks of economic stability and prosperity, of political stability and peace. This goes to the heart of the IMF’s mandate. It must be placed at the heart of the policy agenda. Thank you very much.”   (The Global Jobs Crisis— Sustaining the Recovery through Employment and Equitable Growth, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, Managing Director IMF, April 13, 2011)

Can you imagine the chorus of groans that must have emerged from the crowd when Strauss-Kahn made his pitch for “progressive taxation”, “collective bargaining rights”, “protecting social safety nets”, “direct labor market policies” and  “taxes on financial activities”? And how do you think the crowd reacted when he told them he’d settled on a more enlightened way to distribute the wealth they’d accumulated over a lifetime of insider trading, crooked backroom deals and shady business transactions?

Do you think they liked that idea or do you suppose they lunged for their blood pressure medication before scuttling pell-mell towards the exits?

Let’s face it; Strauss-Kahn was headed in a direction that wasn’t compatible with the interests of the cutthroats who run the IMF. That much is clear. Now whether these same guys concocted the goofy “honey trap” at the Sofitel Hotel, we may never know.  But what we do know is this: If you’re Managing Director of the IMF, you’d better not use your power to champion “distribution” or collective bargaining rights or you’re wind up like Strauss-Kahn, dragged off to the hoosegow in manacles wondering where the hell you went wrong.

DSK was probably done-in by the people who hated his guts. Now they want to polish-up their image by rewriting history.

And, you know, they’re rich enough to pull it off, too.

 

The post Trotsky At The IMF – OpEd appeared first on Eurasia Review.

ISIL Received $45 Million In Ransoms This Year

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ISIL militants operating in Syria and Iraq have received as much as $45 million in ransoms in the past year, a UN expert says.

Yotsna Lalji, a United Nations expert monitoring sanctions against al-Qaeda, warned during a meeting of the UN Security Council’s counter-terrorism committee that kidnapping for ransom by ISIL and other terrorist groups continues to grow.

She added that terrorist groups have received an estimated $120 million in ransoms between 2004 and 2012.

Lalji said terrorist groups operating in the Middle East, Asia and Africa have made kidnapping “the core al-Qaeda tactic for generating revenue.”

The ISIL has executed several Western nationals including three Americans held hostage by the terrorists in Iraq and Syria. A young American woman remains captive.

Many governments do pay ransom to release their nationals kidnapped by terrorist groups. However, the US says it will not change its position against paying ransom for American hostages.

Original article

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India Must Adjust To The Rise Of China – Analysis

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By Manoj Joshi

The decision to invite US President Barack Obama to be the chief guest at the 66th Republic Day marks out in the clearest terms Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s strategic outlook. Having personally had to deal with the Chumur episode during the visit of Chinese president Xi Jinping in September, Modi is familiar with just how the assertive leader of China is seeking to redraw the geopolitical landscape of Asia.

In the past year, we have seen Beijing make inroads into Sri Lanka and witnessed our old ally Russia drifting into the Chinese camp. We have also seen the PLA Navy’s forays into the Indian Ocean region which are barely concealed by the mask of anti-piracy operations.

This is not a new development, but has intensified since 2010 as Xi jockeyed for power in Beijing. But now backed by the modernised PLA and the huge cash reserves accumulated by the economy, China is seeking to expand its economic and political universe.

In the past months, China has set out its ambitions through the establishment of the New Development or BRICS Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and committing more than $40 billion to create transportation linkages under the aegis of its Silk Route initiative. Speaking at the BRICS CEO’s meeting, earlier in November, Xi’s message to the world was that in the next five years China would import goods worth $10 trillion, send outward direct investments worth $1.2 trillion, and also send out 500 million tourists.

All this was part of a more ambitious scheme for a Free Trade Area Asia Pacific (FTAAP) which China got the 21-member APEC to endorse. Economists say that the FTAAP could provide a substantial boost to world trade as compared to the two regional trade pacts that are presently under prolonged negotiation the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional Economic Cooperation Partnership (RCEP).

What we are witnessing is the third surge of the Chinese economy, one aimed at even closer integration of the Asian economies, with much clearer Chinese leadership. In a range of area China seeks to move from being a low-cost manufacturer to a producer of Chinese-designed and made goods.

The other leg of this advance is political. China insists in asserting its maritime claims in Asia, even while seeking to draw it into a close economic embrace. However, in human affairs, it is well known that national pride is often a greater concern than a desire for economic benefit. As a result, many Asian countries are bandwagoning with the United States in its military “rebalance” to the region.

In the face off between China and the US, we see features of competition and cooperation. This was manifested by the FTAAP, as well as three important bilateral agreements signed in Beijing between the US and China at the sidelines of the APEC summit. The first was a bilateral agreement on climate change which could have the effect of driving the negotiations for a global climate deal. The two other military agreements that are still under negotiations that seek to manage their military competition.

But the big Chinese achievement which also played itself out on the sidelines of the APEC summit was the four-point agreement between China and Japan that enabled the Xi Jinping and Shinzo Abe to have a short, but significant summit.

In the agreement, Japan accepted the need for “facing history squarely and looking forward to the future” short-hand for its horrific wartime role in China. Further, it acknowledged that the two parties “had different views” about the issue of the Senkaku/Diayou islands. Japan may not quite have accepted that there is a dispute over the status of the islands, but it has come close to it.

What do all these developments mean for India ? First, after a period of rising tensions, countries like the US and Japan are seeking to reset their ties with a rising China. Even while standing up to China, their approach seeks to accommodate it as well. All three are densely connected with each other through trade and economic ties and are aware of the consequences of a breakdown.

Second, China is benchmarking itself against the United States. While its “new type of great power relations” seeks a non-confrontational and cooperative relationship with the US, it is bent on getting the US to accept it as an equal stake-holder in the Asia Pacific; in future, of course, it may seek to supplant it.

India’s best course is the one that Prime Minister Modi is setting. This seeks to position India as a “swing state”. On one hand, India has joined the New Development Bank, the AIIB and resisted American-led efforts to condemn Russia over Ukraine. On the other, it is actively wooing the US and its allies, Japan and Australia, in the Asia Pacific region.

This is also a prudent course, both the US and Japan, which have much denser relations with China are adjusting to the rise of China in a similar way competition and cooperation there is no reason why New Delhi should not. Yet, at a broad level, in the area of trade, finance, maritime security, non-proliferation and human rights, India remains broadly aligned with the western countries.

India has some sympathy with China’s demand for a more equitable world order. But is also aware that Beijing, in turn, is not particularly sympathetic to India’s demand for a membership in bodies like the Nuclear Suppliers Group or the UN Security Council. India remains deeply distrustful of Beijing because of the Sino-Indian border dispute, its relationship with Pakistan and its competitive efforts to displace India in its own backyard, the South Asian region and its new activities in the Indian Ocean region.

(The writer is a Distinguished Fellow at Observer Research Foundation, Delhi)

Courtesy : www.mid-day.com

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With Hagel Out, Past Contenders Eyed As Next US Defense Chief

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By Luke Johnson

(RFE/RL) — U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel’s abrupt announcement of his resignation on November 24 leaves a top cabinet position open in U.S. President Barack Obama’s administration and early speculation suggests that candidates previously considered for the job could be tapped to lead the Pentagon.

The possible successors to Hagel, who Obama said will stay on until a replacement is confirmed by the Senate, include U.S. Senator Jack Reed (Democrat-Rhode Island), former Deputy Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, and former Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, “The New York Times” quoted Obama administration officials as saying.

All three have been considered for the job before at various points under the Obama administration, according to numerous U.S. media reports.

Here is a rundown on each of them.

Michele Flournoy

Flournoy was passed over for Hagel in 2012. She said she left the administration at the end of 2011 to “rebalance” her life and spend more time with her family. She returned to lead the Center for a New American Security, a Washington think tank she co-founded. Several of the organization’s experts have been hired to work in the Obama administration.

While at the Pentagon, Flournoy helped formulate a counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan for the White House, a strategy that the Obama administration officially moved away from after her departure. If nominated and confirmed, she would be the first female secretary of defense in U.S. history.

Ashton Carter

Carter served as deputy secretary of defense, the No. 2 position in the Defense Department, from 2011 to 2013 and also as assistant secretary of defense for international security policy under President Bill Clinton. He was also passed over in favor of Hagel in 2012. Carter has been a longtime professor at Harvard University and served as an adviser to the investment bank Goldman Sachs and to Global Technology Partners, which advises investment firms on the technology and defense industries.

Jack Reed

A U.S. senator since 1997 and the outgoing chairman of the Armed Services Committee, Reed has already said he is not interested in the job.

“He has made it very clear that he does not wish to be considered for secretary of defense or any other cabinet position,” his spokesman, Chip Unruh, said in a statement. “He just asked the people of Rhode Island to hire him for another six-year term and plans on honoring that commitment.”

Reed won reelection for another six-year term in November. Leaving to become secretary of defense would mean leaving his seat for a job that lasts about two years, though it is possible that the next Pentagon chief could be renominated by the next U.S. president in 2016.

Reed was one of 23 senators to vote against authorization for the Iraq war in 2002.

He has generally been a solid, if low-key, backer of the Obama administration. In September, he released a statement praising Obama for his strategy to combat Islamic State militants.

Influence On Strategy

Flournoy and Carter both served in the Defense Department when relations were tense with the Obama administration, says Gordon Adams, a professor at American University.

“I think it’s pretty clear that Michele Flournoy and Ash Carter both argued inside the administration, when they were in senior positions in the Defense Department, for more resources and, in some cases, tougher foreign policy stances than the White House wanted to do,” Adams says.

Hagel’s other potential successors include current Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Work and Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus, according to U.S. media reports.

While the Pentagon job may be one of Obama’s remaining few top appointments, Michael Cohen, a fellow at the Century Foundation who worked in the State Department under President Clinton, notes that decision-making on foreign policy largely rests with the White House.

“They’ll listen to what cabinet secretaries have to say, but ultimately they’re the ones making the decision,” Cohen said. “I don’t think Hagel had much influence on strategic decision-making inside the White House, and I seriously doubt that the next secretary of defense would have much to input either.”

Hagel’s own exit follows a reported disagreement with national security adviser Susan Rice over the White House’s Syria strategy. Hagel also had tense relations with Obama’s close advisers and former election campaign members, “The New York Times” reported.

The post With Hagel Out, Past Contenders Eyed As Next US Defense Chief appeared first on Eurasia Review.

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